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This	  thesis	  considers	  how	  we	  conceptualize	  the	  meaning	  of	  state	  failure	  with	  reference	  to	  specific	  
so-­‐called	  failed	  states.	  The	  term	  implies	  certain	  prescriptions	  in	  an	  era	  of	  nation-­‐building	  projects,	  
and	   as	   such	   imposes	   certain	   identity	   aspects	   on	   any	   state	   labeled	   as	   failed.	   Yet	   the	   specific	  
histories,	  experiences	  and	  political	  culture	  of	  those	  states	  must	  also	  have	  meaning	  –	  not	  only	   in	  
understanding	  how	  the	  current	  conditions	  came	  to	  be	  but	  also	  in	  understanding	  how	  and	  why	  we	  
are	  able	  to	  talk	  and	  think	  about	  that	  state	  in	  whatever	  particular	  ways	  we	  do.	  The	  importance	  in	  
this	  is	  that	  much	  of	  the	  academic	  and	  policy	  conversation	  around	  state	  failure	  takes	  into	  account	  
the	  former,	  but	  not	  the	  latter.	  
Accordingly,	  this	  project	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  Afghanistan.	  This	  country	  is	  largely	  seen	  
as	  a	  very	  straight-­‐forward	  example	  of	  classic	  state	  failure.	  Yet	  it	  displays	  attributes	  which	  are	  quite	  
different	   from	   many	   of	   those	   often	   assumed	   in	   both	   liberal	   and	   critical	   scholarly	   literature.	  
Further,	  Afghanistan	  has	  a	  long	  history	  of	  interaction	  with	  the	  West,	  which	  this	  thesis	  analyses	  in	  
episodic	  detail	  by	  way	  of	  critical	  discourse	  analysis.	  	  
Analysis	  is	  leveled	  on	  narratives	  and	  discourse	  on	  Afghanistan	  through	  five	  historic	  encounters	  –	  
the	   First,	   Second	   and	   Third	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  wars,	  USSR-­‐US	   competition	   in	  Afghanistan	  during	   the	  
Cold	  War,	   and	   the	  post-­‐September	   11	   intervention.	   This	   analysis	   suggests	   that	  Afghanistan	  has	  
been	  assigned	  a	  certain	  indeterminacy	  in	  its	  character	  through	  the	  course	  of	  those	  interactions	  to	  
the	  extent	  that	  assumptions	  of	  statehood	  which	  necessarily	  predate	  state	  failure	  are	  problematic.	  	  
This	  project	  contributes	  to	  academic	  knowledge	  by	  bringing	  a	  careful	  deconstructive	  treatment	  to	  
the	  notion	  of	  “state	  failure”.	  Through	  the	  recognition	  of	  binaries	  underpinning	  the	  narratives	  on	  
Afghanistan	   specifically	   and	   its	   place	   as	   a	   “failed	   state”	   generally,	   this	   thesis	   seeks	   to	   disrupt	  
certain	  “settled”	  knowledges	  about	  state	  failure	  too	  often	  taken	  for	  granted	  in	  liberal	  and	  critical	  
approaches	  to	  state	  failure	  alike.	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Introduction  –  There   is   no  Afghanistan?  
	   	  
Afghanistan	  today	  is	  widely	  considered	  the	  epitome	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  failed	  state.	  
A	  perennial	   top-­‐10	  place	  holder	  at	   the	  Foreign	  Policy	  /	  Carnegie	  Fund	   for	  Peace	  annual	  “Fragile	  
States	   Index”	   (outside	   of	   the	   list’s	   first	   year,	   where	   Afghanistan	   placed	   11th),	   Afghanistan	   is	  
probably	   the	   highest	   profile	   U.S.	   intervention	   since	   Vietnam	   and	   is	   now	   beginning	   to	   pose	  
quandaries	  for	  a	  third	  U.S.	  Presidential	  administration.	  	  
Yet	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  failed	  state	  is	  not	  immediately	  clear.	  What	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  state	  
failure?	   What	   does	   it	   mean	   to	   be	   a	   failed	   state?	   A	   common	   approach	   to	   answering	   these	  
questions	   has	   been	   to	   diagnose	   political	   and	   economic	   dysfunctions	   within	   the	   state	   which	  
purportedly	  led	  to	  collapse.	  Accordingly,	  categories	  and	  severities	  of	  failure	  abound	  in	  literature.	  
Yet	  it	  has	  become	  increasingly	  clear	  through	  interaction	  with	  theoretical	  and	  policy	  literature	  that	  
there	  are	  deep	  underlying	  issues	  within	  the	  narratives	  and	  empowering	  truth/knowledge	  regimes	  
underlying	  the	  diagnostic	  and	  evaluative	  discourse.	  
A	   core	   issue	   is	   the	   term	   “failed	   state”	   itself.	   Rather	   than	   being	   definitive	   in	   itself,	   it	   is	  
rather	  descriptive	  –	  describing	  a	  place	  that	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  state	  but	  for	  whatever	  reason	  is	  not	  
or	   cannot	   be.	   In	   practice,	   “failed	   state”	   is	   a	   term	   forming	   one	   half	   of	   a	   dichotomy	   (failed	   /	  
successful	  state)	  that	  is	  as	  much	  about	  defining	  success	  as	  it	  is	  about	  failure.	  It	  serves	  to	  highlight	  
the	   privileged	   status	   of	   successful,	   generally	   Western	   states	   allowing	   them	   to	   pursue	   certain	  
policies	   that	  affect	  other	  parts	  of	   the	  world.	  The	  sovereign	  power	  of	   these	  privileged	   (Western)	  
states	   is	   confirmed	   by	   way	   of	   focusing	   on	   the	   vacuum	   that	   purportedly	   exists	   in	   failed	   states	  
where	  their	  sovereignty	  ought	  to	  be.	  	  
In	   narrative	   usage,	   the	   failed/successful	   dichotomy	   is	   associated	   heavily	   with	  
illegitimate/legitimate,	  Oriental/Western,	   uncivilized/civilized,	   illiberal/liberal.	   Through	   historical	  
and	   contemporary	   association,	   the	  moral	   supremacy	   of	  Western	   statehood	   is	   emphasized	   and	  
interventionist	  projects	  in	  ‘failed’	  spaces	  made	  to	  seem	  not	  only	  justified	  but	  just.	  The	  power	  and	  
status	   differential	   between	   these	   kinds	   of	   states	   is	   not	   narrowed	   by	   seeing	   ‘failed	   states’	   as	  
developing	  into	  successful	  sovereign	  states;	  rather	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  exertion	  of	  Western	  power.	  
This	  exertion	   is	   further	  validated	  by	  a	  dampening	  effect	   that	  comes	  alongside	  the	   failed	  
label.	  Identification	  as	  a	  “failed	  state”	  marginalizes	  any	  possible	  specific	  identity	  of	  that	  so-­‐called	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failed	  state,	   in	  essence	  substituting	   itself	  as	   fully	   indicative	  of	   the	  character	  of	   that	  space.	  Thus,	  
Afghanistan	   is	  seen	  as	  a	  failed	  state	  and	  that	   is	  more	  or	   less	  all	   that	   it	   is.	  Any	  other	  attribute	  of	  
Afghanistan’s	  character	  is	  either	  invisible	  or	  infected	  by	  this	  label	  of	  failure.	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  
this	   state	   of	   affairs	   has	   come	   to	   be	   in	   Afghanistan	   is	   something	   which	   that	   can	   be	   better	  
understood	   through	   careful	   analysis	   of	   historical	   interventions	   on	   Afghanistan	   by	   the	   United	  
Kingdom	  and,	  more	  recently,	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
This	   thesis	   is	  one	  attempt	  at	   that	   careful	   analysis,	   considering	   five	  episodes	  of	  Western	  
interactions	  with	  and	  attendant	  perceptions	  of	  Afghanistan.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  consideration	  
it	   will	   be	   shown	   that	   perceptions	   of	   Afghanistan	   in	   these	   interactions	   have	   no	   real	   focus	   on	  
Afghanistan.	   No	   such	   thing	   as	   an	   Afghanistan	   is	   recognized	   as	   such	   –	   Afghanistan	   is	   not	   the	  
referent	  object	  even	  while	  it	  is	  the	  object	  of	  intervention.	  	  
Rather,	   Afghanistan	   is	   overlooked	   as	   perceptions	   of	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	   United	  
Kingdom	   are	   instead	   focused	   on	   American	   /	   British	   interests	   and	   generalized	   dichotomies	   that	  
make	   justifying	   that	   focus	   easier.	   Those	   dichotomies	   situate	   Afghanistan	   as	  
uncivilized/Oriental/savage/empty.	  That	  sense	  of	  emptiness,	  the	  indeterminate	  nature	  of	  Afghan	  
identity,	   makes	   it	   suitable	   as	   a	   space	   for	   certain	   geopolitical	   and/or	   ideological	   projects	   to	   be	  
carried	  out.	  Those	  terms,	  then,	  are	  in	  fact	  projects	  generated	  by	  Western	  interests.	  Afghanistan	  is	  
never	   considered	   in	   and	   of	   itself	   –	   rather	   it	   is	   a	   place	   that	   lacks	   substance	   from	   the	  Western	  
perspective	  and	  that	  insubstantiality	  is	  central	  to	  all	  of	  those	  interactions	  and	  the	  formulation	  of	  
strategic/ideological/security	  policies.	  	  
What	  we	  find	  through	  this	  consideration	  is	  that	  “failed	  state”	  as	  a	  label	   is	  only	  the	  most	  
recent	   in	  a	   long-­‐running	  series	  of	  dichotomous	  typifications.	   In	  each	  episode,	  these	  dichotomies	  
have	   purported	   to	   describe	   Afghan	   character	   accurately	   when	   in	   fact	   they	   create	   a	   certain	  
emptiness	   that	   seems	   to	  make	   legitimate	  Western	   interventions.	   This	   thesis	   intends	   to	   explore	  
the	   implications	   of	   this	   enforced	   emptiness	   of	   Afghan	   character,	   how	   it	   has	   justified	   particular	  
interventions	  on	  Afghanistan	  and	  what	  this	  means	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  state	  failure	  (and	  policies	  of	  
state	   saving	   /	   state	   saving	   from	   the	   privileged	   Western	   standpoint).	   That	   exploration	   will	   be	  





Deconstruction  and  Discourse  Analysis  
Explaining	  content	  
At	  its	  most	  boiled-­‐down	  form,	  this	  dissertation	  considers	  how	  Western	  interveners	  have	  
conceived	   of	   Afghanistan	   and	   what	   the	   implications	   of	   those	   conceptions	   might	   be.	   As	   such,	  
discourse	   analysis	   suggests	   itself	   as	   a	   natural	   analytical	   approach.	   There	   are	   positives	   and	  
negatives	  to	  the	  approach	  –	  both	  on	  its	  own	  and	  compared	  to	  other	  approaches	  –	  which	  will	  be	  
discussed	  later	  in	  this	  sub-­‐section.	  	  
Five	   episodes	   of	  Western	   intervention	   are	   analyzed:	   the	   first,	   second	   and	   third	   Anglo-­‐
Afghan	  wars;	  the	  USSR	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  (specifically	  the	  US	  response	  to	  same)	  during	  the	  
Cold	  War	   and	   the	   post-­‐September	   11	   intervention.	  While	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   narrative	  material	   is	  
available	  on	  the	  most	  recent	   intervention	  from	  a	  kaleidoscope	  of	  perspectives,	   this	  was	  not	  the	  
case	   for	   earlier	   interventions.	   Availability	   of	   narrative	   material	   necessarily	   informed	   both	  
analytical	   approach	   (documentary	   analysis)	   and	   content	   selection.	   In	   interests	   of	   creating	  
regularity	   in	   content	   selection,	   this	   project	   considers	   official	   government	   documentation	   and	  
articles	   published	   in	   major	   media	   outlets	   for	   substantive	   analysis.	   For	   purposes	   of	   historical	  
context	  -­‐	  an	  important	  consideration	  when	  tackling	  discourse	  analysis	  –	  other	  documents	  such	  as	  
commentary	   and	   memoirs	   are	   brought	   to	   bear.	   Despite	   this,	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   research	  
materials	  comprise	  of	  government	  documents	  and	  newspaper	  articles	  /	  editorials1	  
Official	   government	   documentation	   includes	   but	   is	   not	   limited	   to:	   parliamentary	   and	  
congressional	   proceedings,	   white	   papers,	   intelligence	   reports,	   speeches,	   official	   inter-­‐
departmental	   correspondence	  and	   treaties.	  Newspapers	  used	   include	  The	  Times,	  The	  New	  York	  
Times	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  The	  Guardian.	  These	  were	  chosen	  based	  on	  reach,	  amount	  of	  content	  
and	   a	   willingness	   to	   publish	   editorials	   from	   influential	   members	   of	   society	   across	   the	   political	  
spectrum.	  Another	  aspect	  of	  content	  selection	  had	  to	  do	  with	  availability	  –	  each	  of	  these	  sources	  
has	   a	   relatively	   easily	   navigable	   digital	   archive	   system.	  Other	   sources	   are	   at	   times	   used,	   but	   in	  
these	  cases	  content	  comprises	  such	  things	  as	  the	  publication	  of	  a	  Presidential	  speech	  or	  the	  text	  
body	  of	  a	  treaty.	  
Except	  in	  cases	  of	  providing	  historical	  context,	  only	  documents	  originating	  from	  within	  the	  
society	  of	  the	  intervening	  party	  are	  used.	  One	  of	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  project	  is	  to	  reveal	  ways	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Newspapers used are The Times, The New York Times, and to a lesser extent The Guardian. These were 
chosen based on a number of factors 
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which	  agency	  over	  the	  complexion	  of	  Afghan	  identity	  –	  and	  the	  articulation	  of	  that	  identity	  –	  have	  
been	   denied.	   As	   such	   one	  might	   ask	   legitimate	   questions	   over	   this	   decision.	   This	   decision	  was	  
come	  upon	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  One	  reason	  is	  content	  availability.	  Particularly	  during	  the	  19th	  
century	  there	  is	  a	  dearth	  of	  written	  material	  native	  to	  Afghanistan.	  What	  exists	  is	  largely	  related	  
to	   religion	   and	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent	   bureaucracy.	   This	   situation	   is	   somewhat	   improved	   coming	  
toward	  more	  contemporary	  times,	  but	  language,	  archiving	  and	  accessibility	  are	  still	  problematic.	  
Those	   problems	   might	   have	   been	   overcome,	   but	   ultimately	   it	   was	   decided	   not	   to	   make	   the	  
attempt.	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  this.	  Firstly,	  using	  discursive	  material	  from	  Afghanistan	  coming	  
from	   recent	   times	   (where	   it	   is	   more	   available)	   and	   not	   earlier	   encounters	   is	   methodologically	  
problematic.	   Secondly,	   attempting	   to	   take	   on	   difficult	   Afghan	   documentation	   would	  make	   this	  
project’s	   focus	   uncomfortably	   broad.	   After	   all,	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   project	   is	   essentially	   to	  
deconstruct	  Western	  narratives	  about	  Afghanistan,	  revealing	  their	  self-­‐referential	  nature	  and	  the	  
mechanisms	   by	  which	   the	   create	   a	  Western	   knowledge	   of	   Afghanistan	   as	   an	   empty	   place.	   The	  
purpose	  of	  this	  project	  is	  not	  to	  make	  clear	  Afghan	  self-­‐knowledge,	  but	  to	  show	  how	  any	  why	  any	  
possibility	  of	  a	  recognized	  Afghan	  voice	  about	  itself	  was	  made	  fundamentally	  impossible	  (to	  even	  
conceive).	   All	   West-­‐Afghan	   interactions	   which	   spurred	   the	   production	   of	   more	   documentary	  
materials	   were	   included	   with	   a	   distinct	   chapter.	   One	   interaction	   with	   less	   documentation	   was	  
considered	   but	   rejected	   for	   a	   chapter2.	   It	   was	   still	   included	   as	   a	   sub-­‐section	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	  
chapter	  as	  a	  way	  of	  helping	  to	  set	  context.	  
Interventions	  were	   identified	  based	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  documented	  discourse.	  That	   is	  
to	   say,	  any	  action	  by	  a	  “Western”	  power	   in	  or	  on	   the	  geographical	   space	  contemporarily	   called	  
Afghanistan,	   which	   saw	   discussion	   in	   either	   well-­‐circulated	   (and	   credible)	   media	   or	   within	  
governmental	   forums	  was	  analysed.	  Of	  all	   the	   interventions,	   the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  had	  the	  
smallest	  amount	  of	  discursive	  content	  available.	  There	  was	  very	  little	  popular	  media	  discussion	  of	  
the	  conflict	  and	  the	  bulk	  of	  government	  discourse	  came	  by	  way	  a	  set	  of	  cables.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  
actual	  documentary	  materials	  available	  a	  case	  could	  potentially	  have	  been	  made	  for	  excluding	  this	  
intervention.	   It	   was	   included	   on	   the	   strength	   of	   two	   considerations:	   it	   was	   Britain’s	   first	  
intervention	   in/on	   Afghanistan	   and	   analysis	   found	   that	   in	   many	   ways	   it	   set	   the	   “tone”	   and	  
understanding	  of	  Afghan	  character	  for	  later	  interventions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This refers to a set of U.S. diplomatic cables in the first half of the 20th century. These items internally 
discussed how to handle Afghan overtures of establishing formal diplomatic relations. The notion was 
eschewed by the U.S. for a few reasons – notably the relative insignificance of Afghanistan and a preference 
to deal with Afghanistan through British intermediaries, as a concession to British preferences. 
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Why	  discourse	  analysis?	  
This	  dissertation	  uses	  discourse	  analysis	  –	  or	  more	  properly	  critical	  discourse	  analysis	  –	  as	  
a	   tool	   for	  understanding	  how	  we	  understand	  and	   “know”	  Afghanistan	   in	   terms	  of	   state	   failure.	  	  
Critical	  discourse	  analysis	  holds	  that	  what	  we	  say	  and	  what	  we	  know	  –	  and	  thereby	  how	  we	  act	  –	  
are	   mutually	   constitutive.	   Thus,	   understanding	   how	   we’ve	   come	   to	   talk	   about	   Afghanistan	   in	  
particular	  ways	   through	  historical	   inquiry	  has	   the	  potential	   to	   tell	   us	   something	  different	  about	  
contemporary	  approaches	  to	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  failed	  state	  and	  security	  dilemma.	  	  
There	   have	   been	   numerous	   attempts	   to	   explain	   state	   failure	   as	   a	   phenomenon	   and	  
suggest	  policy	  goals	  and	  responses	  to	  the	  challenges	  therein.	  These	  are	  discussed	  in	  some	  detail	  in	  
Chapter	  2	  along	  with	  critiques	  of,	  broadly	  speaking,	  a	  number	  of	  liberal	  and	  critical	  approaches	  to	  
understanding	  state	  failure.	  In	  a	  very	  general	  sense,	  these	  critiques	  suggest	  that	  most	  analysis	  of	  
state	   failure	   situates	   any	   possible	   understanding	   of	   state	   failure	  within	   an	   already	  well-­‐defined	  
knowledge	  of	   the	  social	  world.	  Thus,	  once	  state	   failure	   is	  explained	  there	   is	  nothing	  particularly	  
unique	  or	  unexpected	  about	  it	  –	  there	  are	  mechanisms	  which	  cause	  it	  that	  are	  already	  known	  and	  
understood	  within	  the	  intellectual	  paradigm	  used.	  	  
At	   its	  core	  this	   is	  a	  problem	  of	  specificity	  versus	  generalized	  explanation.	  One	  thing	   this	  
dissertation	  seeks	  to	  prove	  is	  that	  while	  generalization	  is	  an	  unavoidable	  aspect	  of	  social	  inquiry	  it	  
has	  powerful	  negative	  effects.	  It	  marginalizes	  aspects	  of	  social	  phenomena	  which	  don’t	  fit	  within	  
generalized	  explanations	  –	  it	  makes	  them	  unheard	  and	  indecipherable.	  This	  is	  a	  problem	  of	  both	  
justice	  and	  pragmatism.	  Harm	  is	  done	  to	  the	  marginalized	  by	  a	  certain	  stripping	  away	  of	  agency.	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   relegating	   certain	   concepts	   or	   places	   to	   the	   margins,	   by	   rendering	   them	  
indecipherable,	  makes	  effective	  policymaking	  in	  those	  areas	  problematic	  at	  best.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  by	  
assuming	   knowledge	   we	   create	   blind	   spots	   in	   our	   knowledge.	   For	   this	   reason,	   disturbing	   the	  
generalized	   with	   the	   specific	   is	   not	   only	   a	   critical	   operation	   but	   a	   necessary	   and	   corrective	  
operation.	  	  
It	  is	  for	  this	  purpose	  that	  this	  dissertation	  turns	  to	  Derrida	  to	  inform	  its	  discourse	  analysis.	  
Other	  approaches	  have	  been	  suggested	  as	  plausible	  as	  well.	  From	  critical	  theory	  approaches	  such	  
as	  post-­‐colonial	   inquiry	  or	  neo-­‐Gramscianism	   (post-­‐Marxism)	  have	  been	  suggested.	  While	   these	  
approaches	  have	  something	  to	  offer,	  they	  were	  ultimately	  set	  aside	  in	  favour	  of	  Derrida.	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In	  the	  case	  of	  neo-­‐Gramscianism,	  the	  approach	  is	   interested	  in	  critical	  discourse	  analysis	  
and	  questions	  the	  centrality	  of	  certain	  static	  ideas	  of	  state-­‐ness.	  These	  are	  attractive	  aspects,	  but	  
the	  centrality	  of	  historical	  materialism	  to	  the	  approach	  seems	  counterproductive	  in	  this	  case.	  This	  
approach	   leads	   to	   questions	   of	   hegemony	   and	   a	   sort	   of	   neo-­‐imperialism	   that	   leads	   to	   staking	  
normative	   positions	   that	   are	   at	   the	   same	   time	   unconvincing	   and	   unhelpful	   to	   suggesting	  
constructive	  ways	  forward	  in	  Afghanistan.	  
Post-­‐colonialism	   is	   a	   somewhat	   trickier	   consideration.	   It	   is	   a	   very	   broad	   theoretical	  
approach	  –	  with	  many	  post-­‐colonial	  authors	  even	  mobilizing	  neo-­‐Gramscianism,	  for	  instance.	  This	  
approach	  is	  often	  concerned	  with	  discursive	  knowledges	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  identity	  of	  former	  
colonies	   –	   and	   how	   that	   informs	   current	   policy	   toward	   those	   spaces.	   In	   that	   sense,	   although	  
Afghanistan	  was	  never	  a	  colony	  this	  project	  is	  within	  or	  at	  least	  adjacent	  to	  post-­‐colonial	  theory.	  
Edward	  Said’s	  theoretical	  approach	  has	  a	  lot	  to	  suggest	  it	  and	  it	  would	  have	  been	  an	  appropriate	  
choice	  to	  inform	  this	  project.	  However,	  much	  of	  contemporary	  post-­‐colonialism	  is	  concerned	  with	  
economic	   /	  material	   inequities,	  North/South	   subjugation	  and	   repackaged	   colonial	   norms.	  While	  
these	  critiques	  raise	  important	  points	  and	  ask	  important	  questions,	  their	  underlying	  assumptions	  
are	   similarly	   inappropriate	   for	   this	   project.	   Finally,	   this	   project	   is	   less	   concerned	  with	   criticizing	  
specific	  assumptions	  about	  Afghanistan’s	  nature	  or	  character	  and	  more	  concerned	  with	  proving	  
the	   externally	   determined	   indeterminacy	   of	   Afghan	   character	   –	   and	   the	   dangers	   attendant	   to	  
assuming	  the	  correctness	  of	  that	  imposed	  episodic	  “knowledge”.	  	  
Addressing	  critiques	  
The	   use	   of	   discourse	   analysis	   –	   informed	   by	   Derrida’s	   deconstructive	   tactics	   –	   requires	  
some	   further	  explanation	   in	   terms	  of	   criticisms	  often	   leveled	  at	   such	  approaches.	  This	  project’s	  
analytical	  approach	  will	  be	  considered	  “postmodernism”	  by	  many	  academics,	  and	  that	  will	  be	  an	  
intentionally	   pejorative	   label.	   It	   is	   not	   a	   label	  which	   this	   author	  would	   claim	   –	   to	   be	   explained	  
shortly	  –	  but	  it	  is	  still	  a	  criticism	  which	  must	  be	  dealt	  with.	  
One	  potential	  difficulty	  is	  Quentin	  Skinner’s	  “mythology	  of	  doctrines”.	  Skinner	  described	  it	  
in	  this	  way:	  	  
I	   turn	  now	   to	   [an]	  of	   inadequacy	  which	  marks	   the	  method	  of	   concentrating	   instead	  on	   the	  
"idea"	   itself	  as	  a	  "unit,"	  and	  so	  of	  "tracking	  a	  grand	  but	  elusive	  theme"	  either	  throughout	  a	  
period,	   or	   even	   "over	   many	   centuries."	   The	   danger	   that	   such	   an	   approach	   may	   simply	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engender	   empirically	   false	   claims	   has	   already	   been	   skillfully	   pointed	   out	   for	   at	   least	   one	  
classic	   case	   of	   this	   tendency	   to	   find	  what	   has	   been	   called	   "spurious	   persistence.”	   (Skinner	  
1969:	  35)	  
Skinner’s	  mythology	  of	  doctrines	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  a	  strong	  warning	  for	  this	  project.	  After	  all,	  
this	  dissertation	   looks	  at	  five	  different	  historical	  cases	  of	   intervention,	  each	  with	   its	  own	  unique	  
historical	  context.	  It	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  assume	  a	  connection	  of	  certain	  core	  ideas	  from	  one	  episode	  
to	  the	  next	  and	  then	  simply	  craft	  analysis	  to	  justify	  that,	  spuriously.	  It	  is	  a	  well-­‐taken	  warning,	  and	  
this	  project	  does	   strive	   to	  avoid	   such	  a	  misadventure.	   In	   this	   case,	  discourse	  analysis	   takes	   into	  
account	   the	  very	  specific	  contexts	  of	   the	   times.	  Further,	  narrative	  discontinuities	  are	  drawn	  out	  
and	  talked	  about	  as	  much	  as	  any	  apparent	  continuities	  of	  ideas.	  While	  there	  does	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  
sense	  of	  borrowing	  on	  narratives	  from	  previous	  encounters	  to	  “know”	  Afghanistan	  in	  subsequent	  
interventions,	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  the	  case	  and	  is	  largely	  unprovable.	  There	  are	  times	  when	  
previous	   interventions	   are	   referred	   to	   as	   ways	   to	   understand	   Afghanistan,	   and	   those	   are	  
discussed,	  but	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	   this	  dissertation	  does	  not	   try	   to	  argue	  a	   specific	   and	  
continuous	   discourse	   on	   Afghan-­‐ness	   with	   one	   thing	   leading	   necessarily	   to	   the	   next.	   Here	   the	  
point	   in	   drawing	   out	   similarities	   revolves	   primarily	   around	   the	   way	   in	   which	   Afghanistan	   and	  
defined,	  redefined,	  forgotten	  and	  then	  re-­‐emergent	  suited	  to	  the	  particular	  and	  contextual	  needs	  
of	  the	  particular	  times	  in	  which	  interventions	  take	  place.	  This	  is	  about	  a	  historical	  and	  continuing	  
indeterminacy	   rather	   than	   a	   determined	   set	   of	   assumptions	   which	   are	   themselves	   totally	  
knowable	  and	  can	  explain	  our	  interactions	  with	  Afghanistan.	  It’s	  not	  about	  what	  we	  “know”	  about	  
Afghanistan	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  about	  how	  malleable	  and	  indeterminate	  those	  “knowledges”	  are,	  and	  
how	  our	  treatment	  of	  Afghanistan	  discursively	  makes	  that	  difficult	  to	  recognise.	  	  	  
One	   common	   theme	   in	   critiquing	   postmodern	   approaches	   is	   the	   so-­‐called	   “vow	   of	  
silence”.	  Deconstruction,	  it	  is	  said,	  is	  concerned	  with	  taking	  apart	  arguments	  exclusively…	  unable	  
to	  make	  authoritative	  statements	  because	  doing	  so	  would	  open	  the	  author	  up	  to	  the	  exact	  same	  
sort	   of	   critique	  which	   he	   or	   she	   has	   leveled	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Colin	  Hay	  makes	   a	   detailed	   case	  
against	   postmodernism	   and,	   considering	   his	   stature	   in	   the	   academic	   realm,	   answering	   his	  
critiques	  should	  be	  sufficient.	  
Hay	   argues	   that	   postmodernism	   is	   faced	   with	   tension	   between	   two	   foundations	   of	  
postmodern	   thought:	   epistemological	   skepticism	   and	   normative	   emancipatory	   positions.	   They	  
must	   either	   implicitly	   abandon	   their	   desire	  not	   to	   suppress	  otherness	   to	  practice	  emancipatory	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politics,	   or	   they	   must	   forgo	   their	   normative	   desires	   in	   favour	   of	   intellectual	   purity.	  	  
Postmodernism	  generally	   toward	   the	   latter,	   argues	  Hay.	   	   This	   is	   dangerous	   in	   that	   it	   ultimately	  
leads	   to	  a	   certain	   support	   for	  a	  negative	  “complicity	   in	   the	   status	  quo”	  brought	  on	  by	   this	   self-­‐
imposed	  silence.	  	  (Hay	  2002:	  246)	  
It	   is	   true	   that	   epistemological	   skepticism	   and	   normative	   emancipatory	   positions	   are	   at	  
some	  tension.	  Critical	  deconstruction	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  making	  strong	  knowledge	  claims	  –	  it	  is	  rather	  
the	  process	  of	  picking	  apart	  assumptions	  underpinning	  strong	  knowledge	  claims.	  Yet	  lauding	  this	  
as	  a	  damning	  critique	  of	  critical	  discourse	  analysis	   is	  an	  oversimplification	  and	  misunderstanding	  
of	   the	   aims	   of	   deconstructive	   practice.	   As	   argued	   by	   Lyotard	   (Lyotard	   1987:	   6)	   and	   at	   various	  
times	  Derrida3,	  the	  goal	  is	  not	  to	  produce	  perfect	  or	  even	  authoritative	  knowledge	  –	  postmodern	  
approaches	   hold	   that	   no	   such	   knowledge	   exists.	   Rather,	   the	   point	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   constructive	  
deconstruction	   –	   by	   bringing	   to	   light	   problematic	   assumptions	   within	   certain	   discourses	   on	  
knowledge	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  suggest	  improvements.	  Not	  perfections	  –	  improvements.	  
This	   is	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	   project.	   This	   project	  does	  not	   seek	   to	  make	  an	  authoritative	  
statement	   about	   where	   we’ve	   gotten	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   failed	   state	   (and	   how	   to	   fix	   it)	   wrong	  
followed	   by	   prescriptions	   to	   fix	   those	   things.	   The	   point	   is	   to	   bring	   to	   light	   difficulties	   in	   our	  
assumptions	  about	  Afghanistan	  and	  Afghan-­‐ness	  and	  suggest	  different	  ways	  to	  think	  which	  may	  
be	   both	  more	   productive	   and	  more	   just.	   The	   key	   terms	  here	   are	  more	   productive,	  more	   just	   –	  
rather	  than	  attempting	  to	  lay	  claim	  to	  findings	  that	  are	  the	  epitome	  of	  productiveness	  and	  justice.	  	  
It	   is	  the	  case	  that	  there	  are	  academics	  who	  have	  taken	  on	  epistemological	  skepticism	  as	  
an	  end	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  This	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  helpful	  in	  the	  broader	  field	  of	  political	  theory.	  It	  is	  
not,	  however,	  what	  this	  project	  is	  about	  –	  this	  project	  aims	  for	  constructive	  deconstruction	  with	  
an	  eye	  toward	  pragmatism.	  
Toward	   this	   end,	   the	   use	   of	   Derrida	   was	   deemed	   felicitous.	   Many	   would	   find	   this	  
counterintuitive,	   so	   it	   requires	   some	   explanation.	   Few	   would	   tend	   to	   think	   of	   Derrida	   as	   a	  
pragmatic	   scholar	   and	   there	   are	   those	  who	   find	   his	  work	   to	   be	   obtuse	   rather	   than	   revelatory.	  
There	  is	  some	  justification	  for	  these	  feelings	  but	  there	  are	  other	  considerations.	  Firstly,	  Derrida’s	  
later	   works	   take	   social	   problems/questions	   seriously	   –	   and	   he	   speaks	   convincingly	   on	   how	  
deconstruction	   can	   be	   used	   to	   this	   end.	   A	   central	   component	   to	   this	   is	   the	   concept	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See for instance Part 1 of Derrida 1992 where Derrida discusses deconstruction and its relation to justice – 
or deconstruction as justice… and justice as a pursuit rather than an attainable concept. 
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autoimmunity	   –	   the	   tension	  within	   an	   idea	   construct	   that	   causes	   it	   to	   break	   down	   (or	   go	   into	  
discursive	  crises)	  when	  dominant	  discourses	  attempt	  to	  assume	  a	  single,	  concrete,	  authoritative	  
(and	   unchanging)	   definition.	   (Derrida	   2005)	   This	   is	   a	   specific	   take	   on	   the	   problem	   of	  
epistemological	   skepticism	   versus	   normative	   position-­‐taking,	   and	   his	   take	   on	   the	   notion	   of	   a	  
democracy	  (to	  come)	  suggests	  a	  way	  to	  look	  for	  constructive	  progress	  while	  being	  sensitive	  to	  the	  
problems	  of	  staking	  a	  static	  normative	  position.	  Further,	  Derrida	  has	  written	  extensively	  around	  
the	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  its	  internal	  tensions	  (Derrida	  2005,	  Derrida	  2009)	  and	  these	  works	  
were	  instrumental	  to	  shaping	  this	  project’s	  argumentation.	  	  
This	   project	   is	   in	   part	   demonstrative.	   Through	   discourse	   analysis	   it	   shows	   that	   what	   is	  
(believed	   to	  be)	   “known”	  about	  Afghanistan	   is	   formed	  by	  a	   string	  of	  often	  discordant	  historical	  
narratives.	   Those	   narratives	   rely	   on	   certain	   tropes	   and	   binary	   conceptualizations	  which	   contain	  
internal	   inconsistencies	  and	  tensions.	  Our	  contemporary	  knowledge	  about	  Afghanistan	  relies	  on	  
stories	   which	   are	   at	   odds	   with	   themselves,	   self-­‐destructive	   and	   internally	   contradictory.	   It	   has	  
worked	   in	   large	   part	   because	   Afghanistan	   is	   not	   seen	   as	   having	   a	   character	   of	   its	   own.	   The	  
referent	   object	   of	   these	   stories	   is	   rather	   the	  Western	   intervener,	   be	   it	   England	   or	   the	   United	  
States.	   Stories	   told	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   Afghan	   identity	   in	   each	   intervention	   helps	   to	   reinforce	  
certain	   knowledges	   about	   the	   valorous	   character	   of	   the	   intervener	   rather	   than	   reflecting	  
interaction	  with	  characteristics	  of	  Afghanistan	  itself	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  find	  productive	  solutions	  
to	   real	   issues	   of	   the	   time.	   This	   is	  more	   easily	   seen	  by	  way	  of	   situating	   the	   interventions	   in	   the	  
context	   of	   their	   given	   times	   –	   so	   we	   can	   see	   how	   Afghanistan’s	   “traits”	   are	   articulated	   with	  
reference	  to	  the	  tactical	  and	  discursive	  needs	  of	  the	  geopolitical	  context	  of	  the	  time	  rather	  than	  
anything	   specific	   to	   the	   Afghan	   experience	   in	   itself.	   Discourse	   analysis	   and	   deconstruction	   are	  
most	  suited	  to	  this	  task.	  
As	  an	  example,	  one	  might	  consider	  the	  terms	  “barbarian”	  and	  “savage”.	  In	  contemporary	  
usage	   these	   are	   for	   the	   most	   part	   functionally	   synonyms,	   with	   “savage”	   generally	   being	  
understood	  to	  be	  a	  somewhat	  more	  insulting	  label.	  	  In	  19th	  century	  Britain,	  the	  words	  had	  related	  
but	  distinct	  meanings.	  Contemporarily	  an	  historically,	  the	  labels	  have	  “civilized”	  as	  their	  referent	  
counterpoint.	  In	  19th	  century	  Britain,	  “barbaric”	  and	  “savage”	  had	  functionally	  distinct	  meanings,	  
with	   “barbaric”	   referring	   to	   social	   groups	   with	  many	   aspects	   of	   civilization	   but	   in	   a	   crude	   and	  
underdeveloped	  sense.	  Thus,	  India	  was	  barbaric.	  “Savage”	  would	  refer	  to	  social	  groups	  which	  had	  
no	  understanding	  or	  experience	  of	  anything	   like	  civilization	  whatsoever	  –	   tribal	  groups	   in	  Africa	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which	   had	   neither	   developed	   cities	   and	   urban	   government	   nor	   been	   ushered	   into	   these	   things	  
through	  colonization	  were	  savages.	  
Afghanistan	  and	  Afghans	  were	  typified	  by	  one,	  the	  other,	  or	  both	  in	  turns	  (and	  sometimes	  
simultaneously).	   This	   speaks	   to	   a	   certain	   uncertainty	   about	   the	   character	   of	   Afghanistan	   and	  
Afghans	  which	  arises	  again	  and	  again	  in	  this	  study.	  This	  is	  in	  turn	  indicative	  of	  a	  broader	  tendency	  
identified	  by	   this	  dissertation	  –	   an	   indeterminacy	  of	  Afghan	   character	  both	  empowered	  by	   and	  
empowering	   a	   lack	   of	   engagement	   with	   Afghan-­‐ness	   from	   a	  Western	   perspective	   in	   favour	   of	  
positioning	  Afghanistan	  in	  relation	  to	  Western	  valour.4	  
Project  Questions  
This	  thesis	  posits	  three	  questions.	  
Why	  are	  we	  able	  to	  talk	  about	  failed	  states?	  
Others	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  discursive	  act	  of	   labeling	  outlier	  states	  as	  ‘rogue’	  due	  to	  an	  
apparent	   refusal	   to	   integrate	   into	   the	   international	   (liberal)	   community	   of	   states	   retroactively	  
brings	  about	  a	  certain	  rogue-­‐ness	   in	  the	  labeler.	  (Derrida	  2005,	  2009)5	  These	  arguments	  suggest	  
ways	   in	   which	   we	   can	   imagine	   that	   the	   loss	   of	   sovereignty	   implied	   in	   the	   label	   of	   ‘failure’	  
introduces	  a	  crisis	  in	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  success.	  Sovereignty	  and	  statehood,	  then,	  
are	   very	   susceptible	   to	   a	   certain	   self-­‐destructiveness	   (auto-­‐immune	  dysfunction)	   if	   not	   handled	  
carefully.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  interventions	  and	  state-­‐building,	  intervening	  upon	  a	  “failed	  state”	  in	  order	  
to	   rebuild	   it	  with	  a	  particular	   conception	  of	  how	   sovereignty	   should	   look	   is	   at	   tension	  with	   the	  
notion	   of	   sovereign	   self-­‐determination.	   Whether	   the	   intervention	   itself	   is	   justifiable	   on	  
humanitarian	   grounds	   is	   not	   at	   issue.	   Rather,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   we	   talk	   about	   failed	   states	   as	  
needing	  to	  be	  intervened	  on	  and	  fixed	  in	  a	  very	  particular	  way	  is	  destructive	  to	  the	  fundamental	  
concept	  of	  sovereignty	  in	  itself.	  	  
This	   is	   particularly	   difficult	   in	   that	   narratives	   on	   liberal	   statehood	   seem	   to	   offer	   little	  
choice	   but	   to	   talk	   about	   failed	   statehood.	   Understandings	   of	   successful,	   “functional	   statehood	  
seem	  almost	  to	  demand	  a	  certain	  differentiation	  from	  outliers.	  “Good”	  states	  are	  defined	  in	  some	  
aspects	   by	  what	   they	   are	   not	   –	   they	   are	   not	   these	   “failed”	   states.	   	   In	   the	   liberal	   state	   system	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Afghanistan is referred to in terms of savagery and barbarism. For examples, see: Low (1878) and Times 
(1871, 1872, 1877, 1878a and 1878b) 
5 The act of labeling a state as ‘rogue’ strips away the justness of its sovereign power, suggesting its power is 
wielded illegitimately. However, the notion of sovereignty is conceptually sacrosanct and doing violence to 
the notion of another state’s sovereignty is in itself a fundamentally illegitimate use of sovereign power. 
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narrative,	  successful	  statehood	  is	  assumed	  to	  occur	  naturally	  if	  a	  state	  plays	  by	  the	  rules,	  adopting	  
particular	  models	  of	  democracy	  and	  capitalism.	  	  
This	   both	   justifies	   patterns	   of	   social	   relations	  within	   the	   ‘international	   community’	   and	  
gives	   grounds	   to	   explain	   how	   and	  why	   some	   states	   face	   dramatic	   internal	   crises.	   States	   facing	  
these	  crises	  are	  ultimately	  at	  fault	  for	  their	  problems	  because	  they	  failed	  to	  follow	  this	  well	  laid-­‐
out	  roadmap	  to	  success.	  To	  understand	  our	  social	  world,	  we’ve	  settled	   into	  particular	  dominant	  
narratives	  of	   intelligibility	  which	  refer	   to	  assumed	  underlying	   ‘truths’	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  states	  
and	   interstate	  relations	   in	  order	  to	  make	   it	   intelligible	  and	  allow	  us	  to	  make	   informed	  decisions	  
about	  the	  confusing	  world	  around	  us.	  
What	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   ‘known’	   about	   Afghanistan	   and	   how	   do	   those	   knowledges	  
empower	  dominant	  narratives	  of	  intelligibility?	  
	  This	  question	  appears	   to	  be	   largely	  descriptive,	  being	   filled	   in	  with	  particular	   character	  
traits	   of	   the	  Afghan	  polity.	   Initially	   that	   is	   how	   this	   project	  moved	   forward.	  Over	   the	   course	   of	  
analysis,	  however,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  all	  the	  various	  ‘knowledges’	  about	  Afghanistan	  that	  were	  
assumed	  to	  encapsulate	  its	  character	  shared	  an	  important	  discursive	  touchstone.	  Afghanistan	  has	  
always	  been	   situated	   in	  Western	   interactions	  as	   an	   indeterminate	   space,	   empty	  of	  particularity	  
and	   importance	  on	   its	  own.	   In	  different	   interventions	  Afghanistan	  was	   typified	   in	  very	  different	  
ways	   –	   though	   some	   threads	   of	   continuity	   are	   shown	   to	   exist	   in	   this	   project’s	   analysis.	   Those	  
threads	   of	   continuity	   consistently	   point	   to	   Afghanistan’s	   assumed	   emptiness,	   as	   a	   space	  which	  
could	  be	  defined	  and	  redefined	  at	  each	  interaction	  to	  fit	  comfortably	  within	  the	  dominant,	  West-­‐
focused	  narrative	  of	  intelligibility.	  	  
Within	   discourses	   of	   successful	   statehood,	   state	   failure	   and	   the	   security	   concerns	   /	  
humanitarian	   crises	   in	   the	   contemporary	   context	   of	   a	   Global	   War	   on	   Terror,	   Afghanistan’s	  
indeterminacy	   enables	   very	   specific	   –	   and	   self-­‐destructive	   –	   conceptions	   of	   sovereignty	   to	   be	  
mobilized.	   Afghanistan	   identity	   is	   (re)constructed	   utilizing	   empty	   signifiers	   of	   Afghan	   character	  
which,	   at	   the	   times	   they	   were	   used,	   were	   little	   more	   than	   ways	   of	   defining	   the	   intervener	   as	  
justified	  and	  valorous	  while	  having	  little	  to	  do	  with	  Afghanistan	  itself.	  	  
How	  do	  dominant	  assumptions	  about	  sovereignty	  and	  successful	  statehood	  by	  intervening	  
parties	  limit	  attempts	  to	  understand	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  Afghanistan	  crisis?	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These	  assumptions	  are	  by	   their	  nature	  generalized,	   intended	  to	  be	  applicable	  with	   little	  
regard	  to	  context.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  statehood	  and	  sovereignty	  are	  assumed	  to	  have	  a	  natural,	  static	  
state.	  Assumptions	  about	   the	  nature	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  statehood	  are	   foundational	   to	  how	  the	  
international	   community	   and	   norms	   of	   intervention,	   success	   and	   failure	   are	   situated.	   These	   in	  
some	  way	  form	  the	  bedrock	  on	  which	  orthodox	  analyses	  of	  various	  geopolitical	  situations	  rest.	  	  
These	   static	   assumptions	   about	   the	   (natural)	   nature	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   statehood	  may	  
become	  problematic	  when	  held	  up	   to	   individual	  political	   events.	  When	   specific	   situations	   are	   a	  
challenge	   to	   orthodox	   knowledges	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   social	  world,	   that	   orthodoxy	  would	  
need	  to	  adjust	  to	  or	  marginalize	  these	  new	  specificities.	  What	  we	  find	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Afghanistan	  is	  
that	   any	  possible	   attempt	   to	  understand	   the	  unique	  nature	  of	  Afghan	  political	   character	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  various	   interventions	   in	  Afghanistan	  over	  the	  years	   is	  silenced.	  This	  marginalization	  is	  
accomplished	   through	   the	   use	   of	   binary	   oppositions	   in	  which	   Afghanistan	   is	   assigned	   a	   certain	  
indeterminacy,	   made	   empty.	   This	   serves	   to	   reinforce	   those	   orthodox,	   largely	   static	   notions	   of	  
successful	  statehood	  and	  just	  sovereignty.	  	  
Mobilizing  the  Project  Questions  
This	  project	  critiques	  orthodox	  assumptions	  of	   sovereignty	  which	  cast	   it	  as	  a	   stable	  and	  
naturalized	   construct.	   It	   calls	   to	  account	  assumptions	   that	   failed	   states	  occur	  only	  because	  of	   a	  
sovereign	   state’s	   failure	   to	   maintain	   its	   sovereign	   power/responsibility.	   Other	   critical	   accounts	  
make	   similar	   critiques,	   but	  may	   inadvertently	   reproduce	   certain	   orthodox	   assumptions	   in	   cases	  
where,	   as	   in	   Afghanistan,	   sovereignty	   proper	   cannot	  meaningfully	   be	   understood	   to	   have	   ever	  
resided.	   It	   is	  critical	   to	  expose	  the	  very	  particular	   journey	  that	  Afghanistan	  took	  to	  “statehood”,	  
wherein	   it	   was	   formally	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   state	   but	   informally	   “known”	   to	   not	   hold	   true	  
sovereignty.	   This	   deconstructive	   undertaking	   shows	   that	   narratives	   and	   interventions	   on	  
Afghanistan	  across	  time	  have	  denied	  Afghanistan	  even	  the	  possibility	  of	  sovereignty.	  Further,	  the	  
language	  which	  is	  used	  to	  “know”	  Afghanistan	  –	  in	  orthodox	  and	  critical	  accounts	  alike	  –	  ignores	  
this	   historical	   specificity	   and	   thus	   effectively	   erases	   it,	   further	   reinforcing	   Afghanistan’s	  
indeterminate	  “nature”.	  
This	   assumption	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   indeterminacy	   recurs	   in	   each	   intervention	   from	   a	  
Western	   power	   since	   at	   least	   the	   early	   19th	   century.	   Again	   and	   again,	   specifications	   of	   Afghan	  
character	   are	   made	   in	   ways	   which	   justify	   that	  Western	   intervention	   –	   in	   the	   particularly	   geo-­‐
political	  context	  of	  the	  time	  –	  and	  in	  ways	  which	  reinforce	  a	  particular	  and	  valorous	  depiction	  of	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the	   intervener.	   In	   this	   way,	   Afghanistan’s	   assigned	   character	   traits	   are	   distorted	   reflections	   of	  
what	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  dominant	  Western	  character	  traits.	  Over	  time	  this	  has	  brought	  into	  being	  a	  
number	  of	  narrative	  binaries	  which	  situate	  a	  malleable	  and	  changing	  (indeterminate)	  Afghanistan	  
persona	  as	  definable	  only	   in	  terms	  of	  what	   it	  was	  not.	  And	  what	   is	  was	  not,	   in	  these	  cases,	  was	  
something	  cast	  as	  quintessentially	  Western.	  
One	   way	   to	   give	   space	   for	   understanding	   the	   highly	   specific	   history	   and	   character	   of	  
Afghanistan	   is	   to	   disrupt	   naturalized	   knowledges	   about	   sovereignty	   by	   which	   Afghanistan	   is	  
depicted	  in	  the	  failed	  state	  discourse.	  Recurring	  and	  repressive	  understandings	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  
essentially	  empty	  are	  reinforced	  by	  the	  naturalization	  of	  these	  dominant	  notions	  of	  sovereignty.	  
In	  this	  way,	  Afghanistan	  is	  made	  faceless	  by	  the	  face	  –	  stripped	  of	  any	  possible	  identity	  by	  being	  
forcibly	  identified	  by	  signifiers	  that	  are	  ultimately	  intended	  to	  reinforce	  certain	  knowledges	  of	  the	  
West.	  This	  disruption	  will	  be	  carried	  out	  through	  discourse	  analysis,	  along	  with	  the	  identification	  
(and	  deconstruction)	  of	  binary	  oppositions	  within	  those	  narratives.	  
Narrative  Analysis  and  Binary  Oppositions  
This	   thesis	   disrupts	   the	   idea	   of	   that	   staticity	   by	   demonstrating	   how	   any	   possibility	   of	  
understanding	  events	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  subverted	  by	  use	  of	  these	  binary	  narrative	  constructs.	  In	  
doing	  so,	  this	  project	  seeks	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  certain	  self-­‐destructiveness	  in	  how	  dominant	  norms	  
and	   terms	   are	   mobilized	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   justify	   orthodox	   approaches	   to	   state	   building	   and	  
interventionism.	  Because	  notions	  of	  sovereignty	  are	  stabilized	  by	  holding	  them	  up	  in	  reference	  to	  
a	   false	   identity	   construct	   (empty,	   indeterminate	  Afghanistan),	   this	   particular	   type	  of	   straw-­‐man	  
justification	   in	   fact	   subverts	   the	  possible	  usefulness	  of	   sovereignty	  as	  a	  concept,	  undermining	   it	  
and	  making	  it	  actively	  harmful	  to	  productive	  international	  security	  policy.	  
Accordingly,	   this	   project	   critically	   analyzes	   and	   deconstructs	   (non)perceptions	   of	  
Afghanistan	   in	   interactions	   between	   the	  United	   Kingdom	   /	  United	   States	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	  
Afghanistan	  on	  the	  other.	  Five	  separate	  interventions	  are	  analyzed	  –	  three	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  wars,	  US	  
actions	  during	  the	  Soviet	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan,	  and	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  intervention.	  In	  so	  doing,	  this	  
thesis	  reviews	  those	  relations	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  number	  of	  binaries:	  
Continuity/discontinuity.	  	  	  Manners	  of	  perceiving	  Afghanistan	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  last	  
180	  years	  have	  in	  many	  ways	  not	  changed	  significantly.	  Certain	  aspects	  of	  narratives	  on	  Afghan-­‐
ness	   remain	   quite	   continuous.	   Simultaneously	   there	   are	   ruptures	   in	   those	   narratives,	  
discontinuities	   that	   can	   threaten	   the	   stability	   (staticity)	   of	   dominant	  discourses	  on	  Afghanistan.	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Continuities	   such	   as	   the	   indeterminacy	   of	   Afghan	   character,	   a	   certain	   savagery	   attributed	   to	  
Afghanistan,	   the	   centrality	   of	   external	   ideological	   conflict	   and	   underlying	   Orientalist	   tropes	   all	  
suggest	   that	   there	   are	   fundamental	   similarities	   between	   how	  Afghanistan	   is	   understood	   in	   the	  
contemporary	  age	  of	   state	  building/saving	  with	   the	   former	  era	  of	   colonial	   subjugation.	   Further,	  
despite	  being	  physically	  intervened	  upon	  Afghanistan	  has	  never	  truly	  been	  the	  referent	  object	  of	  
those	  interventions,	  but	  rather	  a	  convenient	  space	  for	  those	  interventions	  –	  directed	  somewhere	  
else	  entirely	  -­‐	  to	  occur.	  	  
Yet	  discontinuities	  are	   inherent	   to	   this	  discourse	  as	  well	  –	   some	   internal	  and	  some	  not.	  
Most	   obviously,	   at	   one	   point	   discourse	   flows	   from	   a	   British	   standpoint	   and	   then	   later	   from	   an	  
American	  lens.	  Internal	  to	  the	  discourse	  are	  tensions	  wherein	  justifications	  for	  intervention	  shift	  –	  
often	  within	  a	  given	  intervention.	  At	  different	  times	  in	  a	  single	  intervention	  Afghanistan	  might	  be	  
made	   up	   of	   heroes	   or	   villainous	   savages,	   intervention	  might	   be	   to	   save	   the	   Afghan,	   teach	   the	  
Afghan	  a	  lesson,	  or	  put	  the	  Afghan	  in	  his/her	  place.	  At	  other	  times	  Afghanistan	  may	  be	  intervened	  
upon	   but	   never	   so	   much	   as	   mentioned	   except	   as	   a	   set	   of	   place	   names.	   These	   discontinuities	  
suggest	   that	   any	   assumedly	   natural	   manner	   of	   understanding	   of	   Afghanistan	   was	   never	   pre-­‐
ordained.	   There	   are	   other	   ways	   that	   these	   historical	   interactions	   with	   Afghanistan	   could	   have	  
played	  out	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  the	  Afghan	  space	  could	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  completely	  different	  light	  today.	  
These	   discontinuities	  will	   show	   that	   the	   apparent	   staticity	   of	   discursive	   knowledge	   surrounding	  
Afghanistan	   is	   anything	   but	   static	   or	   natural.	   The	   tensions	   inherent	   in	   these	  
continuities/discontinuities	  are	  internal	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  these	  binaries.	  
Identity/Non-­‐identity.	   From	   the	   very	   first	   British	   intervention	   on	   Afghanistan,	  
Afghanistan	   is	   seen	   as	   an	   empty	   space	   –	   a	   non-­‐entity.	   This	   emptiness	   in	   itself	   justified	  
intervention	   during	   the	   first	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war.	   In	   later	   interventions	   when	   some	   more	  
substantive	   justification	  was	   seemingly	   called	   for	   that	   emptiness	   paradoxically	  made	   it	   possible	  
for	   Afghanistan	   to	   be	   assigned	   differing	   roles	   and	   identities	   suitable	   to	   the	  wider	   current	   geo-­‐
political	  context.	  	  
Civilized/Savage.	   This	   dichotomy	   is	   continuous	   through	  all	  West-­‐Afghan	   interactions.	   In	  
this	   dichotomy,	   Afghanistan	   is	   always	   savage	   and	   the	  Western	   intervener	   is	   always	   a	   force	   of	  
civility.	  At	  times,	  however,	  internally	  some	  Afghan	  actors	  are	  argued	  to	  either	  represent	  some	  bit	  
of	  civilized	  gestalt	  or	  at	   least	   to	  be	  a	  “good	  savage”,	  working	  alongside	  the	   forces	  of	  civilization	  
despite	   being	   barbaric	   and	   incapable	   of	   understanding	   true	   civilization	   as	   such.	   Once	   again	  
25	  
	  
remember	  that	  “savage”	  and	  “barbarian”	  are	  used	   interchangeably,	  despite	  meaning	  somewhat	  
different	   things	   historically	   in	   Britain.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   terms	   were	   functionally	   used	  
interchangeably	  within	  British	  discourse	  on	  Afghanistan	  –	  indicative	  of	  the	  discursive	  malleability	  
of	  Afghan	  character.	  	  
Western/Oriental.	   Similar	   to	   the	   civilized/savage	   dichotomy,	   this	   is	   more	  
straightforwardly	   a	   dichotomy	   of	   “us	   versus	   them”.	   It	   was	   particularly	   resonant	   during	   British	  
interventions	  but	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  later	  American	  interventions	  as	  well.	  Afghanistan	  is	  at	  times	  filled	  
with	  particular	  Oriental	   archetypes	   and	   situated	   then	  against	  particular	   archetypes	  of	  Western-­‐
ness.	  	  
Ideology/Security.	   This	   dichotomous	   relationship	   is	   somewhat	   less	   easily	   delineated.	  
Afghanistan	  served	  as	  the	  geo-­‐political	  site	  for	  various	  power	  “games”,	  first	  various	  iterations	  of	  
the	   so-­‐called	   “Great	  Game”	  between	   the	  UK	  and	  Russia	   then	   later	   between	   the	  USA	  and	  USSR	  
then	   the	   USA	   and	   radical	   Islam.	   At	   times	   these	   interventions	   have	   been	   justified	   in	   terms	   of	  
security	   –	   the	   security	  of	  British	   India,	   the	   security	  of	  American	   allies	   during	   the	  Cold	  War,	   the	  
security	   of	   the	   all	   peace-­‐loving	   states	   during	   the	   global	   war	   on	   terror.	   At	   other	   times	   these	  
interventions	   have	   been	   justified	   in	   terms	   of	   ideology	   –	   British	   civility	   versus	   Bolshevism	   (or	  
previously	  general	  Russian	  crudeness),	  Democracy	  versus	  Communism,	  Civilization	  versus	  Terror.	  
This	  set	  of	  binaries	  is	  intrinsically	  related	  to:	  
Actors/Tactical	  Spaces.	  In	  serving	  as	  the	  geo-­‐political	  site	  for	  these	  various	  power	  games,	  
Afghanistan	  was	   given	   no	   agency.	   Rather	   than	   serving	   as	   an	   actual	   actor	   in	   any	   of	   these	   great	  
struggles,	  Afghanistan	  was	   rather	  merely	   the	  board	  on	  which	   the	  games	  were	  played.	  Although	  
Afghans	  themselves	  were	  always	  participants	  in	  the	  conflict,	  they	  were	  always	  either	  minor	  allies	  
or	   unwitting	   catspaws	   of	   the	   opposition.	   This	   dichotomy	   then	   is	   constituted	   by	   the	   distinction	  
between	  players	  and	  non-­‐players	  who	  are	  used	  in	  the	  game	  as	  instrumental	  pieces.	  
Formal/Informal.	  	  Formally	  Afghanistan	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  state,	  to	  possess	  sovereignty	  
and	  to	  be	  accorded	  treaty	  rights	  but	  in	  practice	  and	  informally	  its	  rights	  and	  sovereignty	  are	  not	  
taken	   seriously.	   As	   a	   dichotomy,	   this	   arose	   more	   recently,	   becoming	   particularly	   important	   as	  
notions	  of	  liberal	  statehood	  and	  the	  universal	  right	  to	  sovereignty	  became	  important	  in	  the	  wake	  
of	   the	   First	   World	   War.	   This	   is	   central	   to	   the	   final	   two	   dichotomies	   highlighted	   –	   which	   are	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themselves	  fundamental	  to	  the	  current	   intervention	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  attendant	  state-­‐building	  
project.	  It	  allows	  Afghanistan	  to	  be	  perceived	  simultaneously	  as	  a	  state	  and	  a	  non-­‐state.	  
Sovereignty/non-­‐sovereignty.	  Afghan	  sovereignty	  is	  historically	  never	  even	  conceived	  of	  
or,	   at	   best,	   discussed	   then	   dismissed	   with	   little	   real	   consideration.	   Sovereignty	   is	   something	  
reserved	   for	   the	   forces	   of	   civilization	   and	   is	   wrapped	   up	   in	   a	   mixture	   of	   power	   and	   the	  
sophisticated	  understanding	  of	  how	  to	  effectively	  /	   justly	  wield	  that	  power.	  Later	  Afghanistan	   is	  
supposed	  to	  be	   in	  possession	  of	  sovereignty,	  but	   that	   is	  a	   largely	  symbolic	  supposition,	  while	   in	  
practice	   Western	   powers	   could	   ignore	   that	   supposed	   sovereignty	   at	   need	   –	   informed	   and	  
empowered	  by	  all	  previously	  discussed	  dichotomies.	  	  
Failed/successful	  state.	  Since	  the	  1990s,	  Afghanistan	  has	  been	  considered	  a	  ‘failed	  state’.	  
The	   specificity	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   experience	   with	   concepts	   such	   as	   sovereignty	   and	   statehood	  
undermine	  this	  claim.	  When	  Afghanistan	  has	  routinely	  been	  denied	  any	  semblance	  of	  sovereignty	  
or	   statehood	   throughout	  all	   its	  Western	   interactions	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   countenance	   this	   idea	   that	  
Afghanistan	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  state	  which	  has	  failed.	  	  	  	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   be	  mindful	   that	   these	   binary	   oppositions	   are	   not	   about	   the	   opposing	  
terms	  as	  such.	  Rather	  those	  oppositions	  are	  explanatory	  of	  tensions	  internal	  to	  central	  concepts	  
in	  the	  “Afghanistan	  as	  failed	  state”	  narrative.	  For	  instance,	  the	  sovereign/non-­‐sovereign	  binary	  is	  
central	   to	   understanding	   what	   is	   meant	   by	   a	   failed	   state	   –	   a	   state	   (thereby	   deserving	   of,	   and	  
naturally	   holding	   sovereignty)	   but	   one	   which	   has	   failed	   (lost	   either	   the	   will/capacity	   or	   right	  
[rogue	   states]	   to	   sovereignty).	  A	   failed	   state	   is	   simultaneously	   and	  by	   turns	   sovereign	  and	  non-­‐
sovereign.	   The	   binary	   concept	   concurrently	   legitimizes	   interventions	   on	   a	   non-­‐sovereign	   failed	  
state	  by	  a	  valorous	  sovereign	   intervener,	  whose	  sovereignty	   is	  underpinned	  and	  emphasized	  by	  
the	  act	  of	  intervention	  so	  long	  as	  the	  point	  of	  that	  intervention	  is	  to	  return	  the	  failed	  state	  to	  its	  
purportedly	  natural	   state	  of	   sovereignty.	   In	  both	  of	   these	   situations	   there	   is	   tension	  within	   the	  
binary	  conceptualization	  which	  strongly	  call	  into	  question	  the	  validity	  of	  underlying	  ‘knowledges’	  
informing	  this	  narrative.	  
Both	  parts	  of	  each	  opposition	  are	  necessary	   to	  how	   their	   referent	  object	   is	   “known”	  as	  
well	  as	  being	   in	  some	  way	  autoimmune.	  They	  also	  constitute	  both	  Afghan	   identity	  and	  western	  
identity.	   This	  being	   the	   case,	   each	  binary	   term	  needs	   to	  be	   talked	  about	   in	   the	   context	  of	  how	  
they	  both	  inform	  and	  destroy	  identity	  knowledge.	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Chapter  1  –Statehood,  State  Fai lure,   and  Afghanistan  
	  
This	  chapter	  broadly	  discusses	  narrative	  themes	  on	  Afghanistan	  and	  ways	  of	  positioning	  Afghan	  
character	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  British	  India	  as	  well	  as	  more	  recent	  American	  interactions.	  It	  describes,	  
with	  broad	  strokes,	  how	  certain	  narrative	   themes	   that	   informed	  British	  discourses	  on	  Afghanistan	  are	  
still	   powerful	   in	   how	  we	   understand	   Afghanistan	   contemporarily.	   This	   has	   empowered	   current	   policy	  
tropes	  on	  state	  failure	  and	  terrorism	  as	  they	  apply	  to	  Afghanistan.	  	  
Those	  tropes,	  typically	  framed	  as	  dichotomies,	  were	  discussed	  in	  the	  introduction.	  What	  we	  find	  
through	  analysis	  of	  West-­‐Afghan	   interactions	   is	   that	   interventions	  have	  tended	  to	  simultaneously	   lean	  
on	  one	  or	  more	  of	   those	  dichotomous	   typifications	  of	  Afghanistan	  while	  also	   tending	   to	   reinforce	   the	  
supposed	  naturalness	  of	   those	  dichotomies.	  Not	  every	   intervention	  mobilized	  every	  dichotomy,	  but	   in	  
all	   instances	   Afghanistan’s	   non-­‐identity	   (indeterminacy)	   is	   central	   to	   the	   mobilization	   of	   all	   other	  
discursive	  positioning.	  This	  makes	  it	  possible	  not	  only	  to	  assign	  negative	  values	  from	  those	  dichotomous	  
relationships	  to	  Afghanistan,	  but	  effectively	  to	  silence	  any	  possible	  alternate	  manner	  of	  understanding	  
the	  actors	  and	   relations	   involved	   in	   that	   intervention.	   For	   instance,	  when	  Afghanistan	   is	   situated	  as	  a	  
space	   empty	  of	   any	  meaning	  other	   than	   as	   a	   home	  of	   barbarism	  and	   terrorism,	   then	   any	   voices	   that	  
might	  arise	  out	  of	  or	  on	  behalf	  of	  Afghanistan	  are	  silenced	  because	  terrorism	  is	  the	  enemy	  of	  freedom.	  
This	  effective	  “silencing”	  feeds	  from	  and	  reinforces	  the	  notion	  of	  Afghan	  non-­‐identity.	  What’s	  more,	  that	  
silence	  is	  important	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  dominant	  discursive	  stability.	  To	  a	  large	  extent,	  the	  valorous	  
Western	   identity	   tied	   up	   in	   a	   liberal	   international	   system	   of	   right-­‐acting	   states	   relies	   on	   a	   relatively	  
silent,	  but	  ominous	  and	  dangerous	  ‘other’.	  	  
Today	   Afghanistan	   has	   a	   complicated	   relationship	   with	   these	   dichotomous	   tropes,	   being	  
connected	  in	  symbolically	  powerful	  (and	  fundamentally	  flawed)	  ways	  with	  narratives	  on	  both	  terrorism	  /	  
civilization	  and	   state	   failure	   /	   state	  building.	   This	   contemporary	   state	  of	  affairs	  did	  not	   spring	  up	   fully	  
formed,	  however.	  Narratives	  on	  Afghan-­‐ness	  formed	  over	  many	  decades	  and	  over	  several	  West-­‐Afghan	  
encounters.	  Throughout,	  Afghanistan	  has	   typically	  been	  conceived	  as	  a	  place	  empty	  of	  meaning	   (non-­‐
identity/identity),	  outside	  of	  discursive	  regimes	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  world.	  During	  the	  era	  of	  colonialism	  
and	  British	  empire,	  Afghanistan	  was	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  colonial	  /	  imperial	  experiences	  (savage/civilized	  &	  
Oriental/Western).	  It	  was	  subjected	  to	  certain	  interventions	  that	  seemed	  to	  have	  some	  colonial	  and/or	  
imperial	   complexion	  without	  Afghanistan	   ever	   actually	   being	   a	   colonial	   or	   imperial	   object.	  During	   the	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Cold	  War,	  Afghanistan	  was	  a	  non-­‐aligned	  power	  that	  became	  a	  battleground	  between	  the	  United	  States	  
and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  both	  of	  which	  claimed	  to	  be	  acting	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  the	  Afghan	  people.	  After	  the	  
events	  of	  September	  11,	  Afghanistan	  has	  become	  ground	  zero	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
centerpiece	  of	  American	  state	  building	  practice,	  playing	  the	  part	  of	  both	  victim	  and	  villain	   in	  the	  piece	  
(ideology/security	  &	  actor/tactical	  space).	  
Afghan  Negativity  and  Indeterminacy  
In	  each	  intervention,	  Afghan	  identity	  was	  conceptualized	  in	  different	  ways	  that	  served	  to	  justify	  
those	   interventions,	   to	   make	   them	   seem	   natural.	   Each	   intervention	   was	   different,	   but	   there	   was	   a	  
certain	   discursive	   continuity	   from	   the	   First	   Anglo	   Afghan	   War	   through	   today.	   A	   central	   line	   of	   that	  
thread	  revolves	  around	  a	  certain	  indeterminacy	  or	  emptiness.	  This	  sense	  of	  a	  malleable	  Afghan	  could	  be	  
moulded	  to	  fit	  into	  the	  ideological	  discursive	  needs	  of	  the	  time.	  	  
The	  British	  conceived	  of	  the	  Afghan	   identity	  as	   including	  all	  negative	  attributes	  of	  the	  Oriental	  
with	   none	   of	   the	   positive	   (of	   their	   favored	   Orientals).	   This	   positioned	   Afghanistan	   as	   an	   uncivilized	  
hinterland	   where	   Britain	   was	   justified	   in	   carrying	   out	   warfare	   to	   protect	   the	   boundaries	   of	   British	  
civilization.	   (Though	  how	  this	  was	  expressed	  changed	  significantly	  over	   the	  course	  of	   the	  three	  Anglo-­‐
Afghan	  wars,	   as	   following	   chapters	  will	   show.)	   During	   the	   Cold	  War,	   the	  US	   conceived	   of	   Afghans	   as	  
simultaneously	  barbaric	  heroes	  –	  naïve	  and	  unable	  to	  understand	  the	  import	  of	  the	  conflict	  they	  were	  a	  
part	  of	  –	  and	  victims	  requiring	  the	  valorous	  protection	  of	  the	  United	  States	  against	  the	  evil	  Soviet	  Union.	  
During	  the	  so-­‐called	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror,	  Afghanistan	  is	  now	  seen	  simultaneously	  as	  victim	  and	  villain,	  
with	  the	  United	  States	  being	  simultaneously	  protector	  and	  avenger.	  	  
This	  indeterminacy	  shows	  itself	  in	  both	  policy	  and	  academic	  debates.	  Despite	  acting	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  
‘ground	   zero’	   in	   both	   fighting	   terrorism	   and	   saving	   failed	   states,	   Afghanistan	   is	   often	   talked	   around	  
rather	  than	  talked	  about.	  What	  the	  politician	  or	  analyst	  already	  “knows”	  about	  state	  failure	  or	  terrorism	  
is	   simply	   applied	   to	   Afghanistan,	   twisting	   the	   history	   and	   persona	   of	   Afghanistan	   to	   fit	   within	   the	  
narrative	   rather	   than	   treating	  Afghanistan’s	   history	   and	   character	   carefully	   and	   seeing	   how	   it	  may	   or	  
may	  not	  fit	  within	  these	  other	  discursive	  knowledges.	  	  
This	   theme	   recurs	   time	  and	  again	   throughout	   this	  project.	   Empirical	   research	  of	  narratives	  on	  
Afghanistan	   over	   the	   course	   of	   three	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  wars	   and	   two	   American	   interventions	   highlight	   a	  
series	   of	   discursive	   continuities	   and	   ruptures	   in	   narratives	   about	   Afghan-­‐ness.	   The	   continuities	  
themselves	   (indeterminacy,	   emptiness	   of	   positive	   attribution	   /	   civilization)	   make	   a	   certain	   discursive	  
dissonance	   possible	   that	   would	   otherwise	   likely	   be	   inconceivable.	   Specifically,	   it	   is	   Afghanistan’s	  
29	  
	  
emptiness	  which	  makes	   it	   possible	   to	   constitute	   Afghanistan’s	   “identity”	   in	   contradictory	  ways,	   often	  
within	  the	  same	  period	  of	  intervention.	  	  
During	   certain	   British	   interventions,	   for	   instance,	   Afghanistan	   was	   simultaneously	   depicted	  
within	   narratives	   on	   intervention	   as	   being:	   barbaric	   and	   empty	   of	   value,	   mismanaged	   with	   great	  
potential	  as	  an	  imperial	  addition,	  a	  swath	  of	  land	  insignificant	  but	  for	  its	  geological	  features	  which	  make	  
it	  a	  perfect	  security/buffer	  zone	  for	  India.	  More	  recently,	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  United	  States	  narratives	  
on	  Afghan	  character	  sometimes	  called	  Afghan	  victims,	  sometimes	  heroes,	  and	  sometimes	  victims.	  In	  the	  
more	   contemporary	   post-­‐September	   11	   context,	   Afghanistan’s	   indeterminacy	   is	   typified	   within	  
discourses	  on	  successful	  and	  failed	  statehood.	  Afghanistan	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  deserving	  of	  sovereignty	  while	  
simultaneously	  being	  incapable	  of	  it	  –	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  represents	  the	  savage	  /	  uncivilized	  forces	  of	  
terrorism	  which	  are	  an	  assault	  on	  both	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  liberal	  international	  society	  which	  is	  founded	  
on	   those	   sovereign	   principles.	  Which	   typification	   of	   Afghan	   identity	   is	   expressed	   changes	   at	   different	  
moments	   in	   each	   given	   intervention	   –	   and	   is	   often	   at	   odds	   with	   other	   typifications	   within	   the	   same	  
intervention	   –	   but	   each	   also	   has	   the	   effect	   of	   justifying	   that	   intervention	   in	   a	   different	   way.	  
“Afghanistan”,	   then,	   is	   made	   discursively	  meaningless	   because	   it	   is	   taken	   to	  mean	  whatever	   is	   most	  
contextually	  convenient	  at	  the	  time.	  	  
Afghanistan	   as	  meaningless	   speaks	   to	   a	   perceived	   emptiness	   (from	   the	  Western	   perspective)	  
when	   it	   comes	   to	   Afghanistan’s	   character.	   This	   perceived	   emptiness	   play	   into	   a	   certain	   discursive	  
instability	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  the	  assumption	  of	  emptiness	  demands	  filling	  –	  that	  filling	  generally	  comes	  
from	   outside	   and	   reflects	   the	   context	   of	   whatever	   intervention	   is	   at	   hand6.	   	   Second,	   this	   perceived	  
emptiness	   simultaneously	  makes	  possible	  assumptions	  about	  Afghanistan	  as	   somehow	   fitting	   into	   the	  
world	  system	  of	  states	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War	  and	  the	  liberal	  project	  of	  recognizing	  statehood…	  while	  
simultaneously	  making	  it	  impossible	  to	  accept	  it	  as	  true.	  	  
These	  assumptions	  empower	  all	  kinds	  of	  interventions	  in	  Afghanistan,	  making	  justifications	  easy	  
to	  come	  by	  –	  but	  that	  very	  indeterminacy	  also	  unsettles	  any	  projects	  undertaken	  within	  Afghanistan	  or	  
pronouncements	  made	   about	   Afghanistan.	   Contemporarily,	   the	   course	   of	   intervention	   in	   Afghanistan	  
undermines	   concepts	   (sovereignty,	   statehood,	   democracy)	   which	   are	   mobilized	   to	   justify	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Refer again to the proliferation of Afghan “identities” referred to in the previous paragraph. Afghanistan’s 
emptiness demands filling, and it can be filled with almost anything to suit contextual, discursive needs. If the 
discursive logics of the Global War on Terror demands that Afghanistan be thought of as a rogue polity, and also as 
a failed (but natural) member of the international community while also being peopled by victims, villains and 
heroes… then that can be done. Because Afghanistan means nothing and anything.  
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intervention,	   but	  which	   also	   in	   some	   sense	   rely	   on	  Afghanistan’s	   perceived	   indeterminacy	   to	   operate	  
within	   the	   larger	   discursive	   concept	   of	   the	   Global	  War	   on	   Terror.	   This	   intervention	   is	   justified	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  a	  war	  on	  terrorism	  –	  a	  war	  for	  democracy,	  justice,	  the	  international	  system	  of	  statehood	  and	  
sovereignty	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  a	  war	  against	  the	  forces	  of	  terror	  and	  barbarism.	  Yet	  not	  only	  the	  action	  of	  
invasion	   but	   also	   the	   active	   shaping	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   perceived	   character	   as	   indeterminate	   undercuts	  
those	   same	   notions	   of	   democracy,	   justice	   and	   sovereignty.	   This	   is	   because	   of	   how	   Afghanistan’s	  
indeterminate	   character	  came	  about	  discursively,	   generally	   speaking	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   very	  absence	  of	  
these	  qualities	  and	  that	  foundational	  concept	  which	  underpins	  them	  –	  civilization.	  	  
We	  see	   that	   the	  dichotomies	  underpinning	  perceptions	  of	  Afghan	   identity	   are	   self-­‐destructive	  
(auto-­‐immune).	  There	  are	  seemingly	  irreconcilable	  tensions	  at	  play	  in	  how	  Afghanistan	  is	  conceptualized	  
that	  are	  actively	  destructive	  not	  only	   to	  any	  given	  conception	  of	  Afghanistan	  but	  also	  to	   the	  narrative	  
concepts	   mobilized	   to	   justify	   those	   particular	   conceptions.	   One	   might	   consider,	   for	   instance,	   how	  
concepts	  of	  democracy	  and	  national	  identity	  played	  into	  the	  state	  building	  project	  in	  Afghanistan	  during	  
the	  Obama	  Administration	  –	  with	  a	  community	  cohesion	  project	  being	  run	  by	  USAID	  as	  a	  test	  field	  for	  
examination.	  
Situating  Afghan  National  Character  –  the  Case  of  USAID’s  Community  Cohesion  
Robust	  democratic	  political	   institutions	  –	  with	  significant	  participation	   from	  the	  citizenry	  –	  are	  
central	  to	  orthodox	  understandings	  of	  successful	  statehood.	  The	  lack	  of	  robust	  democratic	  institutions	  is	  
often	  a	  key	  identifier	  of	  a	  failed	  state	  –	  that	  absence	  is	  generally	  explained	  by	  claiming	  the	  government	  
is	  either	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  successfully	  to	  provide	  them.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Afghanistan	  this	  has	  often	  been	  
described	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  corruption,	  or	  of	  culture.	  
“As	  do	  previous	  years’	  State	  Department	  human	  rights	  reports	  on	  Afghanistan,	  the	  report	  for	  
2015	   attributes	  most	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   human	   rights	   deficiencies	   to	   overall	   lack	   of	   security,	  
loose	   control	   over	   the	   actions	   of	   Afghan	   security	   forces,	   corruption,	   and	   cultural	   attitudes	  
such	  as	  discrimination	  against	  women.”	  (Katzman	  2016:	  14)	  
And:	  
“We	   must	   focus	   our	   diplomatic	   efforts	   in	   Kabul	   on	   reforming	   the	   next	   government	   of	  
Afghanistan…	  primarily	  in	  the	  area	  of	  anti-­‐corruption…”	  (Barno	  2009:	  3)	  
Analysts	  suggest	  that	  efforts	  to	  this	  end	  over	  the	  past	  eight	  years	  have	  met	  with	  little	  success.	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“That	   support,	  however7,	  has	  made	  many	  Afghan	  elites	   fabulously	   rich.	  Despite	  15	  years	  of	  
capacity-­‐building,	  too	  much	  of	  the	  Afghan	  government	  remains	  predatory	  and	  kleptocratic.”	  
(Kolenda	  2017)	  
This	   apparent	   inability	   /	   unwillingness	   is	   blamed	   for	   poverty	   and	   alienation	   from	   the	   state	  
apparatus.	   	   (Benn	  2004,	  Natsios	   2006,	   Patrick	   2006)	   This	   creates	   political	   breakdown,	   a	   situation	   ripe	  
with	  potential	  for	  insurgency	  and	  humanitarian	  disaster.	  The	  cause	  of	  political	  breakdown	  is	  attached	  to	  
the	  failed	  state’s	  identity	  –	  to	  the	  Western	  perception,	  the	  government	  has	  failed	  on	  its	  own,	  for	  reasons	  
of	   its	   own.	   A	   cure	   for	   what	   ails	   the	   failed	   state,	   then,	   must	   come	   from	   outside	   –	   the	   failed	   state’s	  
government	   has	   proven	   itself	   unable	   to	   handle	   its	   own	   affairs.	   The	   state	   building	   project	   must	   be	  
successful	   in	   reforming	   the	   failed	   state’s	   political	   culture,	   in	   rectifying	   whatever	   is	   “broken”	   in	   the	  
character	  of	  the	  failed	  state	  or	  that	  intervention	  is	  in	  danger	  of	  being	  seen	  as	  illegitimate.	  	  
“We	   must	   focus	   our	   diplomatic	   efforts	   in	   Kabul	   on	   reforming	   the	   next	   government	   of	  
Afghanistan…	  primarily	  in	  the	  area	  of	  anti-­‐corruption…	  If	  the…	  next	  government…	  is	  every	  bit	  
as	   corrupt	  as	   the	  current	  one,	  our	  efforts	  will	   lack	   legitimacy	   in	  Afghanistan	  and	  at	  home.”	  
(ibid)	  
From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  given	  state’s	  failure	  can	  be	  diagnosed	  in	  a	  straight-­‐forward	  
(if	   not	   simple)	  way.	  A	  project	  of	  nation-­‐building	  designed	   to	   “save”	   the	   failed	   state	  and	   reintegrate	   it	  
into	   the	   global	   society	   of	   successful	   states	   would	   generally	   seek	   to	   reform	   and	   reinforce	   democratic	  
institutions	   and	   their	   corollaries.	   In	   failed	   states	  where	   the	   government	   has	   been	   unwilling	   to	   create	  
those	  healthy	  institutions,	  programs	  encouraging	  a	  shift	  in	  political	  culture	  are	  indicated.	  In	  failed	  states	  
where	  low	  capacity	  is	  at	  issue,	  social/political/economic	  infrastructures	  can	  be	  invested	  in	  and	  built	  up.	  
Afghanistan,	   like	   most	   failed	   states,	   is	   seen	   to	   suffer	   from	   both	   capacity	   and	   willingness	   gaps.	   In	  
Afghanistan,	   state	   weakness	   is	   associated	   with	   spillover	   security	   concerns	   as	   a	   center	   for	   terrorism,	  
drugs	  and	  black	  market	  activity.	  (Patrick	  2009:	  30-­‐32)	  
Contemporary	   imaginings	   of	  Afghanistan	   as	   a	   space	  with	  neither	   the	  will	   nor	   the	   capacity	   for	  
sovereignty	  have	  historical	   roots.	  Narrative	   tropes	  emanating	   from	   interventions	  on	  Afghanistan	   from	  
the	  19th	  century	  through	  today	  suggest	  that	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  land	  occupied	  by	  barbaric	  people	  incapable	  
of	   truly	  understanding	   civilization	  and	   its	   trappings8.	   They	  desire	   to	  be	   treated	  and	   seen	  as	   sovereign	  
equals	   in	  the	  international	  community	  of	  statehood9	  but	  are	  ultimately	  incapable	  of	  even	  a	  semblance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This refers to infrastructure and governance works, the vast sums in dollars and manpower invested by the United 
States – essentially referring to CCI and other similar programs.  
8 See chapters 3 – 5 of this thesis. 
9 See chapters 5 – 6. 
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of	  sovereign	  statehood	  without	  either	  the	  paternal	  mentoring	  by10	  or	  outright	  protection11	  of	  a	  Western	  
benefactor.	   These	   imaginings	   can	   be	   seen	   through	   consistent	   reference	   to	   those	   binaries	   of	  
civilized/savage,	   identity/non-­‐identity,	  Western/Oriental	  et	  al.	  Those	  binaries,	   referred	   to	  and	  built	  up	  
over	   the	   course	   of	   historical	   interactions	   with	   Afghanistan,	   can	   be	   found	   in	   contemporary	   policy	  
interactions	  with	  Afghanistan.	  Take	  as	  an	  example	  the	  Afghanistan	  Community	  Cohesion	  Initiative.	  
The  Afghanistan  Community  Cohesion  Initiative  
The	  Community	  Cohesion	  Initiative	  [CCI]	  was	  one	  policy	  response	  to	  a	  state	  building	  project	   in	  
Afghanistan	   during	   the	   Obama	   Administration.	   It	   was	   formulated	   on	   assumptions	   rooted	   in	   the	  
conception	   of	   Afghanistan	   as	   indeterminate,	   empty	   of	   unique	   character.	   This	   assumption	   of	  
indeterminate	  character	   is	  rooted	  in	  the	  history	  of	  historic	   interactions	  between	  the	  West	  (Britain	  and	  
then	  the	  United	  States)	  and	  Afghanistan,	  wherein	  Afghanistan’s	  substantive	  character	  and	  identity	  were	  
taken	  to	  be	  different	  things	  at	  different	  times	  and	  always	  situated	   in	  ways	  that	  did	  more	  to	  empower	  
particular	  ideas	  of	  a	  Western	  identity	  than	  to	  discover	  that	  of	  Afghanistan.	  This	  emptiness	  empowered	  
various	   interventions	   on	   Afghanistan	   historically,	   and	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   CCI	   meant	   that	   Afghanistan	  
could	  be	  slotted	  into	  pre-­‐existing	  narratives	  on	  statehood	  and	  state	  failure.	  	  
In	  considering	  some	  of	  the	  binary	  oppositions	  identified	  in	  the	  introduction,	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  
see	  how	  these	  binaries	  interact	  in	  assumptions	  about	  Afghanistan	  that	  informed	  the	  CCI	  –	  and	  how	  they	  
connect	  with	  narratives	  on	  Afghanistan	  in	  historic	  interactions.	  An	  underlying	  assumption	  informing	  the	  
CCI	   is	   that	   Afghanistan	   is	   fundamentally	   broken,	   but	   that	   this	   brokenness	   is	   in	   Afghanistan’s	   nature.	  
Those	  who	  govern	  are	  neither	  capable	  of	  proper	  governance	  nor	  are	  they	  naturally	  motivated	  to	  build	  a	  
successful	  political	  system.	  It	  is	  thus	  necessary	  that	  help	  be	  offered	  from	  the	  outside	  literally	  to	  build	  up	  
a	  new	  political	  culture	  that	  has	  the	  chance	  to	  be	  successful.	  	  
This	  touches	  on	  a	  number	  of	  binary	  oppositions	  previously	  identified.	  Most	  immediately	  obvious	  
are	  the	  Civilized/Savage	  and	  Sovereignty/non-­‐Sovereignty	  binaries.	  The	  first	  to	  consider	  has	  to	  do	  with	  
how	  sovereignty	  is	  articulated	  in	  this	  case.	  
When	  the	  Obama	  Administration	  took	  over	  in	  2009,	  there	  was	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  internal	  debate	  as	  
to	   the	   best	   course	   of	   action	   in	   Afghanistan.	   Various	   military	   and	   civilian	   experts	   testified	   before	  
Congressional	  committees,	  and	  one	  argument	  that	  appeared	  to	  have	  some	  currency	  was	  legitimacy.	  In	  
addition	   to	   greater	   military	   involvement	   (the	   surge)	   a	   concurrent	   civil	   effort	   to	   change	   the	   political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See chapter 5. 
11 See chapter 6. 
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culture	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  a	  government	  that	  would	  enjoy	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  
eyes	  of	  its	  own	  people	  and	  the	  international	  community	  –	  and	  thus	  truly	  be	  able	  to	  be	  sovereign.	  
“We	   must	   focus	   our	   diplomatic	   efforts	   in	   Kabul	   on	   reforming	   the	   next	   government	   of	  
Afghanistan…	  primarily	  in	  the	  area	  of	  anti-­‐corruption…	  If	  the…	  next	  government…	  is	  every	  bit	  
as	   corrupt	  as	   the	  current	  one,	  our	  efforts	  will	   lack	   legitimacy	   in	  Afghanistan	  and	  at	  home.”	  
(Barno	  2009:	  3)	  
And:	  
“The	  first	  [priority]	  is	  the	  primacy	  of	  politics,	  the	  need	  to	  reach	  political	  settlements,	  not	  just	  
at	  the	  national	  level	  where	  the	  current	  crisis	  resides,	  but	  at	  regional	  and	  local	  levels	  as	  well.	  
We	  must	   redouble	  our	   efforts	   to	   separate	   reconcilable	   insurgents	   from	   those	  who	  will	   not	  
forsake	  violence.”	  (Cole	  2009:	  1)	  
These	  represent	  calls	   from	  both	  the	  military	  and	  civilization	  agencies12	   to	   focus	  on	  community	  
and	   political-­‐culture	   building	   as	   a	   necessary	   supplement	   to	   war-­‐fighting	   in	   Afghanistan.	   In	   order	   to	  
defeat	   the	  Taliban,	  and	  come	  out	  ahead	   in	   this	  particular	  arena	   in	   the	  global	  war	  on	   terrorism	   it	  was	  
necessary	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  both	  reform	  the	  government	  of	  Afghanistan	  and	  build	  trust	  between	  
Afghan’s	  and	  the	  government	  on	  a	  community	  and	  local	  level.	  This	  message	  was	  taken	  to	  heart	  with	  the	  
Community	  Cohesion	  Initiative	  in	  Afghanistan:	  
“USAID/OTI’s	  Community	  Cohesion	  Initiative	  (CCI)	  strengthens	  the	  resiliency	  of	  communities	  
in	   the	   face	   of	   political	   and	   social	   upheaval,	   insurgent	   infiltration,	   and	   other	   pressures.	  
Specifically,	   CCI	   (1)	   increases	   cohesion	   within	   and	   between	   communities;	   (2)	   supports	  
peaceful	   and	   legitimate	   governance	   processes	   and	   outcomes;.	   and	   (3)	   counters	   violent	  
extremism.”	  (USAID	  2016)	  
Community	  cohesion	  as	  a	  policy	  concept	  was	  developed	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  from	  2001	  in	  the	  
aftermath	  of	  riots	  in	  certain	  communities.	  Certain	  groups,	  often	  ethnic	  minorities	  and	  generally	  suffering	  
from	  poverty,	  were	  seen	  as	  excluded	  from	  their	  communities	  –	  whether	  structurally	  by	  or	  self-­‐exclusion.	  
Community	  cohesion	  refers	  to	  a	  set	  of	  policies	  which	  sought	  to	  encourage	  those	  groups	  to	  integrate	  into	  
the	   larger	   community	   with	   the	   idea	   that	   it	   would	   not	   only	   decrease	   alienation	   but	   also	   improve	  
economic	  wellbeing.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Barno is a retired Lieutenant General who held a high command role in Afghanistan for several years and Cole 
was a member of USAID. 
34	  
	  
Many	   scholars	   have	   criticized	   community	   cohesion	   projects	   on	   several	   levels.	   It	   is	   broadly	  
argued	  that	  community	  cohesion	  either	  destroys	  (by	  assimilation)	  or	  ignores	  the	  character	  and	  value	  of	  
marginal	  community	   identities.	  Communities	  are	  absorbed	   into	   the	   larger	  national	  cultural	   framework	  
through	   bribery	   -­‐	   grants	   for	   community	   programs,	   employment	   preparation	   and	   infrastructure	   –	  
(Donoghue	   2014:	   282	   –	   292)	   and	   blame	   (social	   problems	   among	   the	   marginal	   are	   due	   to	   the	  
community’s	  unwillingness	  to	  integrate).	  (Werbner	  2005:	  747-­‐748,	  750)	  
The	  Community	  Cohesion	  Initiative	   in	  Afghanistan	  did	  not	  so	  much	  seek	  to	   integrate	  alienated	  
portions	   of	   Afghan	   society	   into	   the	   larger	   Afghan	   community	   as	   it	   tried	   to	   create	   an	   Afghan	   political	  
community	  out	  of	  a	  perceived	  vacuum.	  The	  model	   for	   that	  political	  community	  was	  a	  set	  of	  orthodox	  
norms	   of	   successful	   liberal	   statehood.	   In	   essence,	   the	   integration	   aspect	   of	   community	   cohesion	  
traditionally	   simultaneously	  meant	   integrating	   rural	  Afghans	   into	  a	  newly	   formed	  political	   culture	  and	  
integrating	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  whole	  into	  the	  wider	  supposedly	  “global”	  liberal	  political	  culture.	  This	  was	  
to	   be	   accomplished	   by	   way	   of	   encouraging	   local	   leaders	   to	   work	   with	   government	   officials	   on	  
infrastructure	   and	   community	   projects,	   and	   to	   become	   politically	   active	   in	   the	   context	   of	   national	  
elections	  planned	  for	  2014.	  Following	  elections	  and	  the	  program’s	  completion,	  CCI	  was	  hailed	  as	  largely	  
successful.	   Specifically,	   community	   elders	   had	   been	   made	   to	   realize	   the	   importance	   of	   education	   in	  
building	   peace	   and	   prosperity	   and	   opportunities	   for	   doing	   so	   through	   cooperation	   with	   the	   Afghan	  
government.	  (ibid:	  12-­‐13)	  It	  therefor	  arguably	  provided	  marginal	  communities	  with	  powerful	  incentives	  
to	   integrate	   into	   the	   national	   community,	   thus	   creating	   conditions	   conducive	   to	   stability	   and	   less	  
vulnerable	  to	  advantage-­‐taking	  by	  insurgent	  groups.	  
The  CCI  and  Legitimacy  /  Sovereignty  /  Non-­‐sovereignty  
The	   question	   of	   legitimacy	   was	   key	   to	   the	   CCI.	   Intervention	   on	   Afghanistan	   was	   held	   to	   be	  
legitimate	  because	  Afghanistan’s	  political	   institutions	  were	   illegitimate.	  Afghanistan	   lacked	  sovereignty	  
the	  government	  had	  no	  monopoly	  on	  coercive	  force,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  a	  dysfunctional	  or	  nonexistent	  
political	  culture.	  The	  Taliban	  were	  able	  to	  operate	  so	  freely	   in	  part	  because	  the	  Afghan	  people	  did	  not	  
identify	  with	  or	  trust	  the	  government.	  This	  lack	  of	  identification	  with	  the	  government	  was	  problematic	  
beyond	   the	   security	   implications	   because	  while	   the	  meaning	   of	   sovereignty	   is	   hotly	   debated	   (despite	  
being	  generally	  seen	  as	  “settled”	  in	  political	  analyses):	  
“For	   over	   two	   hundred	   years	   the	   nation	   has	   been	   regarded	   as	   the	   proper,	   indeed	   only	  
legitimate,	  unit	  of	  political	  rule…”	  (Heywood	  2004:	  97)	  [emphasis	  mine]	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Nationhood	  is	  essentially	  defined	  by	  those	  within	  the	  purported	  nation	  –	  members	  of	  a	  nation	  
self-­‐identify	   due	   to	   a	   shared	   culture,	   history,	   and	   sense	   of	   shared	   future.	  While	   the	   relationship	   of	   a	  
nation	  and	   state	  are	  often	  quite	   indeterminate,	   a	  political	   culture	  wherein	   the	   citizens	  of	   a	   sovereign	  
state	  recognize	  the	  legitimate	  authority	  of	  that	  sovereign	  is	  essential.	  	  
Legitimacy	  –	  thus	  sovereignty	  –	  is	  missing	  in	  Afghanistan	  (which	  we	  already	  know	  as	  we’ve	  been	  
told	   that	   Afghanistan	   is	   a	   failed	   state).	   The	   purpose	   of	   the	   CCI	   was	   to	   address	   one	   of	   Afghanistan’s	  
deficiencies	   leading	   to	   that	   lack	   of	   sovereignty	   –	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   political	   community.	   This	   lack	   was	  
something	  that	  could	  only	  be	  fixed	  from	  the	  outside,	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  would	  in	  turn	  prove	  its	  
own	  legitimacy	  through	  this	  mentorship.	  	  
	  “I	  think	  one	  of	  the	  challenges	  that	  we	  face	  today	  with	  regard	  to	  our	  efforts	  in	  Afghanistan	  is	  
what	  I	  would	  characterize	  as	  a	  crisis	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  among	  our	  NATO	  
allies	   at	   this	   particular	   juncture.	   In	   the	   aftermath	   of	   a	   very	   deeply	   flawed	   Afghan	   election	  
which	  was	  set	   in	  the	  context	  of	  rising	  American	  and	  NATO	  casualties	  over	  this	  summer,	  the	  
U.S.	  has	  some	  significant	  challenges	  in	  front	  of	  us…”	  (Barno	  2009:	  1)	  	  
This	  turns	  the	  entire	  question	  of	  Afghanistan	  back	  on	  the	  United	  States	  –	  saving	  Afghanistan	  is	  
about	   US	   prestige	   and	   legitimacy	   –	   it	   is	   a	   question	   of	   what	   makes	   the	   West	   a	   good,	   particularly	  
legitimate	  thing.	  
Afghan  History  and  Legitimacy  /  Sovereignty  /  Non-­‐sovereignty  
Situating	  Afghanistan	  as	   lacking	   legitimacy	  –	  and	  sovereignty	  –	   is	  a	   common	   theme	   in	  historic	  
interactions	   with	   Afghanistan.	   That	   lack	   of	   sovereignty	   has	   been	   justification	   for	   interventions	   in	  
Afghanistan	  as	  well	  as	  proof	  that	  those	  interventions	  are	  ultimately	  for	  the	  good	  of	  Afghanistan	  itself.	  	  
The	  question	  of	  whether	  Afghanistan	  was	   entitled	   to	   sovereignty	   first	   came	   about	   during	   the	  
second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war.	  During	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	  it	  was	  taken	  for	  granted	  that	  if	  such	  a	  thing	  
as	  an	  “Afghanistan”	  could	  even	  be	  said	  to	  exist,	  it	  certainly	  had	  no	  sovereign	  character.	  It	  was,	  instead,	  a	  
land	  empty	  of	  national	  status	  but	  rather	  a	  collection	  of	  tribes.	  
“Though	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Affghans	  [sic]	  has	  passed	  out	  of	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  descendants	  
of	   Achmed	   Shah…	   [mention	   of	   important	   tribes,	  with	   the	   strongest	   being	   headed	  by]	  Dost	  
Mahommed	  Khan,	  of	  Cabool	  [sic]…	  has	  connected	  himself	  with	  that	  powerful	  body	  [Persia],	  
and…	  must	  trust	  rather	  to	  them	  than	  to	  the	  native	  Affghans…”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1839b:	  25)	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The	   right	   of	   Persia	   to	   involve	   itself	   in	   the	   affairs	   of	   Afghanistan	   in	   any	   way	   it	   saw	   fit	   was	  
recognized	  by	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  by	  way	  of	  treaty.	  	  
“If	  war	  should	  be	  declared	  between	  the	  Affghans	  and	  Persians,	  the	  English	  Government	  shall	  
not	  interfere…”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1814:	  Article	  IX)	  
The	   idea	   that	  Persia	  had	   the	   right	   to	  make	   incursions	  on	  Afghanistan	  was	   reinforced	  when,	   in	  
1837,	   the	   Shah	  of	   Persia	   contemplated	   just	   that.	   The	  British	   envoy	   to	  Persia	  wrote	   in	   a	  dispatch	   that	  
“…there	  cannot,	   I	   think,	  be	  a	  doubt	  that	  the	  Shah	  is	  fully	   justified	   in	  making	  war	  on	  Prince	  Kamran	  [of	  
Herat].”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1837b:	  34)	  Further,	  Persia	  has	  a	  fully	  “justified	  right”	  to	  expand	  its	  reach	  in	  
Afghanistan,	  but	  such	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  would	  be	  against	  British	  interests.	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1837a:	  2-­‐3)	  
That	  being	  the	  case,	  Britain	  eventually	  decided	  to	  intervene,	  first	  diplomatically	  and	  eventually	  militarily,	  
to	  essentially	  gift	  Afghanistan	  its	  freedom,	  but	  a	  very	  conditioned	  and	  contingent	  freedom.	  
This	  was	  highly	  desirable,	  as	  Russian	  influence	  was	  suspected	  in	  Persia’s	  designs	  on	  Herat,	  which	  
stood	  at	  a	  strategic	  chokepoint	  blocking	  access	   from	  Persia	   to	   India’s	  western	   frontiers.	   	   “…if	  we	  save	  
Herat,	   and	   secure	   it,	   as	   it	   is	   now	   completely	   at	   our	   disposal,	   all	   Affghanistan	  will	   be	   tolerably	   secure	  
behind	  it.”	  (ibid:	  77)	  	  
This	  was	  an	  early	  positioning	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	   tactical	   space	  rather	   than	  a	  sovereign	  space.	  
This	  speaks	  not	  only	   to	  an	  assumption	  of	  non-­‐sovereignty	   for	  Afghanistan	  but	  also	   its	  positioning	  as	  a	  
tactical	  space	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  political	  actor	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  This	  was	  seen	  as	  not	  only	  natural,	  but	  for	  
the	   benefit	   of	   Afghans,	   as	   without	   British	   sponsorship	   Afghanistan	   was	   vulnerable	   to	   any	   aggressor.	  
During	   the	   second	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	   however,	   some	   began	   to	   question	  whether	   or	   not	   Afghanistan	  
might	  have	  some	  claim	  to	  sovereign	  status.	  	  
The	  second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  was	  triggered	  when	  Britain	  wanted	  to	  send	  a	  diplomatic	  mission	  
to	   Kabul.	   The	   Afghan	   ruler	   at	   the	   time	  wanted	   no	   discourse	   with	   Britain	   and	  warned	   that	   a	  mission	  
would	  be	  unwelcome	  and	  considered	  hostile.	  Britain	  sent	  a	  mission	  anyway,	  which	  was	  chased	  out	  of	  
country	   by	   force	   of	   arms.	   It	   was	   in	   response	   to	   this	   insult	   that	   the	   second	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war	   was	  
launched,	  to	  effect	  regime	  change.	  Some	  voices	  were	  raised	  in	  opposition,	  such	  as	  1st	  Baron	  Lawrence,	  
formerly	  the	  Viceroy	  of	  India	  from	  1864	  -­‐	  1869.	  
“Are	  not	  moral	  considerations	  also	  very	  strong	  against	  such	  a	  war?	  Have	  not	   the	  Afghans	  a	  
right	  to	  resist	  our	  forcing	  a	  mission	  on	  them?”	  (Lawrence	  1878a)	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This	  voice	  was	  ultimately	  in	  the	  minority,	  while	  the	  view	  that	  any	  possible	  claim	  to	  sovereignty	  
that	   Afghanistan	   might	   make	   was	   subservient	   to	   Britain’s	   national	   security	   needs.	   Furthermore,	  
Afghanistan	  was	  barbaric	  and	  shouldn’t	  be	  accorded	  the	  same	  respect	  and	  rights	  as	  a	  European	  power.	  
“Whether	   in	   dealing	   with	   an	   Asiatic	   ruler	   like	   Shere	   Ali	   the	   common	   rules	   of	   European	  
international	   law	  have	   any	   application	  whatever…	   [is	   a	   question	   that]	   though	   interesting,	   I	  
shall	  pass	  over…	  [in	  preference	  of	  asking]	  …whether	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  Russian	  and	  Afghan	  
alliance	  make	  the	  strengthening	  of	  our	  frontier	  a	  matter	  of	  pressing	   importance?”	  (Stephen	  
1878a)	  
The	  strengthening	  of	  British	   India’s	   frontier,	   in	   this	  case,	  meant	  ensuring	   that	  a	  pliable	   regime	  
was	  in	  control	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  capital.	  Ultimately,	  the	  “interesting”	  question	  of	  some	  sort	  of	  application	  
of	  sovereignty	  to	  Afghanistan	  was	  meaningless	  in	  any	  case,	  however:	  	  
“[International	  law	  is]	  a	  collection	  of	  usages	  which	  prevail	  between	  civilized	  nations,	  and	  are	  
rendered	   possible	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   leading	   civilized	   nations	   are	   practically	   for	   most	  
purposes	  of	  nearly	  equal	  force…	  we	  are	  exceedingly	  powerful	  and	  highly	  civilized,	  and…	  they	  
are	  comparatively	  weak	  and	  half	  barbarous”.	  (Stephen	  1878B)	  
This	  emerging	  narrative	  is	  explored	  in	  much	  more	  rich	  detail	   in	  chapters	  to	  follow.	  It	   is	  already	  
possible	   to	   draw	  out	   similarities	   to	   aspects	   of	   the	   CCI.	   Afghanistan	   is	   not	   a	   sovereign	   space,	   and	   any	  
question	  of	  the	   justice	  of	  this	  situation	   is	  subverted	  by	  two	  things:	  geopolitical	  security	  considerations	  
and	  the	  much	  greater	  sovereign	  status	  of	   the	   intervener	   (Britain,	   then	  the	  United	  States).	  The	  greater	  
sovereign	   status	   of	   the	   intervener	  was	   also	   conceptualized	   as	  making	   that	   intervention	   beneficial	   for	  
Afghanistan.	   The	   Afghanistan	   of	   2009	  was	   not	   sovereign	   because	   its	   rulers	  were	   corrupt,	   the	   Afghan	  
people	   felt	   no	   sense	  of	   connection	   to	   the	   state	   apparatus	   (no	  political	   culture	  or	   conception	  of	   state	  
sovereignty),	  and	  the	  state	  was	  incapable	  of	  looking	  after	  itself.	  Thus	  the	  CCI	  policy	  could	  only	  be	  seen	  as	  
beneficial,	  as	  the	  United	  States	  –	  epitomizing	  sovereign	  status	  –	  worked	  to	  mentor,	  uplift…	  help	  to	  form	  
a	  liberal	  political	  culture	  where	  before	  there	  was	  only	  tribalism.	  	  
The  CCI  and  Binary  Oppositions  
Tribalism,	   corruption	   and	   incapacity	   to	   look	   after	   itself	   are	   all	   hallmarks	   of	   narratives	   on	  
Afghanistan	   from	   the	   first	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	   up	   through	   every	   intervention	   on	   Afghanistan	   until	   and	  
including	   the	   present	   one.	   Those	   aspects	   of	   Afghan	   identity	   empower	   the	   sovereignty/non-­‐sovereign	  
binary.	  They	  also	  derive	  support	  from	  binaries	  of	  civilized/savage	  and	  Western/Oriental	  –	  as	  we	  already	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begin	  to	  see	  from	  the	  Stephen	  quotes.	  They	  also	  feed	  into	  binaries	  regarding	  Afghanistan	  actors/tactical	  
spaces.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  CCI,	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  place	  to	  be	  acted	  upon.	  The	  United	  States	  is	  an	  actor,	  but	  
so	   is	   the	   Taliban.	   The	   Afghan	   government	   is,	   at	   best,	   a	   defunct	   and	   discredited	   actor	   which	   needed	  
intensive	   mentoring	   and	   reform	   by	   the	   United	   States	   in	   order	   to	   become	   a	   legitimate	   actor	   and	  
Afghanistan	  itself	  was	  a	  tactical	  space	  where	  a	  new	  political	  culture	  needed	  to	  be	  formed	  –	  partly	  for	  the	  
good	  of	  Afghanistan	  but	  also	  as	  a	  tactic	  in	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror.	  (Katzman	  2013:	  9,	  12)	  The	  CCI	  was	  
part	   of	   that	   fight	   against	   terrorism,	   as	   the	   insurgency	  was	   empowered	   by	   the	   political	   illegitimacy	   of	  
Afghan	  governance:	  
“The	  insurgency	  is	  essentially	  an	  Afghan	  political	  problem…	  a	  government	  that	  is	  perceived	  as	  
illegitimate,	  self-­‐serving…	  based	  on	  tribal	  or	  other	  affiliations.”	  (Waldman	  2009:	  2)	  
Indeed,	  the	  CCI	  was	  explicitly	  described	  in	  part	  as	  a	  way	  to	  counter	  the	  Taliban	  insurgency:	  	  
“Through	   the	  Afghanistan	  Community	  Cohesion	   Initiative	   (CCI),	  USAID’s	  Office	  of	   Transition	  
Initiatives	   (OTI)	   seeks	   to	   increase	   resilience	   in	  areas	  vulnerable	   to	   insurgent	  exploitation	  by	  
(1)	   strengthening	   community	   capacities	   to	   promote	   a	   peaceful	   transition;	   (2)	   supporting	  
peaceful	  electoral	  processes	  and	  outcomes;	  and	  (3)	  countering	  violent	   threats	   to	  a	  peaceful	  
transition.”	  (USAID	  2014b)	  [emphasis	  mine]	  
The	  other	   side	  of	   the	  coin,	   so	   to	   speak,	   is	   that	  Afghanistan	   is	   conceptualized	  as	  being	  at	   least	  
morally	   deserving	   of	   sovereignty.	   Though	   the	   Afghan	   state	   is	   illegitimate	   and	   incapable	   of	   holding	  
sovereignty	   on	   its	   own,	   the	  Afghan	  people	   are	   said	   to	   have	   the	   right	   to	   sovereignty,	   as	   enshrined	  by	  
contemporary	   international	   custom	   and	   law	   and	   espoused	   in	   the	   UN	   charter	   itself.	   This	   results	   in	  
language	   of	   moral	   imperatives:	   “moral	   imperative	   of	   not	   abandoning	   the	   Afghan	   people”	   and	   “You	  
Americans	  are	  not	  going	  to	  abandon	  us	  again	  are	  you?”	  to	  be	  used,	  as	  regards	  both	  saving	  Afghanistan	  
from	   terrorism	   and	   reforming	   the	   Afghan	   government	   so	   that	   it	   might	   be	   legitimate	   and	   sovereign.	  
(Bardo	  2009:	  1-­‐3)	  
This	  speaks	  to	  an	  uneasy	  tension	  with	  sovereignty/non-­‐sovereignty	  that	  connects	  to	  the	  binary	  
of	  Western/Oriental.	  Specifically,	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War	  it	  became	  accepted	  in	  discursive	  orthodoxy	  
that	   all	   peoples	   had	   the	   inherent	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   and	   sovereignty.	   Yet	   there	   was	   still	   an	  
underlying	   ”knowledge”	   that	   not	   all	   people	   were	   truly	   deserving	   (or	   at	   least	   capable)	   of	   effectively	  
wielding	   those	   rights.	   This	   meant	   that	   it	   was	   the	   duty	   of	   more	   enlightened	   polities	   to	   mentor	   and	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develop	  political	   civility	   in	  what	  were	  essentially	  barbaric	   (in	   this	   case,	  Oriental)	   spaces.	   It	   also	  meant	  
that	  interventions	  on	  those	  spaces	  were	  conceptually	  always	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  intervenee,	  rather	  than	  
an	  abrogation	  of	  those	  rights.	  	  
This	  tension	  is	  articulated	  within	  this	  project	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  formal/informal	  divide,	  wherein	  
two	  “knowledges”	  about	  Afghanistan	  that	  contradict	  one	  another	  interact	  uneasily.	  For	  purposes	  of	  the	  
CCI,	  Afghanistan	  does	  not	  have	  sovereignty	  –	  and	  is	  at	  fault	  itself	  due	  to	  its	  uncivilized	  nature	  (tribalism,	  
corruption,	   incapacity).	  Thus	   the	  United	  States	  has	   the	   right	   to	   intervene	  –	   that	   right	   is	  articulated	  by	  
reference	  to	  a	  state-­‐building	  project,	  wherein	  intervention	  is	  a	  mentoring	  process	  to	  teach	  the	  Afghans	  
to	   be	   a	   civilized	   nation	   worthy	   and	   capable	   of	   sovereign	   identity.	   That	   mentoring	   process	   is	   also	   a	  
civilizing	   process	  which	  makes	  Afghanistan	  more	   culturally	   resilient	   against	   terrorist	   ideologies,	  which	  
from	  a	  historical	  perspective	  Afghanistan	  apparently	  needs.	  	  
“…the	   rule	   of	   Islam	   was	   never	   one	   to	   encourage	   the	   growth	   of	   civilisation.	   Bigotry	   and	   a	  
fanatical	  intolerance	  were	  its	  handmaids…	  the	  only	  Western	  piece	  of	  civilisation	  that	  appeals	  
to	  them	  –	  the	  art	  of	  war.”	  (Guardian	  1919)	  
And:	  
“Long	   contact	  with	   these	   subjects	   had	  made	   them	   [colonizers]	   believe	   that	   Europeans	   and	  
Orientals	   were	   far	   apart	   in	   political	   capacity	   and	   were	   therefore	   not	   entitled	   to	   the	   same	  
political	  rights.	  When	  individuals	  or	  parties	  among	  the	  subject	  populations,	  inspired	  through	  
contact	   with…	   European	   ideas…	   demanded	   corresponding	   political	   reforms,	   their	   activities	  
were	  commonly	  regarded…	  as	  merely	  imitative…”	  (Intelligence	  Bureau	  1918:	  1)	  
Those	   informal	   understandings	   of	   Afghan	   character	   were	   conditioned	   by	   a	   need	   to	   formally	  
acknowledge	  Afghan	  sovereignty.	  This	  need	  arose	  partly	  as	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  commitments	  made	  by	  the	  
Entente	   in	   opposition	   to	   the	   Central	   Powers	   in	   World	   War	   I	   and	   later	   in	   opposition	   to	   Bolshevik	  
propaganda.	   (ibid:	   2,	   19-­‐23)	   It	   was	   also	   powerfully	   articulated	   in	   Wilson’s	   Fourteen	   Points	   and	   the	  
formation	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  third	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	  where	  Afghanistan’s	  
sovereignty	  was	   formally	   recognized	  by	  Britain,	   the	   formal	   requirements	  of	   sovereign	   recognition	   laid	  
alongside	  informal	  knowledges	  regarding	  Afghanistan’s	  incapacity	  to	  wield	  sovereignty.	  
“…if	   we	   would	   only	   give	   Afghanistan	   an	   assurance	   that	   she	   had	   full	   liberty	   in	   her	   foreign	  
relations	  she	  would	  very	  soon	  come	  back	  to	  us	  in	  practice,	  and	  that	  we	  should	  be	  her	  advisors	  
in	  a	  more	  real	  sense	  than	  ever	  before.”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1919:	  240)	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These	   informal	   ‘knowledges’	   about	  Afghanistan	   continue	   into	   contemporary	   times	   (which	  will	  
be	  explored	  more	   fully	   in	   the	  course	  of	   this	  project).	   Literature	  and	  policy	  briefings	   related	   to	   the	  CCI	  
takes	   for	   granted	   the	   incapacity	   of	   the	   Afghan	   government	   –	   its	   corruption,	   tribalism	   and	   overall	  
weakness	   is	  endemic	   to	   the	  very	  nature	  of	  Afghanistan.	  There	  are	  some	  suggestions	   that	  perhaps	   the	  
United	   States	   bears	   some	   responsibility	   for	   the	   Taliban’s	   depredations	   in	   Afghanistan	   due	   to	   how	   it	  
handled	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  intervention	  –	  but	  the	  inability	  of	  Afghanistan	  to	  fend	  for	  itself	  is	  
both	   taken	   for	   granted	   and	   assumed	   to	   be	   wholly	   a	   function	   of	   the	   Afghan	   identity	   itself.	   These	  
assumptions	  rest	  alongside	  a	  formal	  recognition	  of	  the	  Afghan	  right	  to	  sovereignty,	  and	  its	  legitimacy	  in	  
theory	  –	  both	  of	  which	  are	  important	  aspects	  of	  emphasizing	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  West	  and	  the	  liberal	  
state	  system	  itself.	  
The  CCI  and  Afghan  Emptiness  
This	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  community	  cohesion	  project	  in	  Afghanistan	  highlights	  the	  natural	  
emptiness	  assumed	  about	  the	  place.	  The	  project	  of	  building	  a	  national	   identity	  was	  central	  to	  building	  
the	   government’s	   legitimacy.	   Legitimacy	   is	   the	   key	   central	   aspect	   to	   sovereignty	   –	   by	   accepting	   the	  
government’s	   legitimacy	  you	  accept	   its	   right	   to	   the	   recourse	  of	   legitimate	   force…	  thus	  denying	  such	  a	  
right	  to	  insurgent	  groups	  and	  helping	  to	  foster	  peace	  and	  stability.	  
Afghanistan	  is	  empty.	  It	  is	  a	  collapsed	  space	  that	  could	  have	  /	  should	  have	  been	  a	  state	  (and	  on	  
some	   level,	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   assumptions	   held	  within	   the	   failed	   state	   paradigm,	   Afghanistan’s	   natural	  
position	   is	  as	  a	   state…	  even	  as	  actions	   toward	  Afghanistan	  suggest	   that	   its	  natural	   state	   is	  empty	  and	  
barbaric).	   It	   is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  NATO	  allies	  to	   instill	  Afghanistan	  with	  the	  
civility	  needed,	  the	  knowledge	  and	  the	  moral	  fiber,	  to	  attain	  (regain?)	  sovereignty.	  These	  very	  processes	  
call	   into	  question	   the	  nature	  of	   sovereignty	   and	   the	   state	  –	   if	   sovereignty	   involves	   self-­‐determination	  
then	  it	  cannot	  be	  imposed.	  	  
In	   every	   case	   of	   intervention	   on	   Afghanistan,	   from	   the	   19th	   century	   to	   now,	   Afghanistan’s	  
character	  has	  been	  a	  blank	  slate	  to	  be	  filled	  in	  based	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  intervener	  –	  along	  with	  some	  
narrative	   legacies	   from	  what	   came	  before,	  mobilized	   in	   different	  ways	   according	   to	   the	   exigencies	   of	  	  	  	  
the	   present.	   Afghanistan’s	   savagery	   was	   used	   to	   highlight	   Britain’s	   civility,	   its	   illegitimacy	   reinforced	  
Britain’s	   regional	   place	  of	  moral	   superiority.	   In	   the	  Cold	  War,	   Afghanistan’s	   victimhood	   in	   the	   face	  of	  
Soviet	  aggression	  reinforced	  America’s	  role	  as	  champion	  and	  protector	  against	  the	  evils	  of	  communism.	  
In	   the	   post-­‐September	   11	   context,	   Afghanistan	   is	   both	   victim	   and	   barbaric	   aggressor	   –	   a	   failed	   state	  
which	   is	   suffering	   but	   which	   failed	   through	   its	   own	   fault,	   a	   center	   of	   terrorism	   because	   of	   its	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backwardness	  and	  inability	  to	  plug	  into	  the	  world	  system.	  This,	  then,	  casts	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  dark	  mirror	  
of	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   the	   state	   system	  and	  democracy,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  place	  of	   the	  United	  States	  as	   the	  
guarantor	  of	  that	  system	  against	  the	  evils	  of	  terrorist	  ideologies.	  	  
This	   specific	   example	   of	   the	   CCI	   is	   one	   small	   instance	   of	   this	   discursive	   regime	   of	   truth.	   The	  
United	  States	  is	  the	  only	  one	  able	  to	  show	  Afghanistan	  how	  to	  be	  a	  state	  while	  simultaneously	  teaching	  
the	   people	   of	   Afghanistan	   how	   to	   be	   legitimate	   Afghans…	   while	   simultaneously	   saving	   them	   from	  
terrorism	  and	  from	  themselves.	  This	  insistence	  on	  treating	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  self	  is	  complicit	  
in	  the	  continuing	  string	  of	  crises	  which	  have	  afflicted	  Afghanistan	  for	  generations.	  Its	  long-­‐standing	  role	  
as	   a	   space	   without	   meaning	   of	   its	   own,	   where	   invasions	   can	   be	   undertaken	   legitimately	   call	   into	  
question	  the	  motivations	  behind	  those	  interventions	  and	  force	  us	  to	  ask	  hard	  questions	  about	  our	  own	  
Western	  approaches.	  
Tied	   in	   to	   notions	   of	   Afghan	   legitimacy	   were	   questions	   of	   American	   legitimacy.	   The	   United	  
States	  has	  a:	  “…moral	  imperative	  of	  not	  abandoning	  the	  Afghan	  people…	  depredations	  of	  the	  Taliban…	  
deadly	  spread	  of	  instability”.	  (Barno	  2009:	  3)	  U.S.	  legitimacy	  relies	  on	  changing	  Afghanistan’s	  character	  
from	  that	  of	  an	  empty,	  barbaric	  place	  into	  a	  “real”	  state.	  This	  is	  a	  case	  of	  noblesse	  oblige,	  a	  kind	  of	  post-­‐
paternal	  imperative.	  	  
“The	  fundamental	  flaw	  in	  any	  U.S.	  approach	  to	  Afghanistan…	  remains	  the	  lack	  of	  confidence	  
in	   American	   staying	   power:	   ‘You	   Americans	   are	   not	   going	   to	   abandon	   us	   again	   [emphasis	  
mine]	  are	  you?’”.	  (ibid:	  1)	  
And	  
“We…	   [can]	   help	   the	   host	   nation	   government	   and	   its	   population	   build	   rule	   of	   law,	   stable	  
governance,	   a	   sustainable	   economy	   and	   the	   fundamental	   conditions	   for	   well-­‐being.”	   (Cole	  
2009:	  3)	  
Afghanistan’s	   emptiness	   is	   filled	   up	  with	   a	   need	   for	   legitimacy	   –	   both	   Afghan	   and	   American.	  
Afghanistan	   is	   empty	   of	   the	   civilized	   traits	   needed	   for	   legitimate,	   sovereign	   statehood.	   The	   United	  
States’	  intervention	  on	  Afghanistan	  is	  justified	  in	  large	  part	  as	  articulated	  by	  programs	  such	  as	  the	  CCI.	  
By	  mentoring	  Afghanistan	  and	  transforming	  its	  culture,	  Afghanistan	  could	  have	  its	  emptiness	  filled	  with	  
legitimacy	   and	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   America’s	   leadership	   role	   globally	   (particularly	   in	   the	   Global	  War	   on	  
Terror)	  would	  be	  validated.	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That	   legitimacy	   is	  embodied	   in	   the	  principles	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  democracy	   (with	  state	   failure	  
and	  terrorism	  as	  the	  counter-­‐points).	  However,	  packed	  into	  the	  language	  of	  state	  failure	  are	  discursive	  
notions	  which	   call	   into	   question	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   sovereign,	   of	   the	   state.	   These	   notions	   are	   further	  
destabilized	   by	   the	   simple	   act	   of	   intervention	   –	   the	   principles	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   democracy	   in	  
themselves	   forbid	   acts	   of	   intervention.	   It	   is	   only	   Afghanistan’s	   emptiness	   which	   seems	   to	   authorize	  
those	  acts,	   in	  the	  name	  of	  sovereignty	  and	   in	  the	  name	  of	  democracy	  while	  simultaneously	  serving	  to	  
undermine	  sovereignty	  and	  democracy.	  
In	  order	  to	  understand	  what	  makes	  these	  very	  contradictory	  acts	  possible,	  we	  must	  understand	  
the	  discursive	  legacy	  of	  Western	  intervention	  in	  Afghanistan.	  We	  must	  ask	  how	  Afghanistan’s	  identity	  of	  
non-­‐identity	  was	  constructed	  and	  recreated	  from	  the	  early	  19th	  century	  (at	  least)	  through	  today.	  What’s	  
more,	   this	   needs	   to	   be	   done	   without	   reference	   to	   pre-­‐existing	   critical	   paradigms.	   Those	   critical	  
paradigms	   may	   well	   have	   answers	   to	   what	   makes	   those	   contradictory	   acts	   possible	   [colonial	   /	  
postcolonial	  discursive	  knowledges,	  core/periphery	  relations,	  hegemonic	  logics],	  but	  those	  answers	  are	  
couched	  within	  theoretical	  models	  of	  the	  world	  which	  are	  not	  specific	  to	  Afghanistan.	  Thus	  relying	  solely	  
on	   such	   critical	   perspectives	   replicates	   the	   ignoring	   of	   Afghan	   identity	   that	   outside	   powers	   have	  
assumed	  in	  denying	  a	  unique	  character	  to	  Afghanistan.	  	  	  	  	  
Theory:  Explaining  why  the  Indeterminacy  of  Afghanistan  Matters  
This	  project	  argues	  that	  the	  term	  “failed”	  in	  “failed	  state”	  obscures	  the	  specific	  identity	  of	  states	  
taken	   to	   be	   failing.	   Rather	   than	   describing	   a	   specific	   characteristic	   of	   a	   troubled	   state	   that	  might	   be	  
useful	   in	   helping	   orient	   policy,	   “failed	   state”	   takes	   over	   the	   identity	   of	   states	   bearing	   that	   label	  
completely.	  Exploring	  Afghanistan	  by	  way	  of	  deconstructive	  discourse	  analysis	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  see	  
the	  specific	  and	  unique	  character	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  interactions	  with	  the	  West.	  This	  analysis,	  showcased	  
in	  coming	  chapters,	  reveals	  these	  binary	  oppositions	  in	  how	  Afghanistan’s	  character	  is	  constructed	  and	  
placed.	  Those	  oppositions	  have	  the	  function	  of	  rendering	  any	  appreciation	  of	  an	  actual	  Afghan	  character	  
problematic	   –	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	   Afghan	   character	   is	   subsumed	   by	   a	   constructed	   emptiness	   that	   is	  
driven	  by	  the	  constant	  need	  to	  define	  Afghanistan	  in	  relation	  not	  to	  Afghanistan’s	  attributes	  but	  to	  the	  
seemingly	   compelling	   strategic	   and	  political	   logics	  of	   the	   time.	   Thus	  we	   find	  Afghanistan	  as	   an	  empty	  
wasteland	  of	  barbarism,	  a	  den	  of	  terrorism,	  a	  geopolitical	  gameboard	  to	  fight	  Russia	  and	  protect	  India,	  
or	   to	   fight	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   “save”	   Afghani	   victims.	   In	   each	   intervention	   on	   Afghanistan,	   certain	  
discursive	  tactics	  are	  utilized	  which	  form	  threads	  of	  continuity	  from	  one	  intervention	  to	  the	  next.	  These	  
continuities,	  and	  the	  process	  of	  marginalizing	  Afghanistan	  into	  an	  indeterminate	  empty	  space	  to	  enable	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those	  continuities	  to	  continue	  functioning	  –	  make	   it	  possible	  neatly	  to	  place	  Afghanistan	   in	  a	  category	  
that	  makes	  sense	  in	  a	  liberal	  orthodox	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  international	  arena.	  This	  understanding	  
serves	   to	   reinforce	  Western	  views	  of	   itself	  and	   justify	   certain	  policies	  and	  practices,	  but	   it	  also	  makes	  
understanding	   the	   very	   real	   problems	   that	   plague	   Afghanistan	   and	   the	   Afghan	   people	   all	   but	  
impossible…	  because	  in	  this	  conception,	  one	  can	  say	  that	  there	  is	  no	  Afghanistan.	  	  
Yet	   the	   very	   process	   of	  marginalizing	   Afghanistan	   and	   positioning	   it	   as	   indeterminate	   reveals	  
certain	  tensions	  within	  the	  narrative.	  Those	  binary	  oppositions	  suffer	  from	  an	  auto-­‐immune	  dysfunction.	  
The	  process	  of	  “filling	  up”	  Afghanistan	  with	  character	  traits	  necessary	  to	  justify	  given	  interventions	  while	  
relying	   on	   “knowledges”	   about	   Afghan	   character	   from	   previous	   interventions	   means	   that	   what	   is	  
“known”	   about	   Afghan	   identity	   is	   often	   at	   odds	  with	   itself.	   Further,	   assigning	   character	   attributes	   to	  
Afghanistan	  and	  attempting	  to	  naturalize	  them	  through	  narrative	  orthodoxy	  is	  in	  strong	  tension	  with	  the	  
very	  indeterminacy	  which	  is	  necessary	  to	  continuing	  the	  narrative	  marginalization	  process.	  	  
This	   auto-­‐immune	   dilemma	   shows	   itself	   in	   a	   few	   ways.	   First	   and	   foremost,	   Afghanistan’s	  
seeming	  emptiness	   is	   filled	  up	  with	   contradictory	   concepts,	   each	  of	  which	   is	   somehow	  definitional	   to	  
what	   it	  means	   to	   be	   Afghan.	   At	   different	   times	   Afghanistan	   has	   been	   considered	   empty	   and	   savage,	  
duplicitous,	  wholly	  evil,	  insignificant,	  barbaric,	  innocent,	  heroic…	  naturally	  imbued	  with	  statehood	  (and	  
the	   nationalist	   spirit),	   incapable	   of	   civilized	   action	   or	   thought.	   While	   it	   might	   be	   argued	   that	   many	  
national	   identities	   comprise	  of	   various	   contradictory	   concepts,	   in	   the	  Afghan	   case	   these	   concepts	   are	  
often	  buried	  under	  layers	  of	  narrative	  ‘knowing’	  –	  and	  are	  thus	  unacknowledged.	  More	  tellingly,	  those	  
often	  (but	  not	  always)	  hidden	  concepts	  are	  foundational	  to	  what	  legitimized	  interventionist	  practices	  in	  
Afghanistan.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  access	  these	  discursive	  tensions,	  a	  historical	  survey	  of	  interventionist	  actions	  toward	  
Afghanistan	   (and	   various	   narratives	   around	   those	   interventions)	   has	   been	   conducted.	   This	   analysis	  
suggests	   a	   certain	   continuity	   of	   core	   concepts	   regarding	   Afghanistan.	   One	   of	   these	   is	   a	   concept	   of	  
emptiness	   –	   typified	   by	   barbarism	   (or	   at	   least	   the	   lack	   of	   civilization).	   Another	   is	   this	   idea	   that	  
interventions	   in	  Afghanistan	  are	  always	   justified	  by	  something	   larger	  than	  Afghanistan	  –	  an	  idea	  made	  
easier	   by	   the	   emptiness	   paradigm	   that	   suggests	   that	   most	   things	   are,	   in	   fact,	   more	   important	   than	  
Afghanistan.	   These	   two	   concepts	   interact	   in	   a	   way	   which	   not	   only	   justifies	   interventions,	   but	   also	  
buttresses	  certain	  self-­‐conceptions	  from	  the	  Western	  intervener’s	  perspective.	  Britain	  was	  justified	  in	  its	  
interventions	  because	  it	  was	  a	  proper	  state,	   it	  was	  civilized,	   it	  has	  the	  power	  to	  operate	  unopposed,	   it	  
was	   protecting	   civilization	   in	   the	  Great	  Game	   (in	   this	   case	  British	   India).	   Afghanistan’s	   emptiness	  was	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filled	  up	  with	  geo-­‐political	   logics	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  cast	  as	  an	  oppositional	  way	  of	  Britain	  knowing	  
itself	  –	  it	  could	  be	  defined	  in	  large	  part	  by	  what	  it	  was	  not,	  and	  what	  it	  was	  not	  was	  barbaric,	  Oriental,	  
backward	  Afghanistan.	  
So	   civilization	  –	   and	  an	  emptiness	  defining	   lack	   thereof	  was	  one	   justification	   for	   intervention.	  
That	  continued	  into	  American	  interventions,	  though	  how	  that	  was	  expressed	  changed.	  That	  change	  was	  
empowered	   by	   Afghanistan’s	   emptiness,	   which	   herein	   could	   also	   be	   conceived	   as	   a	   certain	  
indeterminacy	  –	  because	   it	  was	  empty	   it	   could	  be	   reconfigured	   to	  be	  almost	   anything.	  After	   the	  First	  
World	  War,	  Afghanistan	  was	  suddenly	  a	  state.	  However,	  on	  an	  informal	  basis	  it	  was	  not	  and	  could	  not	  
be	  a	  state	  because	  culturally	  Afghans	  lacked	  the	  capacity	  to	  even	  understand	  statehood	  and	  civilization.	  
Thus,	  Afghanistan	  was	  both	  a	  state	  and	  not	  a	  state.	  
Being	  a	   state,	   interventions	   in	  Afghanistan	   to	   follow	  World	  War	  One	  called	   for	  new	  discursive	  
paradigms	  to	  justify	  those	  interventions.	  A	  legitimate	  intervention	  now	  had	  to	  cope	  with	  Afghanistan’s	  
formal	   statehood.	   This	   was	   done	   by	   appeal	   to	   concepts	   which	   underlay	   the	   informal	   idea	   that	  
Afghanistan	   wasn’t	   really	   capable	   of	   true	   statehood.	   In	   the	   Cold	   War	   this	   was	   expressed	   through	  
narratives	  of	  the	  unsophisticated	  Afghan,	  and	  the	  victimized	  Afghan	   in	  the	  face	  of	  evil	  communism.	   In	  
the	  post-­‐	  September	  11	  period	  this	  justification	  comes	  through	  narratives	  of	  state	  failure	  and	  the	  Afghan	  
victim.	   In	  both	  cases	  certain	   ideologies	  were	  strongly	  mobilized,	  both	  relating	   to	  democracy.	  The	  Cold	  
War	  was	  the	  ideological	  battle	  of	  liberal	  capitalism	  versus	  communism;	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  is	  the	  
battle	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  versus	  terrorism.	  In	  both	  cases	  Afghanistan	  was	  the	  battleground	  (as	  during	  
the	  Great	  Game)	  while	  simultaneously	  being	  a	  victim	  of	  the	  enemy	  and	  complicit	  with	  the	  enemy.	  
These	   discursive	   tensions	   then	   seem	   to	   revolve	   largely	   around	   legitimacy.	   What	   legitimizes	  
interventions	   in	   Afghanistan?	   The	   answer	   is	   that,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   talking	   about	   Afghanistan	   very	  
straight-­‐forwardly	   as	   a	   land	   of	   barbarians	   that	   doesn’t	   matter	   (as	   during	   British	   interventions),	   the	  
assumption	  of	  Afghanistan’s	   right	   to	   sovereignty	   is	  what	   legitimizes	   interventions.	   In	   and	  of	   itself	   this	  
sounds	   immediately	   problematic	   but	   perhaps	   not	   in	   a	   new	   or	   unique	   way.	   The	   discursive	   legacy	   of	  
emptiness	  and	  indeterminacy	  is	  a	  big	  part	  of	  what	  sets	  the	  Afghan	  case	  apart.	  Due	  to	  its	  indeterminacy,	  
Afghanistan	   is	   simultaneously	   aggressor	   and	   victim,	   terrorist	   and	   (failed)	   state.	   Afghanistan	  
simultaneously	   has	   a	   right	   to	   sovereignty,	   to	   peace	   and	   prosperity	   that	   are	   being	   infringed	   up	   (by	  
terrorists,	  currently)	  –	  and	  is	  a	  legitimate	  target	  of	  Western	  intervention	  and	  war-­‐making.	  Afghanistan	  is	  
a	  suitable	  theater	  of	  operations	  for	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,	  where	  war	  is	  waged	  both	  on	  the	  Afghan	  and	  on	  
behalf	  of	  the	  Afghan.	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Legitimacy	  is	  fundamentally	  important	  here	  –	  the	  ambiguities	  of	  what	  “legitimacy”	  means	  allows	  
for	  contradictory	  standpoints	  to	  be	  taken.	  Afghanistan	  has	  a	  legitimate	  right	  to	  sovereignty.	  Afghanistan	  
has	   legitimately	   failed	   to	   exercise	   sovereignty	   effectively	   or	   ethically.	   This	   has	   led	   to	   both	   security	  
(terrorism)	   and	   humanitarian	   crises	  which	   the	  United	   States	   is	   legitimately	   concerned	   about.	   Yet	   the	  
United	   States	   cannot	   intervene	   unless	   it	   can	   do	   so	   legitimately,	   or	   it	   will	   undermine	   the	   concept	   of	  
sovereignty	  itself.	  	  
Orthodox	   views	   on	   sovereignty	   is	   figured	   to	   be	   the	   capacity	   of	   a	   state	   to	   possess	   clear	   and	  
legitimate	  political	  authority	  to	  exert	  power.	  To	  be	  sovereign,	  the	  state	  organs	  must	  possess	  both	  power	  
and	  authority,	  where	  that	  authority	   is	  recognized	  and	  respected	  as	   legitimate	  by	  the	  state’s	  people.	   In	  
this	  concept,	  clarity	  arises	  out	  of	  a	  definite	  and	  authoritative	  power	  holder	  and	  legitimacy	  derives	  from	  
the	  source	  of	  symbolic	  authority	  within	  the	  state.13	  	  	  
State	  sovereignty	  is	  taken	  to	  apply	  to	  internal	  operations	  and	  not	  to	  its	  power	  over	  other	  states,	  
which	  are	  assumed	  to	  exert	  sovereignty	  within	  their	  borders.	  By	  default,	  interventions	  on	  another	  state	  
are	  illegitimate	  and	  undermine	  the	  intervener’s	  symbolic	  authority,	  and	  thus	  legitimacy.	  The	  designation	  
of	  “failed	  state”	  is	  used	  to	  make	  interventions	  on	  that	  failed	  state	  legitimate.	  Because	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  
failed	  state,	  an	  intervention	  on	  Afghanistan	  is	  legitimate	  –	  Afghanistan	  has	  the	  right	  to	  sovereignty	  but	  
in	  effect	  has	  no	  sovereignty	  –	  it	  lacks	  authoritative	  power14.	  	  
Even	   this	   statement	   is	   at	   considerable	   tension	   with	   itself.	   This	   intervention	   is	   at	   odds	   with	  
standard	  assumptions	  of	  sovereignty.	  Moreover,	  the	  lack	  of	  respect	  for	  Afghan	  sovereignty	  has	  been	  a	  
continuous	   feature	   of	  Western	   interactions	  with	  Afghanistan	   and	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   detracting	   from	   the	  
symbolic	  legitimacy	  of	  Western	  limited	  sovereignty.	  Derrida	  argues	  that	  the	  designation	  of	  some	  states	  
as	   ‘rogue’	   by	   dominant	   Western	   states	   is	   contradictory	   because	   that	   labeling	   flouts	   international	  
recognitive	  norms.	  If	  a	  state	  is	  a	  state,	  it	  cannot	  be	  a	  “rogue”	  state	  –	  and	  relegating	  a	  state	  to	  the	  status	  
of	   “rogueness”	   from	   an	   external,	   dominant	   position	   is	   a	   violent	   act	  which	   is,	   itself,	   rogue.	   The	   same	  
argument	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  designation	  of	  some	  states	  as	  ‘failed.’	  	  
Beyond	  narrative	  positioning,	  Derrida	  sees	  sovereignty	   in	  a	  general	  way	  as	  harboring	  tensions.	  
On	  the	  one	  hand	  sovereignty	  identifies	  where	  authoritative	  power	  lies	  within	  a	  state	  and	  allows	  for	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See T. Hobbes, Leviathan ed. M. Oakeshott (London, Macmillan, 1962) 
14 This is functionally almost identical to arguments as to why British interventions on Afghanistan during the 
second Anglo-Afghan war were legitimate. Afghanistan didn’t have the power to demand its sovereignty be 
respected, thus it was completely legitimate not to respect any claim to sovereignty by Afghanistan.  
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execution.	  On	  the	  other,	  sovereignty	  is	  held	  to	  be	  legitimate	  but	  there	  is	  always	  a	  gap	  between	  the	  claim	  
to	  legitimacy	  and	  actual	  concrete	  measures	  whereby	  power	  is	   legitimized.	  Hence	  if	  a	  regime	  is	  held	  to	  
be	  a	  democracy	  and	  democratic	  forms	  of	  legitimation	  of	  sovereign	  power	  justify	  sovereign	  actions,	  then	  
these	  democratic	  features	  can	  be	  questioned.	  Through	  the	  exercise	  of	  sovereign	  actions,	  there	  are	  some	  
people	   within	   the	   state	   who	   will	   be	   excluded	   and	   some	   who	   will	   be	   marginalized	   or	   made	   less	  
influential.	   The	   ways	   in	   which	   views	   are	   developed	   or	   actions	   are	   decided	   upon	   can	   be	   questioned.	  
Hence	   sovereignty	   -­‐	   like	   democracy	   and	   justice	   -­‐	   can	   never	   be	   completed	   or	   supported	   conclusively.	  
Sovereignty	  can	  be	   thought	  about	  but	  not	  known.	   It	   is	  always	  at	   tension	  with	   itself,	   its	   reduction	   to	  a	  
series	  of	  dichotomies	  (sovereign/non-­‐sovereign;	  rogue/orderly)	  is	  illicit.	  This	  problematizes	  the	  notion	  of	  
legitimacy	  which	  is	  fundamental	  to	  interventions	  on	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  failed	  state.	  
This	   tension	   is	   dealt	   with	   by	   relegating	   Afghanistan	   to	   a	   position	   of	   indeterminacy	   and	  
insubstantiality.	   Calling	   Afghanistan	   a	   [state/failed	   state/terror	   haven/tactical	   space/humanitarian	  
disaster],	   all	   simultaneously	   (because	   of	   indeterminacy)	   is	   only	   possible	   because	   there	   is	   an	   imposed	  
silence,	   an	   assumption	   of	   emptiness,	   on	   Afghan	   identity.	   That	   silence	   hides	   why	   and	   how	   Afghan	  
identity	  came	  to	  be	  constructed	  as	  something	  which	  could	  be	   -­‐	  which	  deserved	  to	  be	   (by	  way	  of	  both	  
salvation	   and	   punitive	   measure)	   intervened	   upon.	   Yet	   this	   indeterminacy	   only	   distracts	   from	   the	  
tensions	  within	  the	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	  generally,	  and	  how	  it	  is	  mobilized	  specifically	  here.	  It	  does	  not	  
change	  or	  do	  away	  with	  those	  tensions.	  
This	   thesis	   seeks	   to	  make	  explicit	  what	  was	   silent.	   It	   seeks	   to	   find	   alternate	  ways	   to	   confront	  
what	   are	   very	   real	   disasters	   in	  Afghanistan	  without	   recreating	   the	   conditions	  which	  were	   at	   the	   very	  
least	  complicit	   in	  making	  those	  disasters	  possible	   in	  the	  first	  place.	  Through	  analysis	  and	  exposition	  of	  
the	   various	   binary	   oppositions	   utilized	   in	   historic	   interactions	   with	   Afghanistan,	   this	   project	  
demonstrates	   how	   the	   marginalization	   and	   resultant	   assigned	   indeterminacy	   of	   Afghan	   identity	  




Chapter  2  –  Exploring  the  Literature  and  Theoretical   
Posit ioning  
	  
This	  chapter	  considers	  existing	  literature	  on	  state	  failure	  generally	  and	  Afghanistan’s	  place	  in	  the	  
literature	   specifically.	   The	   aim	   is	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   failed	   states	   are	   conceptualized	   –	   and	   how	  
Afghanistan	  in	  particular	  is	  conceptualized	  within	  that	  broader	  failed	  state	  discourse	  –	  plays	  into	  themes	  
identified	  in	  relation	  to	  unhelpful	  discursive	  binary	  oppositions.	  	  
Analysis	  here	  is	  arranged	  in	  several	  parts.	  The	  first	  and	  second	  sections	  consider	  approaches	  to	  
understanding	  state	   failure	  which	   focus	  on	   internal	  and	  then	  external	  causes.	  While	  both	   internal	  and	  
external	   factors	   contributing	   to	   the	   crises	  we	   identify	   as	   state	   failure	   are	   important	   to	   analyze,	   these	  
focuses	   tend	   to	   rely	   on	   a	   generalized	   theoretical	   referent.	   Over-­‐reliance	   on	   these	   foci	   reinforces	  
particular	  narratives	  on	  “how	  the	  world	  works”	   rather	   than	  speaking	   to	   the	  particularities	  and	  unique	  
identity	  of	  any	  given	  so-­‐called	  failed	  state.	  The	  third	  section	  considers	  existing	  literature	  which	  seeks	  to	  
engage	  specifically	  with	  the	  Afghan	  case.	  The	  fourth	  and	  final	  section	  situates	  this	  dissertation	  within	  the	  
literature	   and	  makes	   an	   argument	   for	   deconstructive	   analyses	   exploring	   the	   very	   unique	   and	   specific	  
way	   in	   which	   Afghan	   identity	   was	   created	   narratively	   through	   interventions	   over	   the	   course	   of	   two	  
centuries.	  
Approaches	  assuming	  internal	  causes	  for	  state	  failure	  tend	  to	  be	  connected	  with	  liberal	  theories	  
of	   international	   relations	   while	   approaches	   assuming	   external	   causes	   for	   state	   failure	   are	   connected	  
with	   critical	   theory.	   This	   is	   not	   always	   the	   case:	   Edwards	   and	   Caron	   especially	   don’t	   fit	   comfortably	  
within	   those,	   admittedly	   binary,	   labels.	   This	   particular	   binary	   approach	   (internal/external	   causes,	  
liberal/critical	  theory)	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  naturalize	  particular	  conceptions	  of	  the	  social	  world.	  Nor	  does	  it	  
assume	   all	   social	   theory	   is	   either/or.	   It	   describes	   dominant	   trends,	   identifies	   outliers	   and	   stakes	   out	  
grounds	   for	   the	   uniqueness	   of	   this	   project’s	   approach.	   The	   binary,	   nevertheless,	   privileges	   certain	  
articulations	   of	   the	   social	   world	   (sovereignty,	   statehood)	   that	   this	   project	   intends	   to	   disrupt	   by	  
suggesting	  Afghan	  specificity	  lies	  outside	  those	  defined	  boundaries.	  
Liberal  Statehood  and  the  Internal  Causes  of  State  Failure  
Attempts	  to	  understand	  the	  phenomena	  of	  state	  failure	  which	  focus	  on	  internal	  causes	  can	  be	  
broadly	  identified	  with	  a	  liberal	  stance.	  Within	  what	  we	  might	  very	  loosely	  term	  a	  liberal	  umbrella	  here	  
there	   are	   lively	   debates	   as	   to	   the	   sort	   of	   internal	   dysfunctions	   which	   led	   to	   the	   collapse	   of	   state	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apparatuses.	  A	   trait	   common	   to	   this	   theme	   is	   that	   external	   conditions	   are	  not	   seen	  as	   fundamentally	  
important	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  a	  state.	   If	  the	   internal	  conditions	  of	  the	  state	  were	  healthy,	   it	   is	  presumed,	  
then	  even	  if	  there	  are	  challenging	  external	  conditions	  those	  could	  be	  effectively	  resisted	  and	  –	  short	  of	  
outright	  war	  –	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  success	  could	  be	  maintained.	  These	  approaches	  point	  out	  flaws	  in	  
the	  failed	  state’s	  internal	  political	  culture	  –	  how	  governing	  institutions	  interact	  with	  the	  public,	  with	  the	  
outside	  world,	  and	  within	  itself	  –	  and	  work	  to	  prescribe	  cures	  to	  these	  dysfunctions.	  In	  this	  way	  blame	  is	  
individuated	   and	   there	   is	   no	  perceived	  need	   to	   consider	   how	  external	   pressures	   –	   pressures	   that	   the	  
West	  may	  be	  complicit	  in	  –	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  state	  collapse.	  It	  also	  reinforces	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  
liberal	  system	  of	  statehood	  is	  not	  affected	  by	  this	  instance	  of	  state	  failure	  –	  rather	  the	  opposite,	  we	  find	  
that	  articulations	  of	  state	  failure	  are	  important	  to	  stabilizing	  notions	  of	  state	  success.	  
There	  were	   scattered	   references	   to	   failed	   and	   rogue	   states	   during	   the	   final	   years	   of	   the	   Cold	  
War.	  However,	  a	  certain	  coalescing	  of	  narratives	  around	  failed	  states	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  which	  needed	  
specific	  attention	  came	  about	  in	  the	  early	  1990’s.	  Early	  interaction	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  state	  failure	  had	  a	  
strong	  emphasis	  on	  ‘saving’	  these	  failed	  states.	  For	  instance:	  
“The	   long-­‐term	   acceptance	   of	   limitations	   on	   absolute	   sovereignty…	   [allow	   for]	   new	  
alternatives	  for	  responding	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  failed	  states.	  The	  international	  community	  
should	  now	  be	  prepared	  to	  consider	  a	  novel,	  expansive-­‐-­‐and	  desperately	  needed—effort…	  to	  
undertake	  nation-­‐saving	  responsibilities.”	  (Helman	  and	  Ratner	  1992:	  8)15	  [emphasis	  mine]	  
At	  this	  point,	  failed	  states	  were	  seen	  as	  a	  growing	  issue	  which	  had	  been	  essentially	  ignored	  due	  
to	  (perhaps	  exacerbated	  by)	  geopolitical	  concerns	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Failed	  states	  were	  those	  states	  which	  
did	   not	   emerge	   from	   the	   Cold	  War	   years	  with	   governments	   competent	   or	  moral	   enough	   to	   seize	   for	  
themselves	  the	  benefits	  of	  triumphant	  liberal	  democratic	  capitalism.	  
With	   the	   triumph	  of	   liberal	  democratic	  capitalism,	   the	  argument	  went,	   it	  was	  now	  possible	   to	  
turn	  to	  helping	  these	  so	  called	  failed	  states.	  They	  could	  be	  revived	  and	  reintegrated	  into	  a	  harmonious	  
community	   of	   states.	   There	   was	   a	   recognition	   of	   some	   security-­‐related	   concerns	   but	   the	   primary	  
discursive	   focus	   was	   on	   help.	   This	   period	   saw	   state	   failure	   analyzed	   primarily	   outside	   policy	   making	  
organs,	  though	  it	  was	  filtering	  into	  the	  policy	  conversation	  as	  the	  decade	  matured.	  For	  instance,	  then-­‐US	  
Ambassador	  to	  the	  UN	  (and	  later	  Secretary	  of	  State)	  Madeleine	  Albright	  called	  Somalia	  a	  failed	  state	  in	  
making	  an	  argument	  as	  to	  why	  intervention	  there	  was	  necessary.	  (Albright	  1993)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See also Gros 1996, Thurer 1999 
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The	  events	  of	  September	  11,	  2001	  hurried	  what	  had	  been	  in	  the	  decade	  prior	  a	  slow	  evolution	  
of	  the	  narrative	  on	  state	  failure.	  At	  this	  point,	   literature	  began	  exploring	  connections	  between	  notions	  
of	   failure	  and	   rogueness.	   	   Links	   to	   terrorism	  and	   regional	   /	  global	   threats	  were	  explored.	  Prior	   to	   this	  
there	   had	   been	   some	   movement	   within	   the	   policy	   community	   to	   define	   this	   phenomenon	   of	   state	  
failure,	   its	  parameters	  and	  causes	  (i.e.	  World	  Bank	  1997),	  but	  after	  September	  11	  the	  project	  gained	  a	  
whole	  new	  urgency.	  After	  all:	  
“State	   failure	   threatens	   global	   stability	   because	   national	   governments	   have	   become	   the	  
primary	   building	   blocks	   of	   order.	   International	   security	   relies	   on	   states	   to	   protect	   against	  
chaos…	  and	  limit	  the	  cancerous	  spread	  of	  anarchy…”	  (Rotberg	  2002:	  130)	  
So,	  after	  the	  events	  of	  September	  11,	  saving	  failed	  states	  (which	  is	  to	  say,	  intervening	  upon)	  was	  
necessary	   both	   morally	   –	   to	   “save”	   the	   state	   –	   and	   also	   pragmatically,	   for	   logics	   of	   security.	   Thus	  
categorizing	  different	  types	  of	  failed	  states,	  deciding	  what	  sort	  of	  threat	  different	  types	  of	  failed	  states	  
might	  exhibit,	  understanding	  potential	  causes	  of	  differing	  types	  of	  failures	  all	  became	  vitally	   important	  
questions.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  some	  failed	  states	  were	  threats	  only	  to	  themselves,	  some	  were	  threats	  to	  their	  
neighbors,	   and	   some	   were	   global	   threats.	   Some	   states	   were	   intent	   on	   improving,	   others	   opted	   for	  
dysfunctionality.	  	  
A	   strong	   example	   of	   how	   discursive	   trends	   were	   shifting	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   work	   of	   Robert	  
Rotberg,	  who	  published	  some	  work	  on	  state	   failure	   in	  2002	  both	   for	  Foreign	  Affairs	  magazine	  and	   for	  
the	  U.S.	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations:	  
Although	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  state	  failure	  is	  not	  new,	  it	  has	  become	  much	  more	  relevant	  and	  
worrying	  than	  ever	  before.	  In	  less	  interconnected	  eras,	  state	  weakness	  could	  be	  isolated	  and	  
kept	  distant.	   Failure	  had	   fewer	   implications	   for	  peace	  and	   security.	  Now,	   these	   states	  pose	  
dangers	   not	   only	   to	   themselves	   and	   their	   neighbors	   but	   also	   to	   peoples	   around	   the	   globe.	  
Preventing	   states	   from	   failing,	   and	   resuscitating	   those	   that	   do	   fail,	   are	   thus	   strategic	   and	  
moral	  imperatives.	  
But	  failed	  states	  are	  not	  homogeneous.	  The	  nature	  of	  state	  failure	  varies	  from	  place	  to	  place,	  
sometimes	   dramatically.	   Failure	   and	   weakness	   can	   flow	   from	   a	   nation's	   geographical,	  
physical,	   historical,	   and	  political	   circumstances,	   such	  as	   colonial	   errors	   and	  Cold	  War	  policy	  
mistakes.	  More	   than	   structural	   or	   institutional	  weaknesses,	   human	  agency	   is	   also	   culpable,	  
usually	  in	  a	  fatal	  way.	  (Rotberg	  2002:	  127-­‐128)	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This	   explains	  narrative	   change	  on	   state	   failure	  –	   the	   collapse	  of	   successful	   governance,	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror,	  must	  now	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  security	  dilemma.	  Combating	  state	  failure	  
had	  shifted	  from	  a	  wholly	  moral	  to	  a	  strategic	  and	  moral	  imperative,	  which	  also	  made	  understanding	  the	  
causes	  of	   failure	  critical.	   Importantly,	  Rotberg	  allows	  that	  some	  structural	   factors	  might	  be	  at	  play	  but	  
emphasizes	   that	   the	  bulk	  of	  culpability	   lies	  on	  the	  states	   themselves	  –	   this	   is	   to	  say,	   states	   fail	  due	  to	  
internal	   causes.	   Previously	   possible	   causes	  were	   seemingly	   glossed	   over,	  with	   focus	   being	   on	   how	   to	  
save	  failed	  states	  –	  and	  assuming	  that	  once	  they’d	  been	  helped	  they	  would	  continue	  to	  be	  successful.	  
With	  security	  concerns	  becoming	  central,	  a	  need	  to	  diagnose	  and	  categorize	  became	  ascendant.	  Others	  
followed	  in	  this	  manner.	  	  
Afghanistan	  specifically	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  driver	  of	  narrative	  change	  on	  failed	  states.	  	  
“Al	  Qaeda’s	   ability	   to	  act	  with	   impunity	   from	  Afghanistan	   changed	   this	   calculus,	   convincing	  
President	   George	  W.	   Bush	   and	   his	   administration	   that	   ‘America	   is	   now	   threatened	   less	   by	  
conquering	  states	  than	  we	  are	  by	  failing	  ones.’”	  (Patrick	  2006:	  27)	  
In	  pursuit	  of	  better	  categorizing	  these	  potential	  national	  security	  threats,	  Patrick	  advocates	  new	  
definition	  sets.	  These	  new	  definitions	  assume	  that	  states	  fail	  because	  governments	  are	  either	  unwilling	  
or	  unable	   to	   fulfill	   their	  sovereign	  responsibilities,	  and	  that	   there	  are	   four	  main	  areas	  of	  responsibility	  
that	  can	  be	  analyzed	  for	  failure:	  
State	  strength	  is	  relative	  and	  can	  be	  measured	  by	  the	  state’s	  ability	  and	  willingness	  to	  provide	  
the	   fundamental	   political	   goods	   associated	   with	   statehood:	   physical	   security,	   legitimate	  
political	  institutions,	  economic	  management,	  and	  social	  welfare.	  Many	  countries	  have	  critical	  
gaps	  in	  one	  or	  more	  of	  these	  four	  areas	  of	  governance.	  In	  effect,	  they	  possess	   legal	  but	  not	  
actual	  sovereignty.	  (ibid:	  29)	  [emphasis	  mine]	  
With	   the	   war	   on	   terror,	   discourse	   on	   state	   failure	   came	   to	   favor	   security	   over	   humanity.16	  
International	  law	  doctrine	  in	  development	  at	  the	  time	  tried	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  reflect	  this	  while	  still	  urging	  
pragmatic	   humanitarian	   interventions.	   This	   found	   expression	   in	   the	   international	   legal	   doctrine	   of	  
“Responsibility	   to	   Protect”.	   (ICISS	   2001)	   The	   doctrine	   tries	   to	   balance	   the	   “right	   to	   intervene”	   for	  
humanitarian	   goods	   against	   the	   prohibition	   on	   intervention	   espoused	   by	   national	   sovereignty.	   (Evans	  
2007:	  706)	  The	  doctrine	  defines	  times	  when	  a	  need	  to	  protect	  an	  “individual	  sovereignty”	  overrides	  the	  
international	  community’s	  natural	  interests	  in	  non-­‐intervention	  and	  respect	  of	  state	  sovereignty.	  (ICISS	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For more on this shift, see also Benn 2004, DFID 2005, NSC 2006, and Natsios 2006. 
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2001:	  30)	  At	   some	  point,	   it	   is	   argued,	   the	  abrogation	  of	   individual	  human	   rights	  override	   state	   rights.	  
This	  not	  only	  makes	  intervention	  justifiable	  –	  it	  makes	  it	  a	  kind	  of	  moral	  imperative.	  	  
R2P	  contains	  language	  which	  brings	  to	  the	  fore	  a	  proposed	  legal	  doctrine	  that	  imposes	  a	  moral	  
responsibility	  on	  states	  to	  consider	  their	  foundational	  notions	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  on	  a	  level	  that	  can	  be	  
conditioned	   by	   individual	   sovereign	   rights.	   It	   is	   an	   interesting	   evolution	   of	   the	   idea	   that	   states	   are	  
justified	  in	  their	  practice	  of	  sovereign	  power	  by	  their	  just	  representation	  of	  the	  interests	  and	  well-­‐being	  
of	   their	  citizenry.	   It	  expands	  this	   idea	  of	  citizenry,	  arguably,	   to	  a	  global	  context.	  This	   reconditioning	  of	  
sovereignty	   is	   further	   complicated	   by	   the	   ICISS’	   determination	   that	   intervening	   states	   would	   often	   –	  
perhaps	  out	  of	  another	  type	  of	  competing	  moral	  necessity	  –	  take	  into	  consideration	  their	  own	  interests	  
on	  behalf	  of	   their	  citizenry.	  This	  was	  balanced	  with	  a	   recognition	  that	  any	  state	  would	  only	  choose	  to	  
intervene	  in	  another	  state	  if	  it	  was	  in	  its	  best	  interest.	  	  
“It	   may	   not	   always	   be	   the	   case	   that	   the	   humanitarian	  motive	   is	   the	   only	   one	  moving	   the	  
intervening	   state	   or	   states,	   even	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   Security	   Council-­‐authorized	  
intervention.	   Complete	   disinterestedness	   –	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   narrow	   self-­‐interest	   at	   all	   –	  
may	   be	   an	   ideal,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   likely	   always	   to	   be	   a	   reality:	  mixed	  motives,	   in	   international	  
relations	   as	   everywhere	   else,	   are	   a	   fact	   of	   life.	   Moreover,	   the	   budgetary	   cost	   and	   risk	   to	  
personnel	   involved	   in	   any	  military	   action	  may	   in	   fact	  make	   it	   politically	   imperative	   for	   the	  
intervening	   state	   to	   be	   able	   to	   claim	   some	   degree	   of	   self-­‐interest	   in	   the	   intervention	   [to	  
justify	  the	  act	  to	  its	  citizens]…”	  (ibid:	  36)	  
That	   doctrine,	   formulated	   in	   the	   months	   before	   the	   attacks	   of	   September	   11	   and	   formally	  
published	   shortly	   after,	   reflected	   internal	   tensions	   within	   the	   notion	   of	   sovereignty	   the	   international	  
“community”	  was	  struggling	  with.	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  September	  11,	  R2P	  retained	  relevance	  but	  the	  interest	  
of	  intervening	  parties	  –	  in	  protecting	  themselves	  and	  their	  allies	  from	  security	  problems	  associated	  with	  
failure	   -­‐	   became	   more	   important	   than	   before.	   “Saving	   failed	   states”	   was	   no	   longer	   as	   important	   as	  
“saving	  us	  from	  failed	  states”.	  Failed	  states	  were	  actual	  or	  potential	  havens	  for	  terrorism,	  and	  terrorism	  
is	  considered	  the	  greatest	  possible	  threat	  to	  civilization	  as	  we	  know	  it	  today.	  	  	  Denizens	  of	  those	  failed	  
states	   are	   generally	   considered	   victims	   as	   well	   of	   the	   evils	   of	   terrorism	   –	   thereby	   fulfilling	   the	  
humanitarian	  requirement	  of	  R2P	  –	  but	  there	  is	  an	  attendant	  sort	  of	  suspicion.	  The	  failed	  state	  paradigm	  
tends	  to	  individuate	  blame	  –	  states	  fail	  because	  their	  governments	  did	  just	  that:	  fail.	  The	  causes	  of	  state	  
failure	  are	  internal.	  This	  might	  be	  because	  the	  government	  is	  corrupt:	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“We	   call	   such	   institutions…	   extractive	   economic	   institutions	   –	   extractive	   because	  
such	   institutions	   are	   designed	   to	   extract	   incomes	   and	   wealth	   from	   one	   subset	   of	  
society	  to	  benefit	  a	  different	  subset.”	  (Acemoglue	  and	  Robinson	  2012:	  89)	  
Alternately,	  the	  government	  might	  be	  inept.	  Patrick	  (2006)	  categorizes	  potentially	  failing	  states	  
by	  way	  of	  “will”	  (in	  this	  case,	  willingness	  to	  act	  legitimately)	  and	  “capacity”	  (ability	  to	  govern	  effectively).	  
Either	   case	   justifies	   intervention	   –	   if	   a	   government	   lacks	   the	   will	   to	   govern	   effectively	   then	   it	   is	   not	  
carrying	  out	  its	  sovereign	  responsibility.	  	  
Sovereignty	  in	  this	  narrative	  is	  treated	  inconsistently	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  at	  tension	  with	  itself.	  The	  
concept	   of	   sovereignty	   implies	   that	   it	   is	   above	   the	   law,	   determining	   it.	   Yet	   all-­‐powerful	   sovereignty	  
demands	  justification	   in	  terms	  of	  how	  it	  operates.	   It	  must	  be	   legitimated	  but	   legitimation	   is	   in	  tension	  
with	   its	   power.	   .	   For	   sovereignty	   to	   work	   as	   a	   concept	   it	   must	   exist	   outside	   normal	   bounds,	   being	  
exceptional	  and	  above	   laws	  because	   it	   is	   the	  natural	   law-­‐giver.	  Yet	   it	   can	  only	   justify	   this	  all-­‐powerful	  
nature	  by	  recourse	  to	  acting	  justly	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  those	  who	  the	  sovereign	  holds	  sovereignty	  over	  –	  
the	   very	   need	   to	   justify	   sovereignty	   is	   antithetical	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   sovereignty.	   To	   wield	   sovereign	  
power	  without	   legitimate	  political	  authority	   is	   illegitimate	  and	  “beastly”	  or	  “rogue”.17	   If	  a	  government	  
fails	   to	   carry	   out	   its	   sovereign	   duties	   because	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   capacity,	   that	   lack	   of	   capacity	   is	   a	   lack	   of	  
sovereign	  power	  –	  ergo	  a	  lack	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  If	  it	  fails	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  sovereign	  duties	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  
of	  will	   –	  even	   though	  nominally	   a	   sovereign	  power	  –	   then	   it	   lacks	   legitimate	  political	   authority	   and	   is	  
rogue.	   Rogue	   states	   are	   complicit	   in	   whatever	   evils	   may	   take	   place	   within	   their	   boundaries.	  
Interventions	   then	   are	   justifiable	   because	   either	   no	   sovereign	   exists	   or	   because	   the	   sovereign	   has	  
degenerated	  into	  rogueness	  –	  both	  assumptions	  are	  allowed	  for	  (often	  simultaneously)	  within	  the	  failed	  
state	   paradigm.	   Yet	   both	   are	   in	   tension	   with	   the	   assumption	   within	   dominant	   liberal	   norms	   of	  
international	   relations	   that	   suggest	   statehood	   entails	   an	   inalienable	   right	   to	   sovereignty	   and	   non-­‐
intervention.	   Doctrines	   such	   as	   the	   Responsibility	   to	   Protect	   and	   casting	   failed	   states	   as	   security	  
problems	   in	   the	   Global	   War	   on	   Terror	   seek	   to	   justify	   the	   abrogation	   of	   the	   failed	   state	   right-­‐to	  
sovereignty,	  but	   simultaneously	   suggest	   that	   interventions	   can/will	   realistically	  only	  happen	  when	   the	  
political	  interests	  of	  the	  intervener	  are	  at	  stake.	  	  
This	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  which	  goes	  wholly	  unnoticed	  within	  the	  literature.	  Mazarr	  (2014)	  focuses	  
on	  post-­‐September	  11	  US	  foreign	  policy	  up	  through	  2014,	  arguing	  that	  interventionist	  state	  building	  as	  
typified	  by	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  is	  strategically	  the	  wrong	  policy	  for	  the	  US.	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“The	   practical	   challenges	   of	   state-­‐building	   missions	   are	   now	   widely	   appreciated…	   long,	  
difficult,	  and	  expensive…	  The	  threat	  posed	  by	  weak	  and	  fragile	  states…	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  less	  
urgent	  and	  more	  complex	  and	  diffuse	  than	  was	  originally	  suggested…	  The	  specified	  dangers	  
[especially	  terrorism]	  were	  never	  unique	  to	  weak	  states…	  nor	  would	  state-­‐building	  campaigns	  
necessarily	  have	  mitigated	  them.”	  (Mazarr	  2004:	  115	  –	  116)	  
He	   argues	   that	  while	   the	   events	   of	   September	   11	   brought	   the	   focus	   of	   US	   defence	   policy	   to	  
terrorism	   and	   failed	   states,	   state	   failure	   is	   not	   the	   cause	   of	   terrorism,	   nor	   are	   the	   two	   even	   closely	  
linked.	   Mazarr	   suggests	   that	   there	   will	   still	   be	   a	   place	   for	   US	   policy	   that	   advances	   counter-­‐terrorist	  
operations	   in	   failed	   states	   as	  well	   as	   a	   place	   for	   policies	   intended	   to	   help	   foster	   stability	   and	   growth	  
(potentially	  state-­‐building	  in	  nature	  as	  well).	  However,	  he	  argues	  that	  policy	  should	  and	  will	  begin	  to	  de-­‐
emphasize	  these	  aspects	  of	  security	  as	  it	  becomes	  more	  obvious	  that	  failed	  states	  and	  terrorism	  are	  not	  
intrinsically	  linked.	  	  
Yet	  we	   continue	   to	   see	   intervention	   and	   state	   building	   programs	  mobilized	   in	   so-­‐called	   failed	  
states	  as	  ways	  to	  improve	  security	  and	  better	  fight	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror.	  Perhaps	  more	  usefully,	  Call	  
(2010)	   argues	   for	   conceptual	   alternatives	   to	   that	   of	   the	   failed	   state	  while	   still	   allowing	   for	   a	   need	   to	  
intervene	  in	  spaces	  currently	  thought	  of	  as	  “failed	  states”.	  	  
“Certainly	  the	  West…	  has	  strategically	  deployed	  the	  terms…	  to	  justify	   intervention…	  reflects	  
the	   selectivity	   of	   the	   erosion	   of	   sovereignty…	   terms	   are	   also	   Western-­‐centric	   and	  
patronizing…	   [However]	   the	   prescription	   to	   step	   away	   and	   withdraw	   from	   international	  
engagement	   is	   just	   as	   likely	   to	   benefit	   these	   victimizers	   rather	   than	   their	   victims	   or	   their	  
political	  opponents.”	  (Call	  2010:	  304)	  
Call	  does	  not	  specifically	  call	  into	  question	  the	  notion	  of	  statehood	  or	  sovereignty,	  though	  there	  
is	   an	   implicit	   challenge	   to	   at	   least	   the	  way	   in	  which	   these	  notions	   are	  often	  mobilized.	  He	   argues	   for	  
more	  specificity	   in	  understanding	   the	  situations	  of	  places	  which	  we	  call	   failed	   states,	  arguing	   that	   the	  
diverse	  circumstances	  under	  which	  they	  operate	  defy	  typification	  by	  a	  label	  like	  failed	  state.	  He	  argues	  
that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  gaps	  (or	  types	  of	  failures)	  which	  lead	  to	  situations	  of	  state	  collapse	  
and	   that	   the	   failed	   state	   paradigm	   tends	   to	   ignore	   this	   specificity	   of	   types	   of	   failure.	   An	   interesting	  
conceptual	  evolution,	  Call	  actually	  upsets	  standardized	  notions	  of	  statehood	  while	  explicitly	  and	  strongly	  
supporting	   those	   standardized	   notions	   of	   (successful)	   statehood.	   Again,	   this	   seems	   to	   suggest	   some	  
openness	  to	  alternative	  ways	  of	  ‘knowing’	  a	  place	  such	  as	  Afghanistan.	  (ibid)	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Dissenting	  voices	  within	  dominant	  discourses	  on	  state	  failure	  and	  security	  are	  refreshing	  and	  do	  
point	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  binary	  problematics.	  Call	  brings	  attention	  to	  the	  strategic	  deployment	  of	  failed	  
state	  terminology	  and	  the	  uneven	  application	  of	  notions	  of	  sovereignty	  along	  with	  a	  West-­‐centric	  bias	  
and	  a	  certain	  paternal	  mindset.	  	  
Within	   dominant	   liberal	   literature	   on	   state	   failure,	   the	   tensions	   within	   the	   sovereign/non-­‐
sovereign	  and	  successful/failed	  state	  binaries	  can	  be	  explicitly	  drawn	  out.	  Intervention	  on	  failed	  states	  is	  
immediately	  justified	  by	  Helman	  and	  Ratner	  by	  invoking	  a	  new	  conditionality	  of	  sovereignty,	  calling	  the	  
notion	   of	   absolutely	   sovereignty	   outdated.	   The	   doctrine	   of	   R2P	   expands	   upon	   this,	  weighing	   national	  
sovereignty	   against	   individual	   sovereignty	   while	   Patrick	   argues	   that	   failed	   states	   are	   “legally	   but	   not	  
actually	  sovereign”.	  (Patrick	  2006:	  29)	  
As	  much	  as	  intervention	  on	  failed	  states	  –	  to	  save	  them	  or	  to	  save	  us	  –	  relies	  on	  conditioning	  the	  
sovereign	  status	  of	  failed	  states	  it	  relies	  just	  as	  much	  on	  the	  unconditional	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  intervener.	  
The	   intervener	   is	   the	   savior,	   a	   torch	   holder	   of	   the	   epitome	   of	   achievement	   in	   the	   liberal	   order	   of	  
statehood	  and	  must	  be	  so	  in	  order	  to	  rebuild	  what	  has	  broken.	  The	  intervener	  wields	  ultimate	  sovereign	  
might	   not	   only	   by	   its	   moral	   and	   security-­‐derived	   authority	   to	   intervene	   but	   also	   by	   its	   assumptive	  
capacity	   to	   fix	  what	  was	  broken	  –	  a	   system	  which	  was	  broken	  by	   the	   failed	   state	   itself.	   In	   this	   sense,	  
capacity	  (sovereign	  power)	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  great	  legitimizer	  –	  the	  intervening	  state	  is	  so	  powerful	  it	  not	  only	  
is	  able	  to	  arrange	  itself	  successfully	  but	  to	  concurrently	  build	  a	  successful	  state	  system	  in	  a	  space	  which	  
is	  so	  dysfunctional	  as	  that	  it	  was	  unable	  to	  even	  maintain	  itself.	  In	  this	  way,	  its	  power	  is	  indicative	  of	  its	  
righteousness	  –	  state	  building	   is	   legitimate	  because	  of	  the	  proven	  success	  of	  the	   intervener.	  This	  both	  
reinforces	  the	  legitimate	  sovereign	  status	  of	  the	  intervening	  West	  while	  also	  reinforcing	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  
dysfunctional	  political	  culture	  in	  the	  failed	  state	  –	  its	  broken	  nature	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  valorous	  West.	  	  
Yet	  this	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  what	  are	  broadly	  said	  to	  be	  accepted	  norms	  of	  sovereignty	  within	  liberal	  
narratives	   on	   statehood.	   Sovereignty	   is	   meant	   to	   rest	   on	   the	   twin	   pillars	   of	   sovereign	   might	   and	  
legitimate	  political	  authority	  –	  this	  distinction	  is	  central	  to	  the	  securitization	  of	  the	  failed	  state	  discourse.	  
If	  failed	  states	  are	  places	  where	  illegitimate	  actors	  are	  able	  to	  wield	  sovereign	  might	  (absolutely	  implicit	  
in	  the	  idea	  that	  terrorists	  use	  failed	  states	  as	  bases	  of	  operation	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  type	  of	  global	  warfare),	  
then	  the	  lack	  of	  legitimate	  political	  authority	  is	  key	  to	  state	  failure.18	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This	  suggests	  that	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  intervention	  cannot	  reside	  primarily	  on	  sovereign	  might,	  yet	  
in	   large	   part	   it	   does.	   Helman	   and	   Ratner’s	   conception	   of	   intervention	   tried	   to	   get	   around	   this	   by	  
envisioning	  a	  central	  role	  for	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  saving	  failed	  states	  –	  a	  super-­‐sovereign	  entity	  acting	  
on	  behalf	  of	  established	  norms	  of	  morality	  and	  successful	  state-­‐ness	  rather	  than	  a	  given	  state’s	  political	  
agenda.	   This	   idea	   itself	   has	   some	   problems,	   but	   it	   never	   came	   to	   fruition.	   R2P	   wants	   to	   reconcile	  
individual	   state	  political	   interests	  with	   the	  moral	   imperative	  of	  protecting	   individuals’	   sovereignty	   in	  a	  
context	  of	  a	  broken	  failed	  state	  (that	  has	  lost	  its	  authority	  by	  failing	  to	  protect	  fundamental	  aspects	  of	  
individual	  sovereignty).	  Yet	  it	  openly	  acknowledges	  that	  states	  will	  only	  intervene	  to	  “save”	  failed	  states	  
when	  their	  own	  national	  interests	  –	  be	  they	  economic	  or	  security	  –	  are	  at	  stake.	  	  
Securitization	  suggests	   that	   failed	  states	  do	  (may)	  have	  a	   legal	  right	   to	  sovereignty	  but	  only	   in	  
theory	  –	  in	  the	  real	  world	  where	  the	  security	  of	  the	  civilized	  world	  is	  at	  stake	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  
the	   reality	   that	   those	   failed	   states	   simply	   are	   not	   sovereign.	   In	   this	   conception,	   failed	   states	   can	   be	  
intervened	   upon	   simply	   for	   being	   failed	   –	   because	   their	   governments	   don’t	   wield	   sovereign	   might	  
effectively	  or	  because	  they	  are	  seen	  to	  be	  “bad	  acting”	  –	   in	  both	  cases	  a	  potential	   threat.	   In	  all	  cases,	  
intervention	   is	   justified	   by	   the	   political	   interests	   and	   the	   sovereign	   power	   of	   interveners,	  whereas	   at	  
best	   the	   question	   of	   legitimate	   political	   authority	   (problematic	   when	   abrogating	   a	   state’s	   sovereign	  
rights)	  is	  answered	  by	  claims	  of	  a	  moral	  imperative	  to	  save	  either	  the	  victims	  within	  the	  failed	  state	  or	  
civilization	  at	  large.	  This	  is	  all	  underpinned	  by	  the	  assumption	  that	  ultimately,	  failure	  is	  a	  choice.	  	  
Critical  Approaches  and  the  External  Causes  of  State  Failure  
Outside	   those	   debates	   on	   the	   internal	   causes	   of	   state	   failure	   emanating	   from	   within	   liberal	  
notions	   of	   statehood	   are	   critiques	   of	   the	  whole	   underlying	   set	   of	   assumptions	  making	   those	   debates	  
possible.	  Critical	  approaches	   to	  understanding	  state	   failure	  broadly	  claim	  that	   failed	  states	  have	   failed	  
because	  of	  systemic	  faults	  in	  the	  relations	  between	  more	  powerful	  and	  less	  powerful	  states.	  States	  fail	  
because	   of	   external	   factors,	   outside	   of	   that	   failed	   state’s	   control.	   In	   this	   approach,	   failed	   states	   are	  
victims	  of	  unjust	  outside	  forces	  and	  cannot	  rightly	  be	  blamed	  for	  their	  situation.	  The	  focus	  on	  external	  
factors,	   such	   as	   predatory	   economic	   systems	   and	   uneven	   political	   power	   relations,	  means	   that	   these	  
approaches	  point	  out	  flaws	  it	  finds	  within	  the	  liberal	  system	  of	  statehood.	  
In	  pointing	  to	  external	  factors	  causing	  state	  failure,	  critical	  approaches	  generally	   level	  critiques	  
at	   what	   they	   perceive	   to	   be	   systemic	   injustices	   inherent	   to	   dominant	   liberal	   norms	   of	   international	  
relations.	   This	   is	   healthy	   and	   fosters	   debate	   as	   to	   the	  merits	   and	   downsides	   of	   differing	   orthodoxies.	  
Many	  valid	  and	  important	  points	  are	  brought	  to	  light,	  particularly	   in	  terms	  of	  potential	  dysfunctions	  in	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aspects	  of	  liberal	  dominant	  narratives	  and	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  history.	  There	  are,	  however,	  
some	   shortcomings	   in	   specific	   critical	   approaches	   to	   understanding	   state	   failure.	   Even	   critical	  
approaches	  often	  tend	  to	  frame	  generalized	  explanations	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  failed	  states.	  This	  tends	  
to	  render	  abstract	  from	  unique	  experiences	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  those	  specifics	  are	  less	  significant	  
than	  a	  grand,	  and	  generalized,	  critique.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  there	  are	  still	  important	  lessons	  to	  be	  drawn	  
from	  aspects	  of	  critical	  literature	  on	  state	  failure.	  	  
One	  example	  of	  critical	  perspectives	   finding	  external	  causes	  to	  state	  failure	  comes	  from	  Wade	  
(2005).	  Wade’s	  work	  addresses	  the	  notion	  of	  state	  failure	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  world	  systems	  theory,	  
and	   argues	   that	   imperialist	   practices	   explain	   why	   states	   fail.	   Through	   analysis	   of	   different	   economic	  
models	   and	   indicators,	   he	   argues	   that	   the	   financialization	   of	   capitalism	   has	   led	   to	   a	   new	   sort	   of	  
imperialism.	  	  For	  Wade,	  states	  fail	  because	  those	  states	  which	  hold	  power	  (successful	  states)	  ‘stack	  the	  
deck’	   in	  political	  and	  economic	   relations	   to	   favor	   themselves	   in	   the	  context	  of	  global	   finance	  systems,	  
putting	  undue	  burden	  on	  less	  fortunate	  states:	  
“The	  factors	  considered	  so	  far	  are	  to	  do	  with	  “structures”	  that	  constrain	  or	  favor	  options,	  not	  
with	   agents.	   But	   agents	   also	   have	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   story.	   They	   [the	   West]	   have	  
created	  structures	  (rules	  and	  organizations)	  that	  help	  them	  to	  win.”	  (Wade	  2005:	  28)	  
Wade	  argues	  that	  state	   failure	   is	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	   the	  North-­‐South,	  core-­‐periphery	  structure	  of	  
economic	   and	   political	   power	   relations	   prevalent	   in	   the	   world.	   For	   Wade,	   rather	   than	   legacies	   of	  
imperialistic	  mindsets	  embedded	   in	   the	  capitalist	   structure,	   there	   is	  a	  continuing	  and	  active	   (financial)	  
imperialistic	  project	  being	  undertaken,	  and	  failed	  states	  are	  the	  most	  spectacular	  victims.	  	  
Wade’s	   project	   is	   rigorously	   analytical	   and	  brings	   into	   play	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   empirical	   evidence	  
that	   supports	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  very	  act	  of	   talking	  about	   state	   failure	  creates	  winners	  and	   losers.	  This	  
highlights	  an	  uneven	  flow	  of	  power	  relations	  prior	  to	  the	  labeling	  of	  failure	  as	  part	  of	  his	  argument	  that	  
the	   cause	  of	   state	   failure	   is	   external	   –	   it	   is	   that	  uneven	   flow	  of	   power	   relations.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	  
explains	  all	  state	  failure	  in	  the	  very	  generalized	  context	  of	  an	  assumption	  of	  global	  systems	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  
imperialism	   by	   way	   of	   finance	   capitalism.	   	   For	   Wade,	   predatory	   market	   forces	   pushed	   by	   dominant	  
powers	  within	  the	  liberal	  economic	  system	  to	  leech	  capital	  from	  the	  Global	  South	  /	  periphery	  in	  favor	  of	  
the	   United	   States	   and	   its	   allied	   global	   institutions	   are	   largely	   responsible	   for	   state	   failure.	   (ibid:	   18)	  
Market	  forces	  may	  be	  powerful,	  but	  it	  is	  harmful	  and	  limiting	  to	  think	  solely	  in	  these	  terms.	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Morton	   (2005)	   offers	   a	   post-­‐Marxist	   critique	   of	   state	   failure	   and	   along	   with	   a	   number	   of	  
important	   insights.	  He	  argues	  that	  Western	  policy	  toward	  failed	  states	   indicates	  a	  pathological	  view	  of	  
their	  problems:	  the	   imperfections	   leading	  to	  failure	  are	   inherent	   in	  these	  states	  and,	  as	  such,	  they	  are	  
“deviants”	   from	   the	   normal	   (successful)	   state	   of	   affairs.	   He	   argues	   that	   despite	   this	   discursive	  
positioning,	   the	   universalization	   of	   capitalism	   is	   complicit	   (if	   not	   causal)	   in	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   failed	  
state	   phenomenon.	   He	   advocates	   understanding	   conceptions	   of	   state	   failure	   historically,	   connecting	  
contemporary	  failed	  state	  knowledge	  specifically	  with:	  
	  “the	   historical	   origins	   of	   the	   genesis	   of	   capitalism	   through	   processes	   of	   primitive	  
accumulation	  in	  late	  medieval	  and	  early	  modern	  Europe”.	  (ibid:	  374)	  	  
This	   is	  somewhat	  emblematic	  of	  many	  critical	  approaches	  –	  failed	  states	  are	  cast	  unjustly	  as	  a	  
deviant	   ‘other’,	  broken	  and	  sick	  and	  outside	  of	   success	  because	  of	   their	  deviance	  by	  dominant	   liberal	  
approaches.	   Rather	   than	   simply	   accepting	   this,	  Morton	   argues,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   take	   on	   a	   historical	  
perspective	  which	  suggests	  uneven	  power	  relations	  in	  an	  economic	  system	  which	  privileges	  some	  actors	  
over	  others.	  While	  liberal	  policy	  making	  bodies	  view	  state	  failure	  as	  a	  type	  of	  aberration	  or	  disease	  (ibid	  
372-­‐373)	  state	  failure	  can	  be	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  continuing	  legacy	  of	  historical	  imperial	  and	  colonial	  
relationships.	   For	   Morton,	   the	   compulsory	   adoption	   of	   liberal	   capitalistic	   structures	   among	   former	  
colonies	  –	  regardless	  of	  the	  comfort	  of	  the	  fit	  –	  recreates	  these	  historical	  uneven	  power	  relations	  while	  
simultaneously	  claiming	  that	  the	  era	  of	  systemic	  inequality	  is	  over	  and	  now	  all	  states	  are	  as	  successful	  as	  
their	  ability	  and	  effort	  make	  possible.	  	  
This	   universalization	   of	   very	   particular	   notions	   of	   statehood	   –	   and	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   a	  
successful	  state	  –	  are	  problematic	  for	  Morton.	  In	  order	  to	  justify	  the	  specific	  liberal	  (capitalist)	  model	  of	  
statehood,	  failed	  states	  must	  be	  diagnosed	  (medically)	  as	  deviant	  and	  ill.	  Morton	  suggests	  that	  by	  taking	  
on	  a	  historical	  understanding,	  particularly	  by	  tracing	  imperialist	  legacies	  of	  power	  relations	  in	  the	  failed	  
state	   discourse,	   one	   can	   argue	   that	   the	   proper	   approach	   is	   to	   question	   static	   norms	   of	   statehood	   as	  
such:	  
“Statehood	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  a	  universal	  order	  achieved	  through	  the	  acceptance	  of	  objective	  
conditions	   of	   sovereignty	   shaped	   in	   the	   self-­‐image	   of	   Western	   development.	   Yet	   my	  
argument	   has	   raised	   the	   need	   to	   problematise	   universally	   recognisable	   signs	   of	   sovereign	  
statehood	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  ‘failed	  universalisation	  of	  the	  imported	  state’.”	  (ibid:	  377)	  
Morton	  makes	   numerous	   powerful	   points.	   He	   problematizes	   the	   universalization	   of	   the	   state	  
and	   the	   viability	   of	   “importing”	   success	   on	   the	   liberal	   state	   model.	   He	   also	   explores	   ways	   in	   which	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different	  discursive	  tactics	  are	  used	  to	  justify	  particular	  conceptions	  about	  failed	  states	  –	  particular	  ways	  
of	  constructing	  a	  general	  failed	  state	  identity.	  These	  are	  all	  important	  points	  and	  of	  use	  to	  any	  project	  to	  
critique	  dominant	  narratives	  on	  state	  failure	  –	  however	  the	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  the	  general	  rather	  that	  the	  
particular.	  There	  is	  also	  an	  assumption	  that	  the	  state	  failure	  phenomenon	  as	  a	  whole	  can	  be	  explained	  
through	  recourse	  to	  post-­‐Marxist	  accounts	  of	  new	  colonial	  power	  relations.	  
Gruffyd	  Jones	  (2008)	  expands	  upon	  Morton’s	  critique	  of	  how	  state	  failure	  is	  conceptualized.	  She	  
argues	   that	   the	  methodological	   flaws	   inherent	   in	   the	   failed	   state	  discourse	  undermine	   its	  explanatory	  
power	   and	   proposes	   an	   alternative	   framework	   for	   analyzing	   the	   social	   conditions	   inherent	   to	   state	  
failure:	  
“There	   are	   several	   steps	   in	   the	   development	   of	   an	   adequate	   critique	   of	   the	   ‘failed	   state’	  
discourse.	  One	   step	   is	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   ideological	   character	   of	   the	   discourse.	   This	   requires	  
locating	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘failed	  state’	  in	  a	  longer	  history	  of	  imperial	   ideology,	  and	  emphasizing	  
its	  current	  role	  in	  legitimizing	  intervention.”	  (Gruffyd	  Jones	  2008:	  181-­‐182)	  
For	  Gruffyd	  Jones	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  state	  failure,	  the	  ability	  to	  talk	  about	  these	  crises	  as	  failed	  
states,	  is	  rooted	  in	  imperial	  ideologies.	  So-­‐called	  failed	  states	  have	  “failed”	  due	  to	  neo-­‐colonial	  practices	  
rooted	   in	  a	  global	  political	  economy	  –	  and	   they	  are	  able	   to	  be	  described	  as	  “failed	  states”	  due	   to	   the	  
legacy	  of	   imperial	   ideologies.	   Interestingly	   in	   terms	  of	   this	  dissertation,	   she	   further	  argues	   that	   liberal	  
norms	  of	  statehood	  and	  state	  failure	  lack	  specificity:	  
“One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  methodological	  flaws	  of	  the	  ‘failed	  state’	  discourse	  is	  its	  inability	  
to	   identify	  historically	  specific	  social	   forms	  and	  conditions,	  and	  their	  global	   relations.”	   (ibid:	  
182)	  
It	   is	  an	  important	  point.	  Yet	  she	  relies	  solely	  on	  reference	  to	  legacies	  of	  colonial	  discourse	  and	  
“knowledge”	  about	  so-­‐called	  failed	  states	  -­‐	  justifying	  this	  by	  saying	  that	  nearly	  all	  failed	  states	  were	  also	  
colonies	  (ibid	  186)	  –	  as	  determinative	  of	  how	  and	  why	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  discuss	  failed	  states.	  	  
Gruffyd	  Jones	  touches	  on	  discursive	   legacies	  of	  colonial	   interaction,	  not	  unlike	  Morton’s	  work.	  
She	  identifies	  ways	  in	  which	  those	  legacies	  actually	  make	  possible	  the	  very	  label	  of	  failed	  state.	  Yet	  there	  
must	  be	  different	  types	  of	  colonial	  experience,	  and	  there	  are	  certainly	  states	  which	  are	  today	  conceived	  
as	   “failed	   states”	  –	   like	  Afghanistan	   -­‐	  which	  were	  peripheral	   to	  or	  even	  wholly	  outside	  of	   the	  colonial	  
experience.	   	   Notions	   of	   statehood	   are	   affected	   by	   colonial	   and	   imperial	   pasts	   but	   it	   is	   an	   ideological	  
standpoint	  to	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  modern	  statehood.	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Desai	   (2004)	   makes	   similar	   arguments,	   but	   goes	   further	   in	   leveling	   critiques	   directly	   on	   the	  
United	  States.	  She	  argues	  that	  the	  narrative	  on	  state	  failure	  is,	  in	  fact,	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  
imperial	  strategy.	  Rather	  than	  being	  based	  on	  control	  of	  finance,	  the	  new	  US	  imperialism	  involves	  more	  
direct	  control	  of	  productive	  means.	  The	  “new”	  US	  imperialism,	  for	  Desai,	   is	   in	  part	  a	  sort	  of	  reversion.	  
What’s	  more,	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  what	  nationalism	  means	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  complicit	  in	  
this	  imperial	  project.	  	  
“…if	   there	   is	  a	   single	   referent	   to	  which	   these	  vague	  concepts	   (referring	   to	   the	  Third	  World)	  
relate,	   and	   from	   which	   they	   derive	   programmatic	   longevity,	   it	   was	   the	   idea…	   of	   the	  
progressive	  potential	  of	  nationalism	  within	  capitalist	  imperialism.”	  (Desai	  2004:	  169)	  
This	   new	  way	   of	   orienting	   nationalism	   and	   state	   identity	   –	   to	   include	   state	   failure	   –	   helps	   to	  
sustain	   America’s	   imperial	   hegemony	   for	   Desai.	   Here	   Desai	   mingles	   discourse	   analysis	   with	   Marxist	  
theoretical	   underpinnings	   to	   explain	   the	   shifting	   identity	   of	   the	   ‘third	  world’,	   both	   in	   conception	   and	  
practice.	  All	  states	  of	  the	  peripheral	  Third	  World	  are	  assigned	  identities	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  
the	   imperial	   hegemon	   –	   propping	   up	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   United	   States	   as	   of	   central	   importance	  while	  
ensuring	  that	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  Third	  World	  relies	  on	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  United	  States	  for	  solidity.	  
“There	   are,	   first,	   'bully'	   states,	   allying	   with	   and	   emulating	   the	   increasingly	   brazen	   US	  
imperialism	   regionally.	   Second,	   there	   are	   'rogue'	   states,	  with	   no	   prospects	   of	   such	   alliance	  
and	  emulation	  but	   a	   substantial	   capacity	   for	   violence.	   Finally,	   'failed'	   states	   are	   in	   financial	  
and	  political	  receiverships	  to	  the	  US	  or	  one	  or	  another	  of	   its	   local,	  bully,	  allies.	   In	  this	  world	  
questions	  of	  Third	  World	  solidarity,	  autonomy	  from	  imperialism,	  'third	  way'	  development	  or	  
non-­‐alignment	  simply	  do	  not	  arise.”	  (Desai	  2004:	  172)	  
Desai’s	   critique	   focuses	   on	   the	   uneven	   flow	   of	   power	   relations	   created	   and	   recreated	   by	   the	  
state	  /	  failed	  state	  discourse.	  For	  Desai,	  the	  idea	  of	  sovereign	  statehood,	  development	  and	  success	  are	  a	  
kind	   of	   bait	   for	   peripheral	   polities	   –	   a	   promise	   that	   if	   they	   accept	   the	   dominant	   liberal	   discourse	   on	  
statehood	  they	  can	  reap	  benefits	  and	  do	  well	  within	  what	  she	  calls	  a	  system	  of	  “capitalist	  imperialism”.	  
States	  on	   the	   fringe,	  however,	  are	  unable	   to	   truly	   succeed	   in	  a	   system	  which	   is	   in	   reality,	   for	  Desai,	  a	  
new	  type	  of	  imperialism,	  and	  those	  fringe	  polities	  become	  one	  of	  three	  types	  of	  states	  –	  bully,	  rogue	  or	  
failed	  –	  none	  of	  which	  fulfil	  the	  purported	  promise	  of	  the	  liberal	  state	  system.	  	  
Desai	  calls	  attention	  to	  a	  marginalizing	  tendency	  inherent	  in	  the	  successful	  /	  failed	  state	  model,	  
suggesting	  that	  external	  causes	  –	  in	  this	  case	  a	  new	  imperialist	  system	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  seeks	  
to	  gain	  control	  of	  more	  and	  more	  forms	  of	  production	  –	  ensure	  that	  peripheral	  states	  will	  never	  truly	  be	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part	  of	  the	  liberal	  order.	  If	  they	  have	  any	  sort	  of	  power	  whatsoever	  –	  the	  closest	  to	  success	  she	  deems	  
possible	   in	   this	   system	  –	   they	  will	   be	   either	   ‘bully’	   regimes	   (i.e.	   Saudi	   Arabia)	   or	   ‘rogue’	   regimes	   (i.e.	  
Iran).	   In	   this	   imperialist	   system,	   Desai	   says,	   there	   are	   external	   pressures	   on	   peripheral	   states’	  
governments,	  which	  means	   that	  many	  will	   not	   have	   the	   strength	   to	   be	   a	   bully	   or	   rogue	   regime,	   and	  
those	  are	  the	  failed	  states.	  Thus,	   the	  failed	  state	  paradigm	  only	  gives	  peripheral	  polities	  three	  options	  
and,	  in	  itself,	  creates	  the	  conditions	  of	  failure	  by	  reinforcing	  a	  narrative	  of	  liberal	  statehood	  that	  is	  only	  a	  
cover	  for	  a	  new	  capitalist	  imperialism.	  
Noam	  Chomsky	  offers	  a	  well-­‐regarded	  and	  exhaustive	  critique	  of	  the	  failed	  state	  narrative	  which	  
in	  many	  ways	  echoes	  the	  concerns	  and	  findings	  of	  this	  project.	  He	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  a	  double-­‐standard	  
inherent	  to	  the	  failed	  state	  discourse,	  wherein	  the	  intervener	  (generally	  the	  United	  States	  for	  Chomsky)	  
is	  authorized	  to	  do	  some	  of	  the	  very	  things	  that	  failed	  states	  are	  labeled	  failed	  –	  or	  rogue,	  or	  terrorist	  –	  
for	  doing.	  He	  goes	  about	  his	  analysis	  systematically,	  first	  considering	  means	  of	  categorization:	  
“Among	  the	  most	  salient	  properties	  of	  failed	  states	  is	  that	  they	  do	  not	  protect	  their	  citizens	  
from	   violence—and	   perhaps	   even	   destruction—	   or	   that	   decision	   makers	   regard	   such	  
concerns	  as	  lower	  in	  priority	  than	  the	  short-­‐term	  power	  and	  wealth	  of	  the	  state's	  dominant	  
sectors.	   Another	   characteristic	   of	   failed	   states	   is	   that	   they	   are	   "outlaw	   states,"	   whose	  
leaderships	  dismiss	   international	   law	  and	   treaties	  with	  contempt.	  Such	   instruments	  may	  be	  
binding	  on	  others	  but	  not	  on	  the	  outlaw	  state.”	  (Chomsky	  2007:	  101)	  
Here	   he	   is	   referring	   descriptively	   to	   the	   “will	   /	   capacity”	   analysis	   leaned	   upon	   in	   liberal	   state	  
discourse	  on	  failed	  states.	  He	  then	  discusses	  the	  securitization	  of	  the	  concept:	  
“In	  1994,	  Clinton	  expanded	  the	  category	  of	  "terrorist	  states"	  to	  include	  "rogue	  states."	  A	  few	  
years	  later	  another	  concept	  was	  added	  to	  the	  repertoire:	  "failed	  states,"	  from	  which	  we	  must	  
protect	   ourselves,	   and	   which	   we	   must	   help,	   sometimes	   by	   devastating	   them.	   [but]	   …	  
problems	   beset	   the	   category	   "failed	   state."	   Like	   "terrorist	   state"	   and	   "rogue	   state,"	   the	  
concept	  is	  "frustratingly	  imprecise,"	  susceptible	  to	  too	  many	  interpretations.”	  (ibid:	  107-­‐108)	  
So,	  “failed	  state”	  is	  conflated	  with	  terrorism	  and	  rogue-­‐ness.	  What	  is	  meant	  by	  “failed	  state”	  is	  
already	   imprecise,	   says	   Chomsky,	   and	   this	   conflation	   makes	   it	   even	   more	   so.	   It	   also	   opens	   up	   the	  
possibility	  of	   intervention	  on	   failed	   states	  both	   to	   save	   them	  and	   to	   save	  ourselves.	   Yet	   these	  acts	  of	  
violence,	   sometimes	  by	  devastating	   them,	   Chomsky	  argues,	   are	   themselves	   indicative	  of	   the	  activities	  
used	  to	  describe	  failure	  and	  rogue-­‐ness.	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This	   is	   justified	  by	   reference	   to	   the	  promotion	  of	  democracy.	  Democracy	   is	   considered	   such	  a	  
good	   in	   its	   own	   right	   that	   any	   means	   is	   justified	   in	   spreading	   that	   democracy.	   For	   Chomsky,	   this	   is	  
indicative	  of	  uneven	  power	  relations,	  the	  domination	  of	  “failed	  states”	  by	  the	  United	  States	  for	  its	  own	  
ends,	   but	   justified	   by	   reference	   to	   democracy	   and	   justice	   and	   a	   messianic	   project	   (ibid:	   134-­‐135).	  
Despite	  the	  justification	  of	  spreading	  democracy	  and	  saving	  failed	  states,	  Chomsky	  turns	  to	  neo-­‐Marxist	  
analysis	   to	   suggest	   that	   interventions	   are	   instead	   just	   one	   more	   example	   of	   a	   new	   economic	  
imperialism.	  
The	  major	   task	   in	   the	   subversion	  of	   Iraqi	  democracy	   is	   to	  pressure	  political	  elites	   to	  accept	  
"vague	  promises"	  and	  to	  retain	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  of	  the	  illegal	  economic	  regime	  imposed	  
by	  the	  invaders,	  based	  on	  the	  standard	  principle	  of	  opening	  the	  country	  and	  its	  resources	  to	  
foreign	   control	   (primarily	   US	   and	  UK),	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   "economic	   liberalism."	   (Chomsky	  
2007:	  165)	  
Each	  of	  these	  examples	  of	  critical	  approaches	  have	  something	  important	  to	  offer.	  Yet	  they	  also	  
all	  refer	  to	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  power	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  failed	  state	  narrative	  
and	   associated	   phenomena	   within	   it.	   They	   all	   rely	   on	   generalized	   theories	   of	   international	   relations	  
which	   are	   useful	   but	  which	   cannot	   hope	   to	   capture	   the	   very	   unique	   situation	   of	   Afghanistan	   and	   its	  
specific	  place	  within	  the	  failed	  state	  discourse.	  	  
This	   thesis	   draws	   on	  many	   of	   the	   critiques	   laid	   out	   by	   critical	   approaches	   such	   as	   these,	   but	  
rejects	   a	   generalized	   explanation	   for	   Afghanistan’s	   place	   in	   the	   failed	   state	   narrative.	   This	   act	   of	  
generalization	   tends	   to	   reproduce	   certain	   basic	   assumptions	   about	   sovereignty	   espoused	   within	  
orthodox	   approaches.	   Specifically,	   these	   generalize	   explanations	   turn	   to	   uneven	   power	   relations	   and	  
coercive	   systemic	   structures	   which	   can	   be	   blamed	   for	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   state	   failure.	   This	   fails	   to	  
recognize	   the	   persisting	   indeterminacy	   informing	  Western	   perceptions	   of	   Afghan	   identity	   –	   and	   how	  
contemporary	  mobilizations	  of	  a	  particularly	  determined	  “sovereignty”	  reinforce	  that	  indeterminacy	  and	  
its	  attendant	  marginalizing	  of	  any	  possible	   recognized	  Afghan	   identity.	  Afghanistan	  has	  a	  very	   specific	  
history	  of	  interaction	  with	  the	  West,	  often	  acting	  as	  a	  seemingly	  empty	  tactical	  space	  on	  which	  various	  
geopolitical	   projects	   are	   carried	   out	   in	   ways	   that	   do	   not	   fit	   neatly	   into	   standard	   imperialist	   /	   post-­‐
imperialist	   explanations.	   This	   thesis	   differs	   specifically	   because	   of	   its	   intention	   to	   recognize	  
Afghanistan’s	  historical	  indeterminacy	  and	  lack	  of	  specific	  character	  in	  Western	  conceptualizations,	  and	  
analyzing	  how	  those	  perceptions	  make	  justifiable	  specific	  interventions	  which	  serve	  Western	  interests.	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Escaping  Assumptions  of  State-­‐ness  
In	   addition	   to	   marginalizing	   possible	   interrogations	   of	   Afghan	   specificity,	   reference	   to	  
generalized	  models	   to	  critique	   the	   failed	   state	  paradigm	  can	  have	  other	  negative	  effects.	  Morton	  and	  
Chomsky	  move	  towards	  a	  questioning	  of	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  statehood	  and	  sovereignty	  as	  it	  stands.	  This	  
is	  an	  important	  specification,	  as	  the	  normalization	  of	  a	  central	  concept	  of	  “the	  state”	  is	  important	  to	  the	  
normalization	  of	  the	  failed	  state.	  The	  binary	  of	  successful/failed	  state	  is	  co-­‐constitutive,	  and	  to	  critique	  
the	   notion	   of	   state	   failure	   in	   specific	   cases	   as	   this	   project	   intends	   to	   do	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Afghanistan	  
requires	   that	   binary	   be	   upset.	   The	   tendency	   to	   critique	   state	   failure	   from	   a	   generalized	   theoretical	  
perspective	  can	  serve	  to	  overshadow	  this	  problematization	  which	  –	  in	  practice	  if	  not	  in	  intent	  –	  can	  itself	  
help	   to	   stabilize	   and	   naturalize	   statehood.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   in	   proving	   that	   states	   fail	   due	   to	   external	  
circumstances,	   it	   is	   too	   easy	   to	   take	   for	   granted	   that	   there	   is	   a	  well-­‐defined	   and	   understood	   “state”	  
which	  can	  fail	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
In	  a	  broad	  sense	  this	  problem	  is	  shared	  with	  that	  of	  liberal	  approaches	  assuming	  internal	  causes	  
of	   state	   failure.	   Assuming	   the	   “state”	   as	   a	   viable	   and	   well-­‐understood	   object	   of	   analysis	   closes	   off	  
avenues	  of	  questioning.	  This	  closing	  off	  is	  an	  inherently	  dangerous	  act	  -­‐	  especially	  when	  it	  subsumes	  the	  
identities	  of	  these	  states	  in	  crisis	  -­‐	  relegating	  recognized	  as	  well	  as	  unseen	  potential	  understandings	  or	  
knowledges	  to	  the	  margins	  without	  even	  the	  slightest	  consideration.	  This	   is	   the	  basic	  rationale	  behind	  
Derrida’s	  call	  for	  deconstructive	  critical	  projects.	  
That	   rationale	   is	   one	   which	   this	   project	   shares.	   This	   thesis	   seeks	   to	   illustrate	   how	   standard	  
notions	  of	  sovereignty	  have	  been	  applied	  to	  Afghanistan’s	  specific	  situation	   in	  a	  way	  that	  embeds	  and	  
obliterates	   Afghanistan’s	   potential	   for	   specific	   (one	   might	   even	   say	   sovereign)	   identity	   within	   this	  
dominant	   notion	   of	   sovereignty.	   	   Derrida’s	   work	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   because	   of	   these	   connections,	  
particularly	  in	  his	  problematization	  of	  “rogue”	  and	  “failed”	  state	  designations.	  
Accordingly,	   this	   thesis	   critically	   analyzes	   history	   and	   meaning	   in	   discourses	   and	   assumed	  
knowledges	   –	   such	   as	   the	   assumption	   of	   a	   natural	   form	   for	   statehood.	   This	   is	   a	   questioning	   that	  
seemingly	   Morton	   and	   Chomsky	   would	   find	   compelling	   but	   which	   their	   projects	   nevertheless	   make	  
subservient	   to	   –	   a	  mere	   part	   of	   -­‐	   economic	   and	   imperial	   explanations	   of	   how	   international	   relations	  
operate.	  This	  project,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  sees	  economic	  and	  imperial	  discursive	  knowledges	  to	  be	  parts	  
of	  a	  rigorous	  critique	  of	  the	  failed	  state	  discourse	  –	  at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Afghanistan.	  	  
Afghanistan’s	   unique	   indeterminacy	   and	   determined	   emptiness	   are	  made	   possible	   in	   part	   by	  
imperial	  /	  colonial	  norms	  and	   in	  part	  by	  strategic	  choices	  by	  the	  West.	  Yet	  those	  are	  only	  parts	  of	  the	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story.	  It	  represents	  a	  small	  sample	  of	  the	  discursive	  binaries	  utilized	  which	  (re)enforce	  Afghanistan	  as	  an	  
indeterminate	   space	   empty	   of	   specific	   character.	   By	   focusing	   too	   heavily	   on	   these	   imperial/colonial	  
norms	  one	  obscures	  Afghanistan’s	  very	  specific	  history	  –	  and	  thereby	  its	  unique	  identity.	  	  
What	   follows	   are	   some	   critical	   accounts	   which	   do	   attempt	   to	   make	   space	   for	   some	   kind	   of	  
historical	  specificity	  as	  a	  way	  of	  critiquing	  the	  failed	  state	  discourse,	  though	  we	  will	   find	  that	  here	  too	  
there	  are	  shortcomings	  when	  attempting	  to	  give	  deep	  analysis	  to	  Afghanistan’s	  particular	  situation.	  	  
Literature  Exploring  the  Specificity  of  the  Afghan  Case  
Some	  critical	  theory	  has	  improved	  on	  these	  identified	  difficulties,	  with	  an	  attempt	  to	  move	  away	  
from	   orthodoxies	   and/or	   toward	   more	   focused	   specificity.	   Much	   of	   this	   emerges	   from	   post-­‐colonial	  
traditions.	   There	   are	   rich	   intellectual	   resources	   on	   which	   to	   draw	   from	  within	   these	   wide	   traditions,	  
though	   one	  must	   not	   too	   closely	   equate	   (implicitly	   or	   explicitly)	   colonialism	  with	   state	   failure.	  While	  
there	  are	  very	  often	  connections,	  the	  nature	  of	  those	  connections	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  same	  
across	  specific	  cases.	   Indeed,	  many	  states	  argued	  to	  be	  ‘failed’	  have	  questionable	   if	  any	  connection	  to	  
colonial	  pasts.	   Illustrative	  examples	   come	   from	  the	  work	  of	  Hill	   (2005),	  Maroya	   (2003),	   Stanski	   (2009)	  
and	  Hagmann	  and	  Peclard	  (2010).	  	  	  
Hill	   (2005)	   provides	   a	   broad	   post-­‐colonial	   critique	   of	   the	   state	   failure	   notion,	   arguing	   that	  
colonial	  and	  imperial	  discursive	  legacies	  interact	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  state	  failure	  to	  empower	  a	  continued	  
valorization	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  superior	  West	  and	  a	  continued	  subjugation	  of	  the	  Global	  South.	  Hill	  rests	  
his	  argument	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  colonial	  relations	  inform	  the	  whole	  of	  first/third	  world	  power	  relations.	  
However,	   he	   differentiates	   himself	   from	   previously	   mentioned	   approaches	   in	   that	   he	   focuses	   on	  
problematizing	  sovereignty,	   identifying	  notions	  of	  positive	  and	  negative	  sovereignties.	  For	  Hill	  positive	  
sovereignty	   denotes	   freedom	   from	   outside	   interference	   and	   having	   the	   wherewithal	   to	   order	   things	  
within	  its	  own	  borders	  on	  behalf	  of	  its	  citizenry.	  Negative	  sovereignty	  is	  only	  freedom	  from	  interference.	  
This	   is	   contrary	   to	   the	   very	   notion	   of	   sovereignty,	   which	   lies	   beyond	   restrictiveness.	   “Negative”	  
sovereignty	  could	  be	  more	  readily	  reckoned	  a	  recognition	  of	  the	  right	  to	  sovereignty,	  whereas	  “positive”	  
sovereignty	  is	  the	  actual	  power	  of	  the	  sovereign.	  For	  Hill,	  former	  colonies	  become	  failed	  states	  because	  
they	   had	   their	   actual	   sovereign	   power	   stripped	   by	   colonial	   and	   neo-­‐colonial	   relations	   whilst	  
simultaneously	  being	  given	  the	  responsibility/right	  of	  sovereignty	  (without	  the	  tools	  to	  exercise	  it).	  	  
In	  addition,	  Hill	  talks	  about	  the	  universalizing	  problem	  of	  the	  “failed	  state”	  label:	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Underpinning	   the	   failed	   state	   literature	   therefore,	   is	   a	   European	   or	  Western	   universalism.	  
Identification	   of	   failed	   states	   is	   achieved	   through	   the	   construction	   of	   a	   state/failed	   state	  
dichotomy	  built	  on	  a	  fixed,	  universal	  standard	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  successful	  state.	  Success	  
is	  defined	  as	  the	  possession	  of	  certain	  capabilities	  and	  by	  the	  nationhood	  of	  the	  population	  of	  
that	   state’s	   population.	   Western	   states	   represent	   the	   normative,	   universal	   standard	   of	  
success	   and	   it	   is	   the	   inability	   of	   certain	   African	   states	   to	   replicate	   the	   political,	   economic,	  
social	   and	   cultural	   conditions	  within	  Western	   states	   that	   has,	   according	   to	   the	   failed	   state	  
literature,	  resulted	  in	  their	  failure.	  (Hill	  2005:	  148)	  
This	  is	  a	  well	  taken	  point.	  One	  might	  think	  of	  this	  as	  taking	  Morton’s	  critique	  of	  a	  universalized	  
notion	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   of	   statehood	   a	   bit	   further.	   This	   exploration	   of	   problems	   with	   the	  
generalizations	   inherent	   in	   this	   universalism	   is	   unfortunately	   cut	   short	   by	   reference	   to	   an	   alternate	  
universalism.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  Hill	  critiques	  these	  universalizing	  aspects	  of	  the	  failed	  state	  discourse	  with	  
reference	   to	   a	   generalized	   /	   universalized	   answer	   of	   neo-­‐colonialism.	   Failed	   states	   are	   failed	   states	  
because	  of	  colonial	  and	  neo-­‐colonial	  practices.	  This	  may	  well	  be	  true	  in	  many	  cases,	  but	  not	  every	  failed	  
state	  is	  a	  former	  colony.	  It	  is	  important	  not	  to	  suppose	  that	  colonial	  interactions	  explain	  every	  facet	  of	  
becoming	   a	   so-­‐called	   failed	   state,	   because	   that	   supposition	   leads	   to	   assumptions	   and	   false	  
equivalencies.	  	  
	  Maroya	   (2003)	   offers	   a	   different	   take,	   positing	   that	   states	   on	   the	   fringe	   of	   ‘the	   colonial	  
experience’	  are	   far	  more	   likely	   to	   fail	   than	  other	  states.	  This	   is	  more	  sophisticated,	  accepting	   that	  not	  
only	  are	   there	  different	   types	  of	  colonial	  experience	  but	   that	  colonial	  experience	  does	  not	  necessarily	  
explain	  all	  state	  failure.	  Maroya	  argues	  that	  certain	  former	  colonies	  were	  better	  positioned	  to	  take	  part	  
in	   the	   liberal	   state	   system	  than	  others,	  with	   the	  difference	  being	  how	  significantly	   the	  colonial	  power	  
imprinted	   its	  European	  values	  on	  that	  colony’s	  civil	   society.	  Thus,	   the	  European	  notion	  of	  a	  successful	  
nation-­‐state	  does	  not	  come	  so	  easily	   to	  these	  places;	   the	  neo-­‐liberal	  state-­‐building	  narrative	  then	   just	  
doesn’t	  work	  for	  these	  states.	  Instead,	  the	  ruling	  classes	  of	  these	  states	  instead	  misuse	  aid	  for	  predatory	  
interests,	   leading	   to	   a	   further	   erosion	   of	   civil	   and	   political	   institutions.	   There	   are	   striking	   similarities	  
between	  this	  initial	  analysis	  and	  certain	  prescriptive	  liberal	  analyses,	  such	  as	  in	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  
(2013).	  	  
“…we	  as	  chroniclers	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  system’s	  history	  have	  tended	  to	  view	  its	  expansion	  as	  
the	  vehicle	  of	  progress.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  post-­‐Second	  World	  War	  decolonisation,	  such	  a	  view	  
is	   readily	   understandable,	   given	   the	   manifest	   failings	   of	   the	   colonial	   system	   and	   the	  
compelling	  logic	  of	  self-­‐determination	  as	  a	  principle	  of	  international	  justice.”	  (Maroya:	  268)	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But	  –	  	  
“…countries	   [on	   the	   fringe	  of	  colonial	  administration]	  are	  not	  simply	  struggling	   to	  be	  states	  
(the	  ‘failed	  state’	  thesis),	  but	  are	  struggling	  with	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  statehood	  as	  understood	  
in	  the	  contemporary	  world.”	  (ibid:	  267)	  
He	  bridges	  these	  prescriptive	  sensibilities	  with	  critiques	  of	  colonial	  norms.	  However,	  he	  focuses	  
only	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Western	  norms	  that	  came	  along	  with	  colonialism	  were	  embedded	  into	  the	  
culture	  before	  the	  end	  of	  colonialism.	  	  
Studies	  into	  the	  legacies	  of	  colonialism	  have	  most	  usually	  generalised	  from	  the	  experiences	  of	  
major	   colonies…	   It	   seems	   likely,	  however,	   that…	   frontier	   territories,	  would	  have	  a	  different	  
and	  distinct	  legacy.	  The	  alternative	  suggested	  here	  is	  to	  look	  at	  structures	  within	  colonialism	  
—	  we	   could	   think	   of	   them	  as	   cores	   and	  peripheries	  within	   the	  periphery	  —	   that	  may	  help	  
explain	  varying	  postcolonial	  outcomes.	  (ibid:	  271)	  
The	  work	  does	  ask	  some	   interesting	  questions	  about	   the	  connection	  between	  colonialism	  and	  
statehood	   among	   former	   colonies.	   It	   also	   calls	   into	   question	   certain	   general	   explanations	   sometimes	  
mobilized	  within	  postcolonial	  studies	  of	  statehood	  and	  state	  failure.	   In	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  Hill’s	  work,	  
Maroya	  pushes	  toward	  more	  specificity	  but	  still	  does	  so	  from	  within	  a	  generalizing	  model	  –	  some	  type	  of	  
colonial	   explanation	   is	   still	   the	   best	   explanation	   for	   state	   failure,	   thus	   situating	   all	   of	   the	   failed	   state	  
discourse	  within	  broader	  discourses	  on	  postcolonialism.	  	  	  
Stanski	  (2009)	  pursues	  Afghanistan’s	  specific	  history	  of	  interaction	  with	  the	  West	  as	  a	  model	  of	  
understanding	  Afghanistan	   as	   a	   failed	   state.	  He	   analyzes	   the	   inconsistent	  manner	   in	  which	   important	  
Afghan	  figures	  –	  Warlords	  –	  are	  typified	  from	  a	  Western	  perspective.	  This	  begins	  to	  review	  closely	  how	  
Afghan	  identity	  is	  conceived	  and	  situated.	  He	  approaches	  this	  from	  a	  historical	  and	  genealogical	  analysis,	  
drawing	   out	   strong	   connections	   with	   Orientalist	   archetypes.	   This	   specific	   analysis	   and	   its	   general	  
connection	   to	   Said’s	   work	   then	   allows	   for	   far	  wider	   reaching	   conclusions	   on	   the	   nature	   of	  West-­‐rest	  
interaction.	  	  
“…Orientalist	   assumptions	   of	   a	   violent	  Afghan	   ‘Other’	   colour	  US	   understandings	   of	   ‘Afghan	  
warlords’.	  It	  shows	  how	  US	  officials	  and	  commentators	  employed	  these	  cultural	  constructions	  
to	   advance	   the	   armed	   intervention,	   at	   first	   by	   validating	   certain	   major	   militia	   leaders	   as	  
valuable	  allies	  and	  later	  to	  justify	  a	  more	  invasive	  role	  in	  the	  troubled	  state-­‐building	  project.	  
(Stanski	  2009:	  77)	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Stanski	  shows	  us	  how	  at	  times	  these	  so-­‐called	  warlords	  are	  heroes,	  and	  at	  other	  times	  they	  are	  
villains	  –	  with	  typifications	  being	  strategically	  deployed	  depending	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  time.	  This	  goes	  a	  
considerable	   distance	   toward	   articulating	   Afghanistan’s	   indeterminacy.	   Yet	   the	   historical	   depth	   of	  
analysis	  is	  somewhat	  limited,	  bringing	  focus	  to	  Orientalist	  archetypes	  as	  broadly	  explanatory.	  Analysis	  of	  
all	   major	   Western	   interventions	   on	   Afghanistan	   in	   the	   past	   two	   hundred	   years	   uncovers	   narratives	  
which	  recourse	  to	  Orientalist	  explanations	  alone	  (ibid:	  89-­‐91)	  do	  not	  adequately	  explain.	  	  	  
Other	  critical	   takes	  show	  more	   interest	   in	  the	   limits	  and	  potential	  harms	   in	  the	  very	  gestalt	  of	  
the	  failed	  state	  discourse.	  This	  moves	  further	  toward	  one	  aspect	  of	  this	  dissertation’s	  aim,	  considering	  
the	   foundational	  underlying	  assumptions	  of	   successful	  and	   failed	   states	  as	   they	  pertain	   to	   the	  Afghan	  
case.	  	  
Caron	   (2006)	   speaks	   to	  one	  specific	   instance	  of	  US	  policy	   toward	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	   failed	  state	  
which	   is	   highly	   instructive.	   Part	   of	   the	  Bush	  Administration’s	   failed	   state	   doctrine,	   Caron	   says,	   argues	  
that	  failed	  states	  have	  lost	  all	  rights	  and	  protections	  accorded	  to	  states	  –	  in	  addition	  to	  losing	  claim	  to	  
statehood	  Afghanistan	  has	  lost	  recourse	  to,	  for	  instance,	  the	  Geneva	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (and	  
all	  other	  associated	  international	  law	  and	  custom).	  	  
“The	  four	  1949	  Geneva	  Conventions	  do	  not	  apply	  –	  the	  memorandum	  answers	  –	  because	  Afghanistan	  is	  
not	  a	  party	  to	  the	  treaties…	  Do	  we	  take	  this	  reply	  to	  mean	  that	  Afghanistan	  never	  ratified	  the	  treaties?	  
No,	  it	  did	  so	  in	  September	  of	  1956.	  Do	  we	  take	  this	  to	  mean	  that	  Afghanistan	  has	  withdrawn	  from	  the	  
treaties?	  No,	  it	  did	  not.	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  Afghanistan	  is	  not	  a	  party	  because	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  “state”.”	  
(Caron	  2006:	  215)	  
Caron	  here	  is	  speaking	  to	  an	  internal	  memorandum	  for	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  looking	  at	  the	  
legality	   of	   things	   like	   torture	   in	   Afghanistan.	   He	   argues	   that	   the	   most	   bothersome	   aspect	   of	   this	  
memorandum	   is	  not	   that	   it	   argues	   for	   the	   legality	  of	   torture,	  however.	   Instead	   the	  most	  bothersome	  
idea	   is	   that	   the	  so-­‐called	   failed	  state	  doctrine	  assumes	  that	  when	  a	  state	   fails,	   it	  completely	  ceases	  to	  
exist	  in	  terms	  of	  international	  law.	  This	  leads	  Caron	  to	  make	  the	  captivating	  statement	  –	  “If	  Afghanistan	  
is	  failed,	  then	  Afghanistan	  is	  dead”.	  He	  moves	  on	  from	  this	  to	  examine	  international	  legal	  doctrine	  and	  
sovereignty.	  Caron	  effectively	   captures	  one	  problem	  within	   the	   failed	   state	  narrative,	  which	   supposes	  
that	  statehood	  is	  the	  only	  effective	  measure	  of	  character	  and	  rights	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  He	  argues	  
that	  what	  constitutes	  statehood	  is	  less	  precise	  and	  clear	  than	  this,	  and	  that	  using	  labels	  of	  state	  failure	  
as	   justification	   for	   intervention	  conflates	  political	   science	  analysis	  with	   international	   law	  solely	   for	   the	  
political	  gain	  of	  the	  intervener.	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“…It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasize	  that	  the	  definition	  of	  failed	  state	  was	  constructed	  for	  political	  
science	  analysis.	  If	  it	  had	  been	  developed	  in	  a	  context	  where	  the	  consequence	  of	  meeting	  the	  
definition	   would	   be	   that	   the	   state	   no	   longer	   existed,	   one	   can	   be	   sure	   that	   the	   definition	  
would	  be	  far	  more	  demanding	  and	  precise…	  I	  very	  much	  doubt	  that	  any	  of	  these	  scholars	  or	  
analysts	  would	  have	  stated	  that	  those	  states	  because	  of	  their	  ‘failed’	  status	  no	  longer	  existed	  
as	  states	  in	  a	  legal	  sense.”	  (ibid:	  218-­‐219)	  
This	   constitutes	   a	   powerful	   critique	   of	   the	   failed	   state	   narrative,	   but	   it	   focuses	   exclusively	   on	  
legal	  analysis.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	  Caron	   is	  concerned	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  statehood	  and	  sovereignty	   from	  a	  
legal	   perspective.	   Those	   are	   important	   and	   interesting	   considerations,	   but	   they	   fail	   to	   consider	   the	  
actual	   specificity	   of	   the	   Afghan	   situation.	   In	   other	   so-­‐called	   failed	   states,	   would	   an	   intervening	   party	  
have	  such	  a	  disregard	  for	  that	  failed	  state’s	  character	  in	  international	  law?	  Perhaps	  or	  perhaps	  not,	  but	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  Afghanistan	  there	  is	  a	  historical	  tendency	  to	  treat	  the	  Afghan	  space	  as	  without	  character	  –	  
it	   is	  not	   caused	  by	   the	   failed	   state	   label	  but	  predates	   that	   label	   and	   thus	   interacts	  with	   the	   label	   and	  
concept	  in	  very	  unique	  and	  specific	  ways.	  
Edwards	   (2010)	   contends	   that	   Western	   models	   of	   state	   building	   have	   failed	   and	   examines	  
efforts	   in	   Afghanistan	   after	   the	   events	   of	   September	   11	   as	   a	   case	   study	   in	   why	   that	   might	   be.	   She	  
explores	  what	  is	  supposed	  to	  constitute	  state	  failure	  and	  identifies	  some	  gap	  between	  conceptualization	  
of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  failed	  state	  and	  the	  goals	  of	  state	  building.	  	  
	  “Various	   interventions	   by	   the	   international	   community	   have	   taken	   place	   in	   Afghanistan,	  
Bosnia,	  Liberia,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  Haiti,	  and	  Iraq,	  with	  ‘state-­‐building’	  perceived	  as	  the	  dominant	  
‘solution’	  for	  places	  deemed	  to	  have	  ‘failed’.	  A	  variety	  of	  definitions	  exist,	  which	  encompass	  
‘failure’,	   ‘weak’,	   or	   ‘fragile’,	   but	   there	   remains	   a	   vagueness	   and	   sometimes	   a	   blurring	   of	  
distinctions	  between	  these.”	  (Edwards	  2010:	  971)	  
State	  building,	  Edwards	  contends,	  has	  not	  been	  successful	  in	  Afghanistan	  particularly,	  but	  also	  in	  
a	  general	  sense,	  because	  what	  a	  successfully	  rebuilt	  state	  (in	  terms	  of	  a	  state-­‐building	  project)	  looks	  like	  
is	  conditioned	  by	  Western	  security	  interests:	  
“‘fragile	  states	  are	  seen	  through	  the	  dominant	  lens	  of	  Western	  security	  interests’	  and	  that	  in	  
this	   context	   they	   appear	   as	   little	   more	   than	   fertile	   breeding	   grounds	   for	   the	   export	   of	  
terrorism	  or	  safe	  havens	  for	  terrorists.	  As	  such	  they	  become	  a	  threat	  to	  ‘the	  national	  security	  
of	   the	  USA’	   and	   to	   ‘international	   security’.	  Hence,	   ‘rebuilding	   states’	   is	   seen	  as	   a	   challenge	  
that	  US	  policy	  must	  take	  on.”	  (ibid:	  972)	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Edwards’	  work	  suggests	   that	  processes	  of	  state	  building	  and	  concepts	  of	  state	   failure	  are	  only	  
related	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  one	  justifies	  the	  other.	  Definitions	  of	  state	  failure	  encompass	  a	  number	  of	  
broad	  and	  unclear	  traits,	  but	  the	  implication	  of	  state	  failure	  is	  an	  inability	  to	  exercise	  sovereignty.	  This	  
justifies	  state	  building	  projects	  –	  but	  those	  projects	  are	  generally	  tied	  directly	  to	  security	   interests	  and	  
the	  complexion	  of	  these	  imposed	  state	  building	  projects	  directly	  reflect	  that	  aim.	  
Situating  this  Project  in  Relation  to  the  Literature  
This	   thesis	   is	   a	   critical	   project	   that	   has	   an	   affinity	   with	   much	   of	   what	   the	   critical	   literature	  
explored	   in	   this	   chapter	   has	   to	   say.	   The	   empirical	   research	   chapters	   that	   follow	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  
fundamental	  critique	  of	  assumptions	  on	  statehood,	  sovereignty,	  and	  Afghan	  identity	  represented	  in	  this	  
chapter’s	  review	  of	   liberal	  narratives	  on	  state	  failure.	  Many	  of	  this	  project’s	  critiques	  will	  echo	  specific	  
critiques	   leveled	   by	   other	   critical	   authors	  mentioned	   above.	   At	   times,	   this	   project	   will	   lean	   on	   other	  
critical	  scholars’	  works,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  Weber	  (1995)19,	  to	  articulate	  particular	  critiques	  of	  sovereignty.	  
This	  project,	  then,	  must	  be	  considered	  to	  lie	  within	  the	  broad	  umbrella	  of	  critical	  scholarship.	  
Critical	   scholars	   have	   captured	   aspects	   of	   the	   uneven	   relations	   between	   Afghanistan	   and	   the	  
West	   in	   some	   important	  ways.	   Chomsky	   and	  Morton	   bring	   out	   neo-­‐colonial	   aspects	   of	   the	   situation,	  
Stanski	   identifies	   Orientalist	   influences	   in	   the	   narrative,	   Caron	   critiques	   sovereign	   domination	   while	  
Edwards	  critiques	   imposed	  state	  building	  and	  Hill	   levels	  a	  post-­‐colonial	   lens.	  These	  approaches	  are	  all	  
important,	  but	  tend	  to	  frame	  generalized	  explanations.	  
This	   study	   is	   a	   part	   of	   critical	   literature,	   but	   stands	   apart	   from	   these	   approaches	   in	   its	  
determination	   to	  draw	  out	   indeterminacy	   and	   insubstantiality	   in	  Western	  perceptions	  of	  Afghanistan.	  
This	   is	   important	   because	   that	   indeterminacy	   makes	   possible	   a	   set	   of	   often	   internally	   contradictory	  
justifications	   for	   intervention	  on	  Afghanistan	  which	  often	  seem	  to	  be	  more	   reflective	  of	  valorous	  self-­‐
imaginings	  of	  the	  West	  than	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  referent.	  These	  internal	  contradictions	  are	  reflected	  in	  
contemporary	  reliance	  on	  a	  stabilized	  and	  naturalized	  understanding	  of	  sovereignty	  which	  underpins	  the	  
state	   system	   but	   is	   itself	   contradictory.	   This	   suggests	   that	   a	   state-­‐building	   project	   in	   Afghanistan-­‐as-­‐
failed-­‐state	   is	   not	   only	   unlikely	   to	   have	   lasting	   positive	   effects	   but	   also	   recreates	   practices	   of	  
marginalizing	  Afghanistan’s	  potential	  (sovereign?)	  character.	   	  Thus,	  any	  project	  to	  confront	  the	  terrible	  
problems	  which	  clearly	  plague	  the	  polity	  of	  Afghanistan	  must	  be	  undertaken	  from	  a	  position	  that	  works	  
to	   understand	   rather	   than	   obscure	   Afghanistan’s	   specificity	   –	   which	   may	   make	   possible	   a	   uniquely	  
Afghan	   solution.	   Drawing	   this	   out	   requires	   a	   deconstructive	   history	   of	   Western	   interactions	   with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See chapter 6. 
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Afghanistan,	   and	   this	   deconstructive	   approach	   –	   and	   its	   focus	   on	   Afghan	   indeterminacy	   /	   identity	  
assignation	  –	  is	  what	  differentiates	  this	  project.	  	  
In	  conducting	  a	  historical	  analysis	  of	  Afghanistan,	  a	  variety	  of	  binary	  oppositions	  have	  come	  to	  
light	   which	   frame	   the	   relations	   between	   Western	   powers	   and	   Afghanistan.	   The	   critical	   literature	  
considered	  earlier	   in	  this	  chapter	  at	  times	  makes	  –	  explicitly	  or	   implicitly	  –	  reference	  to	  some	  of	  these	  
binaries.	   A	   great	   deal	   of	   attention	   is	   paid	   to	   the	  West/other	   (or	  Oriental)	   binary	   in	   particular,	   to	   the	  
extent	  that	  this	  binary	  view	  of	  a	  “West”	  and	  an	  oppositional	  “Other”	   is	  the	  core	  analytical	  referent.	   In	  
this	   view,	   “failed	   states”	   can	   be	   labeled	   and	   treated	   as	   they	   are	   because	   this	   failed	   state	   narrative	  
occupies	   one	   small	   place	  within	   a	   normalized	   structure	   of	   power	   relations	   between	   the	  West	   and	   its	  
oppositional	  Other.	  	  
This	   is	   not	   the	   only	   binary	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   critical	   literature	   (though	   it	   is	   the	   most	   widely	  
referenced).	  Each	  critical	  approach	  appears	  to	  privilege	  one	  or	  another	  general	  binary	  opposition	  to	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  others.	  This	  project	  intends,	  through	  its	  deconstructive	  historical	  approach,	  to	  give	  space	  for	  
all	   of	   these	  discursive	  objects	   –	   and	   their	   inherent	   tensions	   –	   and	   show	  how	   they	   interact	  within	   the	  
broader	  Afghan	  narrative,	  exhibiting	  Afghan	   indeterminacy	  and	   its	  specificity	  within	  the	  broader	  failed	  
state	  discourse.	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Chapter  3  –  First   Anglo  Afghan  War  
	  
“If	  the	  Shah	  should	  take	  Herat,	  he	  will	  undoubtedly	  have	  a	  game	  before	  him	  in	  Affghanistan,	  
aided	  as	  he	  is	  by	  Russia…	  He	  cannot	  be	  thwarted	  in	  these	  views	  except	  by	  England,	  and	  this	  
he	  well	  knows.”	  
UK	  Foreign	  Office	  (b)	  
Nascent  Narrative  -­‐  Britain  Comes  to  ‘Know’  Afghanistan.  
Afghanistan	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  was	  politically	  divided,	  with	  a	  number	  of	  factional	  
leaders	   in	  charge	  of	  regions	  within	  Afghanistan	  but	  no	  dominant	   figure	  or	  unifying	  polity.	  Accordingly,	  
Britain	  had	  no	  formal	  or	  specific	  way	  of	  talking	  about	  Afghanistan.	  Afghanistan	  occupied	  a	  non-­‐space	  far	  
outside	  the	  popular	  Western	  imagination	  at	  the	  time,	  only	  coming	  to	  Britain’s	  attention	  even	  tentatively	  
due	   to	  a	  Persian	   invasion	  which	   seemingly	   could	  have	   implications	  on	  British	   India’s	   security.	   Prior	   to	  
this,	  interaction	  with	  Afghanistan	  was	  limited	  to	  leveraging	  ways	  to	  ensure	  outside	  powers	  did	  not	  gain	  
influence	  in	  Afghanistan	  (once	  again,	  as	  a	  way	  to	  protect	  British	  dominion	  in	  India).	  This	  is	  a	  trend	  which	  
would	  continue	   for	  over	  a	  century	  up	   to	   the	  state-­‐building	  and	  war-­‐on-­‐terrorism	  eras	  of	   international	  
relations.	  
The	   first	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	   took	   place	   between	   1839	   and	   1842,	   at	   a	   time	  when	   the	   Shah	   of	  
Persia	  was	  pushing	  forces	  into	  Afghanistan	  and	  laying	  siege	  to	  Herat.	  Documents	  from	  the	  time	  suggest	  
that	   Britain	   saw	   no	   real	   problem	   with	   this	   as	   such	   –	   Persia’s	   claims	   on	   Afghanistan	   were	   seen	   as	  
legitimate	   if	  Persia	  were	  able	  to	  press	  them	  home.	  Not	  only	  was	  this	  a	  generally	  accepted	  idea,	   it	  was	  
written	  directly	  into	  an	  1814	  treaty	  between	  Britain	  and	  Persia.20	  
“If	  War	  should	  be	  declared	  between	  the	  Affghans	  and	  Persians,	  the	  English	  Government	  shall	  
not	   interfere	  with	  either	  Party,	  unless	  their	  mediation	  to	  effect	  a	  Peace	  shall	  be	  solicited	  by	  
both	  Parties.”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1841:	  p	  263)	  
Britain’s	  particular	   interests	  were	  such,	  however,	  that	  they	  preferred	  to	  see	  Persia’s	  ambitions	  
fail.	  Within	  Afghanistan	  ruling	  factions	  of	  various	  cities	  had	  overlapping	  and	  competing	  alliances;	  some	  
were	  related	  to	  and	  friendly	  with	  Persia’s	  ruling	  groups	  while	  others	  were	  not.	  Persia’s	  advance	  had	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




potential	   of	   pushing	  Afghanistan	   into	   a	   general	   state	  of	   internal	   conflict	   and	  Britain	   strongly	   believed	  
that	  Persia’s	  rulers	  had	  been	  suborned	  by	  Russian	  interests.	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  [b]:	  pp1-­‐12)	  
Unlike	   during	   future	   conflicts	   with	   Afghanistan,	   there	   is	   no	   attempt	   at	   arguing	   that	   British	  
intervention	   in	   Afghanistan	   was	   legitimate.	   In	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   British	   intervention,	   before	   actual	  
conflict	   involving	   British	   forces,	   a	   representative	   of	   the	   British	   government	   sought	   to	   bring	   Persia’s	  
invasion	   to	   a	   close	   through	   diplomatic	   means.	   This	   slowly	   shifted	   into	   a	   situation	   where	   Britain	  
considered	  giving	  material	  support	  to	  certain	  friendly	  Afghan	  groups	  (particularly	   in	  Herat).	  Ultimately,	  
the	  decision	  was	  made	   to	  depose	   the	   ruling	   figure	   in	   Kabul	   (Shah	   Soojah)	   in	   favor	   of	  Dost	  Mahomed	  
Khan.	  Soojah	  was	  friendly	  with	  Persia,	  supporting	  Persia’s	  designs	  on	  certain	  portions	  of	  what	   is	  today	  
Afghanistan	   (and	   were	   under	   sway	   of	   cities	   held	   by	   his	   rivals).	   Khan	   had	   formerly	   been	   Amir	   of	   the	  
whole	  of	  Afghanistan	  (to	  the	  extent	  that	  there	  was	  any	  centralized	  government)	  but	  had	  been	  deposed	  
by	  a	  coup	  which	  saw	  Soojah	  gain	  power.	  Khan	  had	  been	  friendly	  with	  Britain,	  and	  this	  was	  purportedly	  
at	  least	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  why	  he’d	  been	  deposed.	  (Kaye	  1871,	  pp	  100	  –	  110)	  
Prior	  to	  this	  time,	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  leader	  friendly	  to	  Britain	  on	  the	  throne	  of	  Kabul	  wasn’t	  seen	  
as	  a	  problem.	  Referring	  back	  to	  the	  1814	  treaty	  between	  Persia	  and	  Britain,	  India’s	  security	  from	  its	  west	  
was	  secured.	  
“The	  Persian	  Government	  judges	  it	  incumbent	  on	  them,	  after	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	  Definitive	  
Treaty,	   to	  declare	  all	  Alliances	  contracted	  with	  European	  Nations	   in	  a	  state	  of	  hostility	  with	  
Great	  Britain	  null	  and	  void,	  and	  hold	  themselves	  bound	  not	  to	  allow	  any	  European	  Army	  to	  
enter	   the	  Persian	  Territory,	  nor	   to	  proceed	   towards	   India21,	  nor	   to	  any	  of	   the	  Ports	  of	   that	  
Country;	  and	  also	  engage	  not	  to	  allow	  any	  Individuals	  of	  such	  European	  Nations,	  entertaining	  
a	  design	  of	   invading	   India,	  or	  being	  at	  enmity	  with	  Great	  Britain,	  whatever,	   to	  enter	  Persia.	  
Should	   any	   European	   Powers	   wish	   to	   invade	   India	   by	   the	   road	   of	   Kharazm,	   Tartaristan,	  
Bokhara,	   Samarcand,	  or	  other	   routes,	  His	  Persian	  Majesty	  engages	   to	   induce	   the	  Kings	  and	  
Governors	  of	  those	  Countries	  to	  oppose	  such	  invasion,	  as	  much	  as	  is	  in	  his	  power,	  either	  by	  
the	  fear	  of	  his	  Arms,	  or	  by	  conciliatory	  measures.”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1841:	  p262)22	  
There	   is	   a	   lot	   to	   be	   gleaned	   from	   this	   first	  article	   of	   the	   treaty.	   Its	   essence	   is	   to	   gain	   Persia’s	  
guarantee	   that	   routes	   into	   India	   through	  all	  environs	  near	   to	  Persia	  would	  be	  proofed	   from	  European	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 i.e. through Afghanistan, which wasn’t even given a mention. 





aggression.	   This	   is	   primarily	   aimed	   at	   ensuring	   roads	   into	   Afghanistan	   were	   secure	   –	   Kharazm,	  
Tartarstan,	  Bokhara	  and	  Samarkand	  are	  all	  in	  Central	  Asia	  along	  (though	  outside)	  the	  northern	  borders	  
of	  contemporary	  Afghanistan.	  Although	  Afghanistan	  was	  an	  apparent	  focus	  of	  this	  article,	   it	  was	  never	  
mentioned	   by	   name	   nor	   were	   any	   of	   its	   cities	   mentioned	   (though	   Herat	   figures	   as	   perhaps	   the	   key	  
geographical	  point	  in	  all	  narratives	  to	  follow).	  Afghanistan	  is	  only	  mentioned	  in	  Article	  IX	  wherein	  Britain	  
promises	   not	   to	   involve	   itself	   in	   any	   conflict	   between	   Persia	   and	   Afghanistan,	   without	   Persia’s	  
permission.	  
By	  the	  late	  1830’s	  things	  had	  changed.	  	  It	  was	  feared	  that	  Persia	  was	  acting	  as	  an	  intermediary	  
for	  budding	  relations	  between	  Soojah	  and	  Russia.	  (Foreign	  Office	  1839a:	  pp.	  26-­‐33)	  Worse	  from	  Britain’s	  
view,	   there	  was	   growing	  evidence	   that	  Persia	   intended	  an	   invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  
taking	  Herat	  and	   its	  environs	  at	   the	  urging	  of	  Russia:	  “The	   lately	  contemplated	  against	  Herat,	   if	   it	  was	  
not	  prompted,	  was,	  as	  is	  well	  known,	  strenuously	  urged	  on	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  Persian	  Government	  by	  
the	  Russian	  Ambassador…”	  (ibid:	  34)	  This	  feared	  invasion	  did	  go	  forward,	  with	  Britain’s	  emissary	  to	  the	  
Persian	   Shah’s	   court	   attempting	   to	   play	   some	   sort	   of	   peacemaking	   role.	   At	   length	   the	   emissary,	  Mr.	  
McNeill,	  argued	  that	  Britain	  would	  need	  to	  support	  Herat	  directly,	  arguing	  that:	  
	  “If	  the	  Shah	  should	  take	  Herat,	  he	  will	  undoubtedly	  have	  a	  game	  [emphasis	  mine]	  before	  him	  
in	  Affghanistan,	  aided	  as	  he	   is	  by	  Russia…	  He	  cannot	  be	   thwarted	   in	   these	  views	  except	  by	  
England,	  and	  this	  he	  well	  knows.”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1839b:	  20-­‐21)	  
Also:	  	  
“A	   general,	   indeed	   an	   [sic]	   universal,	   opinion	   prevails	   in	   all	   those	   countries,	   that	   Persia	   is	  
pushed	  on	  and	  supported	  by	  Russia	  in	  her	  schemes	  of	  conquest.”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1839a:	  
86)	  
And:	  
“…it	   is	   no	   secret	   to	   any	   one	   that	   the	   British	  Government	   has	   been	   desirous	   to	   prevent	   its	  
[Herat's]	   fall;	  and	   that	  Russia,	  on	   the	  contrary,	  has	  been	  solicitous	   to	  see	   it	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  
Persia.”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1839b:	  46)	  
And:	  
“It	  is	  reported	  and	  believed	  at	  Tehran,	  that	  the	  Russian	  Minister	  has	  announced	  the	  intention	  
of	   his	   Government,	   if	   the	   Shah	   should	   succeed	   in	   taking	   Herat,	   to	   release	   Persia	   from	   the	  
engagement	   to	   pay	   the	   balance	   of	   the	   debt	   due	   her	   by	   Russia…	   the	   Emperor	   desires	   to	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contribute	   that	   amount	   towards	   defraying	   the	   expences	   [sic]	   of	   the	   campaign…	   [and]	   the	  
Russian	  Minister	   had	   lent	   the	   Shah	   fifty	   thousand	   tomauns	   [additionally]	   to	   enable	   him	   to	  
proceed	  on	  this	  campaign.”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1839a:	  79)	  
It	  is	  then	  not	  surprising	  to	  learn	  that	  Mr.	  McNeill	  made	  a	  recommendation	  that	  important	  terms	  
of	  the	  1814	  treaty	  with	  Persia	  were	  to	  be	  breached.23	  
“I	   see	   no	   reason	   why	   we	   should	   conceal	   from	   Persia	   that	   we	   cannot	   rely	   with	   sufficient	  
confidence	   on	   her	   means,	   to	   entrust	   her	   with	   the	   defence	   [sic]	   of	   all	   the	   countries	   lying	  
between	   the	  Arras	  and	   the	   Indus;	  and	   that	   the	  necessity	  of	  providing	   for	  our	  own	  security,	  
compels	   us	   to	   require	   that	   she	   should	   abstain…	   that	   the	   terms	   offered	   by	   the	   Herat	  
Government,	  secure	  to	  her	  all	   she	  had	  a	  right	   to	  demand,	  and	  that	   the	  British	  Government	  
could	  neither	  sanction	  nor	  permit	  the	  prosecution	  of	  a	  war	  against	  Herat	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
demanding	  more.”	  (ibid:	  82)	  
This,	  along	  with	  evidence	  that	  Russia	  was	  cultivating	  ties	  with	  certain	  Afghan	  leaders	  who	  were	  
friendly	  with	  Persia	  (see	  Foreign	  Office	  1839a:	  pp.	  26-­‐33,	  119-­‐120)24	  made	  Britain	  acutely	  uneasy	  about	  
India’s	  security.	  The	  rulers	  particularly	  of	  Kabul	  and	  Kandahar	  were	  Shia,	  with	  historical	  and	  familial	  ties	  
to	  Persia.	  There	  was	  evidence	  of	  collaboration	  between	  these	  leaders	  and	  Persia,	  as	  well	  as	  Russia.	  (ibid:	  
26-­‐7)	  Thus,	  in	  a	  sense,	  the	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  was	  seen	  not	  so	  much	  as	  an	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  
but	  an	  action	  against	  Persia	  and,	  by	  extension,	  Russia.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  
was	  launched	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  placing	  a	  united	  Afghanistan	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  an	  Ameer	  friendly	  to	  Britain.	  	  
In	   analyzing	   examples	   of	   discourse	   from	   the	   period,	   we	   find	   that	   there	   are	   a	   few	   recurrent	  
themes	  that	  are	  echoed	  in	  other,	  later	  interactions	  between	  Afghanistan	  and	  first	  Britain	  then	  later	  the	  
United	   States.	  Documented	  discourse	   from	   the	  period	   is	   fairly	   sparse	  and	   typifications	  of	  Afghanistan	  
(and	  even	   the	   ‘Orient’	   generally)	  were	  not	   yet	  well	   developed.	  As	   such,	   there	   is	   a	  prevailing	   sense	  of	  
emptiness	   in	   regards	   to	   Afghanistan	   (which	   remains	   present	   throughout	   subsequent	   interactions),	  
buttressed	  by	  assignations	  of	  emptiness	  and	  positioning	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  “Great	  Game”.	  
Deciding  Afghanistan  
Already	   there	   are	   signs	   of	   what	   will	   be	   a	   running	   theme	   throughout	   this	   project	   –	   that	   of	  
Afghanistan’s	   emptiness	   and	   indeterminacy.	  When	  deciding	  Afghanistan’s	   fate	   (will	   it	   be	   absorbed	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Further argued in (ibid: 100-101) 
24 The latter reference includes a draft treaty between Russia and the Sirdar of Kandahar promising that Herat would 
be given over to the Sirdar if Persia were to capture it, and that Russia guaranteed Persia would not amalgamate any 
Afghan territory into Persia. 
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Persian	  conquest,	  or	  would	  Britain	  “save”	  Afghanistan	  for	   its	  own	  reasons?)	  there	  was	   little	  talk	  about	  
Afghanistan	  itself.	  There	  is	  little	  indication	  of	  a	  recognized	  sovereign	  identity	  for	  Afghanistan,	  a	  situation	  
arising	  from	  the	  various	  Afghan	  rulers’	  inability	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  Persia’s	  aggression.	  	  
This	   is	  not	  a	  new	   idea.	  Sovereign	   identity	  has	   long	  been	   reserved	  by	  political	  philosophers	   for	  
those	  polities	  with	  the	  power	  to	  demand	  their	  identity	  be	  respected.	  The	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	  has	  long	  
involved	  competing	  and/or	  complementary	  norms	  of	  justice	  and	  coercive	  power.	  
“It	   is	   just	   that	  what	   is	   just	   be	   followed;	   it	   is	   necessary	   that	  what	   is	   strongest	   be	   followed.	  
Justice	  without	  force	  is	  impotent;	  force	  without	  justice	  is	  tyrannical…”	  (Marin	  1986	  in	  Derrida	  
2008:	  8)	  
Sovereignty	  and	  the	  possible	  recourse	  of	  Afghanistan	  to	  the	  rights	  and	  protections	   involved	   in	  
claiming	  sovereignty	  is	  a	  theme	  which	  comes	  to	  light	  specifically	  during	  the	  second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war.	  It	  
is	  a	  claim	  that	  even	  at	  that	  later	  date	  is	  not	  taken	  particularly	  seriously	  –	  what	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  just	  is	  
not	  merely	  subsumed	  by	  what	  is	  powerful	  (though	  also	  that),	  but	  it	  is	  also	  decided	  by	  what	  is	  powerful.	  
What	  is	  right,	  what	  is	  just,	  what	  matters	  is	  decided	  by	  what	  is	  powerful	  –	  the	  sovereign	  decides	  what	  is	  
sovereign,	   the	  sovereign	  makes	   itself	  known	  by	   its	  ability	   to	  do	  so.	  Hobbes	  sees	  sovereignty	  as	  arising	  
out	   of	   a	   recognition	   that	   the	   sovereign	   must	   wield	   effective	   power	   over	   subjects	   so	   as	   to	   provide	  
peace.25	  As	  Derrida	  argues	  on	  this	  basis:	  
“…sovereignty,	  domination,	  or	  sovereign	  power	   is	  said	  to	  be	   indivisible…	  So	  we	  have	  here	  a	  
configuration	  that	  is	  both	  systematic	  and	  hierarchical:	  at	  the	  summit	  is	  the	  sovereign	  (master,	  
king,	  husband,	  father:	  ipseity	  itself),	  and	  below,	  subjected	  to	  his	  service,	  the	  slave,	  the	  beast,	  
the	  woman,	  the	  child.”	  (Derrida	  2008:	  49-­‐50)	  
Perhaps	  more	  succinctly:	  
“Right	  over	  non-­‐rational	  animals	  is	  acquired	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  over	  persons	  of	  men,	  that	  is,	  
by	  natural	  strength	  and	  powers.	  In	  the	  natural	  state,	  because	  of	  the	  war	  of	  all	  against	  all,	  any	  
one	  may	  legitimately	  subdue	  or	  even	  kill	  Men…”26	  (ibid:	  50)	  
For	   better	   or	   for	   worse,	   sovereign	   power	   is	   assumed	   to	   go	   along	  with	   effective	   power–	   that	  
power	  bestows	  a	  certain	  right	  to	  do	  as	  one	  will.	  Conceptions	  of	  limits	  on	  this	  exist,	  at	  least	  moral	  limits	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 see T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. M. Oakeshott, (London, Macmillan 1962) 
26 Quote from Hobbes; On the Citizen pp 105 – 106. 
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bestowed	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  sovereign	  as	  a	  guarantor	  of	  certain	  rights	  for	  those	  it	  represents.27	  There	  
is	   a	   concept	   of	   what	   constitutes	   legitimate	   authority	   –	   but	   during	   the	   first	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war	   this	  
question	   was	   never	   asked	   (and	   when	   it	   was	   asked	   in	   the	   second	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war	   it	   was	   quickly	  
dismissed).	   From	   Britain’s	   point	   of	   view,	   Persia’s	   invasion	   of	   Afghanistan	  was	  moral	   because	   Persia’s	  
sovereign	   ruler	   was	   acting	   in	   the	   national	   interest	   of	   Persia,	   as	   agreed	   upon	   by	   treaty	   between	   two	  
political	  entities	  whose	  power	  made	  them	  legitimate.	  At	   issue	  was	  whether	   it	  was	   in	  Britain’s	  national	  
interest	   (in	   this	  case	  that	   interest	  would	  be	  the	  preservation	  of	  British	  dominion	   in	   India)	   to	  stop	  that	  
aggression.	  Afghanistan	  had	  no	  power	  here,	  and	  thus	  had	  no	  sovereign	   identity.	  Afghanistan	  would	  be	  
absorbed	  by	  Persia	  –	  or	  not	  –	  based	  on	  the	  decision	  of	  its	  sovereign	  betters.	  In	  a	  way,	  this	  is	  a	  state	  of	  
affairs	  which	  we	  will	  come	  to	  find	  doesn’t	  change	  much	  over	  the	  next	  180	  years.	  
Afghanistan  the  Non-­‐existent    
This	   is	   an	   early	   conflation	   of	   two	   problematic	   binaries	   –	   that	   of	   sovereign/non-­‐sovereign	   and	  
identity/non-­‐identity.	  Afghanistan	  was	  not	  sovereign	  because	   it	  did	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  successfully	  
exert	  a	  claim	  to	  sovereign	  status.	  With	  no	  sovereign	  status,	  Afghanistan	  had	  no	  claim	  to	  an	  identity	  of	  its	  
own	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1814:	  Art.	  VIII	  and	  IX).	  Indeed,	  Afghanistan	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  nothing	  more	  than	  
Persia’s	   frontier	   lands	   in	   the	   Simla	  Manifesto,	   a	   very	   important	   document	   released	   by	   the	   Governor	  
General	  of	  India	  when	  Britain	  embarked	  on	  actual	  war	  to	  place	  a	  new	  ruler	  on	  the	  throne	  in	  Kabul.	  This	  
lack	   of	   identity	   was	   further	   empowered	   by	   certain	   Orientalist	   tropes	   –	   the	   Afghan	   understood	   and	  
respected	  only	  violence,	  seeing	  it	  as	  a	  type	  of	  strength:	  
“I	  need	  not	  inform	  your	  Lordship,	  that	  in	  these	  countries,	  where	  the	  insecurity	  of	  person	  and	  
property	  has	  still	  preserved	  a	  state	  of	  society	  in	  many	  respects	  nearly	  resembling	  that	  which	  
prevailed	   the	   feudal	   ages	   in	   Europe…	   the	   public	   infliction	   on	   a	   servant	   of	   the	   British	  
Government,	  of	  such	  indignities…	  I	  have	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  object	  of	  the	  whole	  proceeding	  
was	   to	   exhibit…	   an	   apparent	   contempt	   for	   the	   English,	   with	   a	   view	   to	   diminish	   the	  moral	  
effect…	   by	   the	   general	   belief	   that	   we	   were	   opposed	   to	   the	   conquest	   of	   Herat	   by	   the	  
Persians.”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1839a:	  68)	  
And:	  
“A	  desperate	  attack	  had	  been	  made	  by	  a	  body	  of	  Affghans…	  our	  men…	  fell	  an	  easy	  prey	  to	  
our	  barbarous	  and	  bloodthirsty	  foe.”	  (Sale	  1843	  :254)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See  J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970) 
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At	  this	  point,	  however,	   little	   is	  said	  about	  any	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Afghan	  people	  specifically.	  
Even	   the	   first	   entry	   refers	   generally	   to	   both	   Aghans	   and	   Persians,	   speaking	   to	   the	   sort	   of	   cruel	   and	  
uncivilized	   tactics	   that	   are	   seen	   as	   effective	   amongst	   them.	   What	   we	   find	   instead	   in	   an	   exhaustive	  
search	   of	   literature	   available	   on	   the	   time	   is	   that	   Afghanistan’s	   apparent	   character	   is	   notable	   most	  
succinctly	  by	   its	  apparent	  absence.	  Afghanistan,	   it	   turns	  out,	   is	  not	  worth	   talking	  about	  as	  a	   rule.	   It	   is	  
already	   an	   empty	   space	   which	   is,	   at	   discursive	   need,	   filled	   up	   with	   temporary	   meaning.	   Here	   was	  
reference	  to	  Afghan	  savagery.	  Later	  tactical	  discussions	  about	  Afghanistan’s	  value	  will	  be	  situated	  largely	  
with	  regard	  to	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  hinterland	  or	  frontier	  of	  important	  places,	  and	  is	  spoken	  of	  only	  in	  geo-­‐
strategic	  terms	  in	  relation	  to	  those	   important	  places	  (India,	  Persia,	  Russia).	  At	  times,	   individual	  Afghan	  
groups	  will	  be	  spoken	  of	  as	  victims,	  or	  heroic,	  or	  otherwise	  worthy	  of	  aid	  when	  the	  speaker	  argues	  for	  
intervention.	  This	  malleability	  of	  assignated	  character	  is	  something	  we	  will	  see	  time	  and	  again	  through	  
analysis	  of	  Afghan	  narratives	  –	  especially	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  intervention	  on	  Afghanistan	  (see	  Chapter	  
6).	  
It	  was	  possible	  to	  intervene	  on	  Afghanistan,	  invading	  and	  putting	  a	  Britain-­‐friendly	  ruler	  on	  the	  
throne	  of	   Kabul	   because	  Afghanistan’s	   identity	  was	  not	  believed	   to	  matter	   (if	   in	   fact	   it	   even	  existed).	  
Afghanistan	  was	  a	  place	  empty	  of	  any	  gestalt	  of	  civilization	  to	  lend	  it	  legitimacy.	  Interestingly	  and	  highly	  
differentiated	  from	  all	  future	  interactions	  with	  Afghanistan,	  there	  is	  little	  emphasis	  given	  on	  its	  alleged	  
uncivilized	   nature.	  Much	  more	   prevalent	   is	   a	   manner	   of	   typifying	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   non-­‐entity	   and	   a	  
tendency	  to	  situate	  Afghanistan’s	  geographic	  space	   in	  reference	  to	  the	  Great	  Game.	  Both	  of	  these	  are	  
aspects	   of	   ‘knowing’	   Afghanistan	  which	  will	   come	   up	   time	   and	   again	   throughout	   interventions	   in	   the	  
future.	   In	   future	   interventions,	   Afghanistan’s	   barbaric	   nature	   is	   presented	   as	   justification	   for	   those	  
interventions	  –	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  this	  was	  not	  seen	  as	  necessary.	  Afghanistan’s	  
emptiness	  is	  taken	  as	  such	  a	  given	  that	  it	  need	  not	  even	  be	  justified.	  
When	   it	   became	   known	   that	   Britain	  was	   involved	   in	   a	   conflict	   in	   Afghanistan,	   the	   awareness	  
came	   from	  a	  publicly	   released	  document	  called	   the	  Simla	  Manifesto.	  The	  whole	  of	   the	  Manifesto	  was	  
published	  in	  the	  Times,	  along	  with	  some	  commentary.	  
An	   article	   from	   the	   Times	   dated	   22	   December,	   1838	   presents	   and	   analyzes	   a	   government	  
document	   which	   explains	   “the	   grounds	   on	   which	   the	   expedition	   to	   the	   frontier	   of	   Persia	   [emphasis	  
mine]28	  has	  been	  undertaken,	  and	  an	  exposition	  of	  our	  relations	  with	  the	  native	  princes	  in	  that	  part	  of	  
India.”	  The	  document	  was	  what	  has	   come	   to	  be	  known	  as	   the	   “Simla	  Manifesto”	  which	   is	   considered	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Note – this is Afghanistan. Referred to not as a place in its own right, only “the frontier of Persia”. 
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separately	   in	   this	   chapter.	   The	   Times	   goes	   on	   to	   discuss	   the	   context	   in	   which	   the	   document	   was	  
released,	  in	  which	  Afghanistan	  was	  in	  a	  state	  of	  confused	  turmoil,	  with	  leaders	  of	  different	  major	  Afghan	  
cities	  at	  odds	  with	  one	  another,	   some	  backing	  a	   targeted	  Persian	   invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  with	  certain	  
rival	  cities	  as	  targets.	  	  
“…that	  the	  chiefs	  of	  Candahar	  [sic]	  have	  avowed	  their	  adherence	  to	  the	  Persian	  policy,	  with	  
the	  ‘full	  knowledge	  of	  its	  opposition	  to	  the	  rights	  and	  interests	  of	  the	  British	  nation	  in	  India’,	  
and	  that	  they	  have	  openly	  assisted	  in	  the	  operations	  before	  Herat.	  Had	  the	  place	  then	  fallen	  
before	  the	  power	  of	  the	  SCHAH	  [sic],	  the	  means	  of	  further	  advance	  were	  immediately	  open	  
to	  him,	  through	  the	  friendship	  and	  cooperation	  of	  these	  chiefs.	  With	  Runjeet	  Singh	  a	  treaty	  of	  
alliance	  is	  stated…	  [and]	  Schah	  Soojah,	  the	  exiled	  prince	  of	  Cabul,	  is	  made	  a	  party…	  [to	  a	  three	  
prong	  alliance	  with	  Persia]”	  (Times	  1838)	  
	  The	  article	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  “Russia	   is	  adverted	  to	   in	  an	  obscure	  manner	  only…”	   in	  the	  
Simla	   document,	   though	   we’ve	   seen	   sufficient	   evidence	   outlined	   earlier	   suggesting	   that	   the	   British	  
government	   saw	   Russia	   behind	   the	   treaties.	   (See	   earlier	   mentioned	   documents	   naming	   Russia	   as	  
guarantor	  of	  certain	  treaties,	  payments	  and	  provisions.)	  At	  issue	  then,	  is	  that	  there	  is	  unrest	  on	  Persia’s	  
frontiers	  with	  certain	  warlords	   in	  that	  area	  allying	  with	  Persia	  and	  Russia	  to	  gain	   influence,	  which	  was	  
seen	  as	  a	  clear	  threat	  to	  British	  interests.	  Afghanistan	  itself	  was	  not	  a	  place	  –	  the	  frontiers	  of	  Persia	  was	  
simply	  a	  wild	  space	  with	  wild	  city	  rulers	  fighting	  among	  themselves.	  It	  was	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  that	  the	  
Simla	  Manifesto	  suggested	  changing.	  
The	  Simla	  Manifesto	   is	  a	  document	  written	  and	  released	  on	  order	  of	   the	  Governor	  General	  of	  
India	   at	   the	   time,	   Auckland.	   It	   laid	   out	   the	   official	   justification	   for	   the	   first	   Anglo	   Afghan	   war.	   The	  
manifesto	  is	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  then	  shah	  of	  Kabul,	  Dost	  Mahomed	  Khan.	  Khan,	  it	  was	  alleged:	  
“…had	  made	  a	  sudden	  and	  unprovoked	  attack	  on…	  our	  ancient	  ally…	  it	  was	  to	  be	  feared	  that,	  
the	  flames	  of	  war	  being	  once	  kindled	   in	  the	  very	  regions	   into	  which	  we	  were	  endeavouring	  
[sic]	   to	   extend	   our	   commerce,	   the	   peaceful	   and	   beneficial	   purposes	   of	   the	   British	  
Government	  would	  be	  altogether	  frustrated…”	  (MacNaghten	  1838)	  
And:	  
“It	   subsequently	   came	   to	   the	   knowledge	  of	   the	  Governor-­‐General	   that	   a	   Persian	   army	  was	  
besieging	   Herat;	   that	   intrigues	   were	   actively	   prosecuted	   throughout	   Afghanistan,	   for	   the	  
purpose	  of	  extending	  Persian	  influence	  and	  authority	  to	  the	  banks	  of,	  and	  even	  beyond,	  the	  
Indus…	  in	  designs	  wholly	  at	  variance	  with	  the	  principles	  and	  objects	  of	  its	  alliance	  with	  Great	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Britain…	   It	   was	   now	   evident	   that	   [the	   British	   government	   could	   not]	   bring	   about	   a	   good	  
understanding	  between	  the	  Sikh	  ruler	  and	  Dost	  Mahomed	  Khan,	  and	  the	  hostile	  policy	  of	  the	  
latter	  chief	  showed…	  so	  long	  as	  Caubul	  [sic]	  remained	  under	  his	  government,	  we	  could	  never	  
[have	  a	  secure	  border	  to	  India].”	  (ibid)	  
Thus,	  Dost	  Mahomed	  Khan	  was	  acting	  savagely	  toward	  neighbors	  as	  part	  of	  a	  coordinated	  effort	  
with	  Persia,	  which	  was	   laying	  siege	  even	   then	   to	  Herat.	  Regarding	  Herat,	   the	  Afghans	  holding	   the	  city	  
were	  situated	  as	  being	  simultaneously	  heroic	  and	  powerless.	  This	  is	  a	  theme	  which	  will	  be	  eerily	  echoed	  
nearly	   a	   century	   and	   a	   half	   later	   in	   how	   the	   United	   States’	   Reagan	   Administration	   talks	   about	  
Afghanistan	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  era	  Soviet	  invasion.	  
“The	  Governor-­‐General	  deems	  it	  in	  this	  place	  necessary	  to	  revert	  to	  the	  siege	  of	  Herat…	  The	  
attack	   up	   on	   it	  was	   a	  most	   unjustifiable	   and	   cruel	   aggression…	   continued,	   notwithstanding	  
the…	  just	  and	  becoming	  offer	  of	  accommodation	  had	  been	  made	  and	  rejected.	  The	  besieged	  
have	  behaved	  with	  a	  gallantry	  and	   fortitude	   [emphasis	  mine]	  worthy	  of	   the	   justice	  of	   their	  
cause…”	  (ibid)	  
This	  idea	  of	  the	  gallant	  (friendly)	  Afghan	  is	  seen	  a	  number	  of	  times	  in	  cables	  from	  McNeill.	  See	  
for	   instance	   UK	   Foreign	   Office	   (1839a:	   121):	   “The	   defence	   [sic]	   of	   the	   town	   [Herat]	   is	   still	   gallantly	  
maintained…”	  against	   the	  aggression	  of	  Persia.	  Every	  time	   in	   the	  cables	   the	  status	  of	  Herat	   is	  brought	  
up,	  it	  is	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  incredulity	  that	  the	  defenders	  of	  Herat	  are	  still	  somehow	  heroically	  holding	  out	  
against	   hopeless	   odds.	   As	   we	   will	   see	   later	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Soviet	   invasion	   of	   Afghanistan,	   those	  
peoples	  within	  Afghanistan	  that	  first	  Britain	  and	  later	  the	  United	  States	  would	  intervene	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  
were	   heroically	   fighting	   against	   an	   evil	   sort	   of	   aggression	   –	   but	   they	   would	   be	   ultimately	   powerless	  
without	  salvation	  from	  outside.	  Thus	  we	  see	  a	  particular	  manner	  of	  using	  this	  label	  of	  valor	  and	  heroism	  
in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  really	  stand	  in	  for	  powerlessness	  and	  emptiness.	  	  
For	  instance,	  immediately	  following	  the	  previous	  quotation:	  	  
“…it	  is	  obvious,	  that	  if	  he	  [Persian	  Shah]	  can	  maintain	  his	  troops	  in	  their	  present	  position	  for	  
an	   indefinite	   length	   of	   time,	   he	   must	   ultimately	   succeed	   in	   reducing	   it	   [Herat’s	   defenses,	  




“…brought	   a	   letter	   from	   Yar	  Mahommed	   Khan29	   giving	  me	   full	   powers	   to	   conclude	   for	   the	  
government	  of	  Herat	  any	  arrangement	  I	  might	  consider	  advisable…”	  (ibid:	  126)	  
Speaking	   of	   Herat’s	   ultimate	   powerlessness	   without	   British	   help	   and	   emphasizing	   a	   sort	   of	  
admittance	  of	  British	  superiority	  (on	  the	  part	  of	  Herat)	  was	  commonplace	  in	  these	  cables,	  with	  praise	  for	  
the	  valor	  of	  the	  defenders	  often	  following	  shortly	  after.	  	  	  
“He	   [Shah	   of	  Herat]	  was	   very	   desirous	   that	   I	   should	   take	   a	   part	   in	   the	   negotiation	   [to	   end	  
hostility	   between	   Persia	   and	  Herat],	   as	   the	  only	  means	   he	   could	   devise	   of	   obtaining	   some	  
security…”	  (ibid:	  42)	  
Giving	  McNeill	  power	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  Herat	  to	  Persia-­‐	  	  
“In	   like	  manner,	   the	  whole	  of	   the	  Affghans,	  appreciating	  your	  kindness,	  commit	  themselves	  
and	  their	  country	  entirely	   to	  your	   judgment	  and	  discretion;	  and	  they	  will	  not,	  by	  neglect	  or	  
remissness,	   act	   in	   opposition	   to	   whatever	   arrangements	   your	   enlightened	   judgment	   may	  
deem	  it	  expedient	  to	  make…”	  (ibid:	  69)	  
This	   represents	   one	   way	   in	   which	   a	   certain	   powerlessness	   and	   emptiness	   of	   character	   was	  
assigned	  to	  (or	  assumed	  upon)	  Afghanistan.	  There	  was	  no	  right	  to	  sovereignty	  to	  be	  even	  implied	  here,	  
and	  sovereignty	  is	  the	  character	  and	  identity	  of	  a	  state.	  Any	  modicum	  of	  independence	  and	  succor	  to	  be	  
had	  for	  Herat	  could	  only	  come	  from	  Britain:	  	  
	  “…if	   I	   could	  succeed	  by	  any	  means	   in	  preserving	   the	   independence	  of	  Herat,	   I	   should	  have	  
secured	  from	  danger	  our	  influence	  in	  all	  the	  countries	  [emphasis	  mine]	  between	  the	  frontiers	  
of	  Persia	  and	  the	  Indus.”	  (ibid:	  128)	  	  
We	  can	  further	  see	  how	  there	  was	  never	  even	  a	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  Afghanistan	  might	  
have	  some	  character	  or	  identity	  of	  its	  own	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  through	  British	  Parliament.	  Queen	  
Victoria	   opened	   Parliament	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   invasion	   of	   Afghanistan,	   presenting	   it	   as	   urgently	  
important	  business…	  but	  in	  the	  whole	  never	  once	  doing	  so	  much	  as	  mentioning	  Afghanistan	  itself.	  
“Differences	   which	   have	   arisen	   have	   occasioned	   the	   retirement	   of	   my	   Minister	   from	   the	  
Court	  of	  Teheran.	  I	   indulge,	  however,	  the	  hope	  of	   learning	  that	  a	  satisfactory	  adjustment	  of	  
these	   differences	  will	   allow	   of	   the	   re-­‐establishment	   of	  my	   relations	  with	   Persia	   upon	   their	  
former	  footing	  of	  friendship.	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“Events	  connected	  with	  the	  same	  differences	  have	  induced	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  of	  India	  to	  
take	  measures	  for	  protecting	  British	  interests	  in	  that	  quarter	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  to	  enter	  into	  
engagements,	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   which	   may	   render	   military	   operations	   necessary.	   For	   this	  
purpose	  such	  preparations	  have	  been	  made	  as	  may	  be	  sufficient	  to	  resist	  aggression	  from	  any	  
quarter,	  and	  to	  maintain	  the	  integrity	  of	  my	  Eastern	  dominions.”	  (Victoria	  1839)	  
Queen	  Victoria	  here	  refers	  to	  an	  actual	   invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  with	  the	  expressed	  purpose	  of	  
completely	  rearranging	  the	   internal	  power	  structure	  of	  the	  country,	   imposing	  a	  central	  government	  of	  
some	   sort	   that	  was	   friendly	   to	  British	   interests.	   The	  whole	  purpose	  was	   to	  ensure	   that	   India’s	  border	  
was	   secure,	   yet	   even	   so	   Afghanistan	   is	   never	   mentioned.	   There	   is	   only	   mention	   that	   there	   was	   a	  
disagreement	  with	  Persia	  that	  put	  India’s	  security	  at	  risk,	  and	  actions	  are	  being	  taken	  to	  fix	  things.	  This	  
brings	  along	  a	  certain	  specter	  of	  imperialism.	  That	  is	  a	  ghost	  which	  is	  often	  present	  in	  British	  interactions	  
with	   Afghanistan	   –	   there	   are	   always	   questions	   if	   this	   will	   be	   the	   time	   that	   Britain	   formally	   colonizes	  
Afghanistan,	   or	   absorbs	   it	   into	   the	   British	   Empire.	   It	   is	   a	   ghost	   which	   never	   becomes	   more	   than	  
ephemeral,	   however	   –	   Afghanistan	   is	   never	   quite	  worth	   the	   effort.	   Its	   emptiness,	   being	   assured	   and	  
natural,	  is	  not	  worth	  filling	  (generally	  because	  it	  is	  peopled	  by	  an	  uncouth	  and	  undesirable	  people).	  
The	   collection	   of	   Parliamentary	   debates	  which	   follow	   took	   place	   over	   two	   sessions	   and	  were	  
notable	   for	   a	   great	   volume	   being	   said,	   with	   very	   little	   on	   Afghanistan.	   A	   recurring	   theme	   in	   these	  
debates	   was	   a	   tendency	   to	   talk	   about	   Afghanistan	   without	   mentioning	   Afghanistan.	   For	   instance,	  
Landsdowne	   said	   that	   in	   deciding	   whether	   the	   policy	   of	   British	   India	   toward	   its	   hinterlands	   was	  
justifiable,	  it	  was	  necessary	  only	  to	  ask	  the	  question	  “whether	  the	  empire,	  as	  founded	  upon	  opinion,	  was	  
not	  sounder	  and	  safer	  than	  at	  any	  former	  time”.	  (Lords	  1839a)	  	  Somewhat	  similarly	  Viscount	  Melbourne	  
argued	   that	  even	  discussing	   the	   “great	  affairs	  of	   the	  Oriental	  Empire”	  was	  unnecessary,	   calling	  on	  his	  
colleagues	  to:	  
	  “suspend	  their	  judgment	  on	  these	  matters	  till	  we	  have	  full	  information	  and	  knowledge	  of	  all	  
the	  various	  circumstances…	  the	  Address…	  has	  been	  so	  framed	  as	  to	  call	  on	  no	  Member	  of	  the	  
House	  for	  a	  decided	  opinion	  on	  the	  subject.”	  (ibid)	  
In	   opposition	   to	   this	  was	   a	   suspicion	   that	   the	   government	  was	  making	   decisions	   and	   starting	  
wars	  without	  sharing	  fully	  their	  reasons	  for	  doing	  so.	  Peel	  said	  that:	  	  
“he	  could	  not	  consider	  this	  question	  [war	  involving	  British	  India]	  without	  the	  greatest	  anxiety.	  
He	   hoped	   that	   her	  Majesty’s	  Ministers	  would	   give	   them	   the	   fullest	   information	   –	   that	   the	  
House	  would	  be	   informed	  of	   the	   causes	  which	  had	   led	   to	   the	   interruption	  of	  our	   amicable	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relations	  with	  Persia…	  he	  trusted	  to	  receive	  such	  information	  as	  would	  afford	  satisfaction	  to	  
the	  public	  mind	  in	  England…	  he	  would	  not	  then	  utter	  one	  word	  in	  condemnation	  of	  it;	  but	  he	  
required	   that	   the	  House	   should	   be	   furnished	  with	   every	   particular…	   if	  we	   feared	   incursion	  
from	  Russia,	  we	   should	   have	   reason	   to	   apprehend	   greater	   evil	   if	  we	   took	  a	  wrong	   view	  of	  
intentions	  with	  Persia…”	  (ibid)	  	  
Indeed,	   in	   the	   later	   Lords	   (1839b)	   document,	   which	   was	   the	   last	   time	   Afghanistan	   was	   even	  
discussed	  during	  this	  period	  in	  Parliament,	  no	  documentation	  had	  been	  provided	  regarding	  the	  invasion	  
of	   Afghanistan	   other	   than	   the	   Simla	   Manifesto,	   which	   we	   also	   know	   had	   been	   published	   publicly.	  
Regarding	  this	  lapse,	  the	  Earl	  of	  Aberdeen	  said:	  	  
“…we	  were	   at	  war	   there	   [Afghanistan,	   though	   again	   it	   is	   never	   named	  or	  mentioned],	   and	  
have	  been	  since	  the	  month	  of	  October,	  and	  it	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  very	  unreasonable	  that	  their	  
Lordships	  should	  know	  what	  we	  were	  fighting	  about,	  and	  the	  causes	  that	  had	  brought	  about	  
this	  condition…”	  (ibid)	  	  
The	  Duke	  of	  Wellington	  and	  Lord	  Ellenborough	  echoed	  the	  sentiments,	  calling	  for:	  	  
“all	  the	  information	  with	  respect	  to	  Persia,	  since	  the	  mission	  of	  Mr.	  Ellis,	  should	  be	  laid	  on	  the	  
Table	  of	  the	  House”	  and	  noting	  that	  “the	  House	  had	  been	  sitting	  for	  more	  than	  two	  months,	  
and	  surely	  the	  noble	  Lord	  had	  had	  time	  to	  lay	  the	  papers	  on	  the	  Table	  of	  the	  House”.	  (ibid)	  	  
Thus	   we	   have	   simultaneously	   a	   situation	   where	   the	   government	   was	   comfortable	   invading	  
Afghanistan	  without	  adhering	   to	  normal	   legal	  proceedings	   regarding	  warfare,	   and	   the	  Parliament	  was	  
more	  interested	  in	  procedural	  concerns	  than	  they	  were	  in	  an	  actual	  state	  of	  war.	  In	  general,	  there	  was	  
an	   underlying	   question	   of	   whether	   conflict	   in	   Afghanistan	   would	   make	   India	   more	   safe.	   Debate	  
surrounded	  not	  whether	  the	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  was	  moral	  or	  even	  effective,	  but	  rather	  whether	  it	  
was	  necessary	  to	  the	  defense	  of	  India	  and,	  if	  it	  was,	  why	  evidence	  substantiating	  that	  had	  not	  been	  laid	  
before	  Parliament.	  A	  concern	  over	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  place	  was	  never	  even	  considered.	  
At	  play	  alongside	  this	  notion	  of	  emptiness	  –	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  emptiness	  of	  Afghanistan	  but	  
also	  authorizing	  the	  viewer	  to	  see	  Afghanistan	  as	  empty,	  overpowering	  any	  sense	  of	  wanting	  humanely	  
to	  think	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  Afghan	  with	  instead	  the	  dreadful	  immediacy	  of	  geopolitical	  survival	  was	  the	  
question	  of	  Russia.	   In	  Parliament	  questions	  were	  asked	  as	   to	  whether	   the	   intervention	  on/invasion	  of	  
Afghanistan	  was	  necessary	  to	  India’s	  security.	  This	  was	  essentially	  a	  question	  of	  whether	  doing	  so	  was	  
necessary	  to	  keep	  Russia	  safely	  distant	  from	  India’s	  borders.	  If	  this	  action	  was	  taken	  in	  order	  to	  secure	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India	  from	  Russia,	  the	  thought	  went,	  then	  anything	  was	  justifiable.	  If	  not,	  then	  Afghanistan	  was	  simply	  
not	  worth	  British	  lives,	  money	  or	  time.	  	  
Afghanistan  the  Game  Board    
It	   is	   by	   now	  obvious	   that	   the	   greater	   part	   of	   discussions	   over	   the	   first	   Anglo	  Afghan	  war	   and	  
events	  surrounding	  it	  were	  carried	  out	  with	  an	  eye	  toward	  Russian	  aggression.	  This	  was	  made	  possible	  
by	  assumptions	  of	  a	  certain	  emptiness/non-­‐sovereignty/indeterminacy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Afghanistan.	  Here	  
we	   find	   reference	   to	   the	   binary	   opposition	   referenced	   as	   actors/tactical	   spaces.	   We	   find	   that	  
Afghanistan	  is	  not	  an	  actor	  –	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  tactical	  space	  which	  is	  acted	  upon.	  Its	  emptiness	  means	  that	  it	  
is	  of	  no	  interest	  unless	  there	  are	  national	  priorities	  at	  issue	  –	  when	  it	  was	  determined	  that	  the	  security	  
of	  India	  was	  at	  stake,	  Afghanistan	  –	  empty	  of	  meaning	  in	  itself	  –	  gained	  a	  certain	  meaning	  in	  this	  sense:	  
it	   became	   a	   tactical	   space.	   In	   order	   to	   be	   a	   tactical	   space,	   it	   was	   necessary	   that	   Afghanistan	   not	   be	  
anything	  else	  of	  note	  –	  in	  order	  to	  be	  a	  tactical	  space	  Afghanistan	  must	  not	  be	  a	  legitimate	  actor	  as	  that	  
legitimacy	  would	  bring	  up	  uncomfortable	  questions	  about	  sovereignty	  and	  thus	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  British	  
strategic	  aims	  in	  the	  region.	  
This	  is	  not,	  however,	  done	  lightly.	  Parliamentary	  debates	  from	  the	  time	  suggest	  that	  there	  was	  
little	   taste	   for	   conflict	   in	   Afghanistan	   on	   principle	   –	   though	   some	   incidental	   imperial	   expansion	   was	  
generally	  to	  be	  expected	  (i.e.	  Lords	  1839b	  among	  others)30.	  Conflict	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  justified	  by	  the	  
overriding	  need	  to	  combat	   the	   threat	  of	  Russian	  expansion	  on	  British	   India’s	   frontiers.	  For	   the	  British,	  
Afghanistan	   was	   a	   place	   to	   carry	   out	   the	  much	  more	   broadly	   fought	   war	   against	   Russia	   –	   the	   Great	  
Game.	  
Following	   the	   narrative	   on	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   place	   to	   fight	   Russia,	   we	   can	   see	   first	   that	  
Afghanistan	  was	  an	  area	  of	  great	  sensitivity	   for	  Britain	  whether	  or	  not	  British	  narratives	  gave	  voice	  to	  
Afghanistan	  as	  a	  place	  at	  all.	  
“The	  Persian	  Government	  has	  openly	  expressed	  a	  belief	  that	  the	  possession	  of	  Herat	  would	  
give	  such	  a	  hold	  upon	  England,	  that	  she	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  deny	  anything	  they	  might	  
demand,	  for	  that	  the	  possession	  of	  Herat	  would	  give	  the	  power	  to	  disturb	  us	   in	   India,	  or	  to	  
give	  a	  passage	  to	  our	  enemies,	  whenever	  the	  Persian	  Government	  should	  think	  proper	  to	  do	  
so.”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1839a:	  79)	  
AND	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 To recap: UK foreign office 1839a pp. 79, 82, 86 and UK Foreign Office 1839b pp. 20-21, 46 
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[Instructions	   relayed	   to	  McNeill]	   “I	  have	   to	   instruct	  you	   to	   state	   to	   the	  Shah	  of	  Persia,	   that	  
whereas	  the	  spirit	  and	  purport	  of	  the	  Treaty	  between	  Persia	  and	  Great	  Britain,	  is,	  that	  Persia	  
should	  be	  a	  defensive	  barrier	  for	  the	  British	  possessions	  in	  India…	  it	  appears…	  that	  the	  Shah	  is	  
occupied	  in	  subverting	  those	  intervening	  States	  between	  Persia	  and	  India,	  which	  might	  prove	  
additional	  barriers	  of	  defence	  for	  the	  British	  possessions;	  and	  that	  in	  these	  operations	  he	  has	  
openly	  connected	  himself	  with	  an	  European	  Power,	   for	  purposes	  avowedly	  unfriendly,	   if	  not	  
absolutely	  hostile,	  to	  British	  interests…”	  (ibid:	  125)	  
Thus	  we	  see	  that	  Afghanistan	  was	  in	  fact	  very	  important	  to	  Britain,	  but	  not	  for	  any	  quality	  that	  it	  
had	  in	  itself.	  Rather,	  it	  was	  a	  security	  space	  existing,	  for	  the	  British	  narrative,	  wholly	  to	  ensure	  the	  safety	  
of	  its	  British	  dominion.	  Not	  only	  was	  that	  security	  at	  risk,	  but	  it	  was	  threatened	  by	  Russia.	  
	  “…in	   the	   event	   of	   Herat’s	   being	   reduced,	   I	   cannot	   doubt	   that	   the	   Chief	   of	   Kandahar	   will	  
consider	  it	  to	  be	  for	  his	  advantage	  to	  connect	  himself	  with	  Persia	  and	  Russia,	  rather	  than	  with	  
England.	   I,	  therefore,	  continue	  to	  be	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  fall	  of	  Herat	  would	  destroy	  our	  
position	   in	   Affghanistan	   and	   place	   all	   or	   nearly	   all	   that	   country	   under	   the	   influence	   or	  
authority	  of	  Russia	  and	  Persia.	  I	  need	  not	  repeat	  to	  your	  Lordship	  my	  opinion	  as	  to	  the	  effect	  
which	  such	  a	  state	  of	  things	  would	  necessarily	  have	  on	  the	  internal	  tranquility	  and	  security	  of	  
British	  India…”	  (ibid:	  119)	  
Not	   only	   did	  McNeill	   believe	   that	   Persia	  would	   be	   quick	   to	   turn	   to	   Russia	   –	   he	   believed	   that	  
Russia	  was	  encouraging	   that	  mindset.	   Indeed,	  McNeill	  was	  deeply	   suspicious	   that	  Russia	  was	  pressing	  
Persia	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  siege	  of	  Herat	  (and	  some	  associated	  conspiracies	  with	  the	  rulers	  of	  Kandahar	  and	  
Kabul).	  
	  “The	  Russian	  Minister	  furnished	  a	  sum	  of	  money	  to	  be	  given	  to	  the	  Persian	  soldiers;	  and	  his	  
countenance,	   support,	   and	   advice,	   confirmed	   the	   Shah	   in	   his	   resolution	   to	   grand	   no	  
conditions	  to	  the	  Affghans	  of	  Herat.”	  (127)	  	  
AND	  	  
“Relieved	  from	  the	  serious	  apprehensions	  he	  had	  entertained	  on	  this	  subject,	  and	  urged	  on	  
by	  the	  Russian	  Minister	  with	  so	  much	  eagerness	  that	  the	  Shah	  feared	  it	  would	  give	  umbrage	  
to	  the	  Russian	  Government,	  if	  he	  desisted	  till	  Herat	  should	  have	  been	  taken…”	  (130)	  
In	  more	  public	  discourse	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  care	  taken	  when	  referring	  to	  Russia	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  Britain.	  However,	  implications	  were	  certainly	  to	  be	  found	  in	  both	  the	  news	  and	  in	  Parliamentary	  
debates.	   In	  the	  Times:	  “Russia	   is	  adverted	  to	  in	  an	  obscure	  manner	  only,	  and	  not	  named	  in	  this	   Indian	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manifest.	   The	   direct	   cognizance	   of	   her	   designs	   is	   judiciously	   left	   to	   the	   authorities	   at	   home.”	   (Times	  
1838)	   In	   Parliament,	   questions	   were	   whether	   or	   not	   India	   was	   secure.	   If	   India	   was	   secure	   as	   things	  
stood,	  then	  there	  would	  be	  no	  reason	  for	  conflict	  in	  Afghanistan.	  If	  India	  was	  not	  secure,	  and	  if	  conflict	  
in	  Afghanistan	  could	  remedy	  that,	  then	  Parliament	  wanted	  only	  to	  see	  proof	  of	  this	  and	  would	  then	  give	  
the	  conflict	  in	  Afghanistan	  its	  full	  blessing.	  (Lords	  1839a,	  Lords	  1839b,	  see	  previous	  entries)	  
Indeterminacy  and  Tactical  Spaces    
Stanski	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  post-­‐Sept.	  11	  conflict	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Afghan	  leadership	  figures	  were	  
conceptualized	  in	  confusing	  and	  often	  internally	  inconsistent	  ways,	  at	  times	  lauding	  Afghan	  warlords	  as	  
heroes	   fighting	  against	   the	  Taliban	  and	  at	  other	   times,	  conceiving	  of	   them	  as	  wild,	  uncontrollable	  and	  
barbaric.	   (Stanski	   2009:	   73-­‐75)	   This	   thesis	  will	   continue	   to	   refer	   tohis	  work	   in	   various	  ways	   later	   –	   of	  
interest	  here	  is	  his	  focus	  on	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  and	  the	  inconsistency	  of	  how	  Afghan	  identity	  is	  
situated	  according	  to	  his	  work.	  	  
Stanski	  argues	  that	  certain	  Orientalist	  archetypes	  were	  mobilized	  during	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  
war,	  though	  somewhat	  unevenly,	  as	  a	  way	  of	  constructing	  a	  violent	  “other”	  who	  it	  is	  justifiable	  to	  level	  
violence	  upon.31	  This	  was	  accomplished	  in	  part	  questioning	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  any	  possible	  Afghan	  polity,	  
claiming	  it	  was	  culturally	  inherent	  to	  the	  Afghan	  to	  be	  corrupt	  and	  dishonorable:	  	  
“Unlike	   British	   colonial	   troops,	   who	   fought	   on	   behalf	   of	   Queen	   Victoria	   and	   the	   British	  
Empire,	   tribal	   structures	   or	   local	   communities	   failed	   to	   exemplify,	   espouse	   or	   enforce	   any	  
‘civilized’	   values,	   such	   as	   honour	   [sic],	   justice	   or	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   that	   might	   restrain	   their	  
members…	  The	   lack	  of	  any	  meaningful	  political	  order,	  British	   commanders	  believed,	  meant	  
tribal	  leaders	  could	  be	  easily	  co-­‐opted	  into	  their	  imperial	  project…”	  [emphasis	  mine]	  (ibid:	  86)	  
Stanski	   identified	   particular	   articulations	   of	   these	   Orientalist	   assumptions	   about	   the	   violent	  
other,	  and	  argued	  these	  perceptions	  continue	  in	  the	  present	  intervention	  on	  Afghanistan.	  	  Stanski	  also	  
implied	  a	   tendency	   toward	  duplicity	   in	   the	  Afghan	  character,	  meaning	   that	  when	   the	  situation	   turned	  
against	  Britain	   (after	   installing	  Dhost	  Muhammed	  Khan	  on	  the	   throne),	  Afghan	  duplicity	  was	   to	  blame	  
rather	   than	  any	  mistakes	  made	   in	  British	  policy.	  Western	  perceptions	  of	  Afghanistan,	  he	   says,	   rely	  on	  
assumptions	  that	  the	  Afghan	  people	  are	  naturally	  violent	  and	  untrustworthy	  and	  that	  this	  assumption	  
continues	   from	   the	   first	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war	   until	   today.	   This	   is	   a	   compelling	   concept	   which	   deserves	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Stanski relies primarily on memoirs written 10-40 years after the war to draw on the most egregious examples of 
Orientalis tropes. These pieces of documentary evidence are narratively very similar to what we find during the 
second Anglo-Afghan war but far more explicit and “out in the open” than much of what was published in the 
immediate time frame surrounding the first Anglo-Afghan war.  
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exploring,	   having	   some	   apparent	   connections	   (which	   Stanski	   draws	   out)	   to	   the	   current	   set	   of	  
interventions	  in	  Afghanistan.	  	  
Stanski’s	  work	  raises	  important	  questions	  which	  are	  echoed	  in	  this	  project.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  
thesis,	  there	  are	  two	  cautionary	  notes	  that	  need	  to	  be	  made	  about	  Stanski’s	  work.	  His	  focus	  on	  a	  very	  
narrow	   question	   and	   his	   assumption	   that	   the	   results	   of	   his	   analysis	   are	   applicable	   in	   a	   very	   general	  
fashion	  both	  create	  some	  issues.	  He	  focuses	  on	  how	  Orientalist	  –	  racist	  –	  conceptions	  about	  Afghan	  –	  
and	  Global	  South	  –	  identities	  allow	  the	  replication	  of	  imperialist	  activities.	  	  
“…patterns	   identified	   in	   this	   article	   are	   demonstrative	   of	   Orientalism’s	   lasting	   influence	   in	  
how	   the	   West	   attempts	   to	   manage	   the	   Global	   South.	   First,	   imperial	   powers	   return	   to	  
Orientalist	  patterns	  to	  justify	  their	  expanding	  influence	  across	  the	  Global	  South.”	  (ibid:	  90)	  
This	   narrow	   focus	   leads	   directly	   to	   the	   wide	   generalization	   –	   the	   idea	   that	   revealing	   how	  
Orientalist	   tropes	   in	   interventions	   in	   Afghanistan	   justify	   imperialist	   practices	   can	   be	   applied	   to	  
imperialist	   practices	   across	   the	   Global	   South.	   There	   is	   certainly	   a	   wide	   and	   rich	   body	   of	   work	  
demonstrating	   different	   ways	   in	   which	   Orientalist	   norms	   empower	   particular	   and	   uneven	   power	  
relationships,	  but	  this	  narrow	  focus	  /	  broad	  generalization	  duality	  misses	  the	  very	  specific	  and	  different	  
way	   in	   which	   Afghanistan	   is	   perceived.	   Afghanistan	   is	   not	   just	   barbaric,	   it	   is	   also	   empty,	   and	   non-­‐
sovereign,	   and	   a	   game-­‐board	   for	   ideological/geo-­‐strategic	   conflicts.	   It	   is	   all	   of	   these	   things	  
simultaneously,	  but	  in	  being	  all	  of	  these	  things	  at	  once	  there	  is	  a	  great	  tension	  within	  narratives	  about	  
Afghanistan	  that	  calls	  into	  question	  if	  it	  is	  anything	  at	  all	  –	  here	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  Afghan	  indeterminacy	  
which	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  most	  basic	  unit	  of	  identification	  in	  relation	  to	  Afghanistan	  –	  Afghanistan	  as	  
a	  (failed)	  state.	  	  
Imperial	  logics	  might	  be	  argued	  to	  have	  informed	  some	  portions	  of	  interventions	  on	  Afghanistan	  
through	   the	   years	   –	   but	   Stanski	   argues	   that	   all	   interventions	   on	   Afghanistan	   have	   been	   essentially	  
imperialist	  in	  nature.	  (ibid:	  74-­‐75)	  For	  Stanski,	  then,	  conflict	  in	  Afghanistan	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as	  one	  
more	   act	   of	   imperialist	   aggression	   in	   a	   broader	   Global	   North	   –	   Global	   South	   metanarrative	   wherein	  
overlapping	   imperialist	   projects	   define	   systemic	   power	   structures.	   Yet	   we	   find	   through	   a	   longer	   and	  
more	   particular	   reading	   of	   interventions	   on	   Afghanistan	   that	   Afghanistan	   is,	   at	   best,	   on	   the	   fringe	   of	  
imperial	  games	  –	  affected	  and	  intervened	  upon	  but	  not	  the	  referent	  of	  intervention.	  The	  Afghanistan	  of	  
the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  did	  not	  deserve	  a	  justification	  for	  British	  aggression	  –	  justifications	  were	  given	  
only	  because	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  justify	  to	  the	  British	  people	  why	  the	  British	  empire	  should	  exert	  itself	  in	  
such	  a	  meaningless	  space.	   Invading	  Afghanistan	  and	  effective	  regime	  change	  did	  not	  gain	  anything	  for	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Britain	  in	  itself	  –	  but	  it	  did	  deny	  a	  potentially	  very	  important	  tactical	  space	  to	  Britain’s	  geo-­‐strategic	  rival,	  
Russia.	  Afghanistan	  was	  simultaneously	  meaningless	  and	  extremely	  important	  –	  but	  its	  importance	  had	  
nothing	  to	  do	  with	  its	  character.	  
This	  project	  aims	  to	  understand	  Afghanistan’s	  unique	  place	  in	  the	  failed	  state	  paradigm.	  It	  seeks	  
to	   explain	   particular	   underlying	   imaginings	   of	   Afghan	   character,	   how	   those	   notions	   allow	   for	  
intervention	   and	   importantly	   how	   those	   articulations	   of	   Afghan	   identity	   undermine	   any	   possibility	   of	  
meaningfully	   addressing	   the	   terrible	   problems	   facing	   Afghanistan.	   The	   assumed	   emptiness	   of	   Afghan	  
character	   and	   the	   indeterminate,	   malleable	   nature	   of	   its	   assigned	   identity	   are	   central	   to	   this	   –	   and	  
simply	  situating	  Afghanistan	  within	  existing	  broader	  critical	  narratives	  of	  neo-­‐imperialism	  is	  injurious	  to	  
that	  project.	  	  
In	   exploring	   the	   idea	   of	   Afghanistan	   as	   an	   empty	   place	   and	   how	   that	   empowers	   certain	  
interventions,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   consider	   the	   context	   in	   which	   Britain	   saw	   Afghanistan	   at	   that	   time.	  
India’s	   security	   was	   of	   paramount	   concern,	   and	   Russia	   was	   the	   biggest	   threat	   to	   that	   security.	  
Afghanistan’s	  importance	  began	  and	  ended	  there.	  
At	   issue	   is	  not	  whether	  or	  not	  Russia	  had	  designs	  on	  Afghanistan	  [historical	  evidence	  suggests	  
they	   did],	   nor	   is	   it	   particularly	   relevant	   the	   reasons	   Russia	   may	   have	   had	   those	   designs.	   What	   is	  
important	   in	   this	   context	   is	   that	   Britain	   saw	   Russia	   as	   a	   threat,	   not	   only	   in	   Europe	   but	   to	   its	   Indian	  
holdings.	  That	  Britain	  chose	  to	  use	  Afghanistan	  as	  the	  place	  to	  resist	  any	  possibility	  of	  Russian	  expansion	  
on	  India	  requires	  deeper	  thought.	  Rather	  than	  closely	  defining	  the	  boundaries	  of	  India	  and	  resolving	  to	  
secure	  those	  boundaries	  in	  the	  case	  of	  external	  aggression,	  Britain	  chose	  to	  use	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  tactical	  
space,	  a	  buffer	   zone	  which	  must	  be	  denied	   to	  Russia	  while	  also	   remaining	  more	  or	   less	   free	  of	  direct	  
British	  influence.	  In	  this	  way,	  a	  buffer	  zone	  could	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  as	  a	  geopolitical	  
vacuum	   as	   well	   –	   or	   at	   least	   that	  may	  well	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   ideal.	  With	   Russian	   aggression,	   however,	  
Britain	  felt	  that	  it	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  assume	  a	  sort	  of	  primacy	  over	  the	  future	  of	  Afghanistan,	  while	  
doing	  so	  at	  the	  greatest	  remove	  possible.	  
It	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   treaties	   signed	  with	  Persia,	  wherein	  Persia’s	   right	   to	   invade	  and	   take	  over	  
parts	  of	  Afghanistan	  was	  explicitly	  acknowledged	  that	  Britain	  had	  no	  philosophical	  objection	  to	  a	  foreign	  
power	  holding	  control	  over	  Afghanistan.	  Keeping	  Russian	  influence	  from	  Afghanistan	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  




Once	   Persia	   became	   an	   unreliable	   partner	   in	   ensuring	   India’s	   security,	   Britain	   was	   forced	   to	  
decide	  how	  best	  to	  use	  Afghanistan,	  now,	  to	  ensure	  India’s	  protection.	  This	  basic	  question	  is	  repeated	  
over	  and	  over,	  through	  the	  course	  of	  all	  three	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  Wars.	  It	  is	  repeated	  again	  in	  both	  the	  Cold	  
War	  and	  after	  the	  events	  of	  Sept.	  11,	  though	  how	  the	  question	  is	  phrased	  has	  changed.	  During	  the	  Anglo	  
Afghan	  wars,	  the	  question	  was	  one	  of	  how	  Britain	  could	  best	  use	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  geopolitical	  space	  to	  
ensure	   the	   security	  of	   its	   very	   important	   Indian	  dominion.	  During	   the	  Cold	  War,	  we	  will	   find	   that	   the	  
question	  was	  how	  Afghanistan	   could	   best	   be	  used	   to	   hurt	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   –	   here	   the	  philosophy	  of	  
liberal,	  capitalist	  democracy	  took	  the	  place	  of	   India,	  needing	  protection	  (and	  Afghanistan	  provided	  the	  
best	   geopolitical	   theater	   for	   it	   at	   the	   time).	   After	   the	   Sept.	   11	   attacks,	   Afghanistan	   again	   became	   a	  
geopolitical	   space	   for	   security	   games	   to	   be	   played	   out	   that	   didn’t	   really	   involve	   Afghanistan	   or	   the	  
Afghan	  people.	  Here,	   the	  enemy	  was	  neither	  Russia	  nor	   the	  Soviet	  Union,	  but	   the	  notion	  of	   terrorism	  
and	  a	  more	  contemporary	  conception	  of	  liberal,	  capitalist	  democracy	  was	  to	  be	  protected.	  Afghanistan	  
was	  not	  in	  itself	  the	  wrong	  doer	  or	  the	  target;	  terrorism	  had	  some	  connection	  there	  but	  the	  same	  could	  
be	   said	   for	   dozens	   of	   other	   political	   spaces,	   some	   of	   them	   in	   fact	   allies	   to	   the	   United	   States	   and	   its	  
western	  allies.	  	  
None	   of	   these	   decisions	   were	   made	   in	   a	   vacuum.	   There	   is	   a	   discursive	   legacy	   in	   which	  
Afghanistan	   is	   situated	   as	   an	   empty	   space	   which	   is	   more	   or	   less	   without	   intrinsic	   value	   or	  meaning.	  
Afghanistan	  was	   indeterminate;	  other	  political	   spaces	  had	   identities	  and	   ideas	  attached	   to	   them	   that,	  
while	  not	   stable	  or	   absolute	  were	  assigned	   stable/absolute	  attributes	  discursively.	   This	   indeterminacy	  
was,	  in	  some	  sense,	  filled	  in	  with	  a	  tactical	  space	  or	  game	  board	  conceptualization.	  Afghanistan	  might	  be	  
filled	  with	   certain	   conceptual	  properties	   in	   keeping	  with	   larger	   societal	   contexts	  at	   a	   given	   time	   (post	  
WWI	  we	  see	  Afghanistan	  more	  or	   less	  given	  sovereignty	  and	   labeled	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	   free	  states	  by	  
unceremonious	  default,	   then	   left	   to	   fend	   for	   itself).	  Yet	  whenever	  a	   situation	  arose	   in	  which	  a	   sort	  of	  
proxy	   conflict	   could	   be	   fought,	   Afghanistan	   had	   become	   a	   very	   natural	   place	   for	   that	   conflict	   to	   be	  
carried	   out.	   This	   legacy	   can	   be	   traced	   at	   least	   from	   the	   first	   Anglo	   Afghan	   war,	   and	   in	   the	   post-­‐
September	  11th	  era	  we	  can	  see	  that	  legacy’s	  influence	  still	  both	  in	  intervention	  practices	  and	  in	  notions	  
of	  rights,	  justice	  and	  sovereignty.	  
British	  strategic	  interests	  were	  the	  justification	  for	  invading	  Afghanistan	  and	  creating	  a	  change	  in	  
leadership.	   For	   much	   the	   same	   reason	   as	   Britain	   considered	   Persia’s	   designs	   on	   Afghanistan	   to	   be	  
ethically	  legitimate,	  Britain’s	  designs	  were	  considered	  the	  same.	  Afghanistan	  didn’t	  have	  any	  right	  to	  be	  
left	   alone	   if	   it	   couldn’t	   press	   that	   right	   by	   force.	   It	   was	   not	   considered	   a	   legitimate	   sovereign	   space.	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British	  interests	  demanded	  that	  a	  ruler	  friendly	  with	  Britain	  rule	  in	  Kabul.	  Britain	  had	  the	  means	  to	  press	  
its	  interests	  by	  force.	  This	  was	  unproblematic	  and	  acceptable.	  Geopolitical	  logics	  of	  the	  Great	  Game	  and	  
preservation	   of	   British	   India	   were	   overriding	   concerns.	   Paternalistic	   justifications	   we	   would	   see	   later	  
were	  lacking.	  So	  were	  appeals	  to	  a	  sort	  of	  higher	  morality	  (civilization	  versus	  barbarism,	  western	  liberal	  
values,	   secularization,	   etc.)	   These	   were	   for	   a	   time	   when	   it	   would	   be	   necessary	   to	   legitimize	   actions	  
which	  denied	  Afghanistan	  any	  sense	  of	  sovereign	  identity	  and	  right.	  During	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	  
there	  was	  no	  need	  for	  that	  –	  the	  question	  never	  even	  came	  up.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  strand	  of	  thought	  in	  theoretical	  treatment	  of	  state	  failure	  that	  suggests	  assignations	  
of	   state	   failure	   are	   a	   new	   turn	   in	   colonial	   relations	   (Stanski	   2009,	   Gruffyd-­‐Jones	   2008,	  Wade	   2005).	  
Failed	  states	  are	  diagnosed	  and	  then	  certain	  cures,	  state	  building	  measures,	  are	  prescribed	  –	  but	  those	  
prescriptions	  intend	  to	  remake	  the	  failed	  state	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  it	  serves	  some	  purpose	  advantageous	  to	  
the	  intervening	  parties.	  Most	  often	  this	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  for	  resources	  or	  as	  part	  of	  a	  geopolitical	  security	  
project.	  If	  this	  were	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  then	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  Afghanistan	  was	  the	  first	  example	  of	  this	  
set	  of	  ‘rules’	  for	  intervention	  and	  prescription	  –	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  classical	  colonialism!	  	  
Afghanistan,	  seen	  as	  something	  other	  than	  a	  sovereign	  entity,	  was	  intervened	  upon	  by	  Britain	  in	  
order	   to	   create	   a	   geopolitical	   secure	   zone	   for	   its	   economic	   interests	   elsewhere.	   While	   the	   logic	   of	  
colonialism	  and	  empire	  play	  some	  role	  here,	  it	  is	  hardly	  similar	  to	  how	  Britain	  interacted	  with	  its	  colonial	  
holdings.	  Rather	  than	  building	  or	  taking	  over	  anything	  within	  Afghanistan,	  Britain	  was	  interested	  only	  in	  
ensuring	   that	   the	   place	   remained	   as	   much	   a	   vacuum	   as	   possible,	   and	   that	   it	   not	   be	   filled	   by	   other	  
European	  powers.	  When	  Persia	  proved	  (to	  British	  eyes)	  not	  up	  to	  the	  task,	  it	  became	  necessary	  to	  back	  
some	  sort	  of	  centralized	  government,	   stripped	  of	  as	  much	  power	  as	  possible,	   to	  ensure	   that	  no	  other	  
European	  power	  could	  gain	  influence	  on	  the	  Indian	  hinterlands.	  	  
Considering  Empty  Afghanistan  
These	   debates	   emphasize	   a	   certain	   emptiness	   in	   Afghanistan.	   The	   earlier	   wires	   conceived	   of	  
Afghanistan	  as	  an	  empty	  space	  wherein	  geopolitical	  competition	  could	  take	  place	  safely	  removed	  from	  
meaningful	  spaces.	  Afghanistan	  was	  empty	  of	  character	  and	  devoid	  of	  sovereignty	  because	  it	  was	  weak.	  
Its	   weakness	   allowed	   Britain	   to	   exert	   some	   control	   over	   Afghanistan	  with	   a	   veneer	   of	   legitimacy;	   its	  
weakness	  acted	  as	  a	  double	  layered	  justification	  for	  intervention.	  	  
Firstly,	   Afghanistan	  was	   too	  weak	   to	   stop	   any	   such	   intervention	   and,	   as	   discussed	   in	   the	   first	  
chapter	  sovereignty	  emanates	  from	  strength.	  This	   is,	  again,	  a	  phenomenon	  with	  regard	  to	  sovereignty	  
that	   Derrida	   supports.	   (Derrida	   2005,	   2009)	   Sovereignty	   is	  meaningless	  without	   a	   sovereign	   strength,	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without	  both	  the	  power	  and	  the	  willingness	  to	  utilize	  that	  power	  to	  ensure	  there	  is	  no	  viable	  threat	  able	  
to	  challenge	  that	  sovereignty,	  be	  the	  threat	   internal	  or	  external.	  This	  ultimate	  reliance	  power	  tends	  to	  
undercut	  notions	  which	   lend	  sovereignty	   legitimacy;	  sovereignty	   is	   justified	   in	  that	   it	   is	  protective	  and	  
not	   aggressive.	   Take	   for	   instance	   	   Derrida’s	   argument	   about	   the	   notion	   of	   sovereignty	   in	   democratic	  
society.	  
“Now,	  democracy	  would	  be	  precisely	   this,	   a	   force…	   in	   the	   form	  of	  a	   sovereign	  authority…	  having	   the	  
power	   to	   decide…	   and	   to	   give	   the	   force	   of	   law…	  and	   thus	   the	   power	   and	   ipseity	   of	   the	   people.	   This	  
sovereignty	   is	  a	  circularity…	  This	  circularar	  or	  spherical	  rotation,	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  re-­‐turn	  upon	  the	  self,	  
can	  take	  either	  the	  alternating	  form	  of	  the	  by	  turns,	  the	  in	  turn,	  the	  each	  in	  turn…	  or	  else	  the	  form	  of	  an	  
identity	  between	  the	  origin	  and	  the	  conclusion.”	  (Derrida	  2005:	  13)	  
To	  be	   legitimate,	   it	  can	  be	  argued,	  sovereignty	  must	  be	   the	  sovereignty	  of	   the	  people,	  and	  on	  
behalf	   of	   the	   people,	   putting	   the	   popular	   will	   into	   action,	   putting	   the	   necessary	   force	   behind	   it.	   Yet	  
Derrida	  argues	  plausibly	  that	  this	  very	  accountability	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  primacy	  of	  sovereign	  power.	  	  
“…this	  sovereign	  cause	  of	   itself	  and	  end	  for	   itself,	  would	  also	  resemble…	  pure	  Actuality,	  the	  
Energeia	   of	   Aristotle’s	   Prime	   Mover…	   Neither	   moving	   itself	   nor	   being	   itself	   moved,	   the	  
actuality	  of	  this	  pure	  energy	  sets	  everything	   in	  motion,	  a	  motion	  of	  return	  to	  self,	  a	  circular	  
motion,	  Aristotle	  specifies,	  because	  the	  first	  motion	  is	  always	  cylindrical.”	  (ibid:	  15)	  
Its	  power	   is	   intended	  to	  set	   into	  place	  certain	   rules	  of	  conduct	  and	  not	   to	   flaunt	  customs	  and	  
rules…	   but	   its	   position	   as	   the	   highest	   possible	   power	   simultaneously	   sets	   it	   outside	   of	   constraint,	  
allowing	  it	  to	  act	  outside	  of	  those	  constraints	  and	  break	  those	  constraints.	  However,	  the	  act	  of	  breaking	  
those	   constraints	   breaks	   not	   only	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   sovereignty	   (breaking	   the	   very	   rules	  which	   are	   its	  
reason	   for	   existence)	   but	   also	   breaks	   its	   very	   power,	   in	   that	   its	   power	   is	   most	   expressed	   in	   the	  
imposition	  and	  maintenance	  of	  those	  constraints.	  
Secondly	  (and	  this	  is	  important	  to	  the	  justification	  for	  a	  particular	  exercise	  of	  power	  by	  Britain,	  
lending	  legitimacy	  to	  its	  particular	  sovereignty),	  Afghanistan’s	  weakness	  allowed	  it	  to	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  
requiring	   external	   intervention.	   Indeed,	   Britain	   could	   position	   itself	   in	   the	   position	   of	   a	   popular	  
sovereign	  force	  here	  –	  casting	  its	  sovereign	  shadow	  temporarily	  over	  Afghanistan	  to	  give	  power	  to	  those	  
people’s	  will	   to	  freedom	  (from	  Persia).	  That	  this	  also	  served	  Britain’s	  national	   interest	  has	  no	  negative	  
value	   in	   this	   conception,	   nor	   does	   the	   idea	   that	   British	   national	   interest	   is	   of	   greater	   import	   here	   –	  
Afghanistan	  hasn’t	  the	  character	  to	  make	  one	  care.	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The	  Simla	  Manifesto	  and	  the	  Queen’s	  speech	  both	  play	  along	  these	  legitimizing	  lines.	  Yet	  this	  is	  
only	  acceptable	   if	  Afghanistan	   itself	   is	  without	  any	   right	   to	   sovereignty.	   In	   the	   time	  of	   the	  First	  Anglo	  
Afghan	  War,	  notions	  of	  sovereignty	  were	  still	  up	  in	  the	  air.	  What	  sovereignty	  meant,	  who	  it	  applied	  to,	  
who	   could	  hold	   it…	   these	  were	  questions	  which	  were	  debated	   in	   some	  circles	  but	  which	  hadn’t	   even	  
become	  a	  wide	  debate.	   (This	  would	  change	  during	   the	  Second	  Anglo	  Afghan	  War,	   to	  some	  extent.)	   In	  
this	   case,	  Afghanistan’s	  very	  assumptive	  character	  of	  emptiness	  allows	   this	  question	   to	  be	  completely	  
deferred.	   No,	   Afghanistan	   does	   not	   have	   sovereignty	   by	   default	   because	   the	   notion	   of	   an	   Afghan	  
sovereignty	  is	  never	  even	  raised.	  It	  simply	  did	  not	  have	  the	  power,	  the	  strength	  to	  ensure	  that	  any	  such	  
character	  might	  be	  considered.	  	  
It	   is	  this	  very	  final	  aspect	  of	  emptiness	  which	  seemed	  to	  carry	  the	  day,	  discursively.	  Ultimately	  
narratives	   of	   heroic	   Britain	   as	   savior	   of	   Afghanistan	   gained	   little	   traction.	   Afghanistan	   was	   simply…	  
somewhere.	  A	  place	  that	  simply	  did	  not	  matter,	  so	  its	  character	  was	  not	  worth	  considering.	  Debates	  on	  
the	  First	  Anglo	  Afghan	  War	  were	  concerned	  simply	  with	  whether	  or	  not	  Britain	  should	  be	  putting	  forth	  
the	  resources	  to	  expand	   its	  empire	   (though	  all	  evidence	  suggests	  that	   imperial	  expansion	  was	  never	  a	  
goal	   of	   this	  war),	   and	  whether	   the	   conflict	  was	   actually	   likely	   to	  make	  Britain’s	   Indian	   holdings	   safer.	  
Was	   the	   action	   in	   Afghanistan	   going	   to	   be	   worth	   the	   price	   it	   exacted	   of	   Britain?	   This	   was	   the	   only	  
question	  worth	  considering.	  
Implications  and  Revisiting  the  Central  Questions  
Afghanistan	  as	  an	  empty	  space	  is	  a	  much	  more	  fundamental	  and	  extreme	  narrative	  hook	  during	  
this	   intervention	   than	   any	   to	   come.	   Perhaps	   this	   is	   because	   up	   to	   this	   point	   very	   little	   has	   been	   said	  
about	  Afghanistan	  so	  little	  discursive	  ‘knowledge’	  had	  been	  built	  up.	  Thus,	  it	  was	  an	  empty	  space,	  or	  at	  
least	  a	  blank	  space	  insofar	  as	  how	  the	  British	  ‘knew’	  the	  world.	  Thus,	  this	  early	  intervention	  was	  taken	  
upon	  wholly	  by	  way	  of	   strategic	   thinking…	  wherein	   the	  strategies	  had	  nothing	   to	  do	  with	  Afghanistan	  
whatsoever	  and	  everything	  to	  do	  with	  what	  was	  at	  the	  time	  considered	  actual	  geopolitical	  threats.	  
These	   strategic	   aims	   were	   conceptualized	   in	   loftier	   terms	   of	   humanitarianism	   and	   justice	   for	  
public	   narrative.	   Interestingly,	   attempts	   to	   tell	   that	   story	   were	   just…	   ignored.	   It	   wasn’t	   important	   to	  
justify	  this	  exercise	  of	  power;	  the	  exercise	  of	  British	  sovereignty	  required	  no	  justification.	  The	  notion	  that	  
the	  intervention	  on	  Afghanistan	  was	  for	  Afghanistan’s	  own	  good	  didn’t	  seem	  to	  matter,	  though	  it	  was	  an	  




Revisiting	   this	   project’s	   central	   questions	   in	   terms	  of	   these	   analytical	   points	   largely	   reinforces	  
the	   earlier	   consideration	  of	   same.	  Most	   important	   of	   the	   three	  questions	   at	   this	  moment	   is	   the	   first:	  
“Why	   are	   we	   able	   to	   talk	   about	   failed	   states?”	   It	   seems	   reasonable	   to	   argue	   that	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
Afghanistan	  a	  very	  strong	  enabler	  for	  talking	  about	  state	  failure	  is	  this	  sense	  of	  emptiness.	  Indeed,	  the	  
sense	   of	   emptiness	   is	   so	   strong	   that	   at	   this	   point	   in	   history	   it	   was	   far	   easier	   to	   just…	   not	   discuss	  
Afghanistan	  at	  all.	  If	  we	  can	  trace	  that	  legacy	  through	  the	  years	  to	  something	  contemporary,	  we	  have	  to	  
match	   this	   legacy	  with	   an	   international	   context	  wherein	   virtually	   every	  political	   space	   is	   considered	  a	  
state.	   We	   face	   a	   situation	   where	   Afghanistan	   can	   only	   be	   conceived	   in	   terms	   of	   statehood,	   but	   the	  
Afghanistan	  of	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  could	  only	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  an	  empty	  space	  suitable	  for	  geo-­‐
strategic	  practices.	   If	   these	  assumptions	  of	  emptiness	  continue	  through	  time,	  as	   this	  project’s	  analysis	  
will	  show	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  this	  state/non-­‐state	  tension	  seems	  to	  demand	  we	  call	  it	  a	  failed	  state.	  Talking	  
about	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  failed	  state	  is	  the	  only	  way,	  with	  this	  legacy	  of	  emptiness,	  that	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  
Afghanistan	  as	  a	  state	  at	  all	  in	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  on	  statehood	  and	  sovereignty.	  	  
Yet	  that	  very	  emptiness	  obscures	  Afghanistan’s	  historical	   legacy	  –	  a	  past	  which	  does	  not	  easily	  
fit	  into	  the	  dominant	  liberal	  discourse	  on	  statehood.	  How	  can	  a	  political	  space	  which,	  as	  we	  will	  find	  in	  
later	  chapters	  was	  never	  really	  considered	  to	  have	  the	  character	  of	  a	  state	  become	  a	  failed	  state?	  Is	  not	  
statehood	  a	  precondition?	  Is	  not	  sovereignty,	  in	  dominant	  discourse,	  a	  given?	  Yet	  if	  Afghanistan	  was	  not	  
and	  is	  not	  a	  state,	  then	  how	  can	  it	  have	  had	  a	  sovereignty,	  how	  can	  that	  sovereignty	  be	  lost?	  How	  can	  
we	   justify	   intervening	   in	   Afghanistan	   in	   order	   to	   rebuild	   its	   statehood	   and	   reinstitute	   its	   sovereignty	  
when	   the	   very	   act	   of	   intervention	   is	   both:	   an	   impingement	   on	   an	   Afghan	   sovereignty	  which	   is	   never	  
really	  acknowledged…	  and	  an	  act	  that	  problematizes	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  intervener?	  
This	   speaks	   to	   the	  second	  major	  question	  of	   this	  dissertation.	  What	   is	  assumed	   to	  be	   ‘known’	  
about	  Afghanistan	  and	  how	  do	  those	  knowledges	  empower	  dominant	  narratives	  of	  intelligibility?	  
Here	  we	   see	   reference	   to	   those	  problematic	  binaries	  which	  will	   be	   replicated	   in	   varying	  ways	  
throughout	  interactions	  between	  the	  West	  and	  Afghanistan.	  While	  barbarism	  versus	  civilization	  will	  be	  a	  
well-­‐articulated	   rendition	   of	   this	   in	   later	   interventions,	   at	   this	   point	   we	   see	   something	   more	  
foundational	  –	  emptiness	  versus	  existence	  (non-­‐identity/identity).	  Emptiness	  could	  mean	  any	  number	  of	  
things,	   and	   indeed	   what	   emptiness	   means	   at	   different	   places	   and	   times	   changes	   in	   Afghanistan,	  
reinforcing	   the	   indeterminate	   nature	   of	   Afghan	   identity.	   Here,	   however,	   emptiness	   represents	   the	  
absence	   of	   a	   sovereign	   gestalt	   (sovereignty/non-­‐sovereignty)	   –	   an	   assumption	  which	   impacts	   on	   any	  
other	  notion	  of	  emptiness	  or	  existence	  as	   it	  might	  apply	  to	  Afghanistan.	   In	  saying	  Afghanistan	   is	  not	  a	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place,	   that	   it	   has	   no	   sovereignty,	   one	   also	   does	   away	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   sovereign	   will	   of	   the	  
people,	  of	  a	  character	  that	   is	  effective	  or	  meaningful	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  an	  international	  society	  of	  states.	  
This	  authorizes	  any	  sort	  of	  intervention	  that	  a	  powerful	  sovereignty	  entity	  may	  wish	  to	  undertake.	  It	   is	  
important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  includes	  discursive	  interventions.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  once	  it	  has	  been	  decided	  that	  
Afghanistan’s	   identity	   is	   one	   of	   absence	   it	   becomes	   acceptable	   to	   (one	   might	   argue	   irresistible,	  
impossible	   to	   avoid	   –	   one	   has	   no	   choice	   but	   to)	   configure	   that	   identity	   with	   traits	   garnered	   from	  
something	  internal	  to	  the	  first	  British	  and	  then	  American	  cultural	  history	  and	  experience.	  	  	  
The	  third	  question	  of	  this	  dissertation	  needs	  to	  wait	  for	  now,	  to	  be	  confronted	  as	  this	  analysis	  
moves	  closer	   to	  contemporary	   times.	  This	   is	  a	  good	  place	   to	  note,	  however,	   that	   these	  deeply	   rooted	  
discursive	   legacies	   need	  not	   be	   permanently	   reproduced.	   Indeed,	   for	  Derrida	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   auto-­‐
immune	  dilemma	  confronting	   this	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	   is	   such	  that	   it	  cannot	  be	  Sovereignty	   involves	  
the	  tension	  between	  power	  and	  its	  justification	  and	  so	  it	  is	  distortive	  to	  try	  and	  fix	  Afghan	  identity	  and	  
how	  sovereignty	  is	  to	  be	  exercised	  by	  an	  outside	  power.	  	  
Sovereignty	  (as	  it	  is	  contemporarily	  and	  dominantly	  understood)	  must	  involve	  the	  interaction	  of	  
supreme	  power	  with	  popular	  will	  in	  a	  by	  turns	  basis.32	  This	  turning,	  this	  internal	  discursive	  interrogation	  
is	   constantly	   unsettling.	  However,	   stabilizing	   particular	   conceptions	   of	   sovereignty	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	  
abrogates	  this	  by	  turns	  mechanism	  introduces	  a	  stability	  that,	  while	  seductive,	   increases	  internal	  auto-­‐
immune	   pressures	   until	   there	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   collapse.	   Afghan	   popular	   will	   cannot	   be	   imposed	   upon	  
Afghanistan,	  it	  must	  come	  from	  Afghanistan	  –	  but	  this	  discursive	  legacy	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  indeterminacy	  
and	   emptiness	   ensures	   that	   only	   silence	   can	   come	   from	   within	   Afghanistan.	   Resolving	   to	   question	  
sovereignty	   as	   it	   is	   applied	   to	   Afghanistan	   is	   a	   necessary	   first	   step	   to	   restoring	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	  
particular	  Afghan	  sovereign	  identity.	  	  
“If	  ever	  this	  double	  bind,	  this	  implacable	  contradiction,	  were	  lifted	  (i.e.	  in	  my	  view	  never,	  by	  
definition,	   it’s	   impossible,	   and	   I	  wonder	  how	  anyone	   could	  even	  wish	   for	   it),	  well,	   it	  would	  
be…	   it	   would	   be	   paradise.	   Should	   we	   dream	   of	   paradise?	   How	   can	   we	   avoid	   dreaming	   of	  
paradise?	   If,	   as	   I	   have	   just	   said,	   it’s	   impossible…	   this	   can	  mean	   that	  we	   can	  only	   dream	  of	  
paradise	  and	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  promise	  or	  memory	  of	  paradise	  would	  be	  at	  once	  that	  
of	  absolute	  felicity	  and	  of	  inescapable	  catastrophe.”	  (Derrida	  2009:	  302)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Refer once again to Locke’s argument that a state’s sovereign might is justified by its resolution to act as an 
expression of its citizenry’s interests and will. 
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This	  paradise	  is	  a	  theoretical	  thing	  that	  can	  only	  be	  truly	  believed	  in	  by	  those	  who	  believe	  in	  a	  
telos,	   a	   natural	   destination.	   It	  can	   never	  be	   arrived	  at,	   because	   announcing	  one’s	   arrival	   immediately	  
destroys	  the	  possibility	  of	  that	  paradise	  as	  it	  destroys	  the	  by	  turns	  mechanism	  which	  is	  vital	  to	  progress.	  
At	  issue	  then	  is	  that	  a	  falsely	  naturalized	  notion	  of	  stable	  sovereignty	  is	  being	  imposed	  on	  Afghanistan,	  
which	  marginalizes	  any	  possibility	  of	  understanding	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  Afghanistan	  crisis.	  Yet	  that	  false	  
stabilization	   is	   self-­‐destructive,	   and	   that	   self-­‐destruction	   offers	   a	   possible	   avenue	   of	   change.	   	   	   Rather	  
than	   relying	  on	  a	  West-­‐imposed	  notion	  of	  what	   it	  means	   to	  be	   sovereign,	   any	  project	  which	   seeks	   to	  
remedy	  Afghanistan’s	  historic	  (apparent)	  lack	  of	  sovereign	  character	  must	  make	  space	  for	  that	  sovereign	  
expression	  to	  come	  from	  a	  space	  that	  is	  uniquely	  Afghani.	  No	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	  can	  be	  categorically	  
imposed	  without	  seriously	  unsettling	  the	  basis	  of	  understanding	  that	  sovereignty.	  	  
These	   tension	  points	   are	   in	   this	   project	   identified	  by	  way	  of	  binary	  oppositions.	  Afghanistan’s	  
place	  as	  a	  successful/failed	  state	   is	   justified	  through	  naturalized	  norms	  of	  sovereignty/non-­‐sovereignty	  
which	   are	   self-­‐destructive,	   but	   which	   are	   in	   turn	   further	   stabilized	   by	   recourse	   to	   a	   certain	   Afghan	  
indeterminacy	  (identity/non-­‐identity).	  That	  Afghan	  indeterminacy	  is	  filled	  up,	  fixed,	  and	  exacerbated	  by	  
recourse	   to	   other	   binaries	   which	   serve	   to	   assign	   Afghanistan	   a	   place	   within	   various,	   sometimes	  
competing	  narratives	  on	  the	  social	  world.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  this	  was	  primarily	  in	  
reference	   to	   actor/tactical	   space	   but	   also,	   implicitly	   and	   to	   some	   extent,	   Western/Oriental	   and	  
civilized/savage.	  Afghanistan	  could	  be	   intervened	  upon	  because	  Afghanistan	  did	  not	  exist	   as	  an	  actor,	  
but	  was	  rather	  a	  tactical	  space	  –	  the	  intervention	  was	  on	  Afghan	  space	  but	  it	  was	  about	  Russia.	  Britain	  
was	  waging	  war	  on	  Russia	  by	  proxy.	  Afghanistan	  was	  only	  a	  tactical	  space	  because	  it	  was	  nothing	  else	  –	  




Chapter  4  –  Second  Anglo  Afghan  War  
	  
“[International	  law	  is]	  a	  collection	  of	  usages	  which	  prevail	  between	  civilized	  nations,	  and	  are	  
rendered	   possible	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   leading	   civilized	   nations	   are	   practically	   for	   most	  
purposes	  of	  nearly	  equal	  force…	  we	  are	  exceedingly	  powerful	  and	  highly	  civilized,	  and…	  they	  
are	  comparatively	  weak	  and	  half	  barbarous”.	  (Stephen	  1878B)	  
“Force	  may	  overbear	  weakness,	  as	  it	  has	  done	  at	  times	  in	  Europe;	  but	  the	  eternal	  principles	  
of	  right	  and	  wrong	  should	  influence	  us	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  world”.	  (Lawrence	  1878C)	  
Stephen	  1878B	  &	  Lawrence	  1878C	  (respectively)	  
	  
The	  Second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  took	  place	  between	  1878	  and	  1880.	  Afghanistan	  was	  now	  ruled	  
by	  Sher	  Ali	  Khan,	  son	  of	  Dost	  Mohammad	  Khan,	  who	  had	  been	  helped	  to	  the	  throne	  of	  Amir	  by	  Britain	  in	  
the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War.	  Sher	  Ali	  Khan	  had	  a	  less	  Britain-­‐friendly	  policy,	  looking	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  limit	  
both	   Russian	   and	   British	   influence	   in	   Afghanistan.	   British	   forces	  moved	   into	   Afghan	   territory	   in	   1878	  
following	  an	  encounter	  in	  which	  an	  envoy	  from	  Britain	  to	  Afghanistan	  was	  turned	  away.	  Britain	  viewed	  
this	  as	  a	  move	  hostile	  to	  British	  interests	  and	  presumably	  feared	  the	  Amir	  was	  growing	  too	  friendly	  with	  
Russia.	  Unlike	  the	  previous	  war	  in	  Afghanistan,	  this	  encounter	  caught	  the	  popular	  British	  mind	  and	  there	  
is	  a	  rich	  body	  of	  civil	  discourse	  on	  the	  war	  and	  Afghanistan’s	  character	  to	  examine.	  	  
Discourse	   analysis	   of	   archived	   newspapers,	   books	   and	   cabinet	   debates	   revealed	   several	  
narrative	  threads	  with	  some	  consistencies	  reaching	  backward	  to	  the	  First	  Anglo	  Afghan	  War	  and	  forward	  
to	   the	   Third.	   These	   were	   all	   tied	   in	   some	   way	   to	   a	   narrative	   situating	   of	   the	   Afghan	   character	   in	   a	  
particularly	  negative	  fashion.	  One	  tendency	  was	  to	   justify	  harsh	  action	  against	  Afghanistan	  as	  the	  only	  
thing	   savages	  will	   understand	  –	   a	   “prestige	  as	   strength”	   argument.	   Second	  was	  a	   tendency	   to	   situate	  
Afghanistan	  specifically	  in	  a	  geopolitical	  perspective	  as	  an	  ideal	  place	  to	  play	  out	  the	  Great	  Game	  and	  as	  
having	  no	  other	  important	  character.	  Third	  was	  a	  sort	  of	  ‘Afghans	  as	  poor	  caretakers’	  argument,	  which	  
legitimized	  British	  intervention	  (and	  potentially	  annexation)	  on	  Afghanistan	  because	  they’ve	  squandered	  
Afghanistan’s	  natural	   riches.	   Last	  was	   in	   fact	   a	  discourse/counter-­‐discourse	  debate	  over	  Afghanistan’s	  
place	  in	  the	  international	  community	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  rights	  and	  sovereignty,	  which	  functionally	  came	  down	  on	  
the	  side	  of	  Afghanistan	  not	  having	  any	  right	  to	  sovereignty	  (or	  if	  it	  did,	  then	  it	  was	  not	  as	  important	  as	  
Britain’s	  right	  to	  intervene).	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The	  vast	  bulk	  of	  discourse	  analyzed	  is	  civil	  rather	  than	  governmental.	  Very	  little	  was	  said	  in	  any	  
official	   capacity	   within	   the	   cabinet.	   Most	   discussion	   was	   focused	   on	   partisan	   concerns	   (did	   the	  
government	  make	  the	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  war	  properly,	  or	  should	  the	  government	  have	  consulted	  more	  
closely	  with	  the	  opposition	  first?)	  There	  was	  some	  discussion,	  however,	  and	  interestingly	  the	  very	  few	  
cases	  where	  Afghanistan	  was	  mentioned	  in	  a	  way	  referring	  to	  its	  character	  managed	  to	  touch	  on	  each	  of	  
these	  topics	  in	  a	  particularly	  negative	  way.	  
The	  civil	  discourse	  analyzed	  in	  this	  project	  was	  carried	  out	  largely	  by	  way	  of	  newspaper	  articles	  
and	  letters	  to	  the	  editor	  within	  The	  Times.	  Each	  coming	  sub-­‐section	  discussing	  a	  different	  thread	  of	  civil	  
narratives	   on	   Afghan	   identity	   follows	   arguments	   laid	   out	   by	   various	   British	   citizens	   –	   many	   being	  
individuals	  of	  social	  consequence	  such	  as	  politicians,	  practitioners	  of	  law,	  or	  military	  men.	  	  
Prestige  as  Strength/Barbarism.    
This	   was	   hugely	   prevalent	   in	   dealings	   between	   England	   and	   its	   colonies	   throughout	   the	   19th	  
century.	  There	  was	  a	  strong	  preoccupation	  with	  national	  pride	  and	  British	  strength	  completely	  separate	  
from	  interaction	  with	  the	  so-­‐called	  Orient	  in	  the	  first	  place33.	  	  This	  had	  a	  certain	  discursive	  synergy	  with	  
notions	  of	  the	  Afghan	  as	  uncivilized	  and	  savage.	  Britain’s	  image	  must	  be	  upheld	  in	  dealings	  with	  savages,	  
it	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  strong	  and	  something	  to	  fear	  (because	  savages	  were	  incapable	  of	  respect	  for	  civilized	  
reasons	  such	  as	  the	  arts	  or	  admirable	  codes	  of	  law).	  Thus	  the	  appearance	  of	  weakness	  endangered	  their	  
sovereign	   power	   over	   their	   colonies,	   over	   savages,	   because	   those	   people	   were	   too	   ignorant	   to	  
understand	  the	  benefits	  of	  civilization.	  	  
Afghanistan	  was,	  in	  this	  narrative	  strand,	  considered	  essentially	  the	  same	  as	  every	  other	  ‘Asiatic’	  
or	  ‘Oriental’	  set	  of	  peoples.	  The	  Orientals,	  in	  this	  narrative,	  only	  respect	  strength.	  To	  uphold	  the	  prestige	  
of	   the	  British	   empire,	   it	  must	   be	   seen	   as	   strong	   and	  unwilling	   to	   allow	  any	   insult	   to	   stand.	   (Havelock	  
1878,	  Beloochee	  1878,	  Murdo	  1878,	  Times	  1857a,	  Times	  1857b,	  Times	  1858)	  Insults	  must	  be	  punished	  in	  
order	  to	  ensure	  the	  security	  of	  British	  imperium	  –	  a	  hard	  line	  must	  be	  taken	  against	  barbarians	  because	  
all	  they	  understand	  is	  retribution:	  restraint	   is	  seen	  as	  weakness.	  (Havelock	  1878,	  Murdo	  1878)	  Indeed,	  
restraint	  and	  civil	  treatment	  of	  savages	  functionally	  becomes	  weakness	  because	  it	  encourages	  rebellion,	  
such	  as	  with	  the	  Sepoy	  Rebellion.	  (Times	  1858)	  Thus:	  
	  “British	  power	  can	  never	  afford	  to	  be	  suspected…	  The	  belief	  that	  on	  any	  point,	  whether	  10	  
miles	  or	  1,000	  miles	  away,	  the	  authority	  of	  England	  can	  be	  overthrown	  for	  a	  day	  by	  Asiatics	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The classic example here is Macdermott’s War Song (1878) from which the term “jingoism” was coined. It also 
included a powerful obsession with Britain’s duty to counter Russian might. 
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any	  race	  or	  creed	  will	  go	  far	  to	  nullify	  all	  our	  character	  of	  superiority	  and	  all	  the	  authority	  of	  
civilization.”	  (Times	  1857a)	  
This	  also	  means	  that	  to	  even	  wish	  for	  conciliation	  or	  civilized	  relations	  was	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  
weak	   tendency	   among	   some	   sheltered	   civilized	   peoples	   to	   fool	   themselves.	   For	   instance,	   “…the	  
Christian-­‐like	  standard	  of	  policy	  suggested	  by	  Lord	  Lawrence	   [respect	  of	   sovereignty	  and	   rights]	   is	  not	  
understood	  at	  all	  [by	  Asiatics]”.	  (Murdo	  1878)	  Thus,	  conciliation	  is:	  
“…a	   “weak	   and	  wretched	   sham”,	   a	   “…mean,	   cowardly,	   and	   treacherous	   cry”.	   In	   Asia,	   “the	  
miserable	   effort	   to	   ‘conciliate’	   an	   alien	   race	   [can	  only]	  miserably	   fail…”	  with	   that	   “mongrel	  
brood	  of	  dusky	  semi-­‐civilized	  aliens”.	  Afghans	  “regarded	  the	  policy	  [conciliatory]	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  
weakness	  and	  timidity.”	  (Times	  1857b)	  
In	   this	   way	   a	   very	   negative	   view	   of	   the	   Afghan	   identity	   was	   paired	   with	   this	   requirement	   of	  
strength	  and	  retribution	  to	  retain	  prestige.	  For	  Havelock	  and	  Beloochee,	  the	  Afghans	  were	  ‘barbaric’	  and	  
understood	  nothing	  else.	  (Havelock	  1878,	  Beloochee	  1878)	  Others	  went	  further.	  Wheeler	  performed	  an	  
extremely	   racist	   ethnology.	   For	   him,	   Afghans	   inherited	   all	   bad	   traits	   of	   Jews	  with	   none	   of	   the	   good,	  
being	   vengeful,	   untrustworthy	   and	   barbarous.	   (Wheeler	   1878)	   Vambery	   went	   further	   still,	   calling	  
Afghanistan	   empty	   due	   to	   “greedy	   Afghans”	   who	   were	   “poor	   caretakers”	   and	   “rulers	   of	   horror”.	  
Afghanistan’s	  emptiness	  empowers	  but	  does	  not	  demand	  British	  imperial	  expansion;	  Vamberry	  says	  that	  
Afghanistan	  would	  be	  a	  fine	  place	  for	  war	  because	  of	  how	  awful	  Afghans	  are.	  (Vambery	  1871)	  
Savage  Afghanistan  in  Critical  Literature  
The	   idea	   that	  Afghans	  were	   situated	  negatively	   in	   relation	   to	  a	   certain	  Western	   superiority	  or	  
civility	  is	  not	  novel,	  with	  many	  theorists	  having	  talked	  about	  it.	  One	  postcolonial	  theorist,	  Jonathan	  Hill,	  
talked	  about	  a	  similarity	  between	  contemporary	  failed	  state	  analysts	  and	  colonial	  powers	  in	  the	  19th	  and	  
20th	   centuries	   in	   this	   light.	  He	   said	   that	   the	   ‘third	  world’	   identity	   is	   characterized	   as	   flawed	  while	   the	  
Western	   identity	   is	   characterized	   as	   meritorious,	   and	   this	   deviancy	   is	   used	   to	   justify	   economic	   and	  
political	  dominance	  by	  the	  West.	   (Hill:	  139)	  His	  understanding	  of	  West-­‐‘third	  world’	   relations	  suggests	  
that	  negative	   characterizations	  are	  ways	   to	  perpetuate	   colonial	   actions/intentions.	   In	   a	   contemporary	  
sense	  he	  uses	  that	  as	  an	  argument	  for	  doing	  away	  with	  certain	  negative	  labels	  surround	  state	  failure	  and	  
in	   many	   ways	   shares	   similarity	   with	   this	   work.	   Hill’s	   arguments	   play	   out	   in	   a	   way	   that	   suggests	   a	  
particular	   logic	   underlying	  West-­‐Third	  World	   relations	   that	   span	   back	   to	   colonial	   times	  with	   a	   strong	  
thread	  of	  continuity	  in	  a	  way	  highly	  suggestive	  of	  neo-­‐colonialism.	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“It	   is	  the	  continuation	  of	   ‘colonial’	  power	  relations	  after	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  colonial	  era	  that	  
has	   given	   rise	   to	   ideas	   such	   as	   neo-­‐colonialism	   and	   neo-­‐imperialism…	   At	   the	   heart	   of	  
postcolonial	  analyses	  and	  works	  therefore,	  is	  a	  concern	  with	  understanding	  the	  temporal	  and	  
geographical	   linkages	  between	   colonies	   and	   their	  Metropoles,	   ex-­‐colonies	   and	   their	   former	  
Metropoles,	  and	  the	  First	  World	  and	  the	  Third	  World.”	  (ibid:	  144)	  
Stanski’s	  case,	  presented	  previously,	  has	  some	  striking	  similarities.	  He	  asked:	  
“…[how]	  do	  US	  observers	  understand	  what	  constitutes	  an	  ‘Afghan	  warlord’?	  Why	  are	  warlord	  
figures	  cast	  in	  such	  stark	  and	  varied	  terms?	  How	  have	  these	  patterns	  of	  thought	  hindered	  or	  
enabled	  the	  United	  States’	  violent	  intervention	  in	  Afghanistan?”	  (Stanski:	  74)	  
So	   he	  was	   deeply	   interested	   in	   early	   British	   interactions	  with	   Afghanistan	   and	   understanding	  
how	   those	   logics	   underpinned	   certain	   policy	   decisions…	   and	   how	   those	   logics	   are	   connected	   to	  
contemporary	   logics.	   While	   this	   is	   a	   welcome	   analytical	   specificity,	   a	   limited	   scope	   of	   analysis	   (First	  
Anglo	   Afghan	   War	   with	   the	   post-­‐9/11	   intervention)	   led	   Stanski	   to	   couch	   Western	   interactions	   with	  
Afghanistan	  within	  the	  premise	  of	  Orientalism	  (ibid:	  75-­‐6)	  and	  leave	  it	  there	  as	  if	  an	  important	  question	  
were	  answered.	  
Both	  approaches	  have	  something	  to	  offer.	  Hill	  would	  situate	  the	  discourse	  on	  Afghanistan	  within	  
a	   larger	   West	   –	   Third	   World	   narrative	   which	   does	   tend	   to	   highlight	   how	   certain	   patterns	   of	   power	  
relations	  within	  Afghanistan	  are	   in	   some	  ways	   replicated	   in	  many	  other	   interactions	  globally.	   Yet	   that	  
doesn’t	   really	   tell	   us	  all	   that	  much	  about	   the	  Afghan	  case	   specifically;	   it	   is	  not	  particularly	  useful	   to	  a	  
project	   looking	   for	   a	  way	   forward	   in	   Afghanistan	   to	   say	   how	   negative	   understandings	   of	   the	   Afghani	  
people	  are	  similar	  to	  negative	  situating	  of	  character	   in	  other	  instances.	  Stanski	   is	   interested	  in	  giving	  a	  
particular	  telling	  of	  a	  particular	  (Afghan)	  story,	  yet	  he	  only	  goes	  far	  enough	  to	  tell	  us	  that	  it	  fits	  perfectly	  
within	  the	  wider	  Orientalist	  critical	  narrative	  on	  international	  relations.	  
In	   a	   way,	   what	   both	   of	   these	   authors	   discuss	   fits	   with	   the	   discursive	   strand	   of	   strength	   as	  
prestige	  when	  dealing	  with	   barbarians	  who	  don’t	   understand	   civility	   and	   restraint.	   This	   is	   definitely	   a	  
theme	  which	  we	  find	  playing	  out	   in	  different	  colonial	  and	  quasi-­‐colonial	   interactions	  across	  space	  and	  
time.	   But	   they	   don’t	   provide	   a	   framework	   for	   trying	   to	   understand	  why	   these	   particular	   interactions	  
were	  happening	  with	  Afghanistan.	  	  
What	  we	  find	  through	  deeper	  analysis	  is	  that	  this	  discursive	  thread,	  saying	  that	  retribution	  is	  the	  
only	   way	   to	   make	   a	   point	   in	   Afghanistan,	   authorizes	   and	   even	   makes	   imperative	   very	   specific	  
98	  
	  
interventions	  that	  in	  themselves	  have	  nothing	  whatsoever	  to	  do	  with	  Afghanistan.	  Generally,	  the	  sort	  of	  
power	   relations	   that	   Hill	   and	   Stanksi	   refer	   to	   act	   as	   a	   precursor	   to	   a	   colonial	   intervention,	   an	   act	   of	  
colonizing,	  an	  acquiring.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  negative	  situating	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  character	  authorizes	  that	  it	  
be	   used	   as	   a	   space	   to	   fight	   a	   way	   against	   a	   completely	   different	   opponent,	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   a	  
completely	   separate	   colonial	   holding.	   This	   is	   a	   specific	   type	   of	   emptiness	   not	   often	   dealt	   with	   in	  
literature.	   It	   is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  declaring	  a	  place	  empty	  of	   civilized	  people,	   thus	  authorizing	  a	   colonial	  
project	  wherein	   that	   land	  would	  be	   filled	  by	  a	   civilized	  colonial	   administration	  and	   the	   land	  would	  be	  
utilized	   in	  a	  fruitful	  way.	  No,	  this	   is	  a	  matter	  of	  declaring	  Afghanistan	  empty	  and	  without	  use,	  thereby	  
making	  it	  the	  idea	  place	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  set	  of	  geopolitical	  games.	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  dismiss	  the	  usefulness	  of	  their	  analysis.	  For	  instance,	  Hill	  says:	  
Underpinning	   failed	   state	   literature	   therefore,	   is	   a	   European	   or	   Western	   universalism.	  
Identification	   of	   failed	   states	   is	   achieved	   through	   the	   construction	   of	   a	   state/failed	   state	  
dichotomy	  built	  on	  a	  fixed,	  universal	  standard	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  successful	  state.	  Success	  
is	  defined	  as	  the	  possession	  of	  certain	  capabilities	  and	  by	  the	  nationhood	  of	  the	  population	  of	  
that	   state’s	   population.	   Western	   states	   represent	   the	   normative,	   universal	   standard	   of	  
success	   and	   it	   is	   the	   inability	   of	   certain	   African	   states	   to	   replicate	   the	   political,	   economic,	  
social	   and	   cultural	   conditions	  within	  Western	   states	   that	   has,	   according	   to	   the	   failed	   state	  
literature,	  resulted	  in	  their	  failure.	  (Hill:	  148)	  
In	   a	   lot	   of	   ways,	   this	   represents	   the	   sort	   of	   critique	   of	   the	   failed	   state	   discourse	   that	   most	  
postcolonial	   analysts	  would	   agree	  with.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   not	   far	   from	   the	   analysis	   offered	   in	   this	   project:	  
failed	   states	   are	   deviants;	   they	   are	   other;	   they	   are	   wrong	   and	   they	   are	   failed	   because	   they	   were	  
unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  evolve	  and	  become	  like	  us.	   	  Yet,	   in	  Hill’s	  critique,	  this	  has	  something	  to	  do	  with	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  states	  were	  formed.	  Due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  colonial	  administration,	  many	  of	  these	  
states	  were	  simply	  not	  able	  to	  take	  negative	  sovereignty	  (the	  sudden	  absence	  of	  outside	  interference)	  
and	   transform	   it	   into	   positive	   sovereignty.	   They	   simply	   weren’t	   given	   the	   tools.	   Further,	   for	   Hill,	   the	  
failed	  state	  paradigm	  has	  no	  explanatory	  power	  (why	  do	  states	  ‘fail’?)	  Of	  course,	  this	  is	  no	  new	  criticism	  
from	   either	   critical	   viewpoints	   or	   orthodox	   viewpoints.	   Indeed,	   this	   is	   what	   much	   of	   contemporary	  
orthodox	  debate	  on	  state	  failure	  aims	  to	  remedy	  (in	  various	  ways,	  most	  of	  which	  critical	  scholars	  would	  
find	   problems	   with).	   Hill	   finds	   these	   problems	   to	   lie	   within	   colonial	   and	   neo-­‐colonial	   relations.	   The	  
identities	  of	  colonies	  and	  former	  colonies	  are	  mutually	  constitutive.	  (ibid:	  140)	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This	  analysis	  has	  potentially	  powerful	  ways	  to	  think	  of	  state	  failure	  in	  certain	  specific	  cases.	  Yet	  
surely	  there	  are	  cases	  where	  assuming	  that	  colonial	  interactions,	  the	  nature	  of	  colonial	  administrative	  as	  
constitutive	  of	   internal	   issues	  which	   lead	  to	  state	  failure	   is	  either	  misleading	  or	  even	  marginalizing.	  To	  
what	  extent	  can	  we	  compare	  Afghanistan’s	  interactions	  with	  the	  West	  as	  colonial?	  Certainly	  there	  was	  
never	   a	   foreign	   administration	   in	   place,	   nor	   was	   there	   any	   sense	   of	   foreign	   intervention	   as	   to	   how	  
internal	   laws	  and	  society	  would	  be	  aligned.	   In	  many	  ways,	  Hill’s	  suggestions	  here	  are	  similar	   in	  vein	  to	  
what	  was	  discussed	  in	  regard	  to	  Maroya	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  but	  in	  Hill’s	  analysis	  there	  is	   less	  flexibility	  
for	  considering	  different	  types	  of	  colonialisms	  than	  even	  with	  Maroya	  (and	  this	  assumption	  of	  colonial	  
mechanism	  was	  a	  problem	  identified	  in	  Maroya’s	  work	  as	  well).	  
Furthermore,	  interacting	  with	  these	  narratives	  on	  Afghanistan	  from	  within	  the	  assumption	  that	  
colonial	  and/or	  imperial	  power	  relations	  are	  sufficient	  to	  explaining	  these	  discursive	  dynamics	  closes	  off	  
some	  other	  possibilities.	  For	  instance,	  we	  begin	  to	  see	  here	  an	  evolution	  of	  how	  Afghanistan’s	  emptiness	  
is	   being	   filled	   through	   narrative	   interpolation.	   Previous	   notions	   of	   Afghanistan	   suggested	   that	   it	   was	  
justified	  to	  intervene	  in	  Afghanistan	  when	  and	  as	  necessary,	  because	  Afghanistan	  had	  neither	  the	  power	  
nor	  the	  legitimate	  moral	  claim	  (and	  perhaps	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  differentiate	  between	  the	  two)	  to	  object.	  
Now,	  however,	  Afghanistan	   is	  being	  assigned	  a	  very	  particular	  character	  –	   the	  character	  of	   the	  unruly	  
Oriental	  who	  must	  face	  harsh	  punitive	  measures	  when	  they	  fail	  to	  show	  the	  proper	  deference	  for	  their	  
betters.	   This	   is	   a	   logic	   underpinning	   certain	   colonial	   power	   relations	   as	   well,	   of	   course.	   What	   this	  
particular	   conceptualization	   of	   the	   Afghan	   identity	   means,	   however,	   is	   not	   determined	   under	   a	  
framework	   so	   easily	   identifiable	   as	   colonial	   in	   power	   relationships.	   Instead,	   situating	   Afghanistan	   as	  
Oriental	   should	  be	   seen	  as	   indicative	  of	  an	   indeterminate	  character.	  Afghanistan’s	   character	   is	  always	  
interruptible,	   always	   changeable,	   never	   specific	   or	   definite	   or	   possessing	   of	   any	  
character/power/importance	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  The	  subject	  of	  a	  colonial	  power	  interaction	  is	  robbed	  of	  a	  
certain	  agency,	  which	  is	  justified	  through	  certain	  typifications	  of	  persona	  that	  are	  insular	  and	  racist.	  That	  
same	   subject	   also	   can	   be	   assumed	   to	   have	   a	   somewhat	   static	   identity	   or	   character,	   making	   the	  
continuation	   of	   particular	   colonial	   interactions	   possible/justified/sensible.	   In	   this,	   Afghanistan	   is	   quite	  
different	  –	  even	  within	  the	  context	  of	  this	  same	  war.	  
Great  Game  
As	   in	  the	  First	  Anglo	  Afghan	  War,	  the	  context	  of	  conflict	   in	  Afghanistan	  was	  heavily	  shaded	  by	  
geopolitical	   considerations	   that	   lay	   far	   outside	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   borders.	   While	   the	   apparent	   insult	  
leveled	  on	  Britain	  by	  Afghanistan	  came	   in	   refusing	   to	   receive	  a	  diplomatic	  envoy,	   the	   threat	  posed	  by	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this	   insult	   was	   that	   it	  might	  mean	   Afghanistan	  was	   becoming	   too	   close	   to	   Russia.	   The	   Second	   Anglo	  
Afghan	  War	  came	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  Crimean	  War,	  and	  popular	  British	  sentiment	  held	  that	  only	  
Britain	  could	  check	  the	  growing	  might	  of	  the	  Russian	  bear.	  Alongside	  this	  was	  the	  long-­‐standing	  fear	  that	  
Russia	  had	  designs	  on	  British	  India.	  	  
Aspects	  of	  the	  narrative	  thread	  identified	  with	  prestige	  and	  strength	  touched	  on	  Afghanistan’s	  
place	  in	  the	  Great	  Game	  already.	  Afghanistan	  was	  either	  empty	  of	  character	  or	  negative	  in	  character	  in	  
any	  case,	  and	  the	  rulers	  of	  Afghanistan	  were	  poor	  stewards.	  Thus,	  there	  was	  no	  reason	  that	  the	  space	  
shouldn’t	   be	   a	   geopolitical	   space	   for	   fighting	   a	   proxy	   war	   against	   Russia,	   if	   it	   was	   convenient.	   The	  
apparent	  insult	  from	  the	  Afghan	  court	  further	  seemed	  to	  invite	  this	  kind	  of	  anti-­‐Russian	  intervention	  (if	  
not	  demand	  it,	  according	  to	  the	  narrative).	  	  
When	  talking	  about	  a	  possible	  war	  in	  Afghanistan,	  it	  was	  made	  clear	  throughout	  civil	  discourse	  
in	   both	   explicit	   (Low	   1878,	   Dalrymple	   1878,	   Havelock	   1878,	   Stephen	   1878A)	   and	   implicit	   (Vamberry	  
1879,	   Malleson	   1879)	   manners	   that	   the	   real	   reason	   to	   worry	   about	   Afghanistan	   was	   Russia.	   “The	  
prestige	   and	   strength”	   portion	   of	   civil	   discourse	   did	   seem	   to	   suggest	   that	   punishing	   Afghanistan	  was	  
important	   in	   order	   to	   keep	   the	   peace	   on	   India’s	   borders	   (by	   keeping	   the	   civilized	   boot	   firmly	   on	   the	  
barbaric	   throat),	   but	   the	   truly	   weighty	   reason	   to	   consider	   Afghanistan	   at	   all	   began	   and	   ended	   with	  
Russia.	  	  
Intrinsic	  to	  this	  in	  all	  instances	  was	  a	  sort	  of	  emptiness	  ascribed	  to	  Afghanistan.	  The	  importance	  
of	   Afghanistan	   was	   simply	   that	   Russian	   influence	   there	   would	   harm	   security	   in	   India.	   “…[B]ut	   her	  
[Russia’s]	   influence	   in	   Afghanistan	   is	   not	   compatible	   with	   our	   safety	   in	   India.	   Let	   us	   secure	   our	  
boundaries,	   if	   necessary,	   by	   a	   rectification	   of	   our	   frontier…”	   (Low	   1878)	   Dalrymple	   suggested	   tactics,	  
emphasizing	   the	   importance	  of	  Herat:	   “with	  a	   fortress	  at	  Herat,	  and	  a	  garrison	  of	  20,000	  men	  there…	  
India	  would	  be	  as	   firmly	   locked	   in	  our	   grasp	  as	   if	   surrounded	  by	  ocean	   [in	   regards	   to	  European	  war].	  
(Dalrymple	   1878)	   Put	   even	   more	   succinctly,	   “…the	   Afghan	   question…	   is	   only	   another	   phase	   of	   the	  
Eastern	  Question;	  of	  the	  unavoidable	  and	  undeniable	  rivalry	  for	  position	  between	  England	  and	  Russia	  in	  
the	  East.”	  (Havelock	  1878)	  	  
Any	  possible	  character	  or	  rights	  that	  Afghanistan	  might	  be	  ascribed	  by	  the	  most	  sympathetic	  is	  
essentially	  overruled	  by	   the	  powerful	   logics	  of	   geopolitical	   conflict.	  Questions	  of	   that	   character	   is,	   for	  
Stephen,	  “interesting”	  but	  not	  worth	  considering	  with	  the	  weightier	  concerns	  of	  British	  security	   in	  the	  
Great	   Game	   looming.	   He	   is	   wholly	   preoccupied	   with	   the	   possibility	   that	   Russia	   might	   “obtain	   an	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ascendancy	   throughout	  Central	  Asia,	   including	  Persia	   and	  Afghanistan,	  which	  would	  enable	   them…	   to	  
form	  an	  army…	  [making]	  India	  open	  at	  any	  moment	  to	  an	  invasion”.	  (Stephen	  1878A)	  Thus	  we	  see	  that	  
the	   geopolitical	   demands	   of	   the	   Great	   Game,	   the	   paramount	   need	   of	   physical	   security	   for	   India’s	  
frontiers	  marginalizes	  all	  other	  concerns,	  thus	  emptying	  Afghanistan	  of	  agency	  or	  character.	  	  
In	   the	   interest	  of	  greater	   security	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  The	  Great	  Game,	   some	  went	   further	  and	  called	   for	  
some	   sort	   of	   occupation	   of	   Afghanistan	   or	   expansion	   of	   borders.	   Low	   hinted	   at	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	  
rectification	   of	   boundaries	   if	   necessary	   for	   security.	   (Low	   1878)	   Others	   argued	   that	   it	   was,	   in	   fact,	  
necessary	   (while	   simultaneously	   arguing	   that	   the	   emptiness	   of	   Afghan	   character	   justified	   such	   an	  
expansion	  in	  itself).	  For	  instance,	  “…the	  British	  Government	  should	  be	  compelled,	  by	  the	  recent	  Russian	  
encroachments,	   [note:	   those	   encroachments	   were	   only	   that	   Russia	   had	   an	   emissary	   at	   Afghanistan’s	  
court]…	   to	   undertake	   if	   only	   a	   temporary	   occupation	  of	   the	   city	   [Herat]	   on	   the	  Heri	   river.”	   (Vambery	  
1879)	  Earlier,	  Vambery	  spoke	  more	  forthrightly	  on	  the	   importance	  of	  Herat.	  “Considering	  Herat	   in	  the	  
light	  of	   importance,	   -­‐	  namely,	  as	  a	  town	  which	   is	  situated	  on	  the	  main	  road	  between	  Central	  Asia	  and	  
India…	  [there	  would	  be	  dire]	  consequences	   in	  case	  that	  fortress	  [the	  city	  of	  Herat]	  should	  fall	   into	  the	  
hands	   of	   [Afghans	  who	   have	   some	   sympathy	  with	   Russia].”	   (Vambery	   1871]	   It	   is	   perhaps	   also	  worth	  
noting	   that	   both	   of	   Vambery’s	   pieces	   were	   full	   of	   very	   negative	   typifications	   of	   Afghan	   character	  
(barbarians,	  rulers	  of	  horror	  and	  so	  on).	  Finally,	  Malleson	  gave	  us	  one	  of	  the	  earlier	  references	  to	  Herat	  
as	   “the	   gate	  of	   India”,	   and	   argued	   that	   taking	   it	   into	  British	  dominion	  would	  be	   very	   good	   for	  British	  
security	   in	   India	   (and	   that	   British	   government	   in	  Herat	  would	   bring	  wealth	   to	   a	   horribly	  mismanaged	  
place).	  (Malleson	  1879)	  
Thus	   there	   is	   broad	   body	   of	   discourse	   suggesting	   that	   Afghanistan	   is	   empty	   of	   character	   and	  
worthless.	   Whether	   that	   applies	   to	   the	   people,	   the	   leadership,	   or	   the	   ‘country’	   as	   a	   whole	   varies	  
somewhat,	   with	   some	   arguing	   that	   taking	   over	   certain	   parts	   of	   Afghanistan	   would	   be	   beneficial	   to	  
Britain	   for	   a	   variety	   of	   reasons.	  Others	   simply	   considered	  Afghanistan	   to	   be	   empty	   by	   nature,	   not	   by	  
mismanagement,	   and	   thus	   its	   only	   utility	   was	   as	   a	   place	   to	   fight	   a	   war.	   In	   any	   case,	   its	   emptiness	  
empowered	   a	   whole	   set	   of	   possibilities	   in	   the	   case	   of	   intervention	   and	   war,	   a	   way	   to	   bypass	   any	  
concerns	  over	  whether	  it	  was	  right	  or	  just	  or	  fair	  to	  the	  Afghans	  themselves.	  This	  indeterminacy	  means	  
that	  Afghanistan	  can	  and	  must	  be	  punished	  –	  but	   it	  also	  can	   justifiably	  be	  the	  battle	  ground	  on	  which	  
Britain’s	  important,	  ethically	  mandated	  battle	  against	  the	  Great	  Power	  Russia	  can	  be	  played	  out.	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Analyzing  Legacies  of  Emptiness  and  Geopolitical  Games    
We’ve	   already	   seen	   something	   of	   how	   Afghanistan	   is	   typified	   with	   a	   certain	   emptiness	   and	  
discussed	  how	   in	   the	  Afghan	   case	   that	   is	   somewhat	  unique	   in	   the	   context	  of	   colonial	   experiences.	   JK	  
Baral	   wrote	   about	   the	   legacy	   of	   historical	   interventions	   in	   Afghanistan	   in	   a	   context	   that	   may	   have	  
something	  to	  offer	  from	  this	  perspective.	  He	  suggested	  that	  British	  imperial	  interventions,	  the	  later	  Cold	  
War	  intervention	  and	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  intervention	  each	  colored	  how	  we	  ‘know’	  Afghanistan.	  (Baral:	  701-­‐
703)	   British	   assumptions	   about	   Asiatic	   character	   were	   used	   to	   fill	   an	   otherwise	   blank	   spot	   in	   British	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  world,	  colored	  liberally	  by	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Great	  Game.	  Because	  of	  this	  blankness,	  
Afghanistan	   could	   be	   situated	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   that	   it	   was	   justifiable	   to	   carry	   out	   tactical	   conflict,	  
security	  ‘games’	  with	  Afghanistan	  as	  the	  game	  board.	  This	  discursive	  ‘knowledge’	  built	  up	  during	  British	  
interventions	   had	   legacy	   effects	   on	   later	   interventions,	   which	   built	   on	   those	   knowledges	   and	   altered	  
them	  in	  the	  course	  of	  those	  newer	  interventions.	  	  
Indeed,	   Baral	   describes	   current	   geopolitical	   conflict	   in	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   new	   iteration	   of	   the	  
Great	  Game.	  
“Not	  only	  the	  Taliban	  but	  also	  several	  stakeholder	  states	  have	  opposed	  this	  [a	  contingent	  of	  
NATO	  troops	  remaining	  in	  Afghanistan].	  The	  unfolding	  drama	  in	  Afghanistan	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  
significant	   implications	   for	   the	   ‘New	   Great	   Game’	   [emphasis	   mine],	   which	  many	   think	   will	  
play	  out	  in	  the	  coming	  years	  in	  the	  adjacent	  region	  of	  Central	  Asia	  and	  South	  Asia.	  
For	  Baral,	   current	  projects	   intended	   to	   ‘save’	  Afghanistan	   as	  a	   failed	   state	  will	   themselves	   fail	  
because	   now	  –	   as	   in	   ages	   past	   –	   the	   character	   of	   Afghanistan	  was	  misunderstood	  by	   interveners.	   An	  
“identity”	  for	  Afghanistan	  is	  imagined	  and	  imposed	  on	  Afghanistan	  in	  the	  context	  of	  each	  intervention,	  
rather	  than	  from	  a	  historical	  context	  or	  from	  a	  place	  of	  understanding.	  Afghanistan’s	  actual	  character,	  
Baral	  argues,	  is	  either	  too	  complicated	  or	  too	  unimportant	  to	  be	  articulated.	  Essentially,	  Afghanistan	  is	  
envisioned	  as	  more	  or	  less	  empty	  by	  intervening	  powers	  and	  ready	  to	  be	  filled	  up	  with	  whatever	  sort	  of	  
meaning	  those	  interveners	  prefer.	  This	  was	  true	  in	  the	  past	  when	  Afghanistan	  was	  conceptualized	  only	  
in	  reference	  to	  its	  utility	  first	  in	  the	  Great	  Game	  power	  struggles	  and	  later	  in	  the	  ideological	  struggles	  of	  
the	   Cold	   War.	   He	   suggests	   that	   these	   legacies	   are	   echoed	   in	   current	   policy	   objectives	   toward	  
Afghanistan.	  An	  external	  power	  (the	  US/NATO)	  intends	  a	  certain	  intervention	  on	  Afghanistan	  to	  create	  
103	  
	  
regional	  stability	   in	  pursuit	  of	  Western	  interests.	  Baral	  argues	  that	  this	  has	  always	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  
fail	  because	  interveners	  don’t	  truly	  understand	  what	  they’re	  dealing	  with.34	  (ibid:	  701)	  	  
Baral	  suggests	  that	  Afghanistan	  is	  primed	  to	  play	  a	  similar	  role	  in	  a	  wider	  geopolitical	  conflict	  in	  
South	  Asia	  today.	  Afghanistan	  is	  conceived	  by	  the	  West	  as	  being	  an	  important	  center	  for	  conflict	  in	  the	  
Global	  War	  on	  Terror,	  but	   it	   is	  also	  a	  site	  of	   struggle	  between	   India	  and	  Pakistan	  –	  each	  of	  which	  has	  
specific	   interests	   in	   Afghanistan’s	   future	   that	   conflict	   with	   one	   another.	   (India	   wants	   to	   see	   stability	  
under	  Northern	  Alliance	  supremacy;	  Pakistan	  wants	  stability	  under	  a	  framework	  of	  Taliban	  and	  Haqqani	  
Network	   power.)	   (ibid	   706-­‐707)	   China	   apparently	   has	   a	   sort	   of	   wild	   card	   role	   in	   this	   as	   well,	   seeing	  
Afghanistan	  as	  a	  place	  to	  make	  free	  economic	  gains	  (ibid:	  707)	  but	  uncertain	  mid-­‐term	  policy	  goals.	  
Baral	   argues	   that	   NATO	   should	   avoid	   thinking	   of	   Afghanistan	   in	   the	   way	   that	   outsiders	   have	  
typically	  viewed	  Afghanistan.	   Intervening	   in	  Afghanistan	  without	  understanding	   its	   role	   in	   the	  regional	  
political	  struggles	  between	  Pakistan,	  India	  and	  China	  can	  only	  lead	  to	  failure.	  The	  West	  must	  understand	  
Afghanistan	   as	   a	   space	   in	   which	   wider	   geopolitical	   games	   which	   aren’t	   immediately	   obvious	   to	   the	  
Western	  eye	  are	  being	  /	  will	  be	  played	  out.	  NATO	  policy	  in	  regards	  to	  Afghanistan	  needs	  to	  take	  those	  
other	  players	  into	  consideration.	  	  
British	   thinkers	   during	   the	   Second	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   War	   considered	   Afghanistan	   to	   have	   no	  
inherent	   character	   or	   value	   of	   its	   own.	   It	   had	   no	   agency	   and	   was	   only	   of	   interest	   because	   of	   its	  
geographical	   placement	   –	   a	   place	   for	   the	   Great	   Game	   to	   be	   played.	   This	   seems	   to	   fit	   with	   Baral’s	  
analysis;	   Britain	   filled	   up	   Afghanistan’s	   seemingly	   empty	   vessel	   with	   a	   set	   of	   character	   traits	   that	   fit	  
through	  ‘knowledge’	  of	  barbarous	  Asiatics	  and	  through	  the	  ‘knowledge’	  of	   its	  geopolitical	  conflict	  with	  
Russia.	   This	   had	   important	   repercussions	   at	   the	   time,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   it	   empowered	   Britain	   to	   invade	  
Afghanistan	  simply	  because	  the	  Ameer	  refused	  to	  accept	  a	  British	  diplomatic	  mission	  (and	  because	  that	  
refusal	   made	   Britain	   afraid	   for	   India’s	   safety	   from	   Russia).	   Yet	   as	   Baral	   warned,	   interventions	   have	  
repercussions	  which	  don’t	  just	  disappear	  in	  a	  generation.	  Afghanistan’s	  emptiness	  became	  naturalized,	  
‘known’.	  We	  can	  project	  this	  into	  more	  contemporary	  times	  and	  think	  of	  how	  Afghanistan	  is	  labeled	  as	  a	  
‘failed	   state’	   and	   things	   are	   kind	  of	   left	   there.	  Analysis	  of	  how	  or	  why	   it	   failed	   (such	  as	   advocated	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 There are assumptions that Baral makes which should not be taken uncritically. For instance, British India did 
remain safe from Russian incursion throughout the 19th and early 20 centuries. Specific objectives of British 
interventions may not have had perfect success, but documentation shows that the geopolitically Britain was 
primarily interested in Afghanistan as a buffer zone to keep India safe. It is also pretty clear that Russia wanted 
influence in Afghanistan, for whatever reason. Finally, for so long as Britain held India, Russia had limited influence 
in Afghanistan. This doesn’t take away from his typification of Afghanistan as an apparent playing field for 
geopolitical games, but it is an important side note to keep in mind. 
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Patrick	  2006,	  Benn	  2004	  and	  National	  Security	  Council	  2006)	  would	  tend	  to	  piggyback	  off	  the	  discursive	  
institutional	   ‘knowledges’	   built	   up	   about	   Afghanistan	   over	   the	   course	   of	   these	   coercive,	   subjugating	  
interventions.	   Even	  policy	   that	   is	   focused	  on	  helping	   to	  uplift	   ‘failed	   states’	   such	   as	  Afghanistan	   from	  
impossible	  situations	  such	  as	  advocated	  by	  Natsios	   (2006)	  could	  tend	  to	  take	  on	  a	  certain	  paternal	  air	  
because	  even	  these	  analyses	  will	   tend	  to	  rely	  on	  these	  discursive	   legacies	  wherein	  Afghanistan	  has	  no	  
positive	   character	   or	   meaning	   in	   itself	   other	   than	   was	   is	   given	   it	   through	   coercive	   intervention.	   Yet	  
despite	  these	  warnings,	  he	  falls	   into	  the	  same	  trap	  as	  he	  warns	  against,	  positioning	  Afghanistan	  as	  the	  
natural	   center	   of	   geopolitical	   conflict	   rather	   than	   wondering	   if	   Afghanistan	   might	   have	   something	  
uniquely	  about	  Afghanistan.	  
Paternal  Caretaking  /  Imperial  Expansion  
Afghan	   character	  or	   the	   lack	   thereof	   is	   a	   running	   theme	   that	  made	  possible	   conversations	  on	  
punishment,	   intervention	   and	   geopolitical	   positioning.	   Implicitly	   tied	   to	   punishment	   and	   especially	   to	  
Great	  Game	   logics	  was	  a	  question	  of	   imperial	  expansion.	  For	  Britain,	  Afghanistan	  was	  useful	  primarily	  
because	  it	  provided	  a	  safe	  place,	  a	  tactical	  game	  board	  on	  which	  the	  Great	  Game	  could	  be	  played	  out	  
without	   endangering	   its	   Indian	  dominion.	   There	  were	   those	   that	   argued	   that	   formally	   annexing	   all	   or	  
parts	  or	  Afghanistan	  would	  be	  particularly	  advantageous.	  We	  already	  saw	  some	  of	  those	  arguments	  in	  a	  
tactical	  sense;	  holding	  Herat	  particularly	  would	  be	  a	  great	  strategic	  boon	  according	  to	  many.	  (Vambery	  
1871,	   Malleson	   1879,	   Low	   1878)	   The	   general	   lack	   of	   any	   meaningful	   and	   agential	   character	   in	  
Afghanistan	  meant	   there	  was	   no	   real	   inherent	   consideration	   dissuading	   such	   adventures.	   Thus,	   there	  
were	   those	  who	   thought	   on	   other	   reasons	   it	  might	   be	   beneficial	   to	   the	   British	   empire	   to	   expand	   its	  
reach	   to	   include	   Afghanistan.	   These	   ideas	   were	   particularly	   empowered	   by	   a	   negative	   view	   of	   the	  
Afghan	  character,	  wherein	  Afghanistan’s	  constitutive	  emptiness	  was	  largely	  due	  to	  mismanagement	  by	  
natives.	  The	  enlightened	  and	  civilized	   stewardship	  of	   the	  British	  could	  perhaps	  make	  Afghanistan	   into	  
some	   place	   that	   has	   some	   sort	   of	   intrinsic	   value.	   (Vambery	   1871,	   Vambery	   1879,	   Malleson	   1879,	  
Wheeler	  1878)	  
It	  may	  be	  that	  motivations	  for	  expansion	  tap	  some	  romantic	  yearning	  for	  an	  exotic	  Oriental	  past,	  
with	  much	  attention	   focused	  on	  Herat.	   In	  addition	  to	  being	  the	  strategic	  gateway	  to	   India,	   it	  was	  also	  
historically	  one	  of	   the	  most	   important	  stops	  on	  the	  old	  Silk	  Road.	  Vambery	   	   talks	  about	  the	  history	  of	  
Herat	   as	   consisting	   of	   great	   beauty	   and	   prosperity	   which	   have	   been	   ruined	   by	   the	   long	   time	  
mismanagement	  of	  the	  Afghan	  people	  after	  violently	  wresting	  control	  from	  the	  Safavid	  Dynasty.	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“Now	  these	  nationalities	   [various	  ethnic	  groups	  not	  members	  of	  the	  ruling	  tribes]	  all	  detest	  
the	   rapacious,	   greedy	   and	   cruel	   Afghan,	   and	  would	   hail	   the	   day	  which	  would	   deliver	   them	  
from	  the	  burdensome	  tutorship	  of	  the	  Barukzais.”	  (Vambery	  1879)	  	  
Malleson	   goes	   into	   further	   detail,	   describing	   Herat	   in	   its	   heyday	   and	   suggesting	   that	   Britain	  
could	  bring	  those	  days	  of	  glory	  back.	  	  
“The	  position	  I	  claim	  for	  Herat	  is	  one	  of	  very	  ancient	  date.	  The	  prosperity	  of	  that	  city…	  12,000	  
retail	   shops,	   350	   schools,	   144,000	   occupied	   houses,	   and	   6,000	   baths…	   Looking	   at	   the	  
enormous	  disadvantages	  under	  which	  she	  has	  labored	  [with	  Afghan	  rule],	  at	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  
has	  been	  governed	  by	  a	  race	  of	  mountain	  robbers,	  who	  know	  no	  rule	  but	  that	  of	  extortion…	  it	  
is	  clear	  that	  were	  she	  administered	  on	  the	  principles	  which	  characterize	  British	  rule	   in	   India	  
she	  would	  speedily	  attain	  a	  position	   far	  exceeding	   in	  splendor	   that	  which	  she	  reached…	  [at	  
her	  heights].”	  (Malleson	  1879)	  
So,	  Malleson	   asks	   –	   “Why	   not	   take	   it	   now?	   The	   possession	   will	   solve	   every	   difficulty.”	   (ibid)	  
Doing	  justice	  for	  the	  oppressed	  peoples	  living	  there,	  increase	  British	  revenue,	  restore	  Herat’s	  glory,	  and	  
deny	  it	  to	  the	  Russians.	  
This	   is	   a	   basis	   of	   the	   argument	   for	   expanding	   the	  British	   Empire’s	   domain	   to	   include	   some	  of	  
Afghanistan.	   Afghans	   didn’t	   deserve	   to	   rule	   in	   Afghanistan;	   they	   had	   wrecked	   its	   fantastic	   potential.	  
They	  were	  vengeful,	  untrustworthy,	  barbarous	  rulers	  who	  were	  poor	  caretakers	  that	  wrecked	  their	  land.	  
(Wheeler	  1878)	  Afghanistan	  was	   important	  because	  of	  how	  it	  stood	  directly	   in	  the	  only	  road	  between	  
cultivated	  Iran	  and	  India,	  and	  was	  a	  place	  that	  could	  become	  great	  again	  in	  its	  own	  right	  if	  taken	  away	  
from	   the	   “greedy	  Afghans”,	   those	   “poor	   caretakers”	  and	   “rulers	  of	  horror”.	   (Vambery	  1871)	  Here	   the	  
underlying	  message	  as	  laid	  out	  by	  Low	  1878	  is	  that	  Afghanistan’s	  character	  doesn’t	  really	  matter	  –	  it	  just	  
isn’t	  an	  existing	  concern	  in	  strategic	  thinking.	  What	  was	  important	  was	  denying	  Russia	  a	  strong	  foothold	  
there,	  and	  if	  that	  involved	  expanding	  the	  British	  Empire	  then	  so	  be	  it.	  
Afghanistan  on  the  Fringes  of  Empire  
Here,	   it	   seems,	   is	   the	   imperial,	   a	   colonial	   approach	   to	  Afghanistan	  averred	   to	  by	   some	  critical	  
scholarship.	  Here	  are	  narratives	  that	  yes,	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  land	  empty	  of	  meaningful	  character	  of	  virtue,	  
but	  it	  could	  be	  so	  much	  more	  under	  the	  correct,	  enlightened	  rule.	  British	  rule	  could	  bring	  a	  better	  life	  to	  
the	  people	  of	  Afghanistan	  –	  it	  could	  also	  help	  to	  make	  the	  British	  empire	  more	  rich…	  and	  serve	  to	  make	  
India	  even	  more	  secure	  all	  at	  once.	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Radhika	   Desai	   considers	   how	   assignations	   of	   otherness,	   emptiness,	   of	   negative	   marginalizing	  
empowers	  imperial	  pursuits.	  In	  a	  2004	  article,	  Desai	  draws	  out	  what	  she	  finds	  to	  be	  similarities	  between	  
imperial	  pursuits	  during	   the	  age	  of	   colonialism	  and	  after	   the	  Cold	  War.	  This	   could	  be	  useful	  both	   in	  a	  
general	  sense	  and	  in	  drawing	  discursive	  connectivities	  between	  British	  interventions	  on	  Afghanistan	  and	  
American	  interventions.	  She	  identifies	  three	  types	  of	  states	  in	  what	  used	  to	  be	  the	  Third	  World.	  
“There	   are,	   first,	   'bully'	   states,	   allying	   with	   and	   emulating	   the	   increasingly	   brazen	   US	  
imperialism	   regionally.	   Second,	   there	   are	   'rogue'	   states,	  with	   no	   prospects	   of	   such	   alliance	  
and	  emulation	  but	   a	   substantial	   capacity	   for	   violence.	   Finally,	   'failed'	   states	   are	   in	   financial	  
and	  political	  receiverships	  to	  the	  US	  or	  one	  or	  another	  of	  its	  local,	  bully,	  allies.”	  (Desai:	  172)	  
For	   Desai	   the	   first	   group	   consists	   of	   states	   which	   act	   as	   proxies	   and/or	   friends	   of	   Western	  
powers.	   Rogue	   states	   are	   those	   which	   are	   on	   unfriendly	   terms	   with	   the	   West,	   but	   which	   are	   too	  
powerful	   to	   be	   directly	   intervened	   upon.	   Failed	   states	   are	   simply	   those	   states	   which	   are	   intervened	  
upon	  by	   the	  West,	   especially	   the	  United	   States,	   and	   are	   essentially	   inseparable	   (in	  Desai’s	   argument)	  
from	  colonial	  client	  states	  or	  objects	  of	  empire.	  Yet	  the	   language	  of	  modern	  discourse	  makes	   it	  nearly	  
impossible	   to	   recognize	   it	   as	   such:	   “In	   this	  world	   questions	   of	   Third	  World	   solidarity,	   autonomy	   from	  
imperialism,	  'third	  way'	  development	  or	  non-­‐alignment	  simply	  do	  not	  arise.”	  (ibid)	  
Desai	  argues	  that	  these	  discursive	  narratives	  make	  possible	  modern	  imperial	  projects.	  They	  are	  
made	   possible	   by	  way	   of	  making	   them	   inconceivable	   –	  we	   see	   intervening	   on	   failed	   states	   as	   saving	  
them	   rather	   than	   subjugating	   them.	   Failed	   states	   are	   described	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   that	   Western	  
intervention	   is	   justified,	   and	   these	   typifications	   are	   naturalized	   through	   a	   long	   discursive	   history	   of	  
liberal	  theories	  of	  development	  economics,	  modernization	  theory	  and	  the	  like.	  	  (ibid:	  172-­‐173)	  
Linkages	  with	  discourse	  on	  Afghanistan	  appear	   fairly	   straight	   forwardly.	  Desai	   argues	   that	   the	  
manner	  in	  which	  we	  situate	  failed	  states	  is	  just	  a	  new	  way	  of	  talking	  about	  colonial	  clients.	  Drawing	  on	  
her	  example	   in	   comparison	   to	  Afghanistan	   in	   the	  period	  of	   the	   second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	   it	  might	  be	  
that	   it	   is	   not	   such	   a	   new	  way	   of	   talking	   at	   all.	   In	   order	   to	   justify	   designs	   on	   imperial	   expansion	   into	  
Afghanistan,	  discourse	  in	  this	  period	  referred	  to	  the	  unsuitability	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  current	  rulers	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  wasted	  potential	  of	  the	  land	  itself.	  By	  taking	  direct	  stewardship	  of	  the	  land,	  Britain	  could	  do	  great	  
things	  for	  the	  Afghan	  people.	  If	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  enriched	  Britain	  and	  granted	  regional	  stability	  that	  
could	   only	   be	   a	   good	   thing	   to	   be	   celebrated,	   not	   seen	   as	   a	   nefarious	   and	   cynical	   reason	   for	   taking	  
stewardship	  in	  the	  first	  place.	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Labels	   of	   failure	   suggest	   that	   the	   failed	   state	   shouldn’t	   be	   where	   it	   is.	   Following	   lines	   of	  
reasoning	  inherent	  in	  neoliberal	  economic	  theoretical	  norms,	  these	  failed	  states	  were	  given	  the	  tools	  to	  
succeed	   in	  the	  process	  of	  decolonization	  and	   interaction	  with	  various	   IGOs	  and	  INGOs.	  Thus,	  the	  term	  
‘failed	  state’	  is	  both	  a	  descriptive	  label	  and	  a	  judgment	  –	  these	  states	  could	  have	  succeeded	  but	  failed	  to	  
do	   so	   through	   their	   own	   negligence.	   Thus,	   labels	   of	   failure	   are	   also	   a	   prescriptive	   label	   –	   they	   were	  
unable	  to	  do	  things	  right	  on	  their	  own,	  now	  somebody	  civilized	  who	  knows	  what	  they’re	  doing	  has	  to	  
step	   in	  and	  right	  their	  mistakes.	  Of	  course,	  these	  state	  building	  projects	  have	  the	  side	  effects	  of	  being	  
profitable	  for	  certain	  segments	  of	  the	  intervening	  population	  and	  bring	  about	  regional	  stability	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  is	  beneficial	  to	  the	  intervening	  group,	  but	  that	  is	  a	  natural	  side	  effect.	  
The	   comparison	   is	   compelling	   on	   its	   face	   but	   involves	   certain	   assumptions	   that	   need	   to	   be	  
recognized.	  While	  Desai’s	  arguments	  regarding	  how	  we	  perceive	  success	  and	  failure	  have	  merit,	  relying	  
on	   economic	   theory	   as	   a	   sole	   explanatory	   mechanism	   is	   in	   itself	   problematic	   from	   a	   perspective	   of	  
discourse	   analysis.	   Desai	   pits	   certain	   proto	  Marxist	   theories	   against	   development	   and	  modernization	  
theory	   (172-­‐175)	   as	   a	   way	   to	   situate	   contemporary	   failed	   state	   discourses	   as	   a	   modern	   iteration	   of	  
imperial	   activism,	   in	   this	   case	   pushed	   primarily	   by	   the	  United	   States.	   Yet	   the	   critical	   /	  Marxist	   versus	  
orthodox	   /	   liberal	   theoretical	   debate	   itself	   is	   heavily	  West-­‐centric	   and	   assigns	   Afghanistan,	   then	   and	  
now,	  a	  very	  specific	  and	  undesirable	  discursive	  identity.	  Colony.	  Imperial	  holding.	  Powerless	  and	  empty.	  	  
Yet	  Afghanistan	  was	  neither	  colony	  nor	  imperial	  holding	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  
war.	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  Afghanistan	  is	  victim	  of	  a	  colonial	  or	  imperial	  project	  at	  present	  is	  
by	   no	   means	   settled	   either	   –	   assuming	   that	   by	   being	   contemporarily	   labeled	   as	   a	   ‘failed	   state’	  
Afghanistan	  is	  therefore	  a	  colony	  or	  an	  imperial	  holding	  prematurely	  ends	  a	  conversation	  that	  is	  worth	  
having.	   This	   is	   done	   by	   assuming	   a	   place	   for	   Afghanistan,	   a	   pre-­‐defined	   place	   in	   an	   already	   existing	  
discursive	   battlefield	   among	   competing	   ideologies	   which	   leaves	   no	   place	   for	   Afghan-­‐ness.	   That	   is,	   it	  
reproduces	  some	  of	  the	  very	  problems	  this	  project	  decries	  within	  orthodox	  narratives	  on	  Afghanistan.	  
Ways	   of	   talking	   about	   Afghanistan	   empowered	   the	   possibility	   of	   expanding	   Britain’s	   imperial	  
domain.	  However,	  Britain	  did	  not	  expand	  its	  imperial	  domain	  or,	  at	  least,	  not	  into	  Afghanistan.	  What	  the	  
conversation	  inarguably	  did	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  doing,	  however,	  was	  empowering	  certain	  interventionist	  
practices.	   We	   can	   draw	   on	   those	   similarities	   between	   these	   historical	   events	   and	   today	   without	  
assuming	  a	  final	  meaning	  to	  those	  similarities.	  Some	  part	  of	  the	  British	  discourse	  saw	  Afghanistan	  as	  an	  
empty	   space	   where	   British	   empire	   could	   expand	   profitably	   (in	   various	   senses	   of	   the	   word),	   but	   the	  
discourse	  itself	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  empowering	  an	  intervention,	  not	  necessarily	  an	  expansion.	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This	   particular	   type	   of	   intervention	  was	   empowered	   by	   a	   conceptualization	   of	   Afghanistan	   as	  
completely	  empty	  of	  unique	  character.	  Afghanistan	  was	  simply	  not	  worth	  dominating	   for	  any	   intrinsic	  
value	  it	  might	  have,	  thus	  it	  was	  not	  worth	  colonizing.	  Instead	  interventions	  always	  had	  some	  other	  end	  
as	  their	  referent	  object.	  	  	  
Afghanistan	   is	   not	   unique	   in	   being	   on	   the	   fringe	   of	   imperial/colonial	   experience.	   Nor	   are	   all	  
colonial	  experiences	  the	  same.	  Nor,	  for	  that	  matter,	  do	  these	  allowances	  mean	  that	  colonial	  tropes	  and	  
knowledges	  had	  no	  part	  to	  play	  in	  interactions	  on	  Afghanistan.	  Rather,	  we	  might	  think	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  
exemplifying	   a	   place	   that	  was	   never	   straight-­‐forwardly	   colonized	  whilst	   being	   variously	   and	   unevenly	  
inscribed	  within	  and	  outside	  of	  colonial	  relations.	  Pursuant	  to	  this,	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  recognize	  certain	  colonial	  
tropes	  as	  they	  are	  applied	  to	  Afghanistan	  –	  and	  indeed	  those	  tropes	  underlie	  particular	  aspects	  of	  what	  
is	  known	  about	  Afghanistan	  even	  today.	  Yet	  it	  is	  equally	  vital	  not	  to	  accept	  that	  critique	  on	  (neo)colonial	  
grounds	  alone	  (no	  matter	  how	  sophisticated)	  comes	  to	  grips	  adequately	  with	  Afghanistan’s	  specificity.	  
Rights  and  Sovereignty    
Each	  of	  the	  previous	  three	  strands	  of	  discursive	  ‘knowledge’	  about	  Afghanistan	  highlights	  either	  
null	  or	  negative	  typifications	  o	  Afghan	  character	  and	  agency.	  By	  and	  large	  this	  was	  unacknowledged	  and	  
accepted	  without	  question.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	  the	  discursive	  examples	  above	  only	   in	  a	  few	  instances	  even	  
considered	   the	   idea	   that	   there	  might	   be	   another	   side	   to	   Afghan	   identity,	   that	   there	  might	   be	   some	  
agency	  or	  identity	  to	  fill	  the	  void	  assumed	  within	  their	  discourse.	  
Yet	   there	  was	   a	   bona	   fide	   debate	   taking	   place	   at	   this	   time	   about	   sovereignty,	   statehood	   and	  
rights.	   It	   was	   unfortunately	   only	   a	   civil	   debate	   which	   never	   influenced	   policy	   in	   a	   discernible	   way	   –	  
furthermore	   the	   tone	   of	   civil	   discourse	   to	   follow	   the	   war	   suggests	   that	   this	   civil	   debate	   didn’t	  
significantly	  influence	  civil	  narratives	  either.	  The	  whole	  of	  the	  ‘debate’	  took	  place	  over	  about	  a	  month’s	  
time	  in	   letters	  to	  the	  editor	  of	  The	  Times	  before	  disappearing	  and	  not	  being	  taken	  up	  again	  until	  after	  
the	  First	  World	  War.	  
Note	   that	   this	   is	   a	   set	   of	   questions	   regarding	   whether	   Afghanistan	   has	   a	   place	   within	   the	  
schemata	  of	  Eurocentric	  international	  law.	  This	  is	  a	  question	  asked	  today	  by	  critical	  scholars	  for	  perhaps	  
very	  different	  reasons.	  But	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  at	  this	  point	  of	  history,	  the	  idea	  of	  treating	  Afghanistan	  
under	  Eurocentric	   law	  and	  custom	  was	  a	  way	  to	  protect	  Afghanistan	  –	  today	  critical	  scholars	  see	  such	  
placement	  as	  injurious	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  Both,	  in	  their	  proper	  context,	  have	  validity.	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The	  debate	  was	  set	  off	  by	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  editor	  written	  by	  Lord	  John	  Lawrence,	  former	  Viceroy	  
of	  India.	  He	  spoke	  out	  against	  war	  with	  Afghanistan	  saying	  that	  “We	  ought	  not,	  indeed,	  to	  be	  surprised	  
that	   the	   Ameer	   has	   acted	   as	   he	   has	   done…”	   (Lawrence	   1878A)	   After	   all,	   according	   to	   Lawrence	  
Afghanistan	  had	  refused	  to	  allow	  a	  British	  diplomatic	  mission	  in	  Kabul	  since	  1857.	  While	  still	  considering	  
Afghans	   to	   be	   “uncivilized”	   and	   “barbarous”,	   he	   also	   considers	   it	   folly	   to	   presume	   that	   Britain	   knows	  
what	   is	   good	   for	   Afghanistan	   better	   than	   Afghanis	   do.	   Indeed,	   his	   letter	   is	   an	   impassioned	   call	   to	  
consider	  that	  Afghanistan	  has	  a	  set	  of	  inherent	  rights	  that	  Britain	  was	  guilty	  of	  violating.	  	  
“Have	  not	  the	  Afghans	  a	  right	  to	  resist	  our	  forcing	  a	  Mission	  on	  them,	  bearing	  in	  mind	  to	  what	  
such	  Missions	  often	   lead,	  and	  what	  Burns’s	  Mission	   in	  1836	  did	  actually	  bring	  upon	  them?”	  
(ibid)	  
There	  was	   a	   rapid	   and	   strong	   reaction	   to	   this.	   General	  Murdo	   (Murdo	   1878)	   accused	   him	   of	  
misleading	  the	  public:	  “…express	  my	  regret	  that	  his	  letter	  was	  written,	  for	  I	  fear	  that	  its	  plausibility	  will	  
mislead	   people	   at	   home	   who	   are	   ignorant	   of	   the	   Asiatic	   character”.	   Insofar	   as	   Afghans	   (and	   other	  
Asiatics)	   cannot	   understand	   restraint	   and	   civility,	   any	   reaction	   to	   the	   refusal	   of	   accepting	   the	   British	  
mission	   would	   only	   be	   seen	   as	   weakness,	   which	   the	   Afghans	   would	   capitalize	   on.	   An	   even	   more	  
outraged	   response	   came	   in	   under	   the	   pen	   name	   of	   Political.	   He	   argues	   that	   anti-­‐war	   arguments	   are	  
fallacious	   because	   they	   treat	   the	   Ameer	   as	   if	   he	   were	   a	   European	   ruler,	   whereas	   he	   is	   in	   fact	  
qualitatively	  different.	  Thus	  Afghanistan	  had	  no	  rights	  to	  be	  considered	  or	  recognized.	  
“He	  is,	  besides,	  a	  barbarian	  and	  ignorant	  of	  the	  common	  amenities	  which	  govern	  the	  political	  
relations	  between	  two	  independent	  States.	  [According	  Afghanistan	  rights]	  would	  be	  to	  enact	  
a	  political	  farce	  for	  the	  amusement	  of	  the	  world	  and	  our	  own	  humiliation	  [as	  it	  would	  accord	  
Afghanistan]	   “the	   international	   privileges	   and	   consideration	   due	   to	   an	   [sic]	   European	   State	  
without	  any	  of	  its	  responsibilities	  being	  demanded	  from	  him.”	  (Political	  1878)	  
Other,	  less	  hostile	  voices	  also	  were	  raised.	  Viscount	  Howick	  supported	  Lord	  Lawrence’s	  position,	  
even	   taking	   the	   argument	   further.	   He	   argued	   that	   it	   was	   “the	   right	   of	   every	   independent	   nation	  
[emphasis	  mine]	   to	   refuse	  to	  receive	  an	  Envoy	   from	  another”	   (Howick	  1878)	  and	  that	   this	  was	  a	   right	  
that	   Afghanistan	   had	   been	   exercising	   for	   two	   decades	   already.	   Furthermore,	   he	   argued	   that	   Britain’s	  
tendency	   to	   ignore	   Afghanistan’s	   rights	   as	   an	   independent	   nation	   were	   to	   blame	   for	   the	   ‘insult’	   of	  
refusing	  Britain’s	  envoy.	  	  
Stephen	  opposed	  Lord	  Lawrence’s	   stance,	   though	  he	  allowed	   that	   there	  was	   something	   to	  be	  
had	  in	  the	  conversation.	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“Whether	   in	   dealing	   with	   an	   Asiatic	   ruler	   like	   Shere	   Ali	   the	   common	   rules	   of	   European	  
international	   law	   have	   any	   application	   whatever…	   [is	   a	   question	   that	   is	   interesting	   but]	  
though	  interesting,	  I	  shall	  pass	  over.”	  	  (Stephen	  1878A)	  	  
So	   Stephen	   felt	   that	   there	   might	   be	   an	   interesting	   and	   useful	   debate	   to	   have	   over	   whether	  
Afghanistan	  should	  be	  accorded	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  as	  under	  European	   international	   law,	  but	   it	  
wasn’t	   actually	   a	   germane	   question	   in	   the	   current	   circumstances.	   This	   reads	   as	   an	   outrageous	   claim;	  
surely	  when	  considering	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  right	  for	  Britain	  to	  make	  war	  on	  Afghanistan	  for	  refusing	  an	  
envoy	   rights	   and	   sovereignty	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Afghanistan	   should	   be	   of	   central	   concern.	   Instead,	   for	  
Stephen,	  the	  question	  was	  whether	  war	  with	  Afghanistan	  was	  to	  Britain’s	  advantage.	  He	  answered	  that	  
there	  was	  such	  an	  advantage	  and	  that	  the	  advantage	  was	  in	  fact	  an	  overwhelming	  imperative.	  	  
“The	  danger	  which	  I	  apprehend	  is	  that	  the	  Russians	  may…	  obtain	  an	  ascendency	  throughout	  
Central	   Asia…	   If	   such	   an	   army	   were	   formed…	   India	   would	   be	   open	   at	   any	   moment	   to	   an	  
invasion	  which	  would	  tax	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  Empire	  to	  the	  utmost.”	  (ibid)	  	  
Thus,	   the	  geopolitical	   logic	  of	   the	  Great	  Game	  was	   too	  powerful,	   too	   imperative	  a	   concern	   to	  
worry	  about	  such	  humane	  concerns	  as	  the	  right	  to	  sovereignty	  held	  by	  Asiatic	  rulers.	  
Lord	  Lawrence	  and	  Stephen	  had	  a	  short	  back	  and	  forth	  around	  these	  claims,	  with	  no	  real	  further	  
input	   from	   other	   figures	   at	   the	   time.	   Lawrence	   responded	   that	   the	   question	   of	  whether	   Afghanistan	  
should	  be	  treated	   in	  accordance	  with	  European	   international	   law	  has	  generally	   just	  been	  passed	  over.	  
He	  argues	  that	  it	  shouldn’t	  be:	  	  
“If	  international	  law	  has	  no	  application	  in	  this	  case,	  then	  what	  is	  the	  law	  or	  principle	  on	  which	  
the	   cause	  between	  Shere	  Ali	   and	  ourselves	   is	   to	  be	   tried?	  Are	  we	   to	  be	   judges	   in	  our	  own	  
cause?	   Are	   we	   to	   decide	   in	   accordance	   with	   our	   own	   interests?	   Is	   this	   an	   answer	   which	  
Englishmen	  will	  give	  in	  so	  grave	  a	  matter?”	  (Lawrence	  1878B)	  	  
It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   he	   doesn’t	   give	   an	   opinion	   on	   the	   action	   from	   an	   international	   law	  
standpoint.	  He	   just	  argues	  that	  Britain	  ought	  to	  adopt	  that	   framework	   for	   thinking	  about	   interactions.	  
Stephen	  responds	  arguing	  that	  international	  law	  is	  not,	  in	  fact,	  law.	  Rather	  it	  is:	  	  
“a	  collection	  of	  usages	  which	  prevail	  between	  civilized	  nations,	  and	  are	  rendered	  possible	  by	  
the	   fact	   that	   the	   leading	   civilized	   nations	   are	   practically	   for	  most	   purposes	   of	   nearly	   equal	  
force.”	  (Stephen	  1878B)	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His	  notion	  of	  international	  law	  is	  essentially	  a	  gentlemen’s	  agreement	  among	  civilized	  nations	  of	  
largely	   equal	   power.	   These	   agreements	   are	   that	   states	   are	   permanent,	   equal	   and	   independent.	   They	  
may	  have	  some	  value	  in	  Europe	  and	  among	  rulers	  of	  actually	  equal	  states.	  They	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  rulers	  
that	  are	  little	  more	  than	  tribal	  chieftains.	  Instead,	  Britain’s	  relations	  with	  them	  must	  be	  based	  on	  this:	  	  
“…we	   are	   exceedingly	   powerful	   and	   highly	   civilized,	   and	   that	   they	   are	   comparatively	  weak	  
and	  half	  barbarous”.	  (ibid)	  	  
With	   this	   different	   set	   of	   rules,	   for	   Afghanistan	   to	   have	   acted	   in	   a	   friendly	   manner	   toward	  
Britain’s	  known-­‐rival	  Russia	  (which,	  by	  the	  way,	  is	  in	  a	  similar	  set	  of	  power	  dynamics	  with	  Afghanistan)	  –	  
“the	  prima	  facie	   inference	   is	  that	  he	  has	  done	  everything	  but	  formally	  declare	  war	  on	  us”.	   (ibid)	  Thus,	  
for	  Stephen,	   invading	  Afghanistan	  was	   legal	  and	  moral	  and	  all	   that.	  Great	  Game.	  This	  reflects	   in	  many	  
ways	  contemporary	  debates	  over	  the	  very	  nature	  of	   international	   law	  and	  the	  unassailability	  of	  rights.	  
Stephen	  essentially	  dismisses	  any	  right	  of	  sovereignty	  as	  meaningless	  against	  harsh	   logics	  of	   interstate	  
conflict.	  In	  such	  situations,	  it	  is	  the	  lot	  of	  weaker	  political	  spaces	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  as	  their	  more	  powerful	  
‘betters’	  see	  necessary.	  	  
Lawrence	  makes	  one	  final	  response	  in	  sovereign	  rights	  argument,	  saying	  that	  international	   law	  
needs	  to	  be	  considered	  because	  some	  sort	  of	  actual	  ethical	  framework	  (outside	  of	  “we’re	  powerful	  and	  
they’re	   being	   nice	   to	   people	   we	   don’t	   like”)	   must	   be	   applied.	   He	   says	   that:	   “Force	   may	   overbear	  
weakness,	   as	   it	   has	   done	   at	   times	   in	   Europe;	   but	   the	   eternal	   principles	   of	   right	   and	   wrong	   should	  
influence	  us	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  world”.	  (Lawrence	  1878C)	  Here	  Lawrence	  falls	  back	  on	  a	  notion	  of	  natural	  
right,	   seemingly	   influenced	   to	   some	   degree	   by	   Kant	   as	   an	   underpinning	   way	   of	   ordering	   relations	  
between	  states.	  	  
Indeed,	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  Lawrence	  was	  somewhat	  ahead	  of	  his	  time.	  His	  arguments	  are	  very	  
similar	  to	  the	  narrative	  underpinnings	  that	  inform	  the	  discursive	  shift	  we	  see	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  
and	  that	  shift	  has	  an	   impact	  on	  relationships	  with	  Afghanistan	  as	  well.	  That,	  however,	   is	   in	  the	  future.	  
This	  very	  interesting	  debate	  falls	  silent	  and	  British	  policy	  carries	  forward	  more	  or	  less	  as	  General	  Murdo	  
would	  have	  advocated.	  	  
One	   could	   argue	   that	   we	   can	   see	   aspects	   of	   both	   sides	   of	   these	   arguments	   in	   international	  
relations	  today.	  International	  law	  is	  given	  some	  credence,	  but	  what	  exactly	  it	  means	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  
it	   applies	   differs	   based	   on	   power	   and	   assumed	   civility.	   To	   an	   extent,	   this	   coincides	   with	   the	  
formal/informal	   discursive	   divide	   we	   identified	   in	   several	   other	   places	   in	   this	   dissertation.	   Stephen	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offered	   a	   wonderful	   example	   for	   how	  we	  might	   look	   at	   this	   formal/informal	   divide	   (though	   it	   didn’t	  
necessarily	  operate	  in	  a	  formal/informal	  structure	  at	  this	  time;	  it	  simply	  resembles	  the	  formal/informal	  
structure	  which	  is	  identified	  and	  discussed	  more	  in	  depth	  with	  analysis	  of	  the	  Third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  War).	  
For	   Stephen,	   there	  might	   be	   some	   validity	   to	   the	   idea	   that	  Afghanistan	  has	   rights	   as	   an	   independent	  
nation,	  and	  in	  a	  kinder	  place	  and	  time	  it	  is	  something	  definitely	  worth	  of	  consideration.	  However,	  in	  the	  
world	  as	  it	  exists	  one	  must	  look	  at	  the	  reality;	  British	  security	  demands	  that	  Afghanistan	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  
space	  with	  no	  sovereignty	  or	  character.	  Afghanistan	  does	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  stop	  that.	  Therefore,	  it	  
is	  the	  right	  thing	  for	  Britain	  to	  do.	  
	  
	  
Afghanistan  the  (no,  not  really)  Sovereign  
It	   is	   worthwhile	   to	   immediately	   point	   out	   strong	   connections	   we	   might	   make	   between	   the	  
Stephen/Lawrence	  debate	  and	  Derrida’s	  work	  on	  sovereignty.	  The	  tension	  between	  coercive	  power	  and	  
rights/justice	   in	   sovereignty	   is	   central	   to	   Derrida’s	   treatment	   of	   the	   idea.35	   The	   entirety	   of	   his	  
compilation	   of	   lectures	   in	   The	   Beast	   and	   the	   Sovereign	   (Derrida	   2009)	   deals	   with	   this	   auto-­‐immune	  
relationship.	  Here	  he	  asks	  the	  question:	  
“So	   it	   is	   the	   concept	   of	   law,	   and	   with	   it	   that	   of	   contract,	   authority,	   credit,	   and	   therefore	  
many,	  many	  others	  that	  will	  be	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  our	  reflections.	  Is	  the	  law	  the	  reigns…	  in	  all	  the	  
so-­‐called	  animal	  societies	  a	  law	  of	  the	  same	  nature	  as	  what	  we	  understand	  by	  law	  in	  human	  
right	  and	  human	  politics?	  And	  is	  the	  complex,	  although	  relatively	  short,	  history	  of	  the	  concept	  
of	  sovereignty	   in	   the	  West…	  the	  history	  of	  a	   law,	  or	   is	   it	  not,	   the	  structure	  of	  which	   is	  or	   is	  
not,	  also	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  laws	  that	  organize	  the	  hierarchized	  relations	  of	  authority…	  in	  so-­‐
called	  animal	  societies?”	  (Derrida	  2009:	  16,	  emphasis	  in	  original)	  
Here	  Derrida	  asks	  if	  sovereignty	  is	  primarily	  based	  on	  coercive	  strength,	  or	  if	  it	  is	  primarily	  based	  
on	  a	  concern	  for	  protecting	  rights	  and	  justice.	  There	  is	  a	  mechanism	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  sovereignty,	  he	  
argues,	  whereby	  it	  tries	  to	  (and	  has	  to	  try	  to)	  do	  both:	  
“…a	  certain	  power	  to	  give,	  to	  make,	  but	  also	  to	  suspend	  the	  law;	  it	  is	  the	  exceptional	  right	  to	  
place	  oneself	  above	  right,	  the	  right	  to	  non-­‐right…”	  (ibid)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 and Derrida in turn reflects the ways in which sundry theorists, such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau see 
sovereignty as about achieving effective rule while also maintaining legitimacy. See discussions of these thinkers in 
G. Browning, A History of Modern Political Thought, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016) 
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There	  are	  aspects	  of	  the	  discourse	  on	  Afghanistan	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  
which	  exhibit	  fascinating	  similarities	  to	  what	  Derrida	  drew	  out	  here.	  British	  sovereignty,	   in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  
certain	  sense	  of	  justice	  for	  British	  interests	  and	  notions	  of	  right,	  because	  it	  was	  powerful	  could	  (and	  was	  
justified	   in)	   suspending	   other	   notions	   of	   right.	   Even	   if	   those	   other	   notions	   of	   right	   had	   at	   least	   some	  
theoretical	   just	   basis.	   The	   need	   of	   Britain	  was	   of	   a	   higher	   order	   precisely	   because	   British	   power	  was	  
great	  enough	  to	  make	  it	  possible,	  thus	  the	  coercive	  nature	  of	  (British)	  sovereignty	  was	  powerful	  enough	  
to	   subsume	   the	   right	   to	   its	   own	   sovereign	   self-­‐rule	   that	   should	   be	   enjoyed	   by	   Afghanistan.	   This	  was	  
done,	   ultimately,	   in	   pursuit	   of	   what	   was	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   just	   end	   of	   British	   sovereignty	   (the	  
protection	  of	  its	  Indian	  dominion,	  which	  was	  typified	  as	  more	  enlightened	  and	  civilized	  than	  Afghanistan	  
in	  any	  case,	  and	  thus	  more	  important	  to	  see	  protected	  and	  nurtured).	  
Governmental  Narrative  
There	  is	  a	  voluminous	  set	  of	  records	  available	  on	  governmental	  discourse	  in	  this	  era.	  Parliament	  
met	   often	   and	  debated	   a	  wide	   range	  of	   issues	   in	   depth.	   Yet	   discussion	  of	  Afghanistan	   is	   almost	   non-­‐
existent.	  British	   imperial	   holdings	  on	   the	  Arabian	  Peninsula	  and	   in	   India	   see	  a	   lot	  of	  discussion,	   as	  do	  
other	   political	   spaces	   bounding	   those	   holdings.	   Yet	   Afghanistan,	   despite	   actual	  military	   conflict	   being	  
undertaken	   there	  by	  British	   forces,	   is	  only	  mentioned	   in	   two	  debates	  during	   the	   late	  1870’s.	  The	  vast	  
bulk	  of	  speeches	  that	  mention	  Afghanistan	  during	  these	  two	  debates	  are	  more	  concerned	  with	  whether	  
or	   not	   the	   ruling	   party	   in	   government	   sufficiently	   informed	   opposition	   of	   their	   plans,	   rather	   than	  
whether	  or	  not	  a	  conflict	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  right	  or	  desirable	  policy.	  There	  are	  only	  three	  instances	  of	  
Afghanistan	   being	  mentioned	   in	   the	   context	   of	   conflict	   and	   their	   justification.	   Their	   brevity	   does	   not	  
make	  them	   inconsequential,	  however.	  The	  opposite	   is	   true;	   they	   tend	  to	   reinforce	  observances	   in	   the	  
civil	  discourse	  rather	  strongly.	  
Queen	  Victoria	  addressed	  Parliament	  on	  a	  number	  of	  what	  was	  considered	  by	  the	  government	  
to	  be	  the	  year’s	  most	  pressing	  issues.	  Afghanistan	  took	  up	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  space	  in	  her	  speech,	  
and	   she	   gave	   it	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  weight.	   She	   even	   invoked	   international	   law	   in	   regard	   to	   Afghanistan,	  
though	  it	  was	  not	  in	  the	  role	  of	  Afghan	  rights	  as	  in	  the	  civil	  discourse.	  Rather	  she	  used	  it	  to	  question	  the	  
validity	  of	  Afghanistan’s	   actions	   in	   turning	  away	  Britain’s	   envoy.	   “I	   do	  not	   know	  whether,	   as	   a	   simple	  
matter	  of	  International	  Law,	  it	  might	  have	  been	  justifiable	  for	  Shere	  Ali	  to	  receive	  a	  Russian	  Mission,	  and	  
to	   reject	   an	   English	   one…”	   (Victoria	   1878)	   She	   claims	   that	   the	   act	   of	   denying	   the	   British	   diplomatic	  
mission	   in	   itself	  was	  an	   insult	  which	  may	  not	  be	   ignored	  and	  must	  be	   responded	   to.	  She	  also	  claimed	  
that	   Britain	   doesn’t	   want	   territorial	   expansion…	   with	   the	   possible	   exception	   of	   expansion	   into	   tribal	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areas	  not	  directly	  under	   the	  Amir’s	   control	   anyway	   (for	   greater	   security).	   These	  points	   touch	  on	  each	  
and	  every	  single	  point	  drawn	  upon	   in	  the	  civil	  discourse	   in	   interesting,	  revealing	  ways.	   It	   is	  also	  worth	  
noting	   that,	   of	   all	   responses	   given	   to	   the	   speech	  on	   that	  day,	   all	   but	  one	  were	  partisan	  debates	  over	  
internal	  governmental	  handling	  of	  the	  Afghan	  situation.	  None	  so	  much	  as	  mentioned	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  
character	   or	   actor	   in	   its	   own	   right.	   This	   very	   absence	   speaks	   to	   the	   underlying	   theme	   of	   Afghan	  
emptiness.	  
Lord	   Ravensworth	   was	   the	   only	   speaker	   following	   the	   Queen’s	   Speech	   to	   acknowledge	   her	  
comments	  on	  Afghanistan.	  	  
“Her	  Majesty’s	  Gracious	  Speech	  has	  informed	  us	  that	  we	  are	  at	  war	   in	  Afghanistan…	  we	  are	  
not	  at	  war	  with	  [emphasis	  mine]	  Afghanistan	  –	  we	  are	  at	  war	  with	  the	  Amir,	  but	  not	  with	  his	  
subjects.”	  (Ravensworth	  1878)	  	  
Afghanistan	   then	   is	   situated	   as	   not	   being	   any	   sort	   of	   sovereign	   space,	   just	   a	   warlord	   with	  
subjects.	   It	  does	  appear	  as	  though	  perhaps	  the	  Afghan	  people	  have	  some	  character,	  some	  meaningful	  
identity	  in	  this	  quote	  –	  a	  popular	  sovereignty?	  It	   is	  possible,	  though	  the	  idea	  is	  never	  expounded	  upon	  
(though	  we’ve	  seen	  there	   is	  some	  civil	  debate	   in	  Britain	  at	  the	  time	  regarding	  some	  right	  to	  sovereign	  
character	  within	  Afghanistan	  so	  it’s	  not	  beyond	  the	  pale).	  In	  any	  case,	  functionally	  Afghanistan	  is	  seen	  as	  
an	  uncontrolled	  space	  with	  prominent	  individuals.	  Ravensworth	  makes	  an	  interesting	  argument	  that	  the	  
Amir	  was	  forced	  into	  friendliness	  with	  Russia:	  Britain	  wasn’t	  willing	  to	  recognize	  him	  as	  a	  sovereign	  and	  
Afghanistan	   as	   his	   legitimate	   realm.	   Russia	   was	   encroaching.	   Britain	   hadn’t	   made	   strong	   enough	  
guarantees	  to	  support	  Afghanistan	  against	  Russian	  aggression.	  Thus,	  Afghanistan	  had	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  
cater	   to	  Russia’s	  apparent	  demands,	   though	  Ravensworth	   is	   in	  no	  way	  protesting	  against	   the	  war.	  He	  
saw	  it	  as	  a	  sad	  necessity.	  There	  is	  an	  implication	  in	  his	  argument	  that	  might	  be	  drawn;	  Afghanistan	  is	  not	  
a	  state,	  but	  it	  could	  have	  been	  if	  Britain	  would	  have	  empowered	  it	  to	  be.	  
A	   later	   meeting	   of	   Parliament	   involved	   the	   loyal	   opposition	   within	   Parliament	   yet	   again	  
protesting	  the	  way	  in	  which	  war	  was	  decided	  upon	  without	  adequately	  consulting	  with	  the	  opposition.	  
During	  these	  procedural	  debates,	  Estanhope	  makes	  some	  comments	  that	  resonate	  with	  earlier	  analysis.	  
He	  touched	  on	  the	  points	  of	  geopolitics	  (Great	  Game)	  and	  prestige.	  “…if	  such	  conduct	  were	  tolerated,	  a	  
feeling	  might	  get	  abroad	  that	  we	  were	  losing	  our	  strength”.	  “…Afghanistan	  under	  a	  foreign	  Power	  might	  
prove	  a	  constant	  menace	  to	  our	  safety	  in	  the	  East…”	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The	   sparsity	   of	   discussion	  on	   the	   invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  by	  Parliament	   is	   in	   itself	   instructive.	  
One	  might	  generally	  suppose	  that	  putting	  national	  resources	  and	  manpower	  into	  armed	  conflict	  would	  
require	  some	  manner	  of	  political	  discussion.	  Yet	  the	  idea	  of	  putting	  troops	  in	  Afghanistan	  in	  response	  to	  
a	  perceived	  insult	  by	  way	  of	  refusing	  to	  accept	  a	  British	  emissary	  was	  so	  natural,	  so	  unobjectionable	  as	  
to	   require	   little	   to	   no	  discussion.	   Indeed,	   discussion	  over	   taxes	   on	  bread	   in	   Ireland	  engendered	  more	  
discussion	  over	  the	  period	  analyzed.	  	  
What	   little	  was	   said	   tended	   to	   follow	   trends	   identified	   in	   civil	   discourse.	   The	  Queen	   felt	   that	  
international	   law,	   if	   at	   all	   applicable,	  must	   naturally	   be	   on	   the	   side	   of	   Britain.	   Further,	   Afghanistan’s	  
insult	  to	  British	  prestige	  required	  a	  strong	  response.	  Ravensworth	  supposed	  that	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  be	  at	  
war	   in	   Afghanistan	  without	   that	  war	   actually	   being	  with	   Afghanistan	   –	  which	   begs	   the	   question	  who	  
Britain	  could	  have	  waged	  war	  with	  and	  what	  the	  differentiation	  was.	  Estanhope	  later	  revisited	  the	  need	  
to	  guard	  both	  British	  prestige	  and	  the	  security	  of	  India	  to	  the	  east.	  	  
Summary  and  Revisiting  Central  Questions  
This	  project	  first	  asks	  why	  we	  are	  able	  talk	  about	  failed	  states.	  Is	  there	  anything	  from	  this	  second	  
Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war	   which	   can	   also	   be	   applied	   to	   understanding	   how	   we	   talk	   about	   state	   failure	   in	   a	  
contemporary	  context,	  particularly	   in	   the	   instance	  of	  Afghanistan?	  Desai	  argued	   that	  pejorative	   labels	  
such	   as	   failure	   (and	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Afghanistan	   in	   the	   historical	   context	   we	   can	   talk	   about	   labels	   of	  
barbarism)	   empower	   notions	   of	   intervention,	  making	   them	   seem	   necessary	   and	   even	   humane.	   Baral	  
warns	  of	  a	  disturbing	  continuity	  between	  how	  Afghanistan	  has	  been	  envisioned	  by	  Western	  interveners	  
in	  the	  past	  and	  today	  (underscoring	  the	  continuity	  by	  falling	  into	  the	  same	  pattern).	  	  
Both	  of	  these	  are	  powerful	  points	  well	  worth	  taking	  on	  board.	  Neither	  alone	  adequately	  explains	  
Afghanistan’s	  failed	  state	  identity,	  nor	  does	  acceptance	  of	  those	  points	  obligate	  one	  to	  accept	  Desai’s	  or	  
Baral’s	   conclusions	   as	   natural.	   Rather	   than	   interpreting	   Afghanistan	   through	   a	   lens	   that	   gives	   it	   a	  
determined	  spot	  within	  a	  well-­‐developed	  view	  of	  how	  power	  relations	  in	  our	  social	  world	  work,	  it	  might	  
be	  more	  useful	  to	  look	  again	  toward	  how	  these	  conceptions	  shaped	  and	  required	  Afghan	  indeterminacy.	  
A	  recurring	  theme	  in	  this	  chapter,	  throughout	  the	  various	  threads	  of	  narrating	  Afghan-­‐ness	  has	  been	  this	  
sense	  of	  indeterminacy.	  The	  only	  determinate	  and	  constant	  aspect	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  apparent	  character	  
in	  this	  narrative	  has	  been	  emptiness	  –	  which	   is	   in	   itself	   indeterminate.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	  Afghanistan	  was	  
talked	   about	   in	   a	   variety	   of	  ways	   (barbarians	   to	   be	   punished,	   potential	   for	   imperial	   expansion,	  Great	  
Game)	  which	  share	  little	  in	  common	  other	  than	  the	  assumption	  that	  Afghanistan	  is	  empty	  of	  character.	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At	  the	  same	  time,	  narratives	  surrounding	  the	  second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  demonstrate	  that	  there	  
were	  questions	  about	  Afghanistan	  and	  a	  sovereign	  identity.	  Whether	  that	  sovereign	  identity	  existed	  and	  
where	   it	   may	   lie	   (Institutions?	   Borders?	   Rulers?	   People?)	   are	   undeveloped	   questions.	   Yet	   there	   are	  
arguments	   that	   some	   kind	   of	   right	   to	   Afghan	   sovereignty	   exists,	   and	   these	   are	   arguments	  which	  will	  
slowly	  develop	  and	  become	  “settled”	  in	  later	  chapters	  (without	  ever	  really	  coming	  to	  grips	  with	  anything	  
particularly	   Afghan	   about	   the	   Afghan	   sovereignty	   question).	   This	   then	   is	   the	   gestalt	   of	   thinking	   of	  
Afghanistan	  as	  a	  state,	  albeit	  not	  much	  of	  a	  state	  and	  a	  state	  which	  one	  might	  easily	  describe	  as	  lesser	  or	  
failed.	  What’s	  more,	  discussion	  on	   the	  elite	  of	  Afghanistan	   (which	   is	  what	   fills	   the	  space	  of	  an	  Afghan	  
‘government’	   in	   this	   discourse)	   is	   focused	   primarily	   on	   how	   those	   leaders	   have	   failed	   a	   wide	   set	   of	  
responsibilities	  both	  domestically	  and	  with	  reference	  to	  Britain.	  
There	   are	   certain	   “knowledges”	   about	   Afghanistan	   that	   we	   see	   developing	   here	   which	   will	  
resonate	  through	  future	  interventions	  and	  which	  touch	  on	  this	  project’s	  second	  central	  question:	  “what	  
assumptive	   discursive	   knowledges	   empower	   dominant	   narratives	   of	   intelligibility?”.	   Uncivilized	  
Afghanistan,	  Afghanistan	  the	  almost-­‐sovereign,	  Afghanistan	  the	  corrupt,	  Afghanistan	  the	  tactical	  space	  –	  
these	  are	  all	  themes	  which	  resonate	  powerfully	  with	  orthodox	  scholarship	  on	  state	  failure	  and	  /	  or	  on	  
Afghanistan	  today.	  They	  also	  serve	  to	  (re)empty	  Afghanistan	  of	  any	  possibility	  of	  meaningful	  identity.	  
Dominant	   discursive	   decisions	   on	   how	   to	   envision	   Afghanistan	   all	   emphasize	   its	   absence	   of	  
meaning.	  A	  decision	  is	  made	  by	  the	  Afghan	  ruler	  to	  turn	  away	  a	  diplomatic	  emissary	  of	  the	  British	  and	  
rather	   than	  a	  political	  move,	   this	   is	   seen	  as	  an	   insult	   from	  a	  barbarian	  not	  properly	  equipped	   to	   truly	  
understand	  how	  civilization	  works.	  This	  barbarity	  was	  of	  such	  a	  nature	  as	  that	  it	  could	  not	  be	  dealt	  with	  
in	  a	  civilized	  fashion	  –	  only	  strength	  would	  do	  –	  and	  only	  violence	  is	  strength	  to	  such	  barbaric	  peoples.	  
The	   conflict	   thus	   arising	   was	   justified	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   ways	   beyond	   simply	   the	   need	   to	   teach	  
Afghanistan	  (or	  its	  rulers)	  a	  lesson	  in	  manners.	  One	  thread	  was	  a	  discussion	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Afghan	  
ruling	  groups	  through	  their	  own	  barbaric	  customs,	  their	  cruelty,	  their	  corruption	  and	  ineptitude	  ruined	  
the	   vast	   potential	   of	  Afghanistan.	   They	  were	  unfit	   rulers	   for	  Afghanistan	  –	   the	  best	   thing	   that	  Britain	  
could	  do	  would	  be	  to	  intervene.	  Indeed,	  Britain	  would	  be	  well	  within	  its	  rights	  to	  seize	  Afghanistan	  and	  
make	  it	  a	  colonial	  dominion,	  but	  at	  the	  very	  least	  a	  regime	  change	  was	  in	  order.	  
Touching	  on	  this	  project’s	   third	  question	  –	  “how	  do	  particular	  assumptions	  about	  sovereignty,	  
justice	   and	   successful	   statehood	  by	   intervening	  parties	   negatively	   impact	   attempts	   to	  understand	   the	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specificity	   of	   the	  Afghan	   crisis,	   currently	   conceptualized	   primarily	   through	   the	   discursive	   lens	   of	   state	  
failure?”	  –	  consider:	  	  	  
As	   to	   whether	   or	   not	   such	   an	   intervention	   was	   just,	   sovereignty	   and	   its	   nature	   under	  
international	  law	  was	  discussed.	  A	  very	  interesting	  discussion	  which	  is	  a	  haunting	  precursor	  to	  post-­‐Cold	  
War	  discussions	  on	   the	  nature	  of	   sovereignty	  ultimately	  demonstrated	   that	  when	  a	  powerful	   country	  
felt	  it	  was	  in	  its	  national	  interest	  to	  ignore	  any	  notion	  of	  sovereign	  rights	  in	  a	  weaker	  country,	  it	  would	  
certainly	  do	  so.	   Justifications	   included	  arguing	   the	  notion	   that	  a	  place	   like	  Afghanistan	  has	  no	   right	   to	  
sovereignty,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  civilized,	  it	  does	  not	  qualify	  as	  a	  state.	  Furthermore,	  geopolitical	  demands	  
for	  the	  very	  survival	  of	  vital	  British	  interests	  were	  at	  stake	  –	  India’s	  security	  was	  at	  risk	  so	  ignoring	  the	  
moral	   question	   of	   whether	   Afghanistan	   should	   have	   any	   right	   to	   sovereignty	   had	   to	   be	   delayed	   for	  
another	   day	   –	   thus	   by	   default	   the	   idea	   that	   in	   fact	   Afghanistan	   had	   no	   inherent	   right	   to	   sovereignty	  
carried	  the	  day.	  
An	  Afghanistan	  without	   sovereign	   rights	  was	  a	  place	  where	  outside	  powers	  could	  play.	   In	   this	  
case	   the	  game	   to	  be	  played	  was	   the	  Great	  Game	  –	  Afghanistan’s	   empty	   character	   and	   indeterminate	  
nature	  meant	  that	  it	  could	  be	  situated	  as	  a	  tactical	  space	  for	  geopolitical	  competition.	  It	  is	  the	  emptiness	  
that	  draws	  a	  common	  thread	  through	  narratives	  on	  Afghanistan	  during	  this	  time,	  in	  the	  previous	  Anglo-­‐
Afghan	  war,	  and	  we	  will	  see	  that	  it	  continues	  in	  varying	  forms	  through	  present	  times.	  
This	  assumed	  emptiness	  empowered	  a	  certain	  way	  of	  talking	  about	  Afghanistan,	  a	  marginalizing	  
set	   of	   discursive	   logics	   which	   ensured	   that	   Afghanistan	   itself	   would	   remain	   powerless	   and	   without	  
character	  or	   agency	   in	  determining	  not	  only	   its	   own	   fate	  but	   its	   very	   identity.	   If	  we	  are	   able	   to	  draw	  
strong	  connections	  between	  discursive	  logics	  in	  the	  period	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  wars	  and	  the	  post-­‐Sept.	  
11	   world,	   then	   we	   will	   have	   strong	   insight	   into	   what	   empowers	   our	   particular	   conversation	   about	  
Afghanistan	  and	  set	  of	  interventions	  in	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  failed	  state	  today.	  The	  indeterminate	  nature	  of	  
Afghanistan	  was	  reinforced	  –	  Afghanistan	  was	  either	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  act	  in	  a	  civilized	  manner	  and	  
thus	  was	  not	  worthy	  of	  sovereign	  rights.	  Thus	  it	  was	  natural	  and	  just	  that	  it	  be	  intervened	  upon	  –	  thus	  it	  
was	  natural	  and	  right	  for	  Afghanistan	  to	  stand	  in	  as	  a	  battleground	  against	  Russian	  interests	  (which	  were	  
seen	  as	  likely	  complicit	  in	  Afghanistan’s	  failings	  in	  the	  first	  place…	  along	  with	  its	  typically	  savage	  nature).	  
Not	   only	   was	   Afghanistan	   indeterminate,	   but	   it	   was	   not	   even	   in	   itself	   the	   focus.	   Afghanistan	   was	   a	  
means	  to	  an	  end:	  punishing	  Afghanistan	  was	  not	  only	  the	  right	  way	  to	  ensure	  continued	  respect	  from	  a	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“The	  fight	  of	  nations	  to	  determine	  their	  own	  destiny…	  is	  regarded	  as	  the	  birthright	  of	  
Europeans…”	  
Intelligence	  Bureau	  (1918)	  	  
	  
Afghanistan  in  an  Emerging  Global  Meta-­‐narrative  
The	  3rd	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  occurred	  at	  a	  time	  of	  great	  change	  globally,	  coming	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  
the	   first	  World	  War.	  Britain’s	   relationship	  with	  Afghanistan	  up	   to	   that	  point	  was	   relatively	   stable.	  The	  
introduction	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Gandamak	  following	  the	  2nd	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  had	  Britain	  firmly	  in	  control	  
of	  Afghanistan’s	   foreign	  affairs.	   Their	   relationship	  was	  generally	   stable	  and	  peaceful	   for	  around	  half	   a	  
decade.	  Yet	   in	   the	  period	   surrounding	   the	   first	  World	  War	   that	  was	  beginning	   to	   change.	  Amir	  Abdur	  
Rahman	   Khan	   was	   perceived	   as	   too	   potentially	   friendly	   to	   Russia	   following	   the	   Bolshevik	   revolution.	  
During	  the	  war	   itself,	  Afghanistan	  remained	  neutral	  but	  maintained	  some	  form	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  
with	   representatives	   of	   both	   the	   conflict’s	   sides–	   undermining	   Britain’s	   claim	   of	   influence	   over	  
Afghanistan’s	  foreign	  policy.	  
However,	   it	  wasn’t	  until	   the	   first	  World	  War	  had	  come	  to	  a	  close	   that	   things	  came	  to	  a	  head.	  
Amir	   Habibullah	   Khan	  was	   assassinated	   in	   1919,	   leading	   to	   a	   short	   internal	   fight	   for	   power	   between	  
Habibullah’s	   brother	   Nasrulla	   and	   his	   son	   Amanulla.	   This	   reawakened	   fears	   of	   Russian	   influence	   in	  
Afghanistan.	  What’s	  more,	  nationalism	  was	  in	  general	  on	  the	  rise	  across	  many	  regions	  where	  statehood	  
previously	  wasn’t	  part	  of	  the	  conversation	  in	  the	  ‘western’	  sense.	  This	  too	  was	  particularly	  concerning	  to	  
a	  Britain	  which	  following	  World	  War	  One	  not	  only	  had	  a	  much	  expanded	  empire	  but	  was	  full	  of	  a	  sense	  
of	  national	  heroism	  itself.	  	  	  
Fallout	   from	  the	   internal	   conflict	  meant	   that	  Amanulla,	  having	  won,	   still	  did	  not	  enjoy	   the	   full	  
support	  of	   the	   various	  Afghan	   tribes.	   This,	   the	  British	  believed,	   led	  him	   to	   incite	   the	   various	   tribes	   to	  
Jihad,	  as	  well	  as	  informally	  declaring	  Jihad	  amongst	  his	  subjects,	  specifically	  against	  British	  rule	  in	  India	  
as	  a	  bid	  to	  solidify	  his	  domestic	  support.	   (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1919:	  3	  March	  and	  21	  May)	   In	  addition	  to	  
inciting	  border	  tribes,	  Amanulla	  commanded	  or	  led	  attacks	  on	  Indian	  interests	  himself	  –	  though	  specifics	  
at	   the	   time	  were	  unclear	   and	  are	  a	  matter	  of	   some	  debate	   still	   today.	   	   By	  mid-­‐May,	  Afghanistan	  had	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asked	   India	   for	   a	   formal	   declaration	   of	   cessation	   of	   hostilities.	   This	   was	   denied,	   and	   it	   was	   in	   the	  
discussion	   over	   this	   where	   the	   cabinet	   of	   UK	   was	   formally	   informed	   that	   they	   were	   in	   conflict	   with	  
Afghanistan	   once	   again.	   (War	   would	   go	   on	   until	   August	   of	   same	   year,	   though	   with	   few	   additional	  
actions.)	  
The	   ‘war’	   in	   itself	  was	   short	   lived	  and	  one-­‐sided.	  Hostile	  acts	  were	  carried	  out	  by	  Afghanistan	  
against	  border	  areas	  of	  India.	  Indian	  forces	  –	  including	  British	  national	  forces	  based	  in	  India,	  responded.	  
Conflict	   lasted	   several	   months,	   though	   after	   May	   negotiations	   for	   some	   lasting	   peace	   began.	   These	  
negotiations	  were	  initially	  quite	  informal	  and	  included	  attempts	  to	  fact	  find	  by	  the	  British.	  Cables	  from	  
the	  time	  suggest	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  confusion	  as	  to	  how	  and	  why	  the	  conflict	  started	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  
as	  well	  as	  what	  the	  apparent	  and	  real	  motivations	  behind	  the	  conflict	  were.	  	  
This	   confusion	   must	   be	   taken	   in	   context	   of	   a	   muddled	   international	   situation	   at	   the	   time.	  
Britain’s	  relationship	  with	  Russia	  and	  with	  India	  were	  both	  troubled	  places.	  India	  was	  restive,	  no	  longer	  
as	  content	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  British	  Empire.	  There	  were	  increasing	  calls	  for	  autonomy	  and	  self-­‐rule	  which	  
had	   led	  both	  to	  reforms	   in	  colonial	  administration	  and	  questions	  within	  Britain	  about	  the	   future	  of	   its	  
empire.	  Russia	  had	  gone	  through	  its	  Bolshevik	  Revolution	  and	  was	  still	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  civil	  strife.	  What	  
Russia’s	  place	  would	  be	   in	  the	  world	  was	  at	  question,	  and	  there	  was	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  anxiety	  over	  
the	  nationalistic	   ideologies	  espoused	  within	  Bolshevism,	  at	   least	   in	  how	   it	  was	  articulated	   toward	   the	  
peoples	   of	   central	   and	   southern	   Asia.	   These	   anxieties	   exacerbated	   anxieties	   over	   the	   future	   of	   the	  
British	   Empire.	   What’s	   more,	   how	   Britain	   viewed	   itself	   and	   its	   place	   in	   a	   world	   that	   was	   seemingly	  
changing	  dramatically	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  first	  World	  War	  likely	  impacted	  narratives	  on	  Afghanistan	  and	  
Afghan-­‐ness.	   World	   War	   One	   was	   hard	   on	   Britain’s	   economy	   and	   had	   put	   strain	   on	   its	   ability	   to	  
administrate	   its	   empire.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	  was	   a	   growing	   sense	   of	   British	   exceptionalism	   –	   a	  
heroic	  Britain	  at	   the	   forefront	  of	  happenings	   in	   the	   international	  arena.	  These	   tensions	   in	  how	  Britain	  
viewed	   itself	   and	   other	   anchor-­‐identities	   (Russia	   and	   India,	   in	   this	   case)	   impacted	   on	   Britain	   would	  
respond	  to	  Afghan	  calls	  for	  independence	  and	  recognition	  as	  a	  sovereign	  state.	  It	  influenced	  a	  discursive	  
pathway	   which	   this	   chapter	   identifies	   and	   informs	   the	   formal/informal	   divide	   on	   Afghan	   sovereign	  
identity.	  
Relations	  with	  Russia	  were	  confused	  at	  the	  time,	  with	  some	  domestic	  voices	  saying	  the	  Russian	  
threat	  was	  gone	  and	  others	  saying	  it	  was	  larger	  than	  ever	  –	  official	  policy	  tended	  to	  fall	  in	  with	  the	  latter	  
view.	   Though	   there	   was	   a	   hopeful	   reaction	   to	   the	   abdication	   of	   the	   Tsar	   of	   Russia	   in	   1917,	   the	  
Bolsheviks’	   actions	   on	   gaining	   power	   in	   Russia	   had	   a	   souring	   effect.	   Particularly,	   the	   peace	  made	   by	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Russia	  with	  Germany	   in	   1918	   (allowing	  Germany	   to	   concentrate	   its	   forces	   on	   the	  western	   front);	   the	  
nationalization	  of	   all	   foreign	  enterprises	   in	  Russia	  without	  notice	  or	   compensation;	   and	   the	   refusal	   to	  
repay	  war	  debts	  incurred	  to	  Britain	  by	  the	  previous	  Russian	  regime	  turned	  public	  and	  especially	  official	  
governmental	  opinion	  against	   the	  Bolsheviks.	  This	  expressed	   itself	   in	  a	   few	  ways.	  For	   instance,	  British	  
troops	  that	  had	  been	  in	  Murmansk	  and	  Archangel	  to	  ensure	  war	  supplies	  that	  had	  been	  sent	  there	  by	  
Britain	  were	  not	  also	  nationalized	  took	  part	  in	  the	  Russian	  civil	  war	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  “white”	  forces.	  In	  a	  
more	   general	   sense,	   British	   foreign	   policy	   was	   completely	   hostile	   toward	   Russia	   from	   1918-­‐1920.	  
(Farmer:	  27)	  
India	   had	   probably	   even	   gained	   in	   importance	   to	   the	   British	   mind	   after	   the	   war.	   “[In	   the	  
interwar	   years]	   all	   [British]	   governments	   …	   saw	   the	   Empire	   as	   a	   considerable,	   or	   potentially	  
considerable,	  economic	  asset…	  in	  the	  interwar	  years,	  the	  Empire	  was	  increasingly	  important	  to	  Britain’s	  
trading	   position.”	   (ibid:	   47)	   Furthermore,	   India	  was	   “Britain’s	   largest	   and	  most	   important	   colony.	   The	  
loss	  of	   India,	   and	   the	   Indian	  army,	  would	  have	  a	   far-­‐reaching	  effect	  on	  Britain’s	  prestige	  and	  power.”	  
(ibid	  56)	  Indeed,	  popular	  unrest	  in	  India	  associated	  with	  a	  wish	  for	  home	  rule	  (and	  the	  perceived	  harsh	  
British	   response	   to	   this	   agitation)	   which	   to	   appearances	   played	   a	   large	   role	   in	   Afghanistan’s	   actions	  
leading	  up	  to	  the	  3rd	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War.	  
As	   for	   Britain	   itself,	   there	   was	   a	   growing	   sense	   of	   self-­‐identity	   as	   a	   nation	   of	   heroes.	   In	   the	  
aftermath	   of	   WWI,	   Britain	   and	   its	   government	   was	   caught	   up	   in	   a	   patriotic	   fervor,	   with	   “glittering	  
forecasts	  of	  a	  Great	  Britain	  fit	  for	  heroes”.	  It	  was	  a	  position	  largely	  imposed	  on	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  due	  
to	  popular	  public	  opinion	  but	  certainly	  saw	  its	  expression	  in	  Britain’s	  foreign	  policy.	  (Ward:	  526)	  This	  will	  
find	  expression	  in	  the	  tenor	  of	  popular	  discourse	  shown	  in	  the	  chapter,	  as	  well	  as	  within	  formal	  military	  
documents	  and,	  especially,	  dispatches	  between	  British	  and	  Afghani	  officials	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  hostilities.	  
Balanced	  against	  this	  was	  a	  sudden	  gain	  in	  territory	  (taken	  from	  Germany	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war)	  
as	   well	   as	   a	   burgeoning	   debt…	  with	   an	   accompanied	   near	   beggaring	   of	  most	   of	   Britain’s	   continental	  
trading	   partners.	   (ibid:	   538)	   There	   was,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   writing	   of	   the	   referenced	   history	   book,	   a	  
realization	   that	   peace	   in	   Europe	   was	   absolutely	   imperative,	   and	   a	   hope	   that	   the	   League	   of	   Nations	  
would	  be	  the	  vehicle	  making	  that	  possible.	  (ibid)	  However,	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  there	  was	  the	  difficulty	  of	  a	  
great	  deal	  of	  debt,	  a	  zealously	  patriotic	  domestic	  constituency	  and	  a	  very	  large	  empire.	  
All	  of	  this,	  of	  course,	  was	  happening	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  post-­‐WWI	  world	  that	  was	  entering	  into	  
the	  infancy	  of	  a	  dominant	  discourse	  on	  liberal	  statehood.	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This	  chapter	  explores	  discourse	  on	  Afghanistan	  and	  its	  proper	  place	  in	  the	  world	  (with	  relation	  
to	  Britain	  and	   India	   specifically)	  with	   the	   context	  of	   these	   turbulent	   times	   in	  mind.	  Discourse	  analysis	  
includes	   newspapers,	   government	  memoranda	   and	   cables	   as	  well	   as	   parliamentary	   debates.	   This	   is	   a	  
time	  of	  great	  narrative	  change	  and	  here	  we	  find	  assumptive	  legacies	  of	  Afghan	  identity	  embedded	  into	  
new	  dominant	  conceptions	  of	  sovereignty,	  statehood	  and	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐rule.	  	  
Analysis	   of	   narratives	   on	   Afghanistan	   at	   the	   time	   found	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	   continuity.	  
Afghanistan’s	   importance	   is	   still	  measured	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   usefulness	   in	   securing	   India,	  which	   is	   still	  
seen	   largely	   in	  relation	  to	  Russia.	  Afghans	  are	  still	  seen	  as	  unimportant	   in	  themselves	  –	  their	  barbaric,	  
uncivilized	  nature	  means	  that	  they	  are	  not	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	   in	  their	  own	  right.	  Rather	  than	  taking	  
into	  account	   their	  particular	   rights,	  Afghans	  and	  Afghanistan	  are	  seen	   in	  relation	  to	  their	  utility	   to	   the	  
civilized	  world.	   This	   impacts	  with	  a	  discursive	   shift	  we	   see.	  Afghanistan	   itself	   is	  pressing	   for	   sovereign	  
respect	  on	  an	   international	  scale	  –	  and	   it’s	  not	   just	  Afghanistan.	  This	   is	  a	   time	  when	  Britain’s	   imperial	  
holdings	   are	   larger	   than	   ever,	   and	   at	   a	   time	  when	   Britain’s	   view	   of	   self	   in	   the	   wake	   of	  WWI	   is	   self-­‐
complimentary.	  Coming	  to	  terms	  with	  movements	  across	  its	  dominion	  (and	  in	  areas	  where	  it	  was	  used	  
to	  wielding	   considerable	   influence	  without	   claiming	   sovereignty	   itself)	   calling	   for	   sovereignty,	   respect,	  
equality…	  It	  is	  a	  jarring	  time.	  
Yet	  the	  underlying	  assumptions	  empowering	  Britain’s	  historical	  understanding	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  
character	   seem	   to	   maintain	   themselves	   through	   this	   change.	   This	   leads	   to	   a	   sort	   of	   formal/informal	  
divide	   of	   knowing	   Afghanistan.	   Eventually,	   Britain	   agrees	   that	   it	   will	   no	   longer	   impose	   its	   will	   on	  
Afghanistan	  in	  any	  way	  –	  recognizing	  its	  sovereignty.	  Yet	  Britain	  discursively	  tries	  to	  position	  itself	  as	  a	  
benefactor	  and	  teacher	  for	  Afghanistan	  in	  a	  sort	  of	  precursor	  to	  modern	  nation	  building.	  It	  justifies	  these	  
positions	   by	   explaining	   that	   places	   like	   Afghanistan	   can	   only	   pretend	   to	   be	   civilized,	   mimicking	   their	  
betters…	  but	  suggesting	  that	  perhaps	  through	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  nurturing	  Britain	  can	  eventually	  instil	  the	  
actual	  attributes	  of	  civilization	  in	  a	  place	  as	  inherently	  bereft	  of	  civility	  as	  Afghanistan.	  	  
This	  benefactor	  model	  of	  understanding	  can	  be	  seen	  through	  future	  interventions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  United	  States	  is	  saving	  Afghanistan-­‐the-­‐victim	  from	  the	  cruel	  oppression	  of	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	   and	   communism,	   giving	   Afghanistan	   the	   opportunity	   to	   follow	  America’s	   example	   and	   take	   on	  
democracy.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror,	  Afghanistan-­‐the-­‐failed-­‐state	  is	  conceived	  partly	  as	  
victim,	   partly	   as	   failure	   and	   partly	   as	   villain.	   Afghanistan	   as	   victim	   and	   as	   failure	   is	   again	   met	   by	   a	  
beneficent	  United	  States	  which	  seeks	  to	  physically	  save	  those	   innocent	  Afghan	  citizens	  from	  terrorism	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while	   teaching	   both	   its	   people	   and	   its	   government	   how	   to	   successfully	   exist	   as	   a	   state	   /	   liberal	  
democratic	  society.	  	  
Savage  Afghanistan  
Envisioning	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  land	  of	  savages	  is	  not	  new.	  There	  is	  some	  change,	  however.	  Afghan	  
elites	  have	  by	  this	  time	  become	  part	  of	  the	  narrative	  on	  Afghanistan.	  	  	  
References	   to	   the	   character	   of	   Afghanistan	   are	   less	   central	   to	   discourse	   during	   this	   time.	  
References	  are	  quite	  often	   in	  passing,	  as	   justification	  for	  given	  policies.	  When	  Afghanis	  are	  mentioned	  
specifically	  at	  all,	  those	  mentions	  tend	  to	  echo	  earlier	  typifications.	  The	  uncivilized	  attitudes	  of	  Afghans	  
have	  led	  to	  a	  serious	  situation	  where	  the	  land	  is	  in	  danger,	  both	  of	  dissolution	  and	  of	  intrusion	  by	  Russia:	  
“Reports	   regarding	   the	  general	   situation	   in	  Afghanistan…	  are	  not	  of	   a	   reassuring	   character.	  
…there	  is	  also	  a	  strong	  belief	  that	  things	  are	  gradually	  drifting	  into	  a	  serious	  position…	  The	  old	  
sore	  of	  Khost,	  originally	  caused	  by	  the	  grosses	  misgovernment,	   remains	  unhealed…	  It	   is	   the	  
old	   story	   of	   clemency	   being	   mistaken,	   among	   ignorant	   and	   semi-­‐barbarous	   Orientals,	   for	  
weakness.”	  (Times	  1914)	  
This	   is	   a	   fairly	   straightforward	   echo	   of	   the	   ‘prestige	   as	   strength’	   discursive	   thread	   identified	  
during	  the	  second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war.	  The	  article	  also	  speaks	  of	  “frightful	  misgovernment	  and	  injustice…	  
corruption…	  a	  hateful	  yolk.”	  Afghanistan	  “is	  very	  isolated,	  backward,	  ignorant…”	  (ibid)	  This	  plays	  into	  a	  
contention	   that	   they	   are	   uncivilized	   and	   not	   yet	   ripe	   for	   reforms	   and	   civilizing.	   (Times	   1919a)	  
Afghanistan	  itself	  is	  a	  “bigotedly	  backward	  country”	  (Times	  1923)	  that	  Britain	  had	  been	  forced,	  so	  it	  was	  
said,	  to	  treat	  with	  undeserved	  respect	  because	  of	  the	  fear	  that	  otherwise	  Russia	  would	  assert	  influence	  
and	  threaten	  India.	  What’s	  more:	  
“…the	   rule	   of	   Islam	   was	   never	   one	   to	   encourage	   the	   growth	   of	   civilisation.	   Bigotry	   and	   a	  
fanatical	  intolerance	  were	  its	  handmaids…	  the	  only	  Western	  piece	  of	  civilisation	  that	  appeals	  
to	  them	  –	  the	  art	  of	  war.”	  (Guardian	  1919)	  	  
This	  expands	  upon	  the	  idea	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  bigoted	  and	  backward.	  Despite	  almost	  a	  century	  of	  
interaction	  with	  Britain,	  Afghanistan	  has	  had	  opportunities	   to	   learn	   something	  of	  Western	  civilization.	  
The	  only	  thing	  that	  Afghanistan	  has	  cared	  to	  learn,	  however,	  was	  better	  ways	  to	  be	  violent.	  	  
Perhaps	  obviously,	   then,	   there	  were	  conflicting	  notions	   regarding	  Afghanistan’s	  ability	   to	  ever	  
become	   civilized.	   At	   issue	  was	   the	   question	   of	  whether	   “Orientals”	  who	   sought	   things	   like	   sovereign	  
nationhood,	  secularism,	  education	  and	  other	  trappings	  of	  civilization	  were	  actually	  learning	  to	  crave	  the	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civilized,	  or	  whether	  they	  were	  simply	  mimicking	  something	  they	  knew	  to	  be	  better	  than	  what	  they	  had	  
naturally.	  	  
In	  1918,	   the	  UK’s	   Intelligence	  Bureau	  wrote	  an	  exhaustive	   report	  analysing	   self-­‐determination	  
movements	  among	  the	  “Muslim	  world”,	  which	  Afghanistan	  was	  folded	  into.	  	  
“Long	   contact	  with	   these	   subjects	   had	  made	   them	   [colonizers]	   believe	   that	   Europeans	   and	  
Orientals	   were	   far	   apart	   in	   political	   capacity	   and	   were	   therefore	   not	   entitled	   to	   the	   same	  
political	  rights.	  When	  individuals	  or	  parties	  among	  the	  subject	  populations,	  inspired	  through	  
contact	   with…	   European	   ideas…	   demanded	   corresponding	   political	   reforms,	   their	   activities	  
were	   commonly	   regarded…	   as	   merely	   imitative…	   The	   ruling	   peoples	   admitted	   that	   their	  
subjects	  might	  develop	  in	  the	  end	  the	  real	  qualifications	  for	  self-­‐government,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
desire	   for	   it,	   but	   they	   regarded	   this	   development	   as	   almost	   infinitely	   remote,	   and	   as	   only	  
attainable	  through	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  existing	  regime.”	  (Intelligence	  Bureau	  1918)	  
Thus,	  we	  have	  a	  contention	  that	  Orientals	  are	  functionally,	  probably	  incapable	  of	  being	  civilized.	  
They	   only	   want	   to	   act	   civilized	   because	   they	   see	   their	   betters	   and	   want	   what	   they	   have.	   There	   is,	  
however,	  perhaps	  a	  very	  slight	  chance	  that	  one	  day	  in	  the	  future	  these	  Orientals	  will	  evolve	  a	  capacity	  
for	   real	   civilization	   –	   though	   this	   would	   only	   come	   through	   intensive	   continued	   patronage	   from	   the	  
civilized	  West.	  	  
These	  general	  themes	  are	  echoed	  among	  popular	  discourse	  as	  well,	  with	  some	  arguments	  that	  
Afghanistan	   specifically	   is	  barbaric	  and	  will	  never	   change…	  alongside	  arguments	   that	  Afghanistan	   is	   in	  
fact	  changing	  and	  showing	  at	  least	  the	  potential	  for	  something	  better.	  	  
Afghanistan	   was	   still	   widely	   seen	   as	   a	   savage	   place.	   A	   report	   entitled	   “The	   Closed	   Book	   of	  
Afghanistan”	   for	   the	   Guardian	   called	   Afghanistan	   a	   place	   “never…	   to	   encourage	   the	   growth	   of	  
civilisation.	   Bigotry	   and	   a	   fanatical	   intolerance”	   were	   its	   primary	   attributes.	   (Guardian	   1919)	   Despite	  
being	   barbaric	   and	   inferior,	   Afghans	   themselves	   are	   arrogant	   and	   insolent,	   demanding	   rights	   and	  
sovereignty	  which	  are	  not	  natural	  for	  them.	  (Lords	  1919a,	  Times	  1923,	  Lords	  1919b)	  
Nevertheless,	   there	   seemed	   to	   be	   some	   hope.	   Due	   in	   no	   small	   part	   to	   the	   enlightened	  
leadership	  of	  certain	  Afghan	  elites…	  who	  had	  managed	  to	  imbibe	  many	  of	  the	  mores	  and	  mannerisms	  of	  
civilized	  Britain,	  there	  was	  a	  chance	  that	  backward	  Afghanistan	  could	  be	  civilized.	  The	  assassination	  of	  
Habibullah	   in	   1919	   (which	   was	   a	   precursor	   to	   the	   3rd	   Anglo	   Afghan	   war)	   was	   a	   setback	   to	   this	   –	  
Habibullah’s	  many	  wonderful	  attributes	  were	  celebrated	  after	  his	  demise	  (which	  echoes	  the	  first	  Anglo	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Afghan	  war	  as	  well).	  However,	  the	  manner	  of	  celebration	  causes	  one	  to	  wonder	  how	  seriously	  this	  was	  
all	  taken:	  
“Habibullah…	  became	  enthusiastic	  about	  motor-­‐cars	  and	  race	  meetings…	  even	  developed	  a	  
weakness	   for	   tea	   parties…	   could	   sing	   a	   song	   or	   two…	   tried	   waltzing…	   and	   astonished	  
everybody	  by	  showing	  that	  he	  could	  play	  an	  uncommonly	  good	  game	  of	  bridge…	  There	  can	  
be	   no	   doubt	   that	   he	   was	   head	   and	   shoulders	   above	   any	   man	   in	   his	   State	   in	   intellectual	  
capacity	   and	   progressive	   tendencies;	   but	   he	   was	   wont	   to	   say	   that	   he	   feared	   to	   introduce	  
reforms	  into	  Afghanistan	  because	  his	  people	  were	  not	  ripe	  for	  them.”	  (Times	  1919a)	  
Also,	  somewhat	  less	  patronizingly:	  
“[Habibullah]	  pursued	  his	  father’s	  [Britain	  friendly]	  policy	  with	  a	  loyalty,	  consistency,	  and	  skill	  
which	  did	  him	  infinite	  credit.	  He	  was	  a	  man…	  of	  a	  genial	  and	  affable	  temperament.	  He	  had	  a	  
great	  taste	  for	  European	  civilisation,	  and	  was	  thoroughly	  imbued	  with	  the	  need	  of	  introducing	  
all	  the	  instruments	  of	  modern	  progress	  into	  his	  rather	  backward	  country.”	  (Lords	  1919a)	  
In	  a	  more	  general	   sense,	   there	  was	  some	  talk	  of	  Afghanistan	  becoming	  more	  open	   to	  outside	  
civilizing	  effects.	  There	  were	  remarks	  on	  Afghanistan’s	  “progressive	  spirit”	  (Times	  1922)	  and,	  four	  years	  
after	  the	  bemoaned	  death	  of	  Halibullah,	  a	  celebration	  of	  the	  progressiveness	  of	  his	  successor.	  
“And	  he	  and	  his	  principle	  [sic]	  advisers	  are	  bitten	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  introduce	  the	  instruments	  
of	  Western	  progress	   into	  Afghanistan…	   it	   is	   a	  notable	  day	  when	  an	  Amir	   is	  bold	  enough	   to	  
break	  with	  the	  traditional	  Afghan	  policy	  of	  seclusion,	  whatever	  obstacles	  the	  experiment	  may	  
find	  –	  and	  there	  will	  be	  no	  lack	  of	  them	  –	  in	  a	  primitive	  and	  undisciplined	  people.”	  (Guardian	  
1923)	  
The	   future	   of	   civilization	   in	  Afghanistan	  was	   seen	   as	   being	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   a	   few	  enlightened	  
Afghan	  rulers	  and	  the	  patronage	  of	   their	  Western	   idols.	  How	  seriously	  the	  prospect	  of	  civilization	  was	  
taken	  is	  somewhat	  unclear,	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  running	  theme	  so	  far.	  Any	  hope	  of	  civilization	  relied	  on	  
forcing	  the	  backward	  common	  Afghan	  into	  civility	  against	  their	  will,	  and	  it	  was	  surely	  seen	  as	  a	  long	  and	  
arduous	   process.	   These	   typifications	   tended	   to	   implicitly	   justify	   Britain’s	   involvement	   in	   Afghanistan	  
previously	  as	   somehow	  good	   for	  Afghanistan	  –	  because	  now	  there	   is	  a	  chance	   it	   can	   join	   the	  civilized	  
society	  of	  nations.	   It	   suggests	  a	  Britain	  which	   is	   somehow	  a	  kind	  benefactor	   to	   the	  benighted	  Afghan,	  
even	  as	  it	  pursues	  its	  own	  enlightened	  self-­‐interest	  in	  maintaining	  India’s	  security.	  	  	  
This	  interplay	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  Afghanistan	  to	  become	  ‘more	  civilized’	  is	  central	  to	  consideration	  
of	   the	   formal/informal	   divide	  which	  will	   be	   discussed	   at	   the	   end	   of	   this	   chapter.	   Formally	   there	   is	   a	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resolution	  that	  Afghanistan	  has	  both	  the	  capacity	  and	  the	  right	  to	  develop	  its	  sovereignty	  and	  join	  the	  
civilized	  society	  of	   states.	   Informally	   there	   is	  a	   feeling	   that	  Afghanistan	  only	  pretends	   to	  civility	  and	   is	  
fundamentally	   different	   from	   the	   ‘real’	   states	   of	   the	   world.	   Afghanistan	   requires	   tutelage	   even	   to	  
approach	   civility,	   and	   there	   is	   very	   real	   question	   as	   to	  whether	   such	   patronage	   can	   even	   civilize	   the	  
savage	  Afghan	  or	  whether	  barbarism	  is	  simply	  within	  that	  country	  –	  those	  peoples’	  –	  nature.	  	  
Afghanistan’s  Determined  Negativity  (and  determined  indeterminism)  
By	   this	   point	   negative	   readings	   of	   Afghan-­‐ness	   have	   become	   more	   or	   less	   embedded	   in	   the	  
narrative.	   It	   has	   the	  effect	   of	   empowering	   a	   certain	  paternal	   frame	  of	   understanding.	   This	   is	   also	   the	  
most	  classically	  colonial	  form	  of	  interaction	  with	  Afghan	  identity	  that	  we	  see.	  Taking	  the	  backward	  and	  
barbaric	  nature	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  given,	  praise	  is	  heaped	  on	  the	  few	  elites	  within	  Afghan	  society	  who	  
at	   least	   try	  to	   imbibe	  Western	  civility.	  This	  acts	   to	   justify	  accepted	  modes	  of	  Western	   interaction	  with	  
Afghanistan	  and	  is	  an	  argument	  for	  a	  continuation	  of	  that	  particular	  state	  of	  affairs.	  	  
It	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  argue	  that	  in	  some	  way	  this	  is	  wholly	  unique	  and	  different	  from	  straight	  
forward	  discursive	  positioning	  of	   colonial	   activities	  on	   the	  part	  of	  Britain.	   Indeed,	   there	   is	  no	  need	   to	  
make	   that	   argument.	   The	   negative	   typfications	   of	   Afghan	   identity	   in	   the	   past	   were	   not	   so	   terribly	  
different	   from	   negative	   typifications	   of	   other	   ‘Orientals’.	   The	   sort	   of	   identity	   construction	   those	  
typifications	  empowered	  is	  what	  differed.	  	  	  
Postcolonial	   theory	   is	   often	   times	   interested	   in	  what	   sort	   of	   harmful	   interactions	   paternalism	  
makes	  possible	  as	  well.	  An	  aspect	  of	  paternalism	  which	  postcolonial	  theory	  is	  particularly	  interested	  in	  is	  
its	  hidden	  nature.	  Strands	  of	  paternalist	  thought	  can	  be	  found	  both	  in	  development	  aid	  discourse	  and	  in	  
narratives	   on	   multiculturalism.	   (Kayatekin	   2009)	   Kayatekin	   is	   interested	   in	   bringing	   a	   postcolonial	  
perspective	  to	  bear	  very	  specifically	  on	  economic	  analysis:	  
Colonial	   and	   imperialist	   hegemonies	   have	   relied	   crucially	   on	   the	   constructions	   of	   the	  
‘conquered’	  cultures	  and	  of	  the	  subject	  populations	  as	  different	  from	  and	  in	  opposition	  to	  an	  
assumed	  norm	  of	  modernity,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  achieved,	  but	  nonetheless	  represents	  
a	   more	   advanced	   stage	   of	   development…	   A	   postcolonial	   critique	   of	   economics,	   therefore,	  
entails	  the	  recognition	  and	  contextualisation	  of	  the	  modernism	  of	   its	   fundamental	  concepts	  
such	  as	  ‘rationality,’	  ‘economic	  agency’,	  ‘economy’	  and,	  of	  course,	  ‘economics’.	  (ibid:	  1114)	  
Kayatekin	   is	   pointing	   to	   a	   small	   movement	   within	   the	   postcolonial	   umbrella	   to	   uncover	   how	  
these	  very	  west-­‐centric	  concepts	  are	  used	  in	  particular	  ways	  to	  describe	  marginal	  spaces	  as	   lacking.	   In	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turn,	   these	   typifications	   justify	  paternal	   interactions	  between	   the	  developed,	   civilized,	  advanced	  West	  
and	  the	  benighted	  other.	  	  
The	  idea	  that	  outside	  concepts	  are	  introduced,	  one	  might	  even	  say	  forced	  upon,	  a	  marginalized	  
political	   space	   in	  order	   to	  make	   it	   slot	   into	  a	  system	  regardless	  of	   fit	   is	  one	   that	   this	  project	   fits	  with.	  
Touchstones	  of	  success,	  of	  civilization	  –	  which	  the	  marginal	  space	  lacks	  –	  are	  justifications	  for	  continued	  
intervention	  of	  various	  types.	  In	  current	  times	  this	  comes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  development	  aid,	  state	  building	  
and	  the	  like	  –	  and	  which	  postcolonial	  theory	  argues	  are	  hugely	  problematic.	  	  
One	  can	  look	  at	  these	  postcolonial	  arguments	  and	  find	  striking	  similarities	  reaching	  back	  to	  the	  
events	  of	  the	  third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  war.	  British	  intervention	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  justified	  on	  any	  number	  of	  
levels	  during	  the	  first	  and	  second	  wars	  and	  continued	  to	  be	  in	  the	  third.	  Other	  justifications	  will	  be	  dealt	  
with	  momentarily	   in	  the	  next	  sections,	  but	  this	  paternal	  turn	  can	  be	  traced	  further	  back	  to	  the	  second	  
Anglo	  Afghan	  war.	  There	  were	  numerous	  arguments	  detailed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  regarding	  Afghan	  
mismanagement	   of	   Afghanistan,	   throwing	   away	   such	   potential	   that	   the	   British	   could	   certainly	   have	  
realized	  with	  their	  enlightened	  government.	  Although	  this	  never	  came	  to	  pass	  (because	  Afghanistan	  was	  
not	  seen	  as	  having	  enough	   intrinsic	  value	  to	  consume),	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  war	  we	  
now	  see	  that	  -­‐	  thanks	  to	  intensive	  interaction	  between	  Afghan	  elites	  and	  British	  culture	  –	  a	  certain	  move	  
toward	  civility	  can	  be	  seen	  among	  certain	  Afghan	  elites.	  This,	  in	  itself,	  is	  a	  very	  particular	  and	  early	  type	  
of	  “development	  aid”,	  a	  gift	  of	  high	  culture	  to	  the	  benighted	  Afghan.	  	  
This	  also	  allows	  us	   to	   trace	  a	  discursive	  shift	   that	  accompanies	   the	  global	   shift	   in	  context	   to	  a	  
liberal	   system	  of	   sovereign	   states	   that	  all	   could	   join.	  Paternalism	  after	   the	  First	  World	  War	  expressed	  
itself	  in	  a	  fairly	  “hands	  on”	  manner	  with	  many	  colonies	  and	  former	  colonies	  –	  and	  even	  this	  to	  different	  
extents	   with	   powerful	   ramifications	   as	   to	   how	   well	   different	   former	   colonies	   adapted	   to	   the	   state	  
system.	   (Maroya	   2003)	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Afghanistan,	   this	   paternalism	  was	   unfolded	   in	   a	   very	   hands	   off	  
manner.	  No	  direct	  interaction	  between	  Britain	  and	  Afghanistan	  was	  desirable	  –	  Afghanistan	  was	  left	  to	  
fend	   for	   itself	   in	   modernizing…	   but	   it	   was	   well	   and	   proper	   to	   praise	   how	   well	   certain	   Afghan	   elites	  
mimicked	   high	   culture.	   As	   we	   will	   find	   in	   the	   following	   chapter,	   this	   hands	   off	   approach	   became	  
widespread	  with	  attempts	  by	  Afghanistan	  to	  build	  relations	  among	  the	  community	  of	  states	  repeatedly	  
rebuffed	   by	   the	   civilized	  West.	   Paternalism,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Afghanistan,	  was	   passive	   –	   it	  worked	  well	  




Afghanistan	   itself	   was	   not	   seen	   to	   be	   worth	   the	   sort	   of	   hands	   on	   paternal	   interactions	   seen	  
between	  Britain	  and	  its	  dependencies	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War	  It	  was	  granted,	  on	  a	  pro	  forma	  
basis,	  recognition	  of	  some	  sort.	  That	  very	  recognition	  played	  into	  a	  formal/informal	  discursive	  divide	  (to	  
be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter)	  wherein	  Afghanistan	  was	  formally	  given	  certain	  recognition,	  respect,	  
rights	  –	  but	  informally	  it	  was	  ignored	  and	  ostracized	  from	  the	  very	  society	  of	  statehood	  it	  was	  ostensibly	  
deemed	  worthy	  of	  joining.	  
The  Great  Game,  v3  
Russia	  was	  an	  ever-­‐present	  bogey	  man	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  British	   India,	   from	  the	  early	  19th	  century	  
through	  the	  end	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  Afghanistan	  was	  discursively	  situated	  accordingly	  as	  a	  strategic	  
space	   to	  be	  utilized	   in	  geopolitical	  gamesmanship.	   	  The	  specific	  way	   in	  which	   this	  has	  been	  expressed	  
has	  changed.	  The	  level	  or	  type	  of	  Russian	  threat	  has	  changed	  over	  time,	  and	  with	  the	  third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  
war	  the	  pattern	  remains.	  	  
With	   the	  3rd	  war,	  Russia	   still	   plays	  a	   role	  of	   aggressor	   to	   the	  British	  mind.	   This	  has	   somewhat	  
receded	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  shifted	  with	  the	  Russian	  turn	  to	  Bolshevism.	  Further,	  during	  WWI	  much	  of	  
this	   fear	   was	   replaced	   by	   a	   fear	   of	   German	   intrigue.	   Before	   the	   Russian	   shift,	   and	   then	   after	   the	   3rd	  
Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  Russia	   is	   conjured	  up	   time	  and	  again	  as	  being	   responsible	   for	  British	  problems	  and	  
warranting	  intervention	  in	  Afghanistan.	  (Whereas	  justifications	  for	  problems	  and	  interventions	  generally	  
lie	  in	  the	  character	  of	  the	  Afghani	  people	  and	  space.)	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  Amir	  Abdurrahman	  Khan	  had	  just	  died.	  Shortly	  after	  this,	  Russia	  
began	  ‘experimenting’	  with	  troop	  movements	  along	  rail	  lines	  in	  the	  central	  Caucasus.	  Although	  nothing	  
came	   of	   this,	   over	   the	   next	   several	   months	   there	   was	   hand	   wringing	   in	   the	   public	   discourse.	   For	  
instance,	   the	  Times	   decried	  what	   it	   called	   “veiled	   threats	   of	   a	   Russian	   occupation	   of	   Kashgar”	   (Times	  
1900a)	   Further,	   by	   June	   there	   was	   a	   far-­‐reaching	   debate	   on	   what	   to	   do	   about	   Russia’s	   apparent	  
encroachment	  and	  there	  were	  calls	  for	  “a	  policy	  to	  meet	  the	  exigencies	  of	  the	  situation”.	  (Times	  1900b)	  
Namely,	  the	  situation	  was	  that	  now,	  more	  than	  ever,	  alarmist	  views	  must	  prevail	  in	  regards	  to	  Russia	  in	  
Afghanistan.	  “The…	  progress	  of	  Russia	  towards	  India…	  had	  been	  frequently	  discussed	  and	  alarmist	  views	  
had	   been	   often	   pooh-­‐poohed.	   The	   time,	   however,	   had	   passed	   for	   so	   treating	   it…”	   (ibid)	   This	   was	  
because	   there	   was	   a	   sense	   that	   the	   geo-­‐political	   situation	   had	   shifted	   somewhat	   away	   from	   the	  
accepted	  notion	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  buffer	  state…	  “The	  old	  theory	  of	  buffer	  states	  had	  gone	  long	  ago,	  
and	   that	  was	   entirely	   understood	   in	   Russia,	   but	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   be…	   in	   this	   country”.	   (ibid)	   So	   now,	  
rather	   than	   Afghanistan	   being	   seen	   as	   an	   acceptable	   neutral	   space	   for	   neither	   Russia	   nor	   Britain	   to	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directly	  rule,	  it	  had	  become	  the	  site	  of	  a	  zero	  sum	  binary	  game	  in	  which	  there	  could	  only	  be	  an	  “increase	  
of	  Russian	  prestige…	  and	  the	  decline	  of	  British	  influence”	  (ibid)	  or	  the	  opposite.	  This	  amounted	  to	  a	  call,	  
hearkening	  in	  a	  way	  back	  to	  some	  of	  the	  discourse	  from	  the	  second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  for	  direct	  British	  
control	   over	   some	   areas	   of	   Afghanistan;	   “…we	  were	   bound	   to	   go	   forward	  with	   British	   capital,	   British	  
railways,	  and	  British	  enterprise,	  and	  distinctly	  with	  the	  support	  of	  British	  force,	  for	  where	  we	  do	  not	  go	  
Russia	  will	   go.”	   (ibid)	   [emphasis	  mine]	   In	   1914	  when	   there	  were	   concerns	   that	   the	   Amir’s	   control	   in	  
Afghanistan	  was	  slipping	  and	  the	  state	  was	  being	  cast	  in	  terms	  highly	  reminiscent	  of	  how	  we	  talk	  about	  
failed	   states	   today,	   this	   conversation	  was	   happening	   in	   context	   of	   fears	   of	   Russian	   advantage	   taking:	  
“…local	  subordinate	  Russian	  officials	  have	  not	  been	  slow	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  [unrest	  and	  weakness	  in	  
Afghanistan].”	  (Times	  1914)	  
A	  period	  of	  relative	  silence	  regarding	  Russia	  followed,	  with	  the	  Bolshevik	  revolution	  and	  the	  First	  
World	   War.	   However,	   the	   uncertainty	   following	   the	   3rd	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war	   (aided	   by	   a	   certain	  
uncommunicativeness	  by	  the	  government)	  saw	  a	  resurgence	  of	  concern	  over	  Russia.	  	  
“They	   mystery	   about	   the	   situation	   on	   the	   Indian	   frontier	   continues	   to	   deepen,	   and	   the	  
Government	  throw	  no	  light	  upon	  it…	  there	  can	  be	  no	  doubt	  that	  Bolshevist	  intrigue	  had	  much	  
to	  do	  with	  the	  recent	  invasion	  of	  India”.	  (Times	  1919b)	  	  
This	  uncertainty	  went	  alongside	  worry	  over	  the	  move	  by	  the	  British	  government	  to	  potentially	  
give	  over	  Afghani	  foreign	  relations	  control	  to	  the	  government	  of	  Afghanistan.	  This	  is	  bolstered	  by	  fears	  
regarding	  Bolshevik	  rhetoric,	  wherein	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  tactical	  space	  in	  that	  it	  can	  act	  
as	  an	  ideological	  gateway,	  a	  way	  in	  to	  India	  for	  Bolshevik	  rhetoric.	  (Times	  1919c)	  This	  is	  suggestive	  of	  the	  
changing	  face	  of	  the	  Russian	  threat.	  Now	  the	  threat	  is	  ideological	  –	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  buffer	  state	  not	  only	  
in	   a	   military	   sense	   but	   also	   as	   a	   way	   to	   keep	   Bolshevism	   (and	   its	   disdain	   for	   empire)	   out	   of	   India.	  
Evidence	   that	   Afghanistan’s	   aggression	   was	   part	   of	   a	   push	   for	   recognition	   of	   Afghan	   sovereignty	   is	  
completely	  overlooked	  in	  favour	  of	  Russian	  alarmism.	  
“Earl	  Curzon	   says	   that	  our	  original	   control	  of	  Afghan	  external	   affairs	  was	  meant	   to	   counter	  
the	  old	  Russian	  menace,	  which	  has	  disappeared.	  That	  is	  true,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  a	  far	  
more	  formidable	  menace,	  for	  there	  can	  be	  no	  doubt	  that	  Bolshevist	  intrigue	  had	  much	  to	  do	  
with	  the	  recent	  invasion	  of	  India.”	  (ibid)	  
Further,	  there	  was	  something	  of	  a	  debate	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  Bolshevik	  Russia’s	  threat.	  “Neither	  
diplomatic	   overtures,	   nor	   even	   heavy	   payments,	   will	   suffice	   to	   keep	   the	   Afghan	   quiet	   for	   long	   if	  
Bolshevism…	  finally	  dominates	  Russia.”	   (Holdich	  1919)	  This	   represents	  a	   fear	  of	  Bolshevik	  propaganda	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that	  seems	  fairly	  settled	   in	  the	  discourse.	   (Times	  1919c)	  Yet	  what	  Britain	  ought	  to	  do	  to	  guard	  against	  
the	  threat	   implied	   is	  disputed.	   In	  the	  view	  of	  Holdich	  guarding	  militarily,	  “look	  to	   it	  that	  our	  armour	   is	  
bright	  and	  our	  defenses	  secure,	  for	  so	  long	  as	  we	  have…	  a	  well-­‐organized	  and	  well-­‐officered	  Indian	  Army	  
no	  [aggression]	  will	  ever	  make	  much	   impression	  on	   India”	   (Holdich	  1919)	   is	  enough.	  Only	  the	  Afghans	  
are	  likely	  to	  fall	  prey	  to	  Bolshevik	  propaganda	  in	  this	  view	  (which	  says	  some	  interesting	  things	  about	  the	  
naivety	   of	   Afghans	   in	   this	   view,	   perhaps).	   In	   contrasting	   view,	   “if	   the	   insidious	   poison	   of	   Bolshevist	  
propaganda	   once	   permeates	   the	   ranks	   of	   the	   Army,	   neither	   shining	   armour	   nor	   secure	   defences	  will	  
prove	  of	  much	  avail”.	  (Times	  1919c)	  Indeed,	  the	  Bolshevik	  propaganda	  inclusion	  of	  self-­‐determination	  as	  
a	   right	   makes	   it	   all	   the	   more	   dangerous,	   with	   Afghanistan	   acting	   as	   a	   potential	   portal	   of	   such	  
propaganda	   into	   India.	   Thus,	   strong	   disagreement	   existed	   as	   to	   the	   exact	   nature	   of	   Afghanistan’s	  
importance	  in	  a	  security	  sense.	  Was	  there	  a	  threat	  to	  physical	  security,	  or	  a	  threat	  to	  discursive	  security?	  
The	  second	  fear	   is	   interesting	   in	  that	   it	  engenders	  a	  certain	  awareness	  of	  the	  fragility	  of	  the	  dominant	  
British	  discourse	  regarding	  India	  and	  Afghanistan	  of	  the	  time.	  
“There	   is…	  not	   the	   slightest	  doubt	   that	   should	   the	  Bolshevists	   succeed	   [with	   a	  propaganda	  
campaign	   in	   Central	   Asia]…	   as	   a	   jumping-­‐off	   ground	   for	   the	   propagation	   of	   their	   ideas	   in	  
adjacent	  lands,	  much	  as	  one	  may	  sympathize	  with	  oriental	  aspirations	  for	  self-­‐determination,	  
such	  a	  situation	  is	  fraught	  with	  immense	  danger.”	  (Times	  1919c)	  
Whatever	  the	  outcome	  of	  Bolshevik	  propaganda	  though	  (whether	  it	  be	  a	  physical	  or	  discursive	  
security	   threat,	   that	   is)	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   there	   was	   widespread	   trepidation	   about	   its	   effects.	  
Indeed,	   both	   the	   propagation	   of	   the	   3rd	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	   (Times	   1922)	   and	   the	   outcome	   (Guardian	  
1921)	  were	  argued	  to	  be	  directly	  caused	  by	  Bolshevik	  propaganda.	   In	   the	   first	  case,	  Afghans	  were	  the	  
dupes.	  “Bolshevism	  spread	  from	  Central	  Asia	  into	  the	  fastnesses	  of	  Afghanistan,	  and	  in	  1919	  the	  Afghans	  
made	   futile	   war	   upon	   India”.	   (Times	   1922)	   In	   this	   case,	   Afghanistan	   is	   now	   a	   space	   for	   ideological	  
competition	  –	  one	  might	  say	  the	  soul	  of	  southern	  Asia	  was	  at	  stake:	  	  
“The	   Afghans	   are…	   watchful	   still,	   and	   on	   their	   guard	   to	   maintain	   their	   independence…	  
Nevertheless	   the	   country	   is	   opening	   out	   now	   to	   many	   and	   various	   influences	   [including]	  
Moscow.	   [Afghanistan’s	   progressive	   spirit]	   deserve[s]	   close	   attention	   and	   sympathy…	   	   It	   is	  




In	  the	  second	  case,	  the	  British	  government	  was	  duped	  (and	  Afghanistan	  gained).	  Specifically,	  the	  
Bolsheviks	  were	  the	  first	  to	  call	  for	  some	  sort	  of	  self-­‐determination	  for	  Oriental	  peoples,	  and	  the	  British	  
have	  imbibed	  that	  propaganda,	  wilfully	  or	  not.	  	  
“The	  Bolsheviks…	  were	  for	  giving	  them	  [Oriental	  peoples]	  back	  full	  liberty	  and	  assisting	  them,	  
so	  far	  as	  possible,	  to	  stand	  erect	  and	  independent.	  The	  non-­‐Bolshevik	  Foreign	  Offices	  would	  
not	  admit	  it…	  [but]	  in	  the	  Afghan	  Treaty	  we	  are	  already	  doing	  it.”	  (Guardian	  1921)	  	  
Geo-­‐strategic  Conflict  and  Ideology  
This	   turn	   to	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   place	   to	   provide	   a	   geo-­‐strategic	   battle	   space	   in	   an	   ideological	  
struggle	   is	   a	   significant	   shift	   from	   its	   place	   as	   a	   physical	   buffer	   state	   previously.	   The	   physical	   aspect	  
lingers,	  but	   this	   shift	  will	   have	  profound	   implications,	  echoing	   in	  narratives	  on	  Afghanistan	  during	   the	  
Cold	  War	  and	  after	  the	  events	  of	  September	  11.	  Ideology	  as	  a	  driver	  for	  conflict	  has	  been	  well	  covered	  
by	  critical	  and	  liberal	  scholars	  alike.	  Most	  literature	  from	  the	  post-­‐September	  11	  period	  does	  not	  reach	  
back	   further	   than	   the	  Cold	  War	   to	   talk	  about	   ideology.	   In	  a	  general	  way,	   this	   seems	   to	  make	   sense	  –	  
much	  of	  the	  state	  system	  as	  we	  know	  it	  has	  been	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  decolonization	  and	  the	  Cold	  War.	  
History	  did	  not	  begin	  with	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	   II	  and	   limiting	  our	  consideration	  of	   ideology’s	  role	   in	  
conflict	  to	  such	  a	  constrained	  time	  frame	  may	  tend	  to	  assign	  a	  certain	  unhelpful	  causality	  to	  Cold	  War	  
era	  political	  systems.	  
This	  problem	  was	  grappled	  with	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  Bilgin	  and	  Morton	  (2002).	  They	  warn	  against	  
applying	  Cold	  War	  logics	  in	  a	  sort	  of	  “plug	  and	  play”	  manner	  into	  analysis	  of	  contemporary	  analyses	  of	  
rogue	  and	  failed	  states.	  Their	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  most	  scholarship	  on	  rogue	  and	  failed	  states	  relies	  on	  
historical	  understandings	  of	  international	  relations	  only	  reaching	  back	  into	  the	  Cold	  War	  era,	  which	  not	  
only	  naturalizes	  those	  Cold	  War	  era	  logics	  but	  also	  makes	  invisible	  other	  possible	  understandings	  with	  a	  
more	  situationally	  specific	  historical	  basis.	  This	  article	  is	  dealt	  with	  in	  some	  depth	  near	  the	  end	  of	  Ch.	  6	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   Afghanistan,	   ideology	   became	   an	   important	   driver	   of	   intervention	   by	   the	   third	  
Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war.	  To	  an	  extent,	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  ideology	  was	  already	  at	  play	  from	  the	  very	  first.	  
Nineteenth	  century	  Britain	  was	  awash	  in	  narratives	  of	  heroic	  Brittania	  –	  the	  only	  power	  able	  to	  stand	  up	  
to	   the	   threat	   of	   nefarious	   Russia.	   One	  might	   consider	  Macdermott’s	  War	   Song	   (1878),	   the	   chorus	   of	  
which	  follows:	  
We	  don't	  want	  to	  fight	  but	  by	  jingo	  if	  we	  do...	  
We've	  got	  the	  ships,	  we've	  got	  the	  men,	  and	  got	  the	  money	  too!	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We've	  fought	  the	  Bear	  before...	  and	  while	  we're	  Britons	  true,	  
The	  Russians	  shall	  not	  have	  Constantinople...	  
Accordingly,	  “jingoism”	  has	  come	  to	  mean	  extreme,	  warlike	  nationalism	  with	  strong	  overtures	  of	  
racism.	   The	   Great	   Game	   was	   to	   some	   extent	   a	   war	   of	   empires,	   but	   to	   another	   extent	   it	   could	   be	  
conceived	  of	  as	  a	  type	  of	  culture	  war.	   It	   is	  hard	  to	  authoritatively	  make	  that	  argument,	  but	  it	  could	  be	  
said	   that	   ideology	   (rather	   than	   simply	   imperial	  manoeuvrings	  by	   two	  great	  powers)	  had	  an	   important	  
role	  to	  play	  in	  justifying	  conflict	  in	  Afghanistan.	  Be	  that	  as	  it	  may,	  by	  the	  third	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  ideology	  
–	  and	  the	  fight	  against	  Bolshevism	  –	  was	  central.	  	  
Keeping	  in	  mind	  Afghanistan’s	  very	  particular	  history	  with	  ideology	  in	  interventions,	  then,	  it	  can	  
still	   be	   useful	   to	   consider	   what	   scholars	   have	   said	   about	   the	   role	   of	   ideology	   in	  more	   contemporary	  
conflicts.	  	  
Prominent	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  securitization	  professor	  Barry	  Buzan	  wrote	  on	  ideology	  
in	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terrorism	  –	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  fundamental	  concepts	  therein.	  	  
“The	  rhetorical	  move	  to	   the	  concept	  of	  a	   ‘long	  war’	  makes	  explicit	  what	  was	   implicit	   in	   the	  
GWoT	   [global	   war	   on	   terrorism]	   from	   its	   inception:	   that	   it	   might	   offer	   Washington	   a	  
dominant,	  unifying	  idea	  that	  would	  enable	  it	  to	  reassert	  and	  legitimize	  its	  leadership	  of	  global	  
security…	  When	   the	   Cold	  War	   ended,	  Washington	   seemed	   to	   experience	   a	   threat	   deficit…	  
The	  terrorist	  attacks	  of	  9/11	  offered	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  problem.	  (Buzan	  2006:	  1101)	  
For	  Buzan,	  ideology	  can	  create	  powerful	  justifications	  for	  military	  activism.	  Buzan	  was	  primarily	  
concerned	  with	  the	  security	  state	  and	  using	  fear	  to	  justify	  what	  he	  considered	  to	  be	  certain	  government	  
overreaches.	   Yet	   the	   idea	   that	   ideology	   is	   a	   powerful	   way	   to	   construct	   identities	   is	   important	   to	  
consider.	   He	   talks	   about	   the	   subjective	   nature	   of	   this	   narrative,	   explicitly	   separating	   it	   out	   from	  
traditionally	  materialist	   threat	   analysis.	   He	   says	   that	   despite	   a	   popular	   belief	   that	   the	   events	   of	   9/11	  
changed	   everything	   –	   “the	   only	   thing	   that	   changed	   is	   the	   belief	   that	   something	   had	   changed”.	   (ibid	  
1102)	  	  
The	  Taliban	  hadn’t	  suddenly	  appeared,	  nor	  had	   it	  suddenly	  become	  more	  (or	   less)	  of	  a	  threat.	  
The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  al	  Qaeda.	  Indeed,	  the	  US	  government	  had	  been	  trying	  to	  find	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  since	  
at	  least	  the	  US	  embassy	  bombings	  of	  Tanzania	  and	  Kenya	  in	  1998.	  Buzan	  argued	  that	  ideological	  conflict	  
creates	  a	  certain	  stability	   in	   international	  systems,	   justifying	  the	  pooling	  of	  uneven	  power	   in	  particular	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entities	  (in	  this	  case,	  the	  United	  States).	  Broad	  ideological	  narratives	  marginalize	  and	  make	  unimportant	  
specific	  details,	  justifying	  broad	  policy	  strokes	  without	  regard	  to	  the	  particular.	  	  
During	   the	   third	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	   this	  mean	   that	  Afghanistan	  must	  be	  controlled,	   intervened	  
upon,	  in	  order	  to	  deny	  it	  as	  a	  tactical	  space	  to	  Russia’s	  Bolshevism.	  Bolshevism	  was	  a	  political	  disease,	  
which	   could	   spread	   unrest	   throughout	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   British	   Empire	   and	   lead	   to	   a	   breakdown	   in	  
civilization.	  Here,	  Afghanistan	  was	  not	  an	  actor	  or	  a	  victim.	  It	  was	  solely	  a	  tactical	  space	  –	  concern	  was	  
not	  over	  Afghanistan’s	  well-­‐being	  but	  over	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  more	  important	  places…	  the	  British	  empire.	  
This	  underscores	   the	   lack	  of	  a	   specific	  political	   character	   for	  Afghanistan	  and	   its	  vulnerability	   to	  being	  
discursively	   positioned	   in	   ways	   that	   make	   tactically	   advantageous	   interventions	   wholly	   justifiable	   –	  
ideology	  played	  a	  big	  part	   in	  that	  during	  the	  third	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  and	  that	  role	  will	  not	  decrease	   in	  
future	  interventions.	  
To	   the	   concerns	   of	   this	   chapter,	   however,	   we	   see	   an	   evolution	   of	   the	   old	   civilized/barbaric	  
binary	   that	   was	   so	   ubiquitous	   previously	   to	   a	   binary	   based	   on	   ideological	   geostrategic	   conflict.	  
Previously	   the	   civilized/barbaric	   dynamic	  made	  possible	   interventions	   on	  Afghanistan	   for	   geostrategic	  
reasons	   –	   the	  Great	  Game.	   The	  Great	  Game	  persists,	   but	   its	   expression	   has	   shifted	   from	  a	  matter	   of	  
physical	   security	   for	   India	   to	  a	  matter	  of	  moral/ideological	   security	   for	   the	  British	  Empire.	  Admittedly,	  
the	  broader	  Great	  Game	  was	  always	  a	  question	  of	  who	  should	  rightfully	  hold	  greater	  sway	  in	  Europe	  –	  
Britain	  or	  Russia.	  	  
Now	  the	  question	  had	  become	  whether	  Bolshevism	  or	  British	  notions	  of	  civilization	  ought	  to	  be	  
ascendant.	   Interestingly,	   and	   not	   unrelated	   to	   Dutta’s	   contention	   that	   the	   very	   exposure	   to	   these	  
ideological	   binaries	   infects	   everybody	   involved,	   Britain	   was	   forced	   in	   the	   course	   of	   waging	   this	  
ideological	  conflict	   to	  “grant”	  Afghanistan	  some	  of	   the	  rights	  and	  considerations	  that	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  
part	  and	  parcel	  of	  Bolshevism	  at	  the	  time	  –	  sovereign	  nationhood	  and	  freedom	  from	  colonial	  practice.	  
Despite	  having	  been	  defeated	  roundly	  by	  British	  forces	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  war,	  over	  
the	  course	  of	  making	  a	  peace	   treaty	  Afghanistan	  was,	   in	   fact,	  granted	   full	   recognition	  of	   its	   sovereign	  
status	  and	  freedom	  from	  uninvited	  British	   interventionism	  in	  the	  future.	  These	  were	  formally	  granted,	  
but	  on	  a	  deeper	  level	  there	  was	  never	  any	  real	  belief	  that	  Afghanistan	  could	  ‘handle’	  sovereignty	  on	  its	  




Britain  the  Beneficent  
One	   facet	   of	   discourse	   related	   to	   Afghanistan	   during	   the	   second	   Anglo	   Afghan	   war	   involved	  
paternal	   caretaking	   as	   justification	   for	   imperial	   expansion.	   This	   didn’t	   seem	   to	   gain	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  
traction	   in	   regards	   to	  Afghanistan	  –	  Britain	   remained	  at	   a	   remove	   in	   its	   interactions	  with	  Afghanistan	  
compared	   to	   its	   varied	   colonial	   holdings.	   However,	   the	   notion	   of	   Britain	   as	   beneficent,	   as	   a	   sort	   of	  
civilized	  mentor	  to	  unruly	  Afghanistan	  continued	  to	  evolve.	  	  	  
By	   way	   of	   noblesse	   oblige,	   British	   discourse	   suggested	   that	   the	   liberties	   it	   took	   with	   Afghan	  
governance	  (such	  as	  insisting	  on	  total	  control	  over	  Afghanistan’s	  foreign	  relations)	  were	  simultaneously	  
very	  good	  for	  Afghanistan.	  By	  way	  of	  this	  interaction,	  primarily	  with	  Afghan	  nobles,	  some	  civilization	  and	  
enlightenment	  was	  bestowed	  upon	  the	  poor	  benighted	  Afghan.	   In	   response	   to	   the	  notion	   that	  Britain	  
might	  give	  up	  its	  control	  over	  Afghan	  foreign	  policy:	  
“it	   [control	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   foreign	   relations]	   should	   never	   have	   been	   surrendered…	   the	  
abandonment	  of	  our	  rights	  gave	  the	  Afghans	  an	  entirely	  false	  idea	  [of	  their	  relationship	  with	  
us]”.	  (Times	  1919b)	  [emphasis	  mine]	  
Those	   rights	   were	   control	   over	   Afghan	   foreign	   policy	   as	   well	   as	   a	   presumed	   care	   for	  
Afghanistan’s	  security	  –	  though	  this	  was	  a	  fringe	  effect	  of	  protecting	  Britain’s	   Indian	   interests.	   Indeed,	  
Afghanistan	   was	   powerless	   without	   this	   sponsorship;	   Afghanistan	   was	   a	   vacuum	  which	   was	   be	   filled	  
either	  by	  Britain	  or	  by	  Russia.	  A	  piece	   in	  Times	   (1900b)	  called	  attention	  to	   this,	  warning	  that	   if	  Britain	  
didn’t	  begin	  taking	  seriously	  its	  influence	  over	  Afghanistan,	  then	  Russia	  would.	  
“The	   slow	   but	   steady	   progress	   of	   Russia	   towards	   India	   was	   no	   new	   subject;	   it	   had	   been	  
frequently	   discussed	   and	   alarmist	   views	   had	   been	   often	   pooh-­‐poohed.	   The	   time,	   however,	  
had	  passed	  for	  so	  treating	  it,	  for	  Russia	  was	  in	  the	  valley	  of	  Herat…”	  (Times	  1900b)	  
Such	  a	  shift	  would	  be	   tragic,	  not	  only	   for	  British	   interests	   in	   India	  but	   for	  Afghanistan’s	   future	  
hope	   of	   civility,	   which	   was	   already	   “almost	   infinitely	   remote,	   and	   as	   only	   attainable	   through	   the	  
continuation	  of	  the	  existing	  regime.”	  For	  this	  reason,	  “The	  European	  democracies	  therefore	  maintained	  
their	  system…	  with	  a	  perfectly	  clear	  conscience…”	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  only	  propaganda	  first	  from	  the	  Central	  
Powers	  during	  World	  War	  I	  and	  Bolshevik	  ideology	  after	  which	  encouraged	  Oriental	  pretensions	  toward	  
sovereign	  nationhood	  on	  their	  own.	  (Intelligence	  Bureau	  1918)	  




“A	  new	  Amir	  has	  arisen	  in	  the	  land…	  and	  the	  influences	  from	  the	  North	  have	  acquired	  a	  new	  
and	   unexpected	   character.	   Bolshevism	   spread	   from	   Central	   Asia	   into	   the	   fastness	   of	  
Afghanistan,	  and	  in	  1919	  the	  Afghans	  made	  futile	  war	  upon	  India.”	  (Times	  1922)	  
It	  was	  partly	  a	  matter	  of	  luck	  that	  Bolshevik	  ideology	  didn’t	  short	  circuit	  negotiations	  on	  a	  peace	  
treaty	  to	  follow.	  
“At	  one	   time	   it	   seemed	  possible	   that	  Bolshevist	   influence…	  would	  defeat	   the	  efforts	  of	   the	  
British	   negotiators.	   Fortunately	   closer	   acquaintance	   with	   Bolshevism	   made	   the	   Afghans	  
cautious…	   They	   are	   watchful	   still,	   and	   on	   their	   guard	   to	   maintain	   their	   independence	  
[garnered	  in	  the	  treaty]…	  Nevertheless	  the	  country	  is	  opening	  out	  now	  to	  many	  and	  various	  
influences.”	  (ibid)	  
Those	  influences	  did	  still	   include	  Bolshevik	  influences,	  and	  so	  it	  was	  imperative	  that	  even	  after	  
the	  war	  and	  Afghanistan’s	  formal	  independence	  that	  Britain	  still	  work	  to	  maintain	  its	  influence.	  This	  was	  
partly	  argued	  for	  the	  security	  of	  India	  but	  also	  argued	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  Afghans	  themselves,	  who	  had	  
displayed	  a	  “progressive	  spirit”	  and	  an	  “eagerness	  to	  develop	  the	  resource	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  to	  send	  
the	  young	  men	  abroad	  to	  study…	  British	  prestige	  has	  suffered	  heavily…	  during	  the	   last	   few	  years.	   It	   is	  
high	  time	  that	  more	  strenuous	  efforts	  should	  be	  made	  to	  recover	  lost	  ground	  in	  Afghanistan.”	  (ibid)	  
This	   jealous	   behavior	   about	   influence	   over	   Afghanistan	  would	   continue	   over	   the	   next	   several	  
decades.	  Attempts	  by	  Afghanistan	  to	   form	  relationships	  with	  other	  powers	  generally	   failed.	  Only	  after	  
the	  Second	  World	  War	  did	  Afghanistan	  succeed	  in	  opening	  up	  relationships	  with	  various	  powers	  –	  the	  
United	  States	  alone	  refused	  half	  a	  dozen	  overtures	  from	  Afghanistan	  (more	  on	  this	  next	  chapter).	  	  
Despite	  this,	  the	  particular	  era	  of	  outright	  paternal	  tutelage	  from	  Britain	  onto	  Afghanistan	  was	  
at	  an	  end.	  For	  instance,	  in	  discussing	  the	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  Treaty	  of	  1921,	  “We	  recognise	  that	  Afghanistan	  
has	  passed	  the	  stage	  of	  our	  tutelage…	  it	  is	  to	  our	  benefit	  that	  she	  should	  be	  strong	  and	  prosperous	  and	  
that	  we	  will	  do	  our	  best	   to	  help	  her.”	   (Guardian	  1921)	  Thus	  we	  see	   that	   intervention	   in	  Afghanistan’s	  
foreign	   and	  domestic	   affairs	  was	   a	   sort	   of	   ‘tutoring’.	  What’s	  more,	   the	   sort	   of	   civilizing	   effects	  which	  
were	  mentioned	   in	   (Guardian	   1923)	  were	  more	   than	  merely	   implicitly	   a	  matter	  of	  British	   tutoring	   (as	  
was	  implied	  in	  said	  article).	  When	  a	  leader	  of	  Afghanistan	  was	  painted	  in	  a	  positive	  light,	  it	  was	  always	  
with	   reference	   to	   how	   this	   or	   that	   British	   influence	   brought	   him	   to	   that	   pass	   –	   as	   highlighted	   in	   this	  
chapter’s	  first	  section.	  In	  venerating	  the	  recently	  murdered	  Amir	  Habibullah,	  it	  was	  opined	  that	  he	  was	  
not	  only	   a	   loyal	   and	   strong	   leader,	   he	  was	   also	  quite	   civilized,	   being	   “enthusiastic	   about	  motor-­‐cars”,	  
having	   “developed	   a	   weakness	   for	   tea	   parties…	   [playing]	   the	   piano…	   waltzing”	   and	   “astonished	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everybody	  by	  showing	  that	  he	  could	  play	  an	  uncommonly	  good	  game	  of	  bridge.”	  (Times	  1919a)	  These	  
accomplishments	  typified	  his	  civility,	  which	  was	  a	  marked	  difference	  from	  earlier	   in	  the	  century,	  when	  
his	  uncivilized	  ways	  in	  dealing	  with	  matters	  of	  the	  state	  hurt	  British	  prestige.	  These	  fixes	  came	  due	  to	  a	  
visit	   to	   India,	   during	   which	   he	   came	   into	   contact	   with	   Lords	   Minto,	   Kitchener	   and	   Lemington,	   all	  
“Englishmen	  who	  made	  a	  marked	  effect	  upon	  the	  Ameer”.	  (ibid)	  	  
Further,	  although	  “any	  suggestion	  of	  national	  or	  racial	  inferiority	  is	  most	  bitterly	  resented	  by	  all	  
the	  influential	  classes	  in	  [Afghanistan]”,	  the	  Afghanis	  “realiz[e]	  that	  she	  must	  learn	  from	  Europe”.	  (Times	  
1923)	   Educational	   and	   social	   reforms	   began	   to	   commence	   after	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	   elite	   interaction	  
with	  British	  elite	  in	  India,	  “after	  his	  visit	  to	  India”	  (ibid)	  and	  successfully	  at	  that.	  “For	  five	  years	  now	  the	  
present	  Ameer	  has	  boldly	  faced	  the	  consequences	  of	  a	  policy	  of	  reform	  and	  progress,	  and	  has	  achieved	  
considerable	  results…	  in	  so	  bigotedly	  backward	  a	  country.”	  (ibid)	  Yet	  there	  was	  still	  a	  great	  deal	  further	  
to	  go,	  which	  Afghanistan	  “recognizes	  with	  a	  scarcely	  disguised	  anxiety…	  that	  she	  is	  contending	  against	  
economic	   and	  political	   forces	   of	   great	  magnitude”	   and	   that	   failure	   to	   become	  a	   viable,	   civilized	   state	  
introduces	  a	  danger	   “of	  becoming	  once	  more	   the	  plaything	  of	  British	  and	  Russian	   rivalry”.	   (ibid)	   Thus	  
Afghanistan	  knew	  it	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  look	  to	  some	  sort	  of	  Western	  tutorship	  to	  achieve	  these	  ends.	  
It	  is	  best	  for	  Britain	  to	  go	  ahead	  and	  fill	  that	  role	  because	  “we	  should	  prefer	  her	  produce	  be	  sold	  in,	  or	  
exported	  through,	  India…”	  (ibid)	  as	  well	  as	  for	  earlier	  discussed	  fears	  of	  Russian	  ideological	  and	  political	  
influence	   in	   Afghanistan.	   This	   rests	   alongside	   the	   earlier	   assertion	   that	   Afghans	   as	   a	   whole	   were	  
generally	  seen	  as	  savage	  almost	  beyond	  hope,	  while	  at	  times	  a	  leader	  might	  be	  enlightened	  (through	  his	  
contact	  with	  the	  West)	  and	  so	  have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  introduce	  some	  reforms	  which	  might,	  potentially,	  
have	  some	  marginal	  effect.	  Indeed,	  this	  was	  also	  expressed	  quite	  explicitly	  in	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  civilizing	  
of	   Afghanistan	   in	   stating	   that	   “when	  we	   speak	   of	   Afghanistan,	   therefore,	   in	   a	   sense	   implying	   Afghan	  
opinion,	  we	  mean	  the	  Ameer	  himself	  and	  his	  Ministers”.	  (ibid)	  
A  Discursive  Shift…    
A	  number	  of	  themes	  have	  come	  up	  over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  chapter’s	  analysis.	  There	  has	  been	  a	  
great	  deal	  of	   continuity	   in	  narratives	  on	  Afghan	   identity	   carried	  over	   from	   the	   first	   and	   second	  Anglo	  
Afghan	  wars.	   Emptiness	   and	   indeterminacy	   are	   still	   central	   to	   situating	   Afghanistan’s	   character,	   both	  
enabling	  and	  empowered	  by	  typifications	  of	  a	  savage	  Afghanistan	  without	  the	  political	  character	  to	  look	  
after	   itself.	   Thus	   not	   only	   did	   Afghanistan	   need	   Britain’s	   intervention	   but	   that	   intervention	   was	   also	  
justified.	  That	  very	  emptiness	  also	  made	  Afghanistan	   the	   ideal	   staging	  ground	   for	  geopolitical	  conflict.	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Yet	  with	   the	   third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  war	   there	   is	  a	  dramatic	  and	   important	   shift	   in	  how	  these	  old	   themes	  
were	  expressed.	  
Ideology	  has	   taken	   center	   stage	   in	   the	   aftermath	  of	   the	   First	  World	  War	  Bolshevism	  must	   be	  
resisted,	  being	  a	   threat	   to	   the	  potential	   growth	  of	  Afghanistan’s	   inner	   character	  and	  an	   ideology	   that	  
would	   harmfully	   rouse	   the	   passions	   of	  Orientals	   all	   over	   against	   their	   European	   betters.	   The	   need	   to	  
counteract	  Bolshevism	  was	  seen	  both	  as	  self-­‐defence	  –	  Bolshevik	  rhetoric	  was	  considered	  likely	  to	  cause	  
civil	  unrest	  in	  the	  British	  empire	  and	  along	  the	  periphery,	  as	  was	  argued	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  the	  third	  Anglo	  
Afghan	  war	  –	  and	  as	  a	  service	  to	  the	  benighted	  savage	  who	  was	  too	  naïve	  to	  understand	  how	  harmful	  
Bolshevism	  could	  be.	  Far	   from	  replacing	  emptiness	  and	   indeterminacy	  as	  a	   justifier	   for	   intervention,	   it	  
feeds	   off	   of	   and	   simultaneously	   strengthens	   the	   typification	   of	   emptiness.	   Afghanistan	   is	   an	   empty	  
vessel	   waiting	   to	   be	   filled	   by	   whatever	   outside	   power	   might	   have	   access	   to	   it.	   Only	   by	   completely	  
denying	   Russia	   access	   to	   Afghanistan	   could	   Britain	   save	   Afghanistan	   –	   only	   by	   continued	   cultural	  
patronage	  of	  Afghanistan	  could	  Britain	  civilize	  Afghanistan.	  
This	  indeterminacy	  was	  thus	  both	  a	  problem	  and	  an	  opportunity.	  Afghanistan	  was	  perceived	  as	  
not	  having	  a	  strong	  identity	  of	  its	  own,	  no	  fundamental	  character	  which	  would	  allow	  it	  to	  affirm	  its	  own	  
identity.	  This	  perception	  meant	  that	  it	  was	  a	  natural	  place	  for	  competing	  ideologies	  to	  attempt	  to	  gain	  
acceptance	  –	  and	  note	  here	  correlations	  that	  we	  can	  easily	  identify	  even	  now	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  come.	  
Afghanistan’s	  empty	  nature	  meant	  that	  it	  was	  a	  weak	  spot	  in	  the	  armour	  of	  British	  India	  –	  if	  Bolshevism	  
could	  gain	  traction	  there	  then	   it	  would	  have	  the	  potential	  of	  causing	  civil	  discord	   in	  an	  already	  restive	  
India.	  Yet	  that	  emptiness	  invited,	  justified,	  seemed	  to	  demand	  British	  intervention	  as	  a	  moral	  imperative	  
on	   its	   own.	   Afghanistan	  needed	   beneficent	   Britain	   to	   look	   after	   it	   because	  Afghanistan	   simply	  wasn’t	  
equipped	   to	   look	   after	   its	   own	   soul.	   Thus,	   Britain	   could	  defend	   India	   and	   its	   own	   interests	   by	  way	  of	  
carrying	  out	  noblesse	  oblige.	  
History	   was	   not	   to	   allow	   things	   to	   remain	   so	   static,	   however.	   Three	   events	   ensured	   that	  
Afghanistan	  could	  not	  remain	  completely	  as	  it	  had	  been.	  During	  World	  War	  I,	  the	  Central	  Powers	  used	  
anti-­‐colonial	  rhetoric	  and	  the	   idea	  that	  the	  Asiatic	  polities	  ought	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  states	   in	  a	  bid	  to	  
bring	   areas	   peripheral	   to	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire	   to	   their	   side.	   (Intelligence	   Bureau	   1918)	   Secondly,	  
Bolshevism	   as	   an	   ideology	   did	   decry	   colonialism	   and	   called	   for	   a	   new	   nationalism	   among	   former	  
colonies.	  Further,	  Russia	   itself	  was	   looking	   to	  build	   relationships	  with	   rulers	   in	  central	  and	  south	  Asia,	  
including	  the	  provision	  of	  subsidies.	   (ibid,	  also	  Times	  1919,	  Times	  1922)	  Finally,	  on	  a	  global	   level	  there	  
was	  an	  emerging	  and	  strengthening	  narrative	  on	  the	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  states	  –	  and	  the	  idea	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that	  self-­‐determination	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  natural	  right	  of	  peoples.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  Afghanistan	  
itself	   craved	   self-­‐determination.	   Though	   at	   the	   time	   the	   cause	   of	   the	   final	   Anglo	   Afghan	   war	   was	  
somewhat	  unclear,	  documents	  now	  show	  that	  it	  was	  a	  bid	  to	  bring	  Britain	  to	  the	  bargaining	  table	  so	  that	  
Afghanistan	  might	  gain	  control	  over	  its	  own	  affairs.	  Specifically,	  at	  length	  a	  proclamation	  to	  the	  Afghan	  
people	  by	  the	  new	  Amir	  in	  early	  1919	  was	  recovered:	  
“…I	  declared	  to	  you	  with	  a	  loud	  voice	  that	  I	  would	  accept	  the	  Crown	  and	  the	  throne	  only	  on	  
the	  condition	  that	  you	  should	  all	  cooperate	  with	  me	  in	  my	  thoughts	  and	  ideas.	  Firstly	  that	  the	  
Government	  of	  Afghanistan	  should	  be	  internally	  and	  externally	  independent	  and	  free,	  that	  is	  
to	  say,	  that	  all	  rights	  of	  Government	  that	  are	  possessed	  by	  other	  independent	  Powers	  of	  the	  
world	  should	  be	  possessed	  in	  their	  entirety	  by	  Afghanistan…”	  (India	  Office	  1919:	  No.	  2)	  
There	  was	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  pressure	  on	  Britain	  to	  give	  Afghanistan	  this	  independence.	  This	  was	  in	  
part	  because	  of	   the	   cost	  of	  Britain’s	  newly	  expanded	  empire.	   It	   also	   followed	   that	  Afghanistan	  would	  
become	   an	   increasingly	   expensive	   asset	   if	   the	   status	   quo	  were	   to	   be	  maintained,	   though	   there	  were	  
many	  within	  government	  who	  fought	  hard	  to	  maintain	  that	  status	  quo.	  Russia	  was	  no	  longer	  considered	  
the	  existential	  threat	  to	  India	  that	  it	  once	  had	  been,	  however.	  As	  an	  ideological	  threat	  it	  remained,	  but	  
granting	   Afghan	   independence	   and	   putting	   Britain	   in	   a	   place	   to	   maintain	   a	   strong	   friendship	   with	  
Afghanistan	  was	  figured	  to	  be	  the	  best	  way	  to	  battle	  the	  Bolshevik	  ideology.	  Thus	  it	  was	  decided	  by	  the	  
British	  government	  to	  find	  a	  peace	  with	  Afghanistan	  that	  would	  keep	  the	  maximum	  informal	  influence	  
possible	  for	  Britain	  while	  giving	  away	  the	  fewest	  possible	  substantive	  concessions.	  This	  was	  to	  come	  in	  
the	  form	  first:	  
“What	  we	  want	  is	  an	  early	  peace	  that	  will	  make	  clear	  to	  Afghans	  and	  to	  world	  generally	  our	  
sense	  of	  outrage	  at	  Amir’s	  wanton	  aggression,	  but	  which	  at	  the	  same	  time	  will	  not	  close	  door	  
to	  establishment	  thereafter	  of	  friendly	  relations	  with	  Afghanistan…”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1919:	  
342)	  
Then	   later,	  with	  the	  concession	   in	  an	   informal	   letter	  from	  the	  British	  delegation	  to	  the	  Afghan	  
delegation:	  
“You	  asked	  me	  for	  some	  further	  assurance	  that	  Peace	  Treaty	  which	  the	  British	  Government	  
now	  offer	  contains	  nothing	  that	  interferes	  with	  the	  complete	  liberty	  of	  Afghanistan	  either	  in	  
internal	  or	  external	  matters.	  My	  friends,	  if	  you	  will	  read	  Treaty	  carefully	  you	  will	  see	  there	  is	  
no	   such	   interference…	   the	   said	   Treaty	   and	   this	   letter	   leaves	   Afghanistan	   officially	   free	   and	  
independent	  in	  its	  internal	  and	  external	  affairs…	  friendship	  and	  subsidy	  would	  depend	  largely	  
138	  
	  
on	  way	  in	  which	  Amir	  conducted	  his	  foreign	  relations	  and	  sought	  and	  accepted	  our	  advice.”	  
(ibid:	  501)	  
Britain	   was	   ready	   to	   recognize	   Afghanistan’s	   formal	   independence.	   However,	   if	   Afghanistan	  
wanted	   to	   remain	   on	   friendly	   terms	   with	   Britain	   and	   to	   receive	   aid,	   it	   would	   be	   necessary	   that	   the	  
leadership	  of	  Afghanistan	  seek	  out	  and	  follow	  British	  advice	  in	  relevant	  matters.	  This	  promise	  was	  made	  
on	   an	   informal	   basis	   and,	   while	   Afghanistan’s	   independence	   was	   ultimately	   acknowledged,	   that	  
acknowledgment	  came	  primarily	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  demands	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Britain	  that	  
Afghanistan	  formally	  surrender	  certain	  aspects	  of	  its	  sovereignty	  (as	  had	  been	  done	  in	  the	  past).	  	  
Here	   is	   another	   iteration	   of	   the	   formal/informal	   divide.	   Formally	   Afghanistan	   would	   be	  
recognized	   as	   a	   self-­‐determined	   and	   sovereign	   state.	   Informally,	   Britain	   had	   great	   reservations	   about	  
Afghanistan’s	  ability	  and	  right	  to	  carry	  out	  all	  aspects	  of	  sovereignty.	  To	  understand	  where	  this	  two-­‐level	  
approach	  comes	   from,	   it	  helps	   to	   look	  more	  closely	  at	   the	  historical	  context	  –	  and	  how	  that	  historical	  
context	  contains	  still	  more	  examples	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  positioning	  as	  an	  empty,	  indeterminate	  space.	  	  
As	  the	  First	  World	  War	  drew	  to	  a	  close,	  Britain	  was	  turning	  its	  eyes	  toward	  what	  the	  post-­‐war	  
geopolitical	   situation	   would	   look	   like.	   Pivotal	   to	   this	   consideration	   was	   the	   outlook	   for	   the	   so-­‐called	  
Muslim	  world	  –	   those	  portions	  of	  Asia	  peopled	  primarily	  by	   those	  of	   the	  Muslim	   faith.	  At	   issue	  was	  a	  
fear	   that	   Russia’s	   ideological	   turn	   to	   Bolshevism	  would	   find	   purchase	   here	   and	   create	   all	  manners	   of	  
geostrategic	  mischief.	   There	  was	   a	   fear	   that	   a	   sense	  of	  Muslim	   solidarity	  might	   induce	   some	   regions,	  
such	   as	   Afghanistan,	   to	   support	   the	   Central	   Powers	   or,	   after	   a	   successful	   conclusion	   of	   the	   war,	   to	  
become	  areas	  of	  unrest	  and	  trouble.	  (Intelligence	  Bureau	  1918)	  
In	   this	   sense,	   then,	   continuing	   a	   sort	   of	   stewardship	   over	   British	   dependencies	  was	   good	   not	  
only	  for	  the	  British,	  but	  it	  was	  paternally	  justifiable.	  ‘Orientals’	  at	  the	  moment	  simply	  don’t	  actually	  have	  
either	   the	  capacity	  or	   the	  desire	   to	  self-­‐govern	   (despite	  agitation	   for	   same,	   this	  being	   imitative	   rather	  
than	  substantive,	  as	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter).	  However,	  perhaps	  through	  very	  long	  term	  contact	  
with	   Europeans,	   this	   civilization	  might	   ‘rub	   off’	   on	   them.	   In	   this	   state	   of	   progress,	   India	  was	   seen	   as	  
being	  most	  advanced	  (ibid:	  13)	  though	  still	  far	  off.	  Afghanistan	  was	  hardly	  worth	  mentioning.	  
There	  was	   fear	   for	   the	   future	   of	   the	  Muslim	  world	   in	   particular	   due	   to	  what	  was	   assumed	   in	  
Europe	  to	  be	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  Muslim	  solidarity.	  	  
“In	   one	   sense	   this	   Islamic	   consciousness	   is	   no	   new	   thing.	   Islam	   –	   a	   simplified	   version	   of	  
Christianity	  lagging	  half	  a	  millennium	  behind	  its	  prototype	  –	  is	  still	  in	  the	  stage	  of	  Christianity	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in	  the	  Middle	  Ages,	  when	  it	  was	  the	  strongest	  bond	  of	  union	  between	  those	  who	  professed	  
it.”	  (ibid:	  21)	  
This	   is	  emblematic	  both	  of	   the	  European	  sense	  of	   Islamic	  unity,	  and	  of	   the	  European	  sense	  of	  
paternal	   protectiveness	   toward	   Muslims.	   Muslims	   are	   defined	   here,	   largely,	   by	   their	   simple	   and	  
laggardly	   religion.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   their	   sense	   of	   group	   consciousness	   is	   dismissed	   as	   a	   primitive,	  
simple	  thing	  that	  Europeans	  were	  getting	  over	  in	  the	  Middle	  Ages.	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  ideological	  and	  
narrative	  pressures	   for	  self-­‐determination	   (which	  were	  refuted	   in	   this	  paternalistic	  manner)	   there	  was	  
also	  an	  economic	  argument	  for	  giving	  greater	  self-­‐determination	  in	  at	  least	  some	  cases.	  	  
Britain’s	   holdings	   increased	   dramatically	   at	   the	   close	   of	   the	   first	   World	   War.	   	   Yet	   it	   was	   in	  
massive	  debt	  due	  to	  the	  War,	  and	  its	  traditional	  trading	  partners	  were	  in	  no	  better	  shape.	  (Ward	  1923:	  
538)	  Thus,	   it	  was	   important	  to	  British	  national	   interest	   to	  be	  on	  as	   friendly	  terms	  as	  possible	  with	  the	  
Muslim	  peoples,	  not	   simply	   for	   short	   term	   interests	   in	   the	  War,	  but	   for	   long	   term	  economic	   interests	  
after	  as	  well.	  If	  Afghanistan	  was	  no	  longer	  needed	  to	  act	  as	  a	  physical	  barrier	  between	  Russia	  and	  India,	  
and	  if	  Afghanistan	  was	  likely	  to	  continue	  proving	  rowdy	  in	  its	  quest	  for	  independence,	  then	  continuing	  
with	  the	  status	  quo	  would	  not	  work.	  
“The	   remaining	  alternative	   is	   to	   find	   some	   trustee	   for	   the	  area	   covered	  by	   the	  non-­‐Turkish	  
territories	   of	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire,	   as	   well	   as	   Persia	   and	   Afghanistan,	   who	   would	   be	  
acceptable	   to	   British	   interests	   and	   to	   Moslem	   public	   opinion…	   The	   trusteeship	   might	  
conceivably	   be	   administered	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	   League	   of	   Nations…	   the	   only	   satisfactory	  
solution	  in	  this	  part	  of	  the	  world	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  United	  States.”	  (ibid:	  
31)	  
As	   a	   contextual	   whole,	   this	   suggests	   several	   things.	  What	  was	   discursively	   seen	   by	   Britain	   as	  
unavoidable	   geo-­‐political	   changes	   necessitated	   a	   change	   in	   the	   way	   they	   interacted	   with	   ‘Orientals’,	  
with	   Afghanistan	   falling	   under	   that	   classification.	   However,	   that	   need	   to	   change	   the	   manner	   of	  
interaction	   did	   not	   necessarily	   coincide	   with	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   underlying	   truth/knowledge	   assumptions	  
about	   the	   character	   of	   ‘Orientals’.	   A	   notion	   of	   progressive	   paternalism	   intermingled	  with	   geopolitical	  
and	   (potentially,	   and	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent)	   economic	   policy	   goals.	   Positioning	   European,	   and	   specifically	  
British,	  intervention	  in	  ‘Oriental’	  governance	  was	  something	  which	  had	  to	  be	  done	  in	  a	  way,	  now,	  that	  
was	  agreeable	  to	  those	  ‘Orientals’.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  does	  not	  admit	  that	  there	  was	  anything	  wrong	  
with	   the	   way	   Europe	   had	   interacted	   previously;	   ‘Orientals’	   were	   still	   simple	   and	   laggardly,	   politically	  
unsophisticated	  –	  empty	  of	  any	  real	  character	  from	  a	  civilized	  point	  of	  view.	  However,	  their	  wants	  had	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regrettably	  increased	  dramatically,	  and	  thus	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  at	  the	  very	  least	  give	  an	  appearance	  of	  
greater	  self-­‐determination.	  	  
This	  approach,	  then,	  was	  one	  of	  dual	  intent:	  formal	  and	  informal.	  Formally,	  ‘Orientals’	  should	  be	  
given	  greater	  degrees	  of	   self-­‐determination	  because	   their	  want	   for	   this	  was	  greater	   than	  ever	  before.	  
Informally,	  there	  was	  a	  sense	  that	  ‘Orientals’	  were	  not	  yet	  ready	  or	  able	  to	  self-­‐govern	  thus	  it	  was	  only	  
natural	   and	   right	   to	   position	   Europeans	   in	   such	   a	   space	   as	   to	   be	   able	   to	   intervene,	   guide	   and,	  
paradoxically,	  protect.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Afghanistan,	  we	  can	  see	  this	  playing	  out	  in	  a	  dialogue	  between	  the	  
Viceroy	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  India.	  	  
…to  a  Promise  of  Empty  Statehood  
In	  discussions	  within	  the	  British	  government	  of	  how	  peace	  with	  Afghanistan	  should	  be	  crafted	  
there	   is	   an	  obvious	   layering	  of	   how	  Afghanistan	  would	  be	   treated	   formally	   and	   informally.	   In	   itself,	   a	  
formal/informal	  mix	   is	   nothing	   unusual	   in	   international	   relations.	   However,	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   this	  
layering	   embeds	   discursive	   legacies	   of	   ‘knowing’	   Afghanistan	   in	   the	   early	   phases	   of	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	  
‘state’	  is	  both	  unique	  and	  of	  great	  import.	  	  
The	   war	   itself	   began	   with	   Afghan	   hostilities	   ostensibly	   intended	   to	   lend	   support	   for	   Indian	  
Muslims	   who,	   it	   was	   contended,	   were	   discontented	   with	   British	   rule.	   In	   the	   process,	   Amir	   Amanulla	  
intended	   that	  Afghanistan	  should	   finally	  gain	   its	   full	   independence	  and	  operate	  on	  an	  even	   level	  with	  
the	  Powers	  of	   the	  day.	   (India	  Office	  1919:	  No.	  2)	   Jihad	  was	   incited;	   some	  of	   the	  border	   tribes	   rose	   in	  
revolt	   in	  concert	  with	  Afghanistan,	  and	   the	  war	   resulted.	  The	  battles	  generally	  ended	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  
British,	  and	  eventually	   the	  two	  sides	  made	  bona	   fide	  movements	   toward	  peace.	  After	   it	  became	  clear	  
that	  some	  sort	  of	  summit	  would	  happen	  to	  discuss	  peace,	  in	  June	  of	  1919,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  made	  it	  
clear	  that	  the	  Afghan	  delegates	  “should	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  put	  forward	  proposals	  of	  their	  own”	  and	  that	  
the	  best	  way	  of	  ensuring	   this	  was	   that	   the	  British	  government	  have	   its	   terms	  considered	  and	   laid	  out	  
ahead	  of	  time.	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1919:	  207)	  	  
The	   plan,	   then,	   was	   for	   negotiation	   of	   peace	   and	   treaties	   commencing	   thereof	   to	   follow	   a	  
format	  by	  which	  Britain	  was	  imposing	  terms	  rather	  than	  a	  situation	  wherein	  an	  actual	  dialogue	  existed.	  
This	   in	   itself	   is	   indicative	   of	   British	   feelings	   toward	   Afghan	   sovereignty.	   What	   follows	   is	   a	   concise	  
summation	  of	  internal	  conversations	  as	  negotiations	  (or	  impositions)	  went	  on.	  
The	   Viceroy	   of	   India	   gave	   these	   instructions	   for	   how	   negotiations	   should	   be	   carried	   out,	   first	  
with	  an	  outline	  of	  general	  demands	  (as	  averred	  to	  earlier):	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  “What	   we	   want	   is	   an	   early	   peace	   that	   will	   make	   clear	   to	   Afghans	   and	   to	   world…	   our…	  
outrage	  at	  Amir’s	  wanton	  aggression,	  but	  which…	  will	   not	   close	  door	   to	  establishment…	  of	  
friendly	   relations…	   all	   we	   really	   require	   of	   Afghanistan	   [is	   the]	   exclusion	   of	   foreign…	  
influences,	   coupled	  with	   friendly	   co-­‐operation	   on	   the	   common	  border.”	   (UK	   Foreign	  Office	  
1919:	  342)	  
Secondly	   the	  Viceroy	  outlined	  a	   two-­‐step	  plan	   for	  a	   treaty	  process.	  The	   first	   step	  would	  be	   to	  
force	  Afghanistan	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  treaty	  formalizing	  the	  demands	  just	   laid	  out,	  though	  in	  vague	  terms	  to	  
make	  them	  more	  palatable.	  A	  second,	   informal	  set	  of	  demands	  was	  compiled	  to	   inform	  the	  Amir	  how	  
Afghanistan	   could	   regain	   Britain’s	   trust	   and	   friendship.	   These	   demands	   included	   expelling	   hostile	  
foreigners	   and	   non-­‐British	   approved	   foreign	   agents,	   the	   reversion	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   foreign	   relations	  
control	  to	  Britain,	  and	  improved	  status	  for	  British	  representatives	   in	  Afghanistan.	  (ibid)	  We	  see	  a	  clear	  
separation	  between	  the	  formal	  and	  informal,	  with	  formal	  positioning	  of	  Afghan	  identity	  left	  vague	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  it	  could	  be	  interpreted	  in	  a	  friendly	  fashion	  –	  while	  informally	  Afghanistan’s	  “government”	  was	  
held	  to	  be	  unworthy	  of	  sovereign	  respect.	  	  
In	   response,	   the	  Secretary	  of	   State	   for	   India	   said:	   “his	  Majesty’s	  Government…	  are	   inclined	   to	  
favour	  an	  alternative	  method	  of	  attaining	  desired	  result”.	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1919:	  216)	  That	  alternate	  
method	  was	  to	  take	  the	  informal	  proposal	  from	  the	  Viceroy	  and	  make	  it	  both	  more	  harshly	  worded	  and	  
more	   formal.	   The	   reservations	   of	   the	   government	   appear	   to	   be	   in	   the	   vagueness	   of	   the	   Viceroy’s	  
suggested	   ‘formal’	   layer,	   believing	   that	   it	   would	   give	   the	   Amir	   too	   much	   room	   to	   interpret	   British	  
intentions	   in	   a	   way	   that	   Britain	   would	   not	   like,	   thus	   putting	   the	   future	   of	   their	   relations	   in	   doubt.	  
Instead:	  
“The	  real	  terms	  of	  peace	  seem	  to	  us	  to	  be	  contained,	  not	  in	  your	  draft	  Treaty,	  but	  in	  your	  six	  
points;	   and	  we	  would	   prefer	   therefore	   to	   incorporate	   them	  with	   as	   precise	   a	   definition	   as	  
possible,	  and	  with	  certain	  additions,	  in	  first	  draft	  of	  Treaty	  straight	  away…	  Question	  might,	  of	  
course,	   still	   arise	   whether	   terms	   had	   been	   strictly	   complied	   with	   [which	   was	   one	   of	   the	  
complaints	  about	  the	  vagueness	  of	  the	  Viceroy’s	  proposed	  draft	  treaty].	  But	  there	  would	  be	  
no	  need	  for	  second	  meeting	  of	  delegates,	  or	  renewal	  of	  negotiations,	  since	  only	  points	  to	  be	  
decided	  would	  be	  [how	  to	  handle	  Afghanistan’s	  compliance/noncompliance].”	  (ibid)	  	  
This	  strips	  away	  the	  Viceroy’s	  formal	  layer	  of	  vague	  respect.	  Rather	  than	  a	  treaty,	  it	  is	  a	  straight	  
forward	  list	  of	  demands	  –	  an	  obvious	  imposition	  of	  terms	  of	  surrender	  rather	  than	  a	  treaty	  of	  peace.	  In	  
other	   words,	   there	   is	   a	   resistance	   in	   His	   Majesty’s	   government	   to	   taking	   on	   this	   formal/informal	  
approach	   which	   is	   a	   dramatic	   shift	   away	   from	   the	   old	   status	   quo	   in	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations.	   These	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disagreements	   play	   out	   in	   a	   conversation	   that	   spans	   several	   cables.	   Ultimately,	   however,	   it	   is	   the	  
formal/informal	   approach	  which	  wins	   out.	   A	   number	   of	   arguments	  were	   advanced	  which	   seemed	   to	  
have	  been	  important.	  
Firstly,	   circumstances	   are	   such	   that	   Afghanistan	   has	   to	   have	   a	   sponsor	   amongst	   Powers,	   and	  
Russia	  cannot	  provide	  that,	  so	  Britain	  is	  the	  only	  choice.	  Thus,	  Afghanistan	  will	  come	  to	  Britain	  of	  its	  own	  
will,	  once	  given	  a	  chance	  to	  realize	  this.	  Next,	  the	  first,	  formal	  treaty	  also	  does	  involve	  a	  concrete	  offer	  
of	  friendship	  “if	  Amir	  will	  only	  play	  the	  game.”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1919:357).	  Lastly,	  this	  approach	  does	  
give	   space	   for	   the	   inevitability	   of	   the	   Amir	   not	   completely	  meeting	   the	   conditions	   of	   friendship,	   and	  
allows	  for	  some	  sort	  of	  flexibility	  in	  dialogue	  on	  how	  Britain	  would	  handle	  that	  going	  forward…	  whereas	  
if	  the	  conditions	  of	  friendship	  were	  made	  public	  and	  formal	  (as	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  wanted)	  it	  would	  
force	   Britain	   to	   take	   Afghanistan	   to	   account	   if	   Afghanistan	   was	   seen	   to	   not	   meet	   those	   conditions	  
perfectly.	   The	   vagueness	   of	   the	   two-­‐tier	   approach	  works	   for	   Britain,	   then,	   on	   several	   levels.	   Further,	  
following	  a	  more	  coercive	  path	  would	  prove	  impossible.	  
“During	  the	  past	  year	  there	  has	  been	  a	  profound	  change	  in	  political	  outlook	  in…	  Afghanistan.	  
General	   unrest	   awakened	   Nationalist	   aspirations,	   President	   Wilson’s	   pronouncement,	  
Bolshevik	   catchwords	   and	   other	   influences	   have	   been	   at	   work.	   This…	   is	   evidenced	   in	  
Amanulla’s	   first	   utterance	   as	   Amir,	   basis	   of	   which	   was	   the	   sovereign	   independence	   of	  
Afghanistan,	  and	  the	  complete	  freedom	  of	  his	  external	  relations.”	  (ibid)	  
Thus,	   continuing	   in	   the	   status	   quo	   was	   impossible	   for	   a	   variety	   of	   reasons.	   Acknowledging	  
Afghanistan’s	  independence	  while	  informally	  remaining	  aware	  that	  Afghanistan	  was	  by	  nature	  incapable	  
of	  carrying	  out	  the	  processes	  of	  sovereignty	  was	  key.	  It	  kept	  Afghanistan	  docile	  and	  positioned	  Britain	  to	  
remain	   influential,	   being	   the	   only	   possible	   source	   of	   aid	   in	   Afghanistan’s	   quest	   to	   become	   a	   civilized	  
place.	   Formally,	   Afghanistan	  would	   ultimately	   be	   recognized	   as	   a	   sovereign	   state,	   eligible	   to	   join	   the	  
international	   community	   of	   nations.	   Informally,	   Afghanistan	   was	   known	   to	   remain	   ill-­‐suited	   to	  
statehood,	   being	   savage	   and	   unrefined.	   Unfortunately,	   from	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   Britain,	   this	   divide	  was	  
necessary.	  Only	  through	  pretending	  to	  believe	  that	  Afghanistan	  was	  in	  fact	  by	  right	  and	  nature	  a	  state	  
with	  total	  sovereignty	  could	  it	  continue	  to	  use	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  tactical	  space	  in	  the	  manner	  that	  British	  
interests	  demanded.	  	  
In	  the	  treaty	  of	  1919,	  Afghanistan’s	  sovereignty	  was	  not	  formally	  recognized	  –	  but	  there	  was	  an	  
informal	  recognition	  of	  it	  by	  way	  of	  no	  claims	  over	  Afghan	  sovereignty	  from	  Britain.	  Alongside	  this	  was	  a	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promise	   that,	   if	   things	  went	  well,	  Britain	  would	   sign	  another	   treaty	   (which	  did	  happen	  and	  came	   into	  
force	  in	  1921)	  formally	  acknowledging	  Afghanistan’s	  sovereignty.	  
“I	   had	  made	   it	   clear	   several	   times	   both	   verbally	   and	   in	  writing	   that	   friendship	   and	   subsidy	  
would	  depend	  largely	  on	  way	  in	  which	  Amir	  conducted	  his	  foreign	  relations	  and	  sought	  and	  
accepted	  our	  advice.”	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1919:	  501)	  
These	  were	  conditions	  which	  Afghanistan	  was	  willing	  to	  accept.	  Ali	  Ahmad	  argued	  hard	  for	  the	  
promises	  of	   independence	  to	  be	  formal	  (UK	  Foreign	  Office	  1919:	  240)	  but,	   in	  the	  end,	  assured	  Maffey	  
that:	  
“…if	   we	   would	   only	   give	   Afghanistan	   an	   assurance	   that	   she	   had	   full	   liberty	   in	   her	   foreign	  
relations	  she	  would	  very	  soon	  come	  back	  to	  us	  in	  practice,	  and	  that	  we	  should	  be	  her	  advisors	  
in	  a	  more	  real	  sense	  than	  ever	  before.”	  (ibid	  )	  
	  
Summary  and  Revisiting  Central  Questions  
This	   chapter	   served	   to	   survey	   how	   and	  why	   old	   assumptions	   about	   Afghanistan’s	   nature	   and	  
identity	   were	   folded	   into	   new	   narratives	   on	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   full	   member	   of	   the	   international	  
community	   of	   sovereign	   states.	   Secret	   and	   hidden,	   assumptions	   about	   Afghanistan	   as	   an	   essentially	  
characterless	  space	  remained	  –	  its	  sovereign	  status	  was	  never	  truly	  believed	  because	  the	  Afghan	  culture	  
was	   incapable	   of	   handling	   sovereignty.	   Both	   strategic	   and	   political	   necessities	   dictated	   a	   formal	  
narrative	  shift,	  however,	  and	  this	   interplay	  between	  formal/informal	   is	  something	  we	  will	  see	  through	  
the	  Cold	  War	  and	  post-­‐9/11	  periods.	  
The	  very	  emptiness	  assigned	   to	  Afghanistan	  both	  made	  possible	  and	  ensured	   the	  necessity	  of	  
this	  formal/informal	  divide.	  Afghanistan’s	  indeterminacy	  meant	  that	  it	  must	  be	  protected	  from	  opposing	  
ideologies	   lest	   it	  move	   to	  mimic	  Bolshevik	  nationalism	  rather	   than	  Western	  civility.	   It	  also	  meant	   that	  
any	   actions	   taken	   on	   Afghanistan	   by	   Britain,	   be	   they	   physical	   or	   symbolic,	   were	   justified	   –	   Britain’s	  
depiction	  of	  Afghanistan	  was	  justified	  as	  the	  only	  way	  to	  help	  “fill”	  Afghanistan	  up	  with	  some	  sense	  of	  
identity	   that	  might	   one	   day	   be	   positive	   for	   it.	   Afghanistan’s	   indeterminate	   nature	   is	   reflected	   by	   the	  
formal/informal	  divide	  –	  somehow	  Afghanistan	  is	  able	  to	  simultaneously	  be	  a	  sovereign	  state	  and	  a	  land	  
so	  bereft	  of	  civilized	  character	  as	  to	  only	  be	  playing	  at	  statehood.	  It	  must	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  state,	  but	  can	  
also	  be	  ignored	  and	  stripped	  of	  sovereign	  persona	  (or	  simply	  continue	  to	  be	  denied	  that	  persona)	  by	  the	  
action	  of	  ignoring.	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The	   implications	   for	   the	   failed	   state	  discourse	  are	  profound.	  Confronting	   this	  project’s	   central	  
questions,	  we	  ask	  first:	  “Why	  are	  we	  able	  to	  talk	  about	  failed	  states?”	  	  
We	  are	  able	  to	  talk	  about	  Afghanistan	  today	  as	  a	  failed	  state	  because	  formally,	  Afghanistan	  was	  
given	  this	  assignation	  of	  statehood	  while	  on	  an	  unacknowledged	  level	  Afghanistan	  was	  never	  expected	  
to	  be	  anything	  but	  a	  failure.	  Afghanistan,	  after	  all,	  was	  peopled	  by	  barbarians	  who	  wanted	  sovereignty	  
only	  because	  it	  was	  a	  trapping	  of	  civilization	  that	  Afghans	  could	  not	  understand	  but	  knew	  was	  somehow	  
prestigious.	  Thus	  the	  closest	  Afghanistan	  could	  come	  to	  true	  statehood,	  to	  true	  sovereignty,	  was	  a	  sort	  
of	  mimicry.	  Further,	  it	  was	  only	  through	  the	  constant	  enlightened	  tutelage	  of	  a	  civilized	  benefactor	  could	  
Afghanistan	  manage	  to	  mimic	  the	  forms	  of	  statehood.	  Thus,	  Afghanistan’s	   failure	  as	  a	  state	  was	  a	  sad	  
inevitability	  –	  when	  Afghanistan	  rejected	  Western	  sponsorship	  it	  chose	  to	  fail.	  This	  is	  the	  identity	  which	  
filled	  Afghanistan’s	   indeterminacy	  at	   the	  close	  of	   the	  third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  war,	  and	  we	  see	  echoes	  of	   it	  
today.	  The	  label	  of	  failed	  state,	  once	  again,	  suggests	  that	  Afghanistan	  failed	  –	  it	  did	  not	  succeed	  when	  it	  
could	  have,	  when	  it	  should	  have,	  when	  it	  was	  its	  sovereign	  responsibility	  to	  do	  so.	  Afghanistan	  accepted	  
that	  responsibility	  when	  it	  pushed	  for	  independence,	  but	  its	  failure	  to	  live	  up	  to	  that	  responsibility	  was	  
foreseen	   by	   civilized	   Britain	   which	   was	   able	   to	   see	   through	   Afghanistan’s	   mimicry	   to	   the	   uncouth	  
barbarism	  that	  lay	  beneath.	  
Next	   we	   ask	   “what	   assumptive	   discursive	   knowledges	   empower	   dominant	   narratives	   of	  
intelligibility?”	  	  
This	  follows	  from	  the	  previous	  point.	  There	  were	  two	  meta-­‐narratives	  at	  play	  that	  Afghanistan	  
was	  placed	  within	  at	  a	  formal	  and	  informal	  level,	  respectively.	  Statehood	  had	  come	  to	  be	  “known”	  to	  be	  
the	  right	  and	  responsibility	  of	  every	  polity	  in	  the	  world.	  An	  emerging	  liberalism	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War	  
demanded	  the	  self-­‐determination	  of	  people	  as	  the	  only	  way	  toward	  a	  just	  global	  society	  that	  might	  be	  
able	  to	  avoid	  another	  global	  war.	  Afghanistan	  then	  was	  by	  default	  a	  state.	  It	  came	  upon	  statehood,	  was	  
gifted	  with	  statehood	  not	  because	  of	  its	  claims	  but	  because	  that	  was	  the	  new	  accepted	  global	  norm	  and,	  
unlike	  the	  case	  of	  India,	  it	  was	  not	  worth	  the	  effort	  involved	  for	  Britain	  to	  retain	  any	  formal	  or	  informal	  
control	   over	   Afghanistan’s	   future.	   Yet	   it	   was	   also	   “known”	   that	   Afghanistan	   wasn’t	   really	   civilized.	   It	  
wasn’t	  really	  “up”	  to	  the	  pressures	  of	  statehood.	  It	  could	  only	  ever	  be,	  to	  lend	  a	  paternalistic	  patronizing	  
air	  to	  it,	  a	  child	  playing	  with	  his	  father’s	  tools.	  Thus,	  again,	  Afghanistan’s	  eventual	  cast	  identity	  as	  ‘failed	  
state’	   is	   quite	   inevitable.	   It	   was	   Afghanistan’s	   indeterminate	   nature	   which	   made	   this	   very	   direct	  




That	   is	  relatively	  straight	  forward.	  Yet	   it	  wouldn’t	  do	  to	   leave	  out	  another	   important	  aspect	  of	  
what	  empowers	  dominant	  narratives	  of	  intelligibility.	  Ideology	  and	  binarism	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  as	  well.	  
Buzan	  argued	  that	  there	  was	  a	  binary	  nature	  to	  the	  ideological	  structures	  after	  World	  War	  Two.	  Not	  only	  
were	   these	   binaries	   about	   two	   different	   sides	   in	   an	   ideological	   struggle	   (communism/democracy	   and	  
terrorism/civilization)	   but	   also	   about	   an	   imagined	  moment	   of	   genesis.	  With	   that	  moment	   of	   genesis,	  
ideological	  struggle	  comes	  about	  in	  response	  to	  a	  sudden	  pivotal	  moment	  of	  existential	  threat	  –	  the	  Iron	  
Curtain	  or	  the	  World	  Trade	  Center	  attack.	  One	  might	  extend	  this	  binary	  moment	  to	  that	  of	  statehood	  for	  
Afghanistan.	   It	   creates	   a	  divide	  between	   statehood	  and	  non-­‐statehood	  and	  purports	   that	  Afghanistan	  
crossed	  that	  divide	  at	  a	  sudden	  pivotal	  moment	  in	  history,	  that	  moment	  post	  World	  War	  One	  when	  so	  
many	  states	  were	  recognized	  where	  none	  had	  been	  before.	  Yet	  what	  actually	  changed	  in	  Afghanistan?	  
Britain	  agreed	  not	   to	  “meddle”	   in	   its	   foreign	  affairs	  but	  other	  established	  states	   (as	  we	  will	   see	   in	   the	  
next	  chapter)	  refused	  to	  interact	  directly	  with	  Afghanistan	  –	  preferring	  to	  go	  through	  a	  more	  legitimate	  
intermediary	   (at	   the	  urging	  of	  Britain,	   in	   fact).	  Did	  Afghanistan’s	   nature	   change	   in	   any	  way?	  Both	   the	  
informal	   aspect	   of	   the	   formal/informal	   divide	   and	   actual	   practice	   after	   World	   War	   One	   argue	   that	  
despite	  this	  apparently	  pivotal	  moment	  which	  is	  referred	  to	  in	  orthodox	  discourse	  on	  statehood	  (where	  
Afghanistan	   became	   a	   sovereign	   state,	   and	   thus	   able	   to	   fail)	   suggest	   that	   this	   change	   was	   at	   best	  
ceremonial.	  
This	   leads	   to	   the	   final	   question	   posed	   by	   this	   project:	   “how	   do	   particular	   assumptions	   about	  
sovereignty,	  justice	  and	  successful	  statehood	  by	  intervening	  parties	  negatively	  impact	  upon	  attempts	  to	  
understand	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  Afghan	  crisis,	  currently	  conceptualized	  primarily	  through	  the	  discursive	  
lens	  of	  state	  failure?”.	  
Sovereignty	   in	   the	   post-­‐World	  War	   One	   context	  was	   expressed	   as	   an	   inalienable	   right	   of	   the	  
world’s	  polities	  and	  culture	  groups.	  Sovereignty	  was	  also	  conceived,	  then,	  as	  something	  to	  be	  granted	  to	  
these	   groups	   as	   if	   it	  would	  be	  a	   transformative	  moment.	   This	   ceremonial	   handing	  over	  of	   a	   torch	   (of	  
civilization)	   imbued	   sovereignty	  with	   a	   certain	  meaningfulness	   and	   impactfulness.	  While	   suggesting	   it	  
was	   fulfilling	   a	   natural	   right	   of	   peoples	   and	   avoiding	   future	   war,	   this	   granting	   of	   sovereignty	   also	  
validated	  the	  specific	  interpretations	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  sovereign	  that	  became	  dominant	  orthodoxy	  and	  
still	   has	   a	   profound	   impact	   on	   international	   norms	   today.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   fundamentally	  
transformative	  moment	  did	  not	  represent	  an	  actual	  fundamental	  change.	  	  
Perhaps	   more	   important	   in	   this	   case	   is	   the	   binary	   relationship	   packed	   within	   sovereignty.	  
Sovereignty	   is	   at	   the	   same	   time	  absolute	   (power)	   and	   conditioned	   (rights).	   The	   conditionality	   justifies	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the	  absolute36,	  but	  renders	  each	  problematic.	  Here,	  Afghanistan	  was	  seen	  to	  have	  a	  ‘right’	  to	  sovereign	  
power	   –	   thus	   sovereign	   power	  was	   ‘gifted’	   to	   Afghanistan.	   Yet	   if	   sovereign	  power	   is	   absolute,	   it	   can	  
hardly	  be	  given	  because	  that	  implies	  that	  it	  did	  not	  necessary	  have	  to	  be	  given…	  also,	  it	  might	  be	  taken	  
away.	   The	   very	   giving	   of	   sovereignty	   conditions	   it,	   and	   that	   in	   a	   way	   quite	   unlike	   the	   conditionality	  
packed	  into	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  word.	  	  
Arguably	   then,	   what	   was	   “given”	   to	   Afghanistan	   was	   not	   sovereignty	   but	   a	   presumed	   and	  
contrived	   sovereignty.	  A	   simulacrum,	   a	  mimic,	   an	   echo	   that	   is	   not	   quite	   the	   same.	   That	   suggestion	   is	  
made	   more	   powerful	   by	   informal	   ‘knowledges’	   of	   Afghanistan.	   Thus	   this	   foundational	   moment	   of	  
change	  involved	  little	  real	  change	  while	  empowering	  an	  ideological	  shift.	  Indeterminate	  Afghanistan	  was	  
now	  determined	  to	  be	  a	  state,	  part	  of	  the	  state	  system	  with	  all	   the	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  thereof.	  
Yet	   Indeterminate	   Afghanistan	   was	   only	   able	   to	   be	   repositioned	   in	   that	   way	   because	   of	   its	  
indeterminacy,	   and	   its	   indeterminacy	   further	   undermined	   any	   possibility	   of	   imbibing	   that	   sovereign	  
identity	  in	  any	  meaningful	  way.	  
Finally,	  it	  deserves	  mention	  that	  the	  formal/informal	  divide	  is	  itself	  a	  sort	  of	  binary	  construct.	  Its	  
usage	   in	   this	  project	   is	  descriptive	  of	  a	  binary	  mechanism	  which	  was	  being	  discursively	  mobilized	  as	  a	  
way	  of	  determining	  Afghanistan’s	  indeterminate	  nature,	  of	  filling	  up	  its	  emptiness.	  Afghanistan	  was	  not	  
really	  simultaneously	  a	  civilized	  state	  with	  full	  sovereign	  powers	  and	  rights	  while	  also	  being	  a	  savagely	  
uncivilized	   vacuum	   with	   barbarians	   mimicking	   their	   civilized	   betters.	   That	   was	   rather	   a	   way	   of	  
discursively	   placing	   Afghanistan	   so	   that	   it	   was	   understandable	   and	   could	   be	   interacted	   with	   in	   the	  
changing	  context	  of	  an	  evolving	  global	  narrative	  on	  liberal	  statehood	  and	  democracy.	  
The	  formal/informal	  divide	  then	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  stabilize	  inherently	  unstable	  idea	  construct.	  It	  
is	  an	  attempted	  “treatment”	  of	   the	  auto-­‐immune	  “disease”	  afflicting	   these	  typifications	  of	   the	  Afghan	  
identity,	  both	  sovereign	  and	  savage.	  The	  attempt	  cannot	  be	  successful,	  as	   in	   its	  execution	   it	   is	   further	  
proof	  and	  cause	  of	  discursive	  instability	  in	  the	  construct	  of	  Afghan	  identity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36   See  J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970) 
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Chapter  6  –  Cold  War  and  Afghanistan  
	  
“In	  other	  words,	  during	  the	  cold	  war	  the	  states	  of	  the	  ‘Third	  World’	  were	  generally	  viewed	  as	  
‘pieces’	  or	  ‘objects’	  to	  be	  ‘taken’	  or	  ‘lost’	  in	  a	  global	  contest	  between	  the	  US	  and	  the	  USSR,	  as	  
‘bit	  players	  in	  the	  larger	  drama	  of	  superpower	  conflict.”	  	  
Krause	  (1998)	  
	  
Afghanistan  as  a  game-­‐board  on  an  ideological  battlefield.  
Following	  the	  full	  independence	  of	  Afghanistan	  after	  the	  Third	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  came	  a	  period	  
widely	  considered	  a	  time	  of	  progress	  for	  Afghanistan.	  Political	  reforms	  were	  undertaken	  in	  the	  realms	  of	  
secularization,	  education,	  and	  women’s	  rights.	  Following	  World	  War	  II	  Afghanistan	  found	  itself	   in	  what	  
on	   the	   surface	  was	   a	   familiar	   situation:	   	   trying	   to	   find	   a	   balance	   between	   competing	   powers	   seeking	  
influence.	  During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Afghanistan	  tried	  to	  keep	  cordial	  relations	  with	  both	  the	  United	  States	  
(and	   its	  NATO	  allies)	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  while	  accepting	  aid	  packages	   in	  exchange	  for	   influence	  and	  
reforms	  from	  both	  sides.	  Which	  direction	  Afghanistan	  leaned	  more	  toward	  changed	  from	  time	  to	  time	  in	  
a	  balancing	  act	  reminiscent	  of	  several	  other	  South	  Asian	  states	  at	  the	  time	  seeking	  to	  remain	  unaligned.	  	  
This	  balancing	  act	  eventually	  came	  to	  an	  end	  when	  a	  heavily	  pro-­‐Soviet	  government	  came	  to	  power.	  	  
The	   conditions	   of	   that	   rise	   to	   power	   are	   still	   contested	   today,	   with	   competing	   narratives	  
claiming	   it	   was	   a	   primarily	   democratic	   ascent	   or	   that	   it	   was	   a	   Soviet	   sponsored	   coup.	   The	  Western	  
perspective	   suggested	   that	   this	   power	   transition	   came	  by	  way	   of	   Soviet	   sponsored	   coup.	   There	   is	   no	  
hard	   evidence	   today	   to	   answer	   the	   question	   authoritatively,	   and	  Western	   assumptions	   in	   this	  matter	  
rely	   and	   well-­‐entrenched	   and	   recurring	   historical	   understandings	   of	   Russia	   (and	   communism)	   as	  
antithetical	   to	  democracy	  and	   free	  choice.	  Taking	  either	  assumption	  to	  hand	   is	   intrinsic	   to	   the	   idea	  of	  
Afghanistan	  as	  an	  ideological	  battlefield.	  The	  Soviet	  viewpoint	  supposed	  that	  the	  West	  was	  interested	  in	  
economic	  imperialism,	  denying	  a	  nation’s	  sovereign	  right	  to	  throw	  off	  the	  chains	  of	  capitalist	  oppression	  
and	  choose	  socialist	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  The	  Western	  viewpoint	  supposed	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  
only	  the	  most	  recent	  expression	  of	  Russia’s	   long-­‐standing	  expansionist	  and	  authoritarian	  aims.	   In	  both	  
cases,	   the	   narrative	  was	  more	   important	   than	   the	  Afghan	   -­‐	   there	  were	   larger	   questions	   of	   capitalism	  




Accompanying	   this	   political	   transition	  was	   a	  military	   intervention	   by	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   (either	  
friendly	  assistance	  at	  the	  bequest	  of	  the	  Afghan	  government	  or	  a	  de	  facto	   invasion,	  depending	  on	  the	  
narrative	  you	  accept).	  One	  way	  or	  the	  other,	   this	  chain	  of	  events	   led	  to	  an	   insurgency-­‐dominated	  civil	  
war	  in	  the	  late	  1970’s.	  
This	  was	  a	  civil	  war	  which	   the	  United	  States	   involved	   itself	   in	  more	  and	  more,	   from	  money	  to	  
direct	   arms	   shipments	   (which	   grew	   in	   size	   and	   sophistication)	   to	   covert	   training.	   Prior	   to	   this	   time,	  
Afghanistan	   was	   essentially	   unknown	   to	   the	   citizenry	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   There	   were	   a	   handful	   of	  
experts	  who	  interacted	  with	  Afghanistan	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  while	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  (and	  
even	  policy	  makers)	  had	  little	  conception	  of	  what/where/who	  Afghanistan	  was.	  There	  is	  ample	  evidence	  
that	   nascent	   conceptions	   of	   Afghan-­‐ness	   were	   adopted	   from	   the	   British	   as	   both	   a	   conscious	   policy	  
choice	  and	  by	  way	  of	  unconscious	  discursive	  legacy.	  Western	  knowledge	  of	  Afghanistan	  appears	  to	  have	  
been	  largely	  inherited	  from	  dominant	  British	  discourse	  –	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
The	  United	  States	  had	  an	  unsteady	  and	  often	  internally	  inconsistent	  notion	  of	  Afghanistan	  and	  
the	   Afghan	   people.	   This	   is	   suggestive	   of	   the	   formal/informal	   divide	   (and	   continued	   Afghan	  
indeterminacy)	   which	   became	   evident	   toward	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Third	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War.	   There	   was	   a	  
public	  stance	  on	  what	  sort	  of	  government/state/people	  Afghanistan	  represented.	  Then	  there	  was	  a	  less	  
nice,	   but	   perhaps	   more	   ‘believed’	   version	   which	   underlay	   that.	   In	   this	   particular	   case,	   however,	   the	  
public,	   official	   stance	   itself	   morphed	   over	   time.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   the	   initial	   public	   stance	   was	   quite	  
consistent	  with	  the	  British	  official	  stance	  on	  Afghanistan	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Third	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War.	  Yet	  
toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  insurgency	  and	  civil	  war	  this	  had	  shifted	  so	  that	  the	  public	  stance	  on	  Afghanistan	  
looked	  much	  more	  like	  the	  unofficial,	  hidden,	  and	  not	  particularly	  admiring	  notion	  of	  Afghanistan	  which	  
existed	  alongside	  the	  official	  British	  one.	  
A  Step  Back  –  Revisiting  the  “Formal/Informal  Divide”  
One	   of	   the	   challenges	   faced	   in	   this	   project	   lies	   in	   proving	   the	   cohesive	   existence	   of	   a	  
recognizably	   continuous	   discourse	   on	   Afghanistan	   and	   Afghan	   identity.	   This	   difficulty	   is	   substantially	  
increased	  when	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  span	  of	  time	  analyzed	  as	  well	  as	  the	  shift	  from	  a	  British	  to	  
an	  American	  dominant	   ‘voice’.	   This	   shift	   across	   era	   and	   culture	   group	  has	   a	   number	   of	   ramifications.	  
Specifically,	   we	   often	   see	   discourses	   categorized	   by	   era	   and	   by	   dominant	   actor.	   Viewing	   Afghanistan	  
solely	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  it	  would	  be	  very	  tempting	  to	  situate	  it	  primarily	  in	  discourses	  concerned	  with	  
colonialism.	  Considering	  Afghanistan	  solely	  after	  the	  third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  war	  would	  lead	  one	  to	  consider	  
Afghanistan’s	   story	   in	   the	   context	   of	   decolonization	   and	   nascent	   conceptions	   of	   secular	   liberal	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statehood.	  Looking	  only	  at	  this	  section,	  on	  Afghanistan	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  
bi-­‐polar	  international	  systems	  and	  geopolitical	  maneuvering	  in	  that	  context.	  
The	   previous	   two	   chapters	   have	   justified	   their	   place	   in	   this	   dissertation	   by	   examining	   how	  
conceptions	   about	   Afghan-­‐ness	   (and	   how	   those	   conceptions	   made	   possible	   /	   justified	   certain	  
interventions)	   by	   pointing	   out	   ruptures	   in	   discourse	   but	   emphasizing	   the	   importance	   of	   central	  
continuities	  within	  narratives.	  This	  process	  was	  somewhat	  straightforward	  then,	  as	  the	  context	  of	  each	  
of	  the	  three	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  wars	  had	  powerful	  continuities.	  It	  is	  a	  much	  trickier	  proposition	  to	  argue	  that	  
central	  continuities	  exist	  when	  we	  shift	  from	  Britain	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  to	  a	  period	  after	  colonialism	  
was	   formally	  closed	  off,	   to	  a	  period	  when	  Afghanistan	   is	  no	   longer	  considered	  a	  wild	  hinterland	  but	  a	  
legitimate	  state	  in	  a	  world	  system	  wherein	  international	  law	  enshrines	  certain	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  
attached	  to	  sovereignty	  and	  statehood.	  
Yet	   there	   is	   an	   argument	   to	   be	  made	   about	   facets	   of	   understanding	   Afghanistan	   as	   strikingly	  
similar	  to	  what	  was	  experienced	  in	  earlier	  times.	  Parallels	  of	  civility	  and	  barbarism	  as	  well	  as	  particular	  
conceptions	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  as	  the	  Great	  Game	  can	  be	  wielded	  with	  some	  effect.	  Indeed,	  much	  of	  this	  
chapter	  will	   look	   in	  that	  direction.	  That	   is	   fine,	  but	  drawing	  parallels	  can	  be	  done	  with	  nearly	  any	  two	  
discrete	  events	  one	  might	  want	  to	  identify	  through	  history.	  In	  order	  for	  these	  parallels	  –	  which	  certainly	  
exist	   –	   to	   really	  mean	   something	   substantial	   to	   this	   project	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   show	   not	   only	   how	   a	  
coherent,	  cohesive	  narrative	  on	  Afghanistan	  evolved	  from	  the	  third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  war	  to	  the	  Cold	  War	  
era,	   but	   also	   how	   Afghanistan’s	   place	   within	   the	   broader	   Cold	  War	   discourse	   is	   highly	   discrete	   from	  
other	  proxy	  battlegrounds	  as	  a	  result	  of	  that	  narrative	  cohesion.	  
This	   can	  best	  be	  accomplished	   through	  an	  exploration	  of	   the	   formal/informal	  divide.	  One	   can	  
argue	   that	   iterations	  of	   that	  divide	  exist	   in	  many	  particular	  discourses	  on	  a	  whole	   range	  of	   ideas	  and	  
identities.	   That	   is	   true	   –	   and	   we	   can	   link	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   formal/informal	   divide	   to	   impactful	  
deconstructive	   concepts	   such	   as	   the	   simulacrum	   and	   auto-­‐immunity.	   The	   mere	   existence	   of	   a	  
formal/informal	  divide	   in	   the	  discourse	  on	  Afghanistan	   is	  not	  unique	  –	  how	   it	   is	  expressed	  and	  how	   it	  
interacts	   with	   broader	   discourses	   (sovereignty,	   decolonization,	   development,	   democracy	   versus	  
socialism)	  is	  unique	  and	  key	  to	  understanding	  how	  the	  current	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  Afghanistan	  came	  to	  be.	  
Continuity  in  the  Formal/Informal  Divide  
Documentary	  analysis	  of	  US	  government	  wires	  along	  with	  a	  selection	  of	  newspaper	  articles	  from	  
the	  New	  York	  Times	  has	  helped	  bridge	  the	  discursive	  gap	  between	  post	  WWI	  and	  the	  late	  1970’s.	  Here	  
we	  see	  some	  important	  continuities	  in	  thinking	  about	  Afghanistan	  from	  Britain	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  This	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also	  provides	   contemporary	  hindsight	   as	   regards	  America’s	   initial	   encounters	  with	  Afghanistan.	   These	  
analyses	  support	  the	  notion	  that	  Afghan-­‐ness	  was	  essentially	  devoid	  of	   importance	  or	  meaning	  except	  
when	   geo-­‐political	   contexts	   dictated	   otherwise.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   already	   existing	   sense	   of	  
what/who/why	  Afghanistan	  was,	   the	  US	   reached	   into	   Britain’s	   discourse	   in	   order	   to	   fill	   in	   knowledge	  
gaps.	   Here	   we	   have	   strong	   examples	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   indeterminate	   nature	   –	   without	   a	   sense	   of	  
Afghanistan	  as	  a	  place	  having	  its	  own	  important	  identity	  external	  events	  fill	   in	  for	  identity.	  So	  in	  a	  very	  
real	  way,	  America’s	   discourse	  on	  Afghanistan	   is	   the	   ‘spiritual	   successor’	   of	   Britain’s.	   Some	  of	   this	   is	   a	  
product	   of	   direct	   inheritance	   –	   Britain’s	   attitudes	   toward	   Afghanistan	   are	  mentioned	   in	   some	   of	   the	  
earliest	  cables	  and	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  central	  aspects	  of	  British	  narratives	  on	  Afghanistan	  throughout	  
the	  documents	  analyzed.	  
This	   section	   pulls	   text	   directly	   from	   diplomatic	   wires	   and	   newspaper	   articles	   fairly	   heavily	   in	  
order	   to	   show	  continuity	   in	   the	  discursive	   shift	  with	  as	   little	  analytical	  embellishment	  as	  possible.	   For	  
purposes	   of	   diplomatic	   wires,	   which	   will	   be	   discussed	   first,	   all	   excerpts	   are	   in	   chronological	   order	  
beginning	  with	  the	  first	  approach	  of	  Afghan	  officials	  to	  the	  US,	  seeking	  to	  build	  a	  relationship	  between	  
states.	  
	  “Apparently	   we	   have	   hitherto	   had	   no	   relations	   with	   Afghanistan	   directly	   as	   formerly	   our	  
dealings	   with	   that	   country	   were	   through	   Great	   Britain…	   Our	   Embassy	   in	   Paris	   was	   also	  
advised	  by	   the	  British	  Ambassador	  at	  Paris	   that…	   the	  British	  Government	  did	  not	   look	  with	  
favor	  on	  [the	  Afghan	  mission’s]	  activities	  or	  its	  endeavors	  to	  conclude	  agreements	  with	  other	  
Governments	  inasmuch	  as	  Afghanistan,	  although	  ostensibly	  independent,	  was	  still	  within	  the	  
British	  ‘sphere	  of	  political	  influence’”.	  (US	  Department	  of	  State	  1921:	  258)	  
An	   Afghan	   delegation	   was	   received	   at	   the	   White	   House,	   with	   friendly	   but	   inconclusive	   (and	  
informal)	   result.	   In	   an	   official	   follow	   up	   to	   the	   in	   person	  meeting,	   the	   office	   of	   the	   President	   of	   the	  
United	  States	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Afghan	  Amir:	  	  
“It	  is	  my	  wish	  that	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Afghanistan	  may	  always	  be	  of	  
a	   friendly	   character,	  and	   I	   shall	  be	  happy	   to	  cooperate	  with	  Your	  Majesty	   to	   this	  end.	   I	   am	  
constrained,	  however…	  that	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  United	  States	  the	  question	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  
a	  Diplomatic	  Mission	  and	  of	  the	  appropriate	  action	  to	  that	  end…	  must	  be	  reserved	  for	  further	  
consideration.”	  (ibid:	  261)	  
This	  was	  to	  set	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Afghanistan	  and	  the	  United	  States	  for	  over	  
two	  decades.	  Afghanistan	   sought	   cordial	  and	   formal	  diplomatic	   relations	  with	   the	  United	  States	  –	   the	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United	  States	  made	  polite	  noises	  and	  was	  willing	  to	  informally	  interact	  with	  Afghanistan	  but	  no	  formal	  
interstate	  relations	  were	  to	  take	  root.	  This	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  related	  both	  to	  a	  sensitivity	  for	  British	  
preference	  and	  for	  a	  belief	  that	  there	  was	  little	  to	  gain	  from	  relations	  with	  Afghanistan.	  
Four	  years	  passed	  before	  any	  mention	  of	  Afghanistan	   is	  again	   found	   in	   the	  US	  Department	  of	  
State’s	  diplomatic	  cable	  archives.	  At	  this	  point,	  Afghanistan	  approached	  the	  United	  States	  with	  a	  formal	  
proposal	   for	   establishing	   diplomatic	   relations	   to	   include	   a	   draft	   Treaty	   of	   Friendship.	   This	   approach,	  
which	   appeared	   to	   have	   been	   encouraged	   by	   the	   American	   Ambassador	   to	   France,	   received	   an	   off-­‐
putting	  response	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  previous	  approach:	  
“I	  have	  been	  instructed	  to	  convey	  to	  Your	  Excellency	  my	  Government’s	  deep	  appreciation	  of	  
the	   friendly	   sentiments…	   careful	   consideration	  will	   be	   afforded	   the	   draft	   treaty	  which	   you	  
have	  presented.	  I	  need	  not	  assure	  Your	  Excellency	  that	  my	  Government	  recalls…	  the	  visit	  to	  
the	  United	   States	   in	   1921	   of	   the	   Afghan	  Mission…	   assured	  His	  Majesty	   of	   his	   [President’s]	  
wish	   that	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Afghanistan	   might	   always	   be	   of	   a	  
friendly	  character…”	  (US	  Department	  of	  State	  1926:	  559-­‐560)	  
Despite	  assurances	   that	   careful	   consideration	  would	  be	  given	   the	  Afghan	  proposal,	   it	  was	  not	  
until	  another	  eight	  years	  had	  passed	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  formal	  set	  of	  relations	  with	  Afghanistan	  was	  
again	  raised.	  When	  it	  happened,	  it	  came	  once	  again	  as	  an	  overture	  from	  Afghanistan:	  
“I	  have	  the	  honor	  to	  report	  that	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  call	  which	  the	  Afghan	  Minister…	  paid	  
on	  me…	  [he]	  raised	  the	  question	  of	   future	  relations	  between	  the	  Afghan	  monarchy	  and	  the	  
United	   States.	   He	   expressed	   the	   hope	   that	   these	   relations	   might	   be	   established	   on	   a	  
permanent	   basis	   as	   soon	   as	   possible	   and	   that	   to	   that	   end	   a	   treaty	   of	   friendship	   should	   be	  
concluded.”	  (US	  Department	  of	  State	  1935:	  555)	  
However,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  not	  desirous	  to	  bring	  a	  formal	  relationship	  into	  play.	  
“Although	  this	  Government	  is	  not	  averse	  in	  principle	  to	  concluding	  a	  treaty	  of	  friendship	  and	  
commerce	  with	   the	  Government	   of	   Afghanistan,	   it	   considers	   that	   the	   purposes…	  might	   be	  
accomplished	   more	   expeditiously	   and	   satisfactorily	   by	   the	   conclusion	   of	   a	   less	   formal	  
agreement.”	  (ibid	  556)	  
The	  Afghan	  government	  disagreed:	  
“The	  Afghan	  Minister	  called	  yesterday	  stating	  that	  he	  had	  submitted	  the	  matter	  of	  an	  accord	  
to	   his	  Government	  which	  preferred	   a	   formal	   treaty.	   I	   pointed	  out	   that	   the	   ratification	  of	   a	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treaty	  was	   a	  matter	   that	   would	   consume	   considerable	   time…	   In	  my	   opinion,	   this	   counter-­‐
proposal	  [put	  forward	  by	  the	  Afghan	  Minister,	  which	  would	  establish	  formal	  relations]	  need	  
not	  be	  taken	  very	  seriously.”	  (ibid:	  559)	  
A	  certain	  amount	  of	  bickering	  entailed,	  during	  which	  Afghanistan	  agreed	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  
an	   informal	   treaty	  of	   friendship	  and	  commerce	  without	   the	  appointment	  of	   legations.	  However,	  even	  
this	  was	  not	   to	  come	  to	  be	  –	   the	  United	  States	   required	  certain	  wording	   that	   strongly	   suggested	   that	  
Afghanistan	  was	  within	  the	  United	  States’	  sphere	  of	  influence,	  and	  Afghanistan	  refused	  to	  include	  that	  
language	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  preferring	  to	  be	   left	  out	  of	  disagreements	   involving	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  
United	  Kingdom:	  
“…Afghanistan	   desires	   to	   leave	   out	   the	   most-­‐favored-­‐nation	   clause.	   The	   reason…	   for	   this	  
omission	   is	   that	   the	  most-­‐favored-­‐nation	   clause	  was	   omitted	   by	   Afghanistan	   in	   its	   treaties	  
with	  Great	  Britain	  and	  the	  Soviets	  and	  that	  it	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  involve	  itself	  later	  with	  these	  
powers.”	  (ibid:	  560)	  
This	   label	   caused	   the	  entirety	  of	   the	  deal	   to	   fail.	  Although	   the	  State	  Department	  did	   consider	  
relations	  with	   Afghanistan	   formally	   opened	   in	   1935,	   this	   came	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	  US	   Ambassador	   to	  
Tehran	  presenting	  his	  credentials	  to	  the	  Afghan	  government,	  while	  remaining	  based	  in	  Tehran.	  (Office	  of	  
the	  Historian	  2016)	  However,	  an	  actual	  mission	  to	  Afghanistan	  was	  not	  undertaken	  for	  nearly	  another	  
decade.	  In	  this	  way,	  for	  twenty	  years	  from	  the	  first	  time	  Afghanistan	  approached	  the	  United	  States	  the	  
relationship	  was	  kept	  as	  at	  far	  a	  remove	  as	  possible.	  The	  reasoning	  behind	  this	  was	  two-­‐fold:	  on	  the	  one	  
hand	  the	  United	  States	  was	  interested	  in	  avoiding	  any	  insult	  to	  Britain.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  seemed	  
to	  be	  little	  economic	  gain	  to	  be	  found	  in	  Afghanistan.	  (US	  Department	  of	  State	  1921,	  1926,	  1936)	  	  
This	  state	  of	  affairs,	  which	  was	  demonstrably	  unsatisfying	  to	  the	  Afghan	  government,	  held	  until	  
the	   second	   World	   War	   had	   progressed	   to	   a	   very	   troubling	   place.	   In	   1941	   it	   appeared	   as	   though	  
southwest	   Asia	   would	   become	   a	   major	   theater	   of	   operations	   in	   conflict	   over	   resources	   there.	  
Afghanistan	  had	  been	  given	   importance	  once	  again	  by	  the	  specter	  of	  presumed	  geopolitical	  necessity.	  
Even	   here,	   however,	   the	   initial	   instinct	   of	   the	   US	   government	  was	   to	   forego	   setting	   up	   a	  mission	   to	  
Afghanistan,	  preferring	  to	  cement	  a	  formal	  friendly	  relationship	  without	  benefit	  of	  a	  formal	  legation.	  	  




“You	  are	  doubtless	  aware	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  an	  American	  diplomatic	  mission	  has	  not	  been	  
established	   in	   Kabul	   up	   to	   the	   present	   time,	   and	   realize	   the	   unlikelihood	   that	   one	   will	   be	  
established	  in	  the	  future	  so	   long	  as	  our	   interests	   in	  Afghanistan	  continue	  to	  be	  slight…”	  (US	  
Department	  of	  State	  1941:	  256)	  
The	   response	   from	   the	   US	   mission	   in	   Iran	   suggested	   that,	   in	   fact,	   American	   interests	   in	  
Afghanistan	  were	  not	  slight	  at	  all	  –	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  
“I	   venture	   to	   recommend	   the	   immediate	   opening	   of	   a	   Legation	   at	   Kabul	   for	   the	   following	  
reasons-­‐first	   and	   most	   important	   the	   United	   States	   should	   accept	   the	   hand	   of	   friendship	  
offered	   it	   by	   this	   small	   and	   independent	   nation	   in	   keeping	   with	   its	   world	   responsibilities;	  
secondly	  this	  is	  an	  opportunity	  which	  should	  not	  be	  missed	  of	  establishing	  ourselves	  solidly	  in	  
a	  strategic	  position	  in	  Asia…	  It	  may	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  Germany	  has	  established	  herself	  well	  
in	  Afghanistan…”	  (ibid	  259)	  
Officials	  in	  Washington	  acquiesced	  to	  this	  advice.	  	  
“In	  view	  of	   recent	  developments	   in	   the	  Near	  East,	   it	   is	   considered	  highly	  desirable	   that	   the	  
office	  at	  Kabul	  be	  opened	  as	  soon	  as	  possible…”	  (US	  Department	  of	  State	  1942:	  45)	  	  
However,	  there	  was	  still	  resistance	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  setting	  up	  a	  robust	  mission	  to	  Afghanistan.	  At	  
this	  point,	   it	  was	  decided	  to	  appoint	  a	  Charge	  d’Affaires	  rather	  than	  an	  actual	  Minister	  Plenipotentiary	  
who	  could	  act	  as	  a	  true	  head	  of	  mission.	  	  This	  was	  justified	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  appointing	  a	  Minister	  
Plenipotentiary	  would	  be	  far	  too	  time	  consuming.	  Afghanistan,	  however,	  took	  exception	  to	  this,	  seeing	  it	  
as	  an	  insult:	  
“When	  you	  were	  in	  Kabul	  I	  discussed	  with	  you	  the	  wishes	  of	  my	  Government	  concerning	  the	  
opening	  of	  Legations	  and	  exchange	  of	  Minsters	  in	  order	  to	  strengthen	  relations	  between	  our	  
countries.	  The	  views	  of	  my	  Government	  have	  remained	  unchanged.	  It	  is	  the	  usual	  practice	  in	  
Afghanistan	  until	   a	   Legation	   is	  opened	  by	  a	  Minster	  not	   to	  give	   the	  privileges	  of	  opening	  a	  
Legation	  and	  use	  of	  codes	  to	  a	  Military	  Attaché	  or	  other	  person.”	  (ibid:	  48)	  	  
In	   a	  matter	   of	   days	   after	   Afghanistan	   took	   this	   stand,	   President	   Roosevelt	   ordered	   a	   regular	  
Minister	   from	  another	  embassy,	   already	   confirmed	  by	  Congress,	   simply	  be	   reassigned	   to	  Afghanistan.	  
Within	  a	   few	  weeks	  this	  was	  accomplished,	  with	  an	  embassy	  being	  opened	   in	  Kabul	   in	  June	  of	  1942	  –	  
Roosevelt’s	  command	  was	  dated	  March	  16.	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Here	  we	  witness	  a	   reticence	   to	  accord	   full	   respect	   to	  Afghan	  as	   a	   sovereign	   state,	   an	  equal	   –	  
despite	   a	   perception	   that	   with	   the	   strategic	   situation	   in	   the	   region	   the	   United	   States	   “needed”	  
Afghanistan.	  This	  reticence	  could	  only	  be	  expressed	  implicitly,	  informally,	  under	  a	  certain	  formal	  veneer.	  
The	   reticence	  was	   justified	  by	   reference	   to	   logistic	  and	   legal	  difficulties	   –	  difficulties	   that	  disappeared	  
immediately	  when	   it	  was	  clear	  that	  Afghanistan	  would	  refuse	  to	  be	  set	  aside	   in	  this	  manner.	   In	  a	  way	  
this	  is	  similar	  to	  what	  Britain	  faced	  in	  the	  third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  war,	  where	  Afghanistan	  had	  some	  form	  of	  
leverage	   and	   was	   unwilling	   to	   have	   terms	   dictated	   to	   it	   in	   quite	   the	   way	   as	   had	   been	   traditionally	  
assumed.	  	  
On	   the	  whole,	  we	   see	   that	   the	  United	  States	   formally	   treated	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	   sovereign	  and	  
respected/able	  nation.	  Yet	  over	  the	  course	  of	  two	  decades,	  Afghanistan	  approached	  the	  United	  States	  
multiple	   times	   with	   an	   eye	   toward	   opening	   diplomatic	   relations	   on	   the	   same	   footing	   as	   the	   United	  
States	   accorded	   any	   number	   of	   other	   states	   (including	   “Oriental”	   states	   such	   as	   Turkey	   and	   Iran).	   At	  
every	   turn,	   the	  United	  States	  put	  Afghanistan	  off,	   saying	   for	  public	   consumption	   that	   formal	   relations	  
were	   unnecessary	   and	  would	   be	   far	   too	   heavy	   a	   legal	   burden	   to	   undertake.	   Even	  when	   the	   strategic	  
demands	  of	  World	  War	  II	  compelled	  the	  United	  States	  to	  seek	  Afghanistan	  out,	  the	  US	  still	  preferred	  a	  
formal-­‐but-­‐low-­‐ranking	  mission.	  When	  Afghanistan	  refused	  what	  it	  felt	  to	  be	  an	  insult	  to	  its	  character	  as	  
a	  sovereign	  state,	  this	  political	  and	  legal	  process	  that	  the	  United	  States	  had	  regularly	  objected	  would	  be	  
lengthy	  was	   decided	   upon	   and	   enacted	  within	  weeks,	  with	   a	   physical	  mission	   being	   opened	  within	   a	  
matter	  of	  under	  three	  months.	  
When	  we	   lay	   these	   considerations	   alongside	   examination	   particularly	   of	   earlier	   documentary	  
evidence,	  an	   iteration	  of	  the	  formal/informal	  divide	  exposed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  war	  
can	  be	  clearly	  seen.	  Britain’s	  objections	  to	  the	  United	  States	  interfering	  in	  its	  “sphere	  of	  influence”	  and	  
US	  protestations	   that	   there	  were	  not	   sufficient	  economic	   inducements	   to	   involve	   itself	   in	  Afghanistan	  
suggest	   that	   Afghanistan’s	   relevance	   as	   a	   sovereign	   state	   in	   a	   supposed	   international	   community	   of	  
states	  was	  not	  taken	  seriously.	  	  
A	  survey	  of	  newspapers	  during	  those	  decades	  seems	  to	  support	  this	  notion.	  Very	  little	  attention	  
was	   paid	   to	   Afghanistan,	   excepting	   when	   Amir	   (sometimes	   called	   King)	   Amanullah	   was	   the	   focus.	  
Amanullah	  captured	  European	  and	  American	  attention	  because	  he	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  figure	  who	  wanted	  to	  
reform	  his	  backward	  country,	  making	  it	  more	  European	  and	  civilized.	  This	  is	  exemplary	  of	  a	  narrative	  in	  
which	  most	  Afghans	  are	  hopelessly	  barbaric,	  with	  a	   few	  enlightened	  elites	  mimicking	  Western	  norms.	  
Other	  common	  themes	  include	  Afghanistan’s	  relationship	  with	  Russia	  and	  with	  Britain.	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Afghanistan	  became	  newsworthy	  over	   the	  course	  of	  1928,	  when	   the	  Amir	  of	  Afghanistan	  was	  
traveling	  Europe	  to	  promote	  Afghanistan’s	  “modernization”	  –	  during	  which	  time	  a	  coup	  overturned	  his	  
government	  in	  Afghanistan.	  
“…	   the	   Ameer,	   who	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   picturesque	   figures	   of	   the	   Old	   World,	   due	   to	   his	  
vigorous	  Occidental	  reforms	  in	  his	  own	  country…	  [is	  making	  a	  European	  tour	  which]	  is	  closely	  
bound	  with	  Afghanistan’s	  need	  for	  industrial	  expansion”	  (New	  York	  Times	  1928a)	  
And:	  
“King	  Amanullah	  of	  Afghanistan	  during	  his	   visit	   here	   [will	   take	  part	   in]	   a	   stag	  hunt…”	   (New	  
York	  Times	  1928b)	  
There	  was	  a	  tone	  to	  discussion	  of	  Amanullah	  at	  the	  time	  which	   is	  substantively	  similar	  to	  how	  
the	   murdered	   Amir	   Habibullah	   decades	   earlier	   was	   talked	   about.	   It	   appears	   as	   though	   there	   was	   a	  
wistful	   imagining	   that	   some	   few	   Afghan	   elites	   had	   soaked	   up	   Western	   civility	   (or	   perhaps	   more	  
correctly,	  learned	  to	  mimic	  it)	  and	  were	  thus	  a	  very	  interesting	  oddity	  not	  terribly	  dissimilar	  from	  a	  well-­‐
trained	   animal	   at	   the	   circus.	   Amanullah	   was	   praised	   for	   his	   ability	   to	   move	   easily	   among	   European	  
society,	  and	  his	  every	  move	  was	  a	  matter	  of	   interest	  –	  even	  something	  so	  whimsical	  as	  plans	   to	  hunt	  
stag.	  
There	  were	  also	  echoes	  of	  earlier	   tendencies	   to	  connect	  Afghanistan	  and	   its	   stability	  with	   the	  
dangerous	  Russian	  specter.	  There	  were	  rumors	  of	  unrest	  in	  Afghanistan	  (which	  would	  later	  turn	  out	  to	  
be	  well	   founded,	   as	   at	   the	   end	   of	   1928	   a	   coup	  would	   force	  Amanullah	   to	   abdicate	   the	   throne).	   That	  
unrest	  immediately	  brought	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  mind.	  
	  “It	   is	   believed…	   that	   conditions	   in	   Afghanistan	   are	   disturbed	   and	   a	   plot	   of	   some	   kind	   has	  
been	  discovered.	  According	   to	  high	  authority	   these	   conditions	  have	  nothing	   to	  do	  with	   the	  
Soviet	  Government.”	  (New	  York	  Times	  1928c)	  
And:	  
“No	   alliance	   between	   Russia	   and	   Afghanistan	   has	   resulted	   from	   the	   Ameer’s	   sojourn	   at	  
Moscow…	   [instead	   there	   have	   been	   a	   set	   of	   agreements]	   forming	   a	   continuous	   buffer	  
between	  the	  Soviet	  territories	  and	  British	  territory	  in	  Asia.”	  (New	  York	  Times	  1928d)	  
In	   late	  1928,	   following	   the	   completion	  of	  Amanullah’s	   tour	  of	   Europe,	   there	  was	   civil	   strife	   in	  
Afghanistan.	   Amanullah’s	  West-­‐oriented	   reforms	  were	   harshly	   criticized	   by	   certain	   aspects	   of	   Afghan	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society.	  The	  revolutionaries	  are	  typified	  as	  ignorant,	  while	  Amanullah	  himself	  is	  a	  benefactor	  –	  though	  a	  
benefactor	  who	  was	  eventually	  deposed.	  Western	  narratives	  turned	  Amanullah	  into	  a	  hero:	  	  
“I	  feel	  sure	  that	  100	  years	  hence	  a	  monument	  will	  be	  erected	  at	  Kabul..	  to	  King	  Amanullah,	  to	  
commemorate	   his	   patriotism	   and	   great	   reforms…	   the	   priestly	   classes…	   were	   extremely	  
ignorant…	  [and]	  objected	  that	  Amanullah’s	  Westernization	  program	  was	  contrary	  to	  the	  Islam	  
faith.”	  (New	  York	  Times	  1930)	  
Following	  the	  coup	  which	  removed	  Amanullah	  from	  power,	  dozens	  of	  articles	  appeared	   in	  the	  
New	  York	  Times	  over	  the	  next	  two	  years.	  There	  was	  great	  interest	  in	  Amanullah	  himself	  and	  his	  unique	  
position	   as	   a	   modernizer	   and	   friend	   of	   Europe	   who	   was	   viciously	   thrown	   out	   of	   Afghanistan	   for	   his	  
enlightened	  ways.	  Only	  rarely	  is	  Afghanistan	  itself	  referred	  to	  –	  when	  referred	  to	  it	  is	  only	  to	  emphasize	  
the	  strange	  and	  violent	  nature	  of	  the	  place	  with	  little	  exposition	  of	  what	  was	  doubtless	  a	  time	  of	  great	  
internal	   political	   turmoil.	   Needless	   to	   say,	   political	   revolution	   in	   any	   European	   or	   “important”	   Asian	  
country	  would	  have	  been	  covered	  assiduously	  for	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  stateness	  and	  the	  then	  still	  
young	  international	  society	  of	  nations.	  
Transitioning  Narratives  on  Afghanistan  
Narratives	  on	  Afghanistan	   in	   this	   transition	  period	  have	  a	  number	  of	  notable	   features.	   Firstly,	  
Afghanistan	   was	   undertaking	   a	   project	   of	   developing	   its	   infrastructure	   and	   internal	   civil	   and	   political	  
institutions	   over	   this	   period.	  Government	  wires	   spoke	   of	   Afghan	  nationhood	   and	   referred	   to	   a	   vague	  
sense	  of	  friendliness	  toward	  Afghanistan	  (but	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  friendliness	  the	  United	  States	  
would	  feel	  as	  default	  toward	  any	  non-­‐hostile	  nation).	  This	  friendliness	  did	  not	  have	  an	  important	  enough	  
character	  to	  bring	  about	  an	  effective	  relationship	  however	  –	  Afghanistan	  had	  little	  or	  nothing	  to	  offer,	  it	  
was	   still	   more	   or	   less	   a	   British	   protectorate,	   its	   character	   was	  without	   important	  meaning.	   This	   only	  
changed	  when	  the	  strategic	  requirements	  of	  World	  War	  II	  dictated.	  
Popular	   narratives	   toward	   Afghanistan	  were	   heavy	   on	   language	   of	  mysticism	   and	   ‘old	   world’	  
wonder.	   Yet	   the	   country	   itself	  was	   also	   a	  place	   inhabited	  by	   the	  backward,	  by	   the	   ignorant,	   by	   those	  
who	   hated	   progress.	   The	   Afghan	   government’s	   programmes	   were	   situated	   as	   “modernization”	   or	  
“Westernization”	   programs.	   Afghanistan	   was	   seeking	   aid	   in	   becoming	   a	   true	   state	   –	   only	   through	   a	  
program	   of	  Westernization	   could	   Afghanistan	   become	   a	   real	   state	  with	   real	   character.	   The	   only	   true	  
character	   is	  Western	  character.	  These	  notions,	  as	  well	   as	   remnants	  of	  unease	   regarding	  Afghanistan’s	  
relationship	  with	  Russia,	  informed	  attitudes	  toward	  Afghanistan	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  Amir	  cut	  a	  dashing	  and	  
romantic	   figure,	   a	   savage	   king	  who	   sought	   to	   understand	   the	  West	   and	  wanted	   to	  make	  Afghanistan	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more	  European.	  Progress,	  it	  would	  seem,	  is	  impossible	  without	  a	  shift	  toward	  the	  West.	  Civilization	  is	  a	  
Western	  artifact.	  
These	  attitudes	  rest	  naturally	  alongside	  the	  way	   in	  which	  the	  US	  government	  set	  aside	  Afghan	  
approaches	  in	  the	  1920’s	  and	  1930’s.	  Afghanistan	  was	  a	  romantic	  place,	  perhaps,	  but	  one	  without	  real	  
character	  even	  if	  it	  must	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  state.	  Yet	  formally	  treating	  it	  as	  a	  state	  did	  not	  mean	  partaking	  
of	   formal	   interstate	   relations	   –	   relations	   could	   only	   be	   handled	   at	   an	   additional	   remove,	   through	  
delegations	  in	  more	  civilized	  lands.	  (Through	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  1930’s,	  the	  United	  States	  went	  through	  
European	   intermediaries	   to	   treat	  with	   Afghanistan	   –	   after	   that	   conversation	  with	   Afghanistan	   flowed	  
through	  Persia.)	  
Afghanistan	   remains	   typified	   primarily	   by	   its	   indeterminacy.	   Orientalist	   language	   and	  
typifications	  abound	  in	  filling	  up	  the	  character	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  before,	  with	  references	  to	  the	  romantic	  
savage	  being	  prevalent.	  As	  was	  the	  case	  in	  previous	  interactions	  between	  Britain	  and	  Afghanistan,	  that	  
indeterminacy	   and	   the	   specific	   way	   in	   which	   Oriental	   norms	   filled	   in	   for	   an	   Afghan	   “character”	  
empowered	  a	  very	  specific	  power	  relationship.	  The	  United	  States	  understood	  Afghanistan	  to	  be	  a	  state	  
that	  was	  vaguely,	  formally	  just	  there	  but	  not	  particularly	  worthy	  of	  its	  attention.	  When	  outside	  pressures	  
dictate	  US	  /	  Afghan	   interactions,	   there	  was	  a	  sense	  of	  displacement	  –	  Afghanistan	  was	  a	  mystery	  and	  
there	  was	  a	  struggle	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  blanks	  as	  it	  were.	  Not	  only	  is	  this	  typical	  of	  interactions	  between	  Britain	  
and	  Afghanistan,	  but	  the	  way	  that	  the	  United	  States	  filled	  in	  the	  gaps	  looks	  very	  similar	  to	  how	  Britain	  
did	  –	  always	  in	  reference	  to	  something	  else	  which	  was	  better	  known.	  Even	  Orientalist	  archetypes	  were	  
lifted	  from	  other	  places	  where	  they	  were	  more	  well	  established.	  Here,	  Afghanistan	  was	  simply	  one	  more	  
part	   of	   the	   “Old	  World”,	   the	   wild	   and	   unconquered	   periphery	   of	   the	   old	   British	   empire.	   Previously,	  
Afghanistan	  was	  essentially	  a	  more	  savage	  and	  less	  culturally	  useful	  adjunct	  to	  India.	  
This	  emptiness,	  this	  indeterminacy,	  this	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  no	  Afghanistan	  (as	  such)	  shows	  itself	  
in	   the	   narrative	   positioning	   of	   Afghanistan	   in	   both	   the	   Cold	  War	   intervention	   and	   the	   United	   States	  
invasion	   of	   Afghanistan	   following	   Sept.	   11.	   Typifications	   of	   Afghanistan	   in	   both	   cases	   are	   dictated	  
primarily	  by	  the	  perceived	  strategic	  needs	  in	  a	  conflict	  that	  was	  outside	  of,	  larger	  than,	  and	  definitional	  
to	  Afghanistan.	  In	  some	  way	  this	  emptiness	  is	  masked	  by	  a	  tendency	  in	  both	  interventions	  to	  reach	  back	  
to	  British	  interventions	  in	  Afghanistan	  to	  “fill	  in	  the	  gaps”	  of	  discursive	  knowledge.	  
In	  the	  cases	  of	  both	  Britain	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  Afghanistan	  was	  /	  is	  a	  space	  which	  in	  general	  
is	   not	   worth	   thinking	   about	   or	   interacting	   with	   –	   it	   has	   no	   relevance	   in	   the	   normal	   course	   of	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international	   relations	   between	   states.	   That	   very	   emptiness	   has	   positioned	   Afghanistan	   (arguably	  
alongside	  its	  unfortunate	  geographic	  placement)	  as	  primarily	  a	  place	  for	  geostrategic	  competition	  to	  be	  
played	  out	  –	  first	  as	  an	  arena	  for	  the	  Great	  Game,	  then	  for	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  in	  contemporary	  times	  the	  
War	   on	   Terror.	   Afghanistan’s	   identity	   is	   filled	   up	  with	   the	   logics	   of	   these	   geostrategic	   conflicts	   –	   it	   is	  
conflict	  which	  gives	  Afghanistan	  importance	  to	  the	  international	  community	  of	  states	  it	  is	  purportedly	  a	  
part	   of.	   Yet	   it	   is	   Afghanistan’s	   inherent	   separation	   from	   the	   character	   defining	   that	   international	  
community	  of	  states	  which	  empowers	  its	  status	  as	  an	  arena	  of	  conflict.	  Afghanistan	  is	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  
conflict	  –	  it	  is	  merely	  a	  convenient	  place	  for	  conflicts	  far	  larger	  than	  it	  to	  be	  carried	  out.	  	  
Afghanistan  in  the  Cold  War  
In	   the	   aftermath	   of	   World	   War	   II,	   there	   was	   an	   international	   reconsidering	   of	   borders,	  
sovereignty,	  and	  alliances.	   Individual	  state	  sovereignty	  seemed	  to	  be	  gaining	  currency	   in	  some	  regions	  
and	   losing	   importance	   in	  others.	  Afghanistan’s	  place	   in	   this	   changing	   landscape	  was	  uncertain,	  and	  as	  
Cold	  War	   political	  maneuvering	   extended	   to	   ‘unsettled’	   political	   spaces,	   Afghanistan	   gradually	   gained	  
geopolitical	  significance	  once	  again.	  Both	  Soviet	  aligned	  and	  NATO	  aligned	  interests	  interacted	  far	  more	  
heavily	  and	  seriously	  with	  Afghanistan	  than	  the	  country	  had	  perhaps	  ever	  seen.	  Material	  and	  intellectual	  
aid	   transformed	   Afghanistan’s	   social	   landscape	   and	   capped	   off	   what	   at	   the	   time	   seemed	   to	   be	  
Afghanistan’s	  great	  move	  into	  modernization	  and	  “legitimate”	  statehood.	  	  
The	  aid	  was	  a	  means	  of	  wielding	  influence	  as	  a	  weapon	  in	  the	  mostly	  ideological	  ‘warfare’	  of	  the	  
Cold	  War.	  As	  assayed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  an	  ideological	  element	  to	  interventions	  in	  Afghanistan	  has	  
some	   historical	   continuity.	   The	   heightened	   interaction	   with	   and	   interest	   in	   Afghanistan	   resulted	  
ultimately	   in	   occupation	   of	   its	   sovereign	   space	   by	   Soviet	   forces.	   There	  was	   disagreement	   at	   the	   time	  
over	   the	   purpose	   and	   legality	   of	   the	   USSR’s	   involvement,	   but	   in	   the	   logic	   of	   Cold	   War	   geopolitics	  
Afghanistan	   was	   very	   important	   symbolically	   and	   strategically	   to	   both	   Soviet	   and	   NATO	   aligned	  
interests.	  	  
With	   this	   in	  mind	   the	   remainder	   of	   this	   chapter	   considers	   how	  Afghanistan	   and	   the	   resulting	  
conflict	  there	  were	  understood	   in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  American	  government	  and	  public.	  Analysis	  reveals	  a	  
shifting	  set	  of	  narratives	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Afghan	  people	  and	  the	  Afghanistan	  conflict.	  Early	  
on	   there	   is	  an	  emphasis	  on	  heroism	  and	  cross-­‐cultural	   similarity	  between	  Afghanistan	  and	   the	  United	  
States.	   This	   gives	  way	  over	   time	   to	  more	  distant	   and	  often	  disdainful	  notions.	   The	  narratives	  are	   tied	  
together	  by	  discursive	  legacies	  which	  emanate	  from	  British	  ‘knowledges’	  about	  Afghanistan’s	  character	  
and	  nature,	  as	  well	  as	  what	   the	  proper	   time	  for/method	  of	  civilized	   intervention	   into	   this	   ‘wild’	   space	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ought	   properly	   to	  be.	   This	  American	  narrative	  on	  Afghanistan	  during	   the	  Cold	  War	   is,	   for	   the	   sake	  of	  
clarity,	  divided	  into	  governmental	  and	  media	  discourse.	  
	  
Savage  Victim  /  Barbaric  Hero  
Afghanistan	   is	   conspicuous	   primarily	   by	   its	   near	   absence	   by	   way	   of	   governmental	  
documentation	  prior	  to	  the	  Soviet	  invasion	  in	  late	  1979.	  Between	  1976	  and	  1979,	  there	  are	  a	  total	  of	  17	  
government	   documents	   that	   reference	   Afghanistan,	   according	   to	   the	   Catalog	   of	   U.S.	   Government	  
Publications37.	  Over	   the	  next	   four-­‐year	  period	   this	  had	  almost	   tripled,	   to	  43.	  This	  holds	   fairly	  constant	  
until	   1990,	   when	   official	   publications	   drop	   off	   significantly.	   The	   manner	   in	   which	   Afghanistan	   and	  
Afghanis	  are	  cast	  is	  also	  interesting.	  Early	  in	  the	  conflict,	  narratives	  of	  heroism	  are	  prevalent.	  Later	  in	  the	  
conflict	  these	  are	  largely	  missing.	  Early	  in	  the	  conflict,	  these	  narratives	  are	  about	  the	  Afghan	  people	  and	  
freedom	  fighters.	  Later	  in	  the	  conflict,	  the	  narratives	  are	  about	  the	  Afghan	  people	  as	  mujahidin.	  There	  is	  
some	  overlap,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  tipping	  point	  somewhere	  in	  the	  mid	  1980’s.	  Of	  note	  are	  conceptions	  
of	  the	  Aghan	  vs	  conceptions	  of	  the	  mujahidin.	  Early	  on	  in	  the	  conflict,	  there	  was	  not	  even	  a	  mention	  of	  
the	  mujahidin.	  Later,	  Afghan	  and	  mujahidin	  were	  used	  as	  synonyms.	  Contemporarily,	  we	  talk	  about	  the	  
mujahidin	  of	  the	  time	  as	  foreign	  fighters,	  who	  then	  became	  the	  Taliban.	  Throughout	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  
period	   analyzed,	   geopolitical	   considerations	   were	   acknowledged	   as	   a	   primary	   motivator,	   though	  
geopolitics	  and	  questions	  of	  justice/morality	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  cross-­‐over	  at	  this	  time.	  This	  suggests	  an	  
insuperable	   quality	   to	   the	  manner	   in	   which	   Afghanistan	  was	   typified	   as	   a	   land	   of	   heroic,	   if	   barbaric,	  
victims	   and	   Afghanistan’s	   geo-­‐strategic	   importance	   to	   the	   Cold	   War	   ideological	   conflict	   with	  
Afghanistan.	  
Speeches	   made	   by	   government	   officials,	   particularly	   the	   President,	   provide	   insights	   into	  
positioning	   of	   the	   Afghan	   identity.	   Several	   trends	   become	   evident	   in	   speeches	   ranging	   from	   1980	   to	  
1990.	  Early	  speeches	  were	  somewhat	  vague	  and	  confused	  regarding	  the	  specificities	  of	  Afghanistan	  but	  
were	   stark	   clear	   regarding	   Soviet	   issues.	   Further	   into	   the	   1980’s,	   as	   the	   United	   States	   became	  more	  
engaged	  with	  supporting	  anti-­‐Soviet	  forces	  in	  Afghanistan	  the	  tone	  changed	  to	  one	  of	  shared	  patriotism	  
and	  highly	  valorous	  connotations.	  Toward	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  1980’s	  we	  find	  another	  discursive	  shift	  
wherein	  language	  takes	  a	  cold	  and	  clinical	  tenor,	  creating	  distance	  from	  the	  identities/forces	  considered	  
almost	  familial	  previously.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See catalog.gpo.gov 
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Initial	  reactions	  to	  the	  Soviet	  incursion	  into	  Afghanistan	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  Afghanistan	  and	  a	  
lot	   to	  do	  with	   the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Here,	  Afghanistan	   is	  essentially	  a	   characterless	   victim.	   	   (Binder	  1980)	  
Little	   reference	   is	  given	   to	  Afghanistan	  or	   its	   character,	   save	   for	  a	  nod	   to	   their	   “fiercely	   independent”	  
nature.	  (Carter	  1980a)	  This	  first	  speech	  was	  followed	  three	  weeks	  later	  by	  President	  Carter’s	  State	  of	  the	  
Union	  address,	  which	  was	  far	  more	  developed	  in	  terms	  of	  moral	  and	  legal	  arguments	  regarding	  why	  the	  
Soviet	  invasion	  was	  wrong	  and	  therefor	  why	  it	  was	  the	  duty	  of	  the	  West	  to	  intervene.	  Despite	  this	  more	  
articulated	  argument,	   there	   is	   actually	   less	   reference	   to	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  place	  holding	  any	   character.	  
Instead,	  focus	  is	  on	  American	  character.	  
“…tonight,	   as	   throughout	  our	  own	  generation,	   freedom	  and	  peace	   in	   the	  world	  depend	  on	  
the	  state	  of	  our	  Union…	  the	  real	  danger	  to	  their	  [Iran’s]	  nation	  lies	  in	  the	  north,	  in	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	   and	   from	   the	   Soviet	   troops	   now	   in	   Afghanistan38…	   The	   implications	   of	   the	   Soviet	  
invasion	   of	   Afghanistan	   could	   pose	   the	  most	   serious	   threat	   to	   the	   peace	   since	   the	   Second	  
World	  War.”	  (Carter	  1980b)	  	  
Afghanistan	  is	  mentioned	  several	  more	  times	  during	  this	  speech,	  yet	  not	  once	  are	  Afghanistan’s	  
rights	   or	   Afghanistan’s	   character	   referenced.	   Instead,	   all	   mentions	   of	   Afghanistan	   come	   in	   regard	   to	  
strategic	  implications	  in	  a	  struggle	  against	  the	  evil	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  referencing	  back	  to	  American	  
character	  is	  something	  that	  is	  seen	  again	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  President	  which	  follows:	  
“Mr.	  President,	  your	  critics	  say	  that	  the	  Soviets	  are	  moving	  [on	  Afghanistan]	  because	  they’ve	  
seen	  weakness	  on	  your	  part.	  They	  don’t	  believe	  you	  or	  the	  American	  people	  will	  fight…”	  (New	  
York	  Times	  1980e)	  
The	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  isn’t	  about	  Afghanistan	  –	  it’s	  about	  the	  United	  States	  and	  a	  balance	  
of	  power	  between	  the	  US	  and	  the	  USSR.	  This	  theme	  of	  an	  evil	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  gallant	  United	  States	  can	  
be	  found	  in	  popular	  media	  at	  the	  time	  as	  well.	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  (1980a)	  characterizes	  Afghanistan	  as	  
symbolic	   of	   a	  wider	  Muslim	  world	  which	   has	   been	   betrayed	   by	   an	   untrustworthy	  Moscow.	   (More	   on	  
similar	  characterizations	  in	  the	  next	  section.)	  
This	  discursive	  stance	  of	  vagueness	  toward	  Afghanistan	  in	  favor	  of	  self-­‐reference	  would	  quickly	  
give	  way	  to	  a	  sort	  of	  symbolic	  solidarity,	  (though	  it	  would	  come	  out	  again	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980’s).	  
Nine	  further	  Presidential	  speeches	  and	  proclamations	  considered	  Afghanistan	  at	   length.	  Most	  of	  these	  
revolved	   around	   a	   proclaimed	   ‘Afghanistan	   Day’,	   first	   announced	   on	   10	  March	   1982	   as	   a	   symbol	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 This was during the hostage crisis in Iran – the President is making an argument that Iran should be more 
concerned about the USSR’s presence in Afghanistan than anything the U.S. might do. 
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solidarity	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Afghanistan	  in	  the	  fight	  for	  freedom	  against	  Afghanistan.	  	  The	  
first	  four	  proclamations	  on	  ‘Afghanistan	  Day’	  (Reagan	  1982,	  1983,	  1984,	  1985)	  were	  full	  of	  the	  language	  
of	  heroism.	  
“The	  Afghan	  people	  have	  defied	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  have	  resisted	  with	  a	  vigor	  that	  has	  few	  
parallels	   in	  modern	   history.	   The	   Afghan	   people	   have	   paid	   a	   terrible	   price	   in	   their	   fight	   for	  
freedom.	  Yet	  their	  fight	  goes	  on…	  Every	  country	  and	  every	  people	  has	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  Afghan	  
resistance,	  for	  the	  freedom	  fighters	  of	  Afghanistan	  are	  defending	  principles	  of	  independence	  
and	  freedom	  that	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  global	  security	  and	  stability.”	  (Reagan	  1982b)	  
And:	  
“The	  tragedy	  of	  Afghanistan	  continues	  as	  the	  valiant	  and	  courageous	  Afghan	  freedom	  fighters	  
persevere	  in	  standing	  up	  against	  the	  brutal	  power	  of	  the	  Soviet	  invasion	  and	  occupation…	  The	  
Soviet	   forces	   are	   pitted	   against	   an	   extraordinary	   people	   who,	   in	   their	   determination	   to	  
preserve	  the	  character	  of	   their	  ancient	   land,	  have	  organized	  an	  effective	  and	  still	   spreading	  
country-­‐wide	  resistance.	  The	  resistance	  of	   the	  Afghan	   freedom	  fighters	   is	  an	  example	   to	  all	  
the	  world...”	  (Reagan	  1983)	  
And:	  
“We	   stand	   in	   admiration	   of	   the	   indomitable	   will	   and	   courage	   of	   the	   Afghan	   people	   who	  
continue	   their	   resistance	   to	   tyranny.	  All	   freedom-­‐loving	  people	  around	   the	  globe	  should	  be	  
inspired	   by	   the	   Afghan	   people's	   struggle	   to	   be	   free	   and	   the	   heavy	   sacrifices	   they	   bear	   for	  
liberty.”	  (Reagan	  1984)	  
And:	  
“Afghanistan	   Day	   will	   serve	   to	   recall	   the	   fundamental	   principles	   involved	   when	   people	  
struggle	  for	  the	  freedom	  to	  determine	  their	  own	  future	  and	  the	  right	  to	  govern	  themselves	  
without	   foreign	   interference…	   Let	   us	   pledge	   our	   continuing	   admiration	   for	   their	   cause	   and	  
their	  perseverance…”	  (Reagan	  1985)	  
Heroic	   characterizations	   of	   Afghan	   character	   are	   found	   in	   other	   places,	   both	   governmental	  
documents	   and	   popular	   media.	   Those	   characterizations	   are	   often	   accompanied	   by	   something	   which	  
looks	  a	  lot	  like	  a	  call	  to	  action.	  In	  the	  examples	  just	  cited	  that	  call	  to	  action	  is	  quite	  straight	  forward	  –	  in	  
other	  cases	  it	  is	  less	  obvious,	  more	  exemplary.	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“…America’s	  deep	  and	  continuing	  admiration	  for	  the	  Afghan	  people	  in	  the	  face	  of	  brutal	  and	  
unprovoked	  aggression…	  Today,	  we	  recognize	  a	  nation	  of	  unsung	  heroes	  whose	  courageous	  
struggle	   is	   one	   of	   the	   epics	   of	   our	   time.	   The	   Afghan	   people	   have	   matched	   their	   heroism	  
against	   the	   most	   terrifying	   weapons	   of	   modern	   warfare	   in	   the	   Soviet	   arsenal…”	   (Reagan	  
1982a)	  
Also:	  
“But	  we	  should	  not	  be	  too	  surprised	  at	  the	  will	  and	  determination	  of	  the	  Afghan	  people.	  Since	  at	  least	  
the	  time	  of	  Alexander	  the	  Great,	  the	  Afghan	  people	  have	  demonstrated	  their	  extraordinary	  willingness	  
to	   bear	   hardships	   and	   make	   sacrifices	   in	   long	   and	   bitter	   resistance	   against	   foreign	   invaders	   in	   all	  
directions.	   They	   are,	   perhaps,	   the	   original	   national	   liberation	   movement	   in	   the	   true	   and	   most	  
meaningful	  sense	  of	  the	  term.”	  (Kirkpatrick	  1984)	  
These	   praises	   rarely	   exist	   in	   a	   vacuum.	   Alongside	   valorization	   of	   Afghan	   character	   are	   other	  
messages.	   In	   keeping	  with	   the	   internal	   tensions	   found	   in	   the	   formal/informal	   discursive	   structure	   on	  
Afghanistan,	  there	  is	  a	  tension	  in	  how	  these	  praises	  are	  conditioned.	  At	  all	  times,	  these	  praises	  reflect	  in	  
some	  way	  on	  the	  speaker	  and	  the	  audience	  in	  some	  way.	  Often	  there	  is	  reference	  made	  specifically	  to	  
the	  ideals	  of	  the	  United	  States	  which,	  in	  some	  way,	  the	  Afghan	  people	  were	  upholding	  themselves.	  
“Few	  observers	  would	  have	  predicted…	  that	  in	  1982	  the	  Afghan	  people	  would	  still	  be	  fighting	  
for	   their	   freedom,	   and	   more	   strongly	   than	   ever.	   It	   is	   time	   for	   Washington	   to	   make	   the	  
American	  public	  aware	  that	  for	  more	  than	  three	  years	  the	  stubbornly	  independent	  Afghans,	  
struggling	  alone	  and	  almost	  unaided	  against	   the	  Soviet	  Union,	  have	  been	   fighting	  our	   fight.	  
[emphasis	  mine]	  (Klass	  1982)	  
This	  quote	   is	   reflective	  of	  American	   identity	   -­‐	   though	  an	  argument	  might	  be	  made	  that	  all	   the	  
language	   of	   heroism	   is	   intended	   in	   the	   same	   way.	   Afghanistan	   is	   heroic	   not	   because	   it	   is	   a	   land	   of	  
heroes,	  or	  because	  it	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  people.	  Afghanistan	  is	  heroic	  because	  it	  is	  fighting	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  –	  Afghanistan	  is	  doing	  exactly	  what	  America	  had	  built	  the	  entirety	  of	  its	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  identity	  
on.	   To	  be	   sure,	   the	   vile	   depredations	  of	   the	   Soviet	   occupiers	   are	   almost	   universally	   highlighted	   along	  
with	   the	   heroism	   of	   the	   Afghan	   fighters.	   The	   Soviet	   position	   is	   very	   often	   explicitly	   juxtaposed	   to	  
American	   values	   –	   oppression	   versus	   freedom	   –	   and	   Afghanistan	   is	   situated	   as	   aligning	   clearly	   with	  
American	  values.	  
However,	   that	  heroism	   is	  not	  without	   some	  conditioning.	  Not	  only	  do	  we	  see	   the	  valorization	  
and	  the	  sympathy	  for	  victimization	  –	  there	  is	  also	  ample	  reference	  to	  the	  Afghan	  barbaric	  nature.	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“…the	   courage	   and	   determination	   of	   the	   Afghan	   freedom	   fighters	   who	   have	   fought	   so	  
valiantly…	  the	  heroism	  of	  the	  Afghans	  themselves…	  The	  nation	  of	  Afghanistan	  [is]…	  a	  land	  of	  
primitive	   people	   undisposed	   to	   governance…	   fierce	   hostility.	   In	   Afghanistan,	   nationalism	   is	  
essentially	  an	  expression	  of	   tribalism.	   [reference	   is	  made	  to	   the	  Kipling	  verse]	  When	  you’re	  
wounded	  an’	   left	  on	  Afghanistan’s	  plains,	  An’	  the	  women	  come	  out	  to	  cut	  up	  your	  remains,	  
Just	   roll	   to	   your	   rifle	   an’	   blow	   out	   your	   brains,	   An’	   go	   to	   your	   Gawd	   like	   a	   soldier.”	   (Ritch	  
1984)	  
Afghans	  were	  both	  heroic	  and	  savage.	  To	  be	  respected	  but	  also	  to	  be	  feared.	  	  
“It	  was	  a	  country	  that	  seemed	  to	  have	  been	  bypassed	  by	  progress…	  what	  I	  remember	  most	  is	  
not	  the	  backwardness	  and	  poverty	  but	  the	  harsh	  beauty	  of	  this	  strange	  and	  haunting	  land…	  I	  
think	  of	  them,	  of	  their	  independence	  and	  passion	  and	  open-­‐heartedness,	  and	  I	  wonder	  how	  
they	  are,	  and	  where	  they	  are.”	  (Carlson	  1980)	  
This	  confusing	  state	  of	  affairs	  was	  best	  explained	  by	  reaching	  back	  to	  British	  understandings	  of	  
Afghanistan.	   This	   was	   the	   case	   in	   both	   official	   governmental	   discourse	   and	   in	   the	   popular	   media.	   A	  
Congressional	   report	   in	   1982	   spoke	   of	   the	   history	   of	   the	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   wars	   and	   how	   the	   fractious	  
Afghan	  tribes,	  unable	  to	  agree	  on	  anything	  like	  a	  government	  in	  normal	  times	  would	  nevertheless	  come	  
together	   to	   fight	   off	   invaders.	   (US	  Congress	   1982)	  Very	   specific	   language	   is	   used	   as	  well,	  which	   looks	  
familiar:	  
“Afghanistan	  is	  indeed	  full	  of	  bellicose	  tribesmen	  with	  a	  long	  tradition	  of	  successful	  resistance	  
against	  foreigners…	  Moslems,	  more	  than	  most,	  also	  admire	  martial	  strength…	  Moslem	  mobs	  
reveal	  as	  much	  realpolitik	  as	  unguided	  fanaticism	  in	  their	  outbursts.”	  (Luttwak	  1980)	  
This	  resonates	  strongly	  with	  British	  narratives	  equating	  prestige	  and	  strength	  when	  dealing	  with	  
barbaric	  Orientals.	   	  Afghans	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  simple	  people,	  savage	  and	  unsophisticated	   in	  their	  
tastes	  but	  very	  jealous	  of	  their	  freedom.	  During	  the	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  wars	  this	  was	  justification	  for	  treating	  
Afghans	  with	  a	   firm	  hand	  and	  explanation	   for	  why	  at	   times	  Afghan	   fighters	   seemed	   far	  more	  capable	  
than	   one	   might	   expect	   from	   savages.	   In	   this	   Cold	   War	   era,	   Afghan	   savagery	   explains	   how	   freedom	  
fighters	  are	  able	  to	  keep	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  at	  bay…	  but	   it	  also	  serves	  to	  separate	  out	  Afghan	  character	  
from	  American	  character.	  That’s	  a	  handy	  trick,	  particularly	  in	  that	  earlier	  examples	  of	  narrative	  tended	  
to	  draw	  Afghan	  and	  American	  character	  quite	  closely	  together	  –	  another	  example	  of	  tension	  internal	  to	  
this	  discourse	  on	  Afghan-­‐ness.	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“After	   four	   years	  of	   brutal	   occupation,	   that	   primitive	   society	   remains	  unpacified…	  The	  wild	  
card	   in	   this	   speculation	   [that	  Soviet	  advance	   to	   the	  Persian	  Gulf	   is	   inevitable]	   is	   the	  Afghan	  
resistance.	  Neither	   imperial	  Britain	  nor	  czarist	  Russia	  was	  able	   to	   turn	  these	  tribesmen	   into	  
docile	   subjects.	   A	   marveling	   Churchill	   wrote	   in	   1897:	   “Every	   influence,	   every	   motive,	   that	  
provokes	  the	  spirit	  of	  murder	  among	  men,	  impels	  these	  mountaineers	  to	  deeds	  of	  treachery	  
and	   violence…	   to	   the	   ferocity	   of	   the	   Zulu	   are	   added	   the	   craft	   of	   the	   Redskin	   and	   the	  
marksmanship	   of	   the	   Boer.	   Soviet	   experience	   has	   confirmed	   Churchill’s	   grudging	   tribute.”	  
(New	  York	  Times	  1984a)	  	  
This	  is	  a	  tribute	  to	  Afghan	  independence	  as	  well	  as	  a	  hearkening	  back	  to	  the	  old	  Great	  Game	  and	  
British	  representations	  of	  Afghan-­‐ness	  –	  finding	  those	  old	  archetypes	  to	  be	  wise	  and	  true	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  
What’s	  more,	   this	   reference	   to	   the	   Great	   Game	   is	   hardly	   unique.	   Particularly	   toward	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
1980’s	  there	  was	  a	  narrative	  shift	  –	  the	  tension	  within	  narratives	  on	  Afghan-­‐ness	  had	  been	  temporarily	  
resolved	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  created	  distance	  from	  American-­‐ness	  and	  Afghan-­‐ness.	  
By	   the	   late	   1980’s,	   sympathy	  with	   the	   Afghan	   plight	   had	   receded.	   No	   longer	  were	   narratives	  
extolling	   the	   virtues	   of	   the	   heroic	   Afghan	   –	   they	   were	   talking	   about	   cold	   analyses	   of	   power	   with	  
Mujhadin	   as	   one	  more	   faction	  more	   or	   less	   synonymous	  with	   Pakistan	   in	   importance.	   These	   factions	  
could	  be	  set	  aside	   in	  a	  manner	  that	  allowed	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  negotiate	  over	  
the	   future	   of	   Afghanistan,	   with	   the	   ultimate	   goal	   on	   the	   United	   States’	   part	   being	   to	   remove	   both	  
powers	  from	  association	  with	  Afghanistan	  and	  allow	  the	  Mujahidin,	  Pakistan,	  and	  perhaps	  presumably	  
Afghans	  themselves	  (though	  Afghan	  natives	  receive	  little	  to	  no	  mention	  by	  now)	  to	  determine	  the	  fate	  
of	  that	  beleaguered	  country.	  	  
This	  narrative	  shift	  is	  on	  one	  level	  a	  return	  to	  initial	  reactions	  to	  the	  USSR	  invasion/intervention	  
in	  Afghanistan.	  Focus	  is	  taken	  away	  from	  the	  Afghans	  and	  centered	  on	  the	  USSR	  (though	  this	  might	  be	  
seen	  now	  as	  more	  pro-­‐active	  as	  compared	  to	  where	  it	  was	  previously	  re-­‐active).	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  in	  
the	  early	  1980’s	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  somehow	  not	  talked	  about.	  Rather,	  Afghanistan	  in	  the	  early	  80’s	  
was	  assigned	  a	  certain	  identity	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  –	  which	  is	  explored	  in	  the	  next	  section	  and	  
is	  connected	  to	  what	  this	  section	  has	  already	  talked	  about.	  Afghanistan	  in	  the	  later	  80’s	  was	  no	  longer	  
the	   object	   of	   narratives,	   however	   –	   rather	   it	   was	   very	   straight	   forwardly	   just	   a	   place	  where	   a	   larger	  
narrative	   was	   playing	   out.	   In	   the	   next	   section	   we	   explore	   how	   this	   game-­‐board	   typification	   actually	  
empowered	  and	  informed	  typifications	  of	  the	  Afghan	  as	  a	  savage	  hero.	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It	   seems	   that	  how	   the	   two	   concepts	   interplay	  with	  one	  another	   is	   suggestive	  of	   a	   completely	  
different	  discursive	  focus.	  Situating	  Afghans	  as	  (heroic,	  barbaric)	  victims	  of	  Soviet	  aggression	  reminded	  
Americans	   that	   the	   character	   of	   America	   –	   its	   identity	   and	   great	   value	   –	   depended	   on	   resisting	   the	  
ideological	   evils	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   represented.	   When	   the	   United	   States	   had	   become	   actively	  
involved	  in	  the	  Afghan	  crisis,	  the	  Afghans	  themselves	  no	  longer	  needed	  to	  be	  put	  into	  a	  sympathetic	  role	  
–	   a	   role	   which	   there	   is	   some	   discursive	   precedent	   for	   but	   which	   is	   a	   relatively	   uneasy	   fit.	   Instead,	  
Afghanistan	  is	  able	  to	  be	  placed	  back	  into	  its	  normal	  role	  of	  a	  non-­‐space	  in	  the	  margins.	  
“Finally,	   the	   success	   of	   U.S.	   policy	   in	   Afghanistan	   is,	   in	   large	  measures,	   attributable	   to	   the	  
sustained,	  bipartisan	  support	  for	  that	  policy	  in	  Congress.	  Our	  ultimate	  success	  in	  ending	  the	  
Soviet	  occupation	  and	  restoring	  Afghanistan	  to	  the	  Afghan	  people…”	  (Tinker	  1988:	  p9)	  
The	   conflict	   in	  Afghanistan	  ended	   in	  a	   victory	   –	  but	  a	   victory	   for	   the	  United	  States.	  With	   that	  
victory,	  there	  was	  little	  more	  to	  do.	  
“When	   American	   policy	   makers	   are	   asked	   [if	   the	   US	   should	   continue	   to	   care	   about	  
Afghanistan	  after	  the	  USSR	  pulled	  out],	  there	  is	  an	  almost	  standard	  reply.	  The	  United	  States	  
wants	   the	   installation	   of	   a	   stable,	   non-­‐aligned	   representative	   government…	   the	   stability	   of	  
the	  region,	  particularly	  of	  Pakistan,	  is	  at	  stake.	  But	  they	  also	  say	  Afghanistan	  has	  little	  intrinsic	  
strategic	  significance.”	  (Sciolino	  1989)	  
This	  article	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  manner	   in	  which	  the	  US	  was	  distancing	   itself	   from	  the	  
future	  of	  Afghanistan,	  largely	  handing	  off	  its	  concern	  for	  the	  situation	  there	  to	  a	  local	  proxy	  (Pakistan).	  
This	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  process	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Accords,	  wherein	  Pakistan	  itself	  was	  a	  signatory	  along	  with	  the	  
Soviet-­‐backed	  Afghan	  regime.	  Afghan	  freedom	  fighters	  and	  Mujahideen	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  accords	  
–	  from	  the	  US	  perspective	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Afghan	  state	  was	  to	  be	  decided	  by	  a	  Soviet	  proxy	  and	  a	  US	  ally.	  
This	  was	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  quite	  amenable	  to	  Pakistan,	  which	  saw	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  potential	  client	  state	  
(rather	  than	  a	  victimized	  space	  deserving	  of	  justice	  and	  a	  sovereign	  future).	  
“We	  have	  earned	  the	  right	  to	  have	  a	  very	  friendly	  regime	  in	  Kabul.	  We	  won’t	  permit	  it	  to	  be	  
like	  it	  was	  before…	  It	  will	  be	  a	  real	  Islamic	  state,	  part	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Islam	  revival,	  that	  will	  one	  day	  
win	   over	   the	   Moslems	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   you	   will	   see.”	   (Interview	   of	   Pakistani	   Gen.	  
Muhammad	  Zia	  ul-­‐Haq,	  in	  New	  York	  Times	  1989a)	  
From	  that	  point,	  the	  United	  States	  essentially	  dismissed	  Afghanistan,	  which	  would	  return	  to	  the	  
status	   of	   an	   unknown	   and	  wild,	   savage	   land	   until	   events	   in	   the	   late	   1990’s	   and	   then	   Sept.	   11,	   2001	  
would	   bring	   it	   back	   into	   stark	   focus.	   Rather	   than	   follow	   on	   with	   a	   concern	   about	   Afghan	   rights	   to	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sovereignty	  and	   justice,	   the	  US	  saw	   its	   job	  as	  done	  once	   it	  defeated	   the	  Soviet	   invasion	   (which	   it	  was	  
narratively	  positioned	  to	  have	  been	  somehow	  solely	  responsible	  for).	  Thus	  we	  see	  that	  this	  concern	  for	  
Afghan	   sovereignty	   and	   distress	   at	   the	   victimization	   of	   the	   Afghan	   people	   must	   be	   seen	   only	  
contextually	  within	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  –	  which	  was	  referred	  to	  fairly	  widely	  even	  at	  that	  point	  as	  a	  
reiteration	  of	  the	  Great	  Game.	  
Westphalian  Sovereignty  and  the  Third  World  
Clapham	   (1999)	   has	   set	   out	   an	   analysis	   of	   how	   so-­‐called	   third	   world	   states	   dealt	   with	  
sovereignty.	   He	   approaches	   it	   from	   a	   fairly	   orthodox	   position	   at	   a	   time	   when	   international	   security	  
scholarship	  was	  struggling	  to	  identify	  causes	  and	  cures	  of/for	  state	  failure.	  	  
For	   Clapham,	   third	  world	   states	   have	   a	   particular	   relationship	  with	   the	  notion	  of	   sovereignty.	  
Referring	  both	  to	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Westphalia	  and	  colonial	  practices	  emanating	  from	  Europe,	  he	  identifies	  
sovereignty	  as	  a	  primarily	  European	  construct,	  designed	  primarily	  for	  European	  states.	  	  
“Westphalian	   sovereignty	   provided	   the	   formula	   under	   which	   territories	   did	   not	   ‘count’	   as	  
states	  according	  to	  the	  criteria	  adopted	  by	  the	  European	  state	  system…”	  (Clapham	  522)	  
This	  speaks	  to	  the	  history	  of	  the	  sovereignty	  construct,	   though	  there	  has	  been	  something	  of	  a	  
turnabout	   with	   the	   end	   of	   colonialism.	   Sovereignty,	   Clapham	   says,	   has	   been	   particularly	   strongly	  
embraced	   by	   states	   of	   the	   third	   world,	   even	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   trying	   to	   expand	  what	   is	  meant	   to	   be	  
protected	   under	   sovereign	   considerations.	   He	   points,	   for	   instance,	   to	   the	   Charter	   of	   Economic	   Rights	  
and	   Duties	   of	   States	   adopted	   by	   the	   UN	   General	   Assembly	   in	   1974,	   wherein	   sovereign	   rights	   and	  
responsibilities	  of	  states	  were	  extended	  toward	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  global	  economy	  (and	  practices	  of	  
economic	  relations).	  (ibid	  523)	  
As	  a	  whole,	  Clapham	  argues	  that	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  third	  world	  states	  
often	  enthusiastically	  embraced	  sovereignty	  as	  a	  survival	  tactic.	  
“Sovereignty	  was,	  moreoever,	   far	  more	   critical	   as	   an	   instrument	   of	   state	   consolidation	   for	  
third	   world	   states	   in	   the	   Cold	   War	   era,	   than	   it	   had	   been	   even	   during	   its	   heyday	   in	   early	  
modern	   Europe…	   third	   world	   rulers…	   were	   often	   heavily	   dependent	   on	   the	   outside	   world	  
both	  for	  their	  artillery	  and	  for	  their	  bureaucracy…	  economic	  resources…	  sovereignty	  was	  all	  
the	  more	  important	  as	  a	  device	  for	  asserting	  a	  measure	  of	  autonomy	  from	  the	  very	  external	  
states	  and	  other	  international	  actors	  to	  which	  they	  were	  subordinate.”	  (ibid	  526)	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However,	  Clapham	  argues,	  within	   this	   sovereignty-­‐as-­‐defense	  mechanism	  was	   the	   seeds	  of	   its	  
own	  destruction.	  It	  relied	  on	  external	  actors	  (already	  deemed	  “above”	  them	  by	  the	  author)	  continuing	  
to	   respect	   third	   world	   sovereignty	   claims.	   It	   also	   relied	   on	   internal	   stability	   in	   states	   which	   often	  
struggled	   to	   stave	   off	   the	   bugbears	   of	   autocracy	   and	   misgovernment.	   (ibid	   530)	   This	   has	   led	   to	   a	  
situation	   wherein	   the	   formality	   of	   sovereignty	   remains,	   but	   situations	   on	   the	   ground	   are	   somewhat	  
different.	  
“…in	  most	  of	   the	  Third	  World…	  the	   formal	  attributes	  of	   sovereignty	   remain	   in	  place…	  Most	  
states	   continue	   to	   maintain	   formal	   representation	   at	   the	   United	   Nations…	   most…	   of	   the	  
mechanisms	  through	  which	  the	  autonomy	  of	  states…	  has	  been	  reduced	  continue	  to	  operate	  
in	  ways	  which	  respect	  at	  least	  the	  fig-­‐leaf	  of	  national	  sovereignty…”	  (ibid	  530)	  
Eventually,	  argues	  Clapham,	  the	  untenable	  nature	  of	  domestic	  polity	   in	  former	  colonies	  would	  
prove	   too	  much	   for	  most	   of	   the	   Third	  World.	  Misgovernment	   alongside	   societal	   dysfunction	   from	   an	  
often	  poorly	  managed	  decolonization	  process	  set	  up	  most	  of	  these	  states	  to	  fail.	  
In	  a	  way,	  then,	  the	  ‘third	  world’	  wasn’t	  ready	  for	  sovereignty,	  but	  was	  obliged	  by	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  
Cold	  War	  to	  embrace	  sovereignty	  tightly.	  The	  adherence	  to	  formal	  trappings	  of	  sovereignty	  went	  a	  long	  
way	  toward	  disguising	  internal	  dysfunctions	  which	  were	  eating	  away	  at	  the	  state	  apparatus,	  until	  a	  time	  
came	  when	  state	  after	  state	  began	  to	  collapse.	  
This	   is	   indicative	   of	   underlying	   assumptions	   that	   this	   project	   has	   attempted	   to	   bring	   to	   light	  
through	   a	   historical	   discourse	   analysis	   in	   Afghan	   relations.	   Clapham	   assumes	   that	   sovereignty,	   for	  
whatever	  reason,	   is	   for	  some	  and	  not	  for	  others.	   In	  this	  case,	  the	  majority	  of	  third	  world	  states	  which	  
embraced	  the	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	  were	  simply	  not	  ready	  for	  it	  –	  and	  the	  blame	  was	  both	  individuated	  
and	  systemic.	  The	  process	  of	  decolonization	  created	   significant	   internal	   tensions	   in	   states	  which	  were	  
often	   created	  with	   little	   historical	   or	   identity-­‐based	   logic.	   Logics	   of	   the	   Cold	  War	   obliged	   third	  world	  
states	  to	  cling	  tight	  to	  the	  formal	  protection	  of	  sovereignty	  in	  a	  system	  of	  international	  relations	  where	  
Great	  Powers	  were	  at	   conflict,	   and	   third	  world	   states	  were	  pawns	   in	   that	   game.	  But	  also,	  elites	  were	  
simultaneously	  unwilling	  and	  unable	  to	  govern	  well	  –	  and	  were	  able	  to	  hide	  both	  their	  corruption	  and	  
their	  incompetence	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  sovereignty.	  
This	   shows	  strong	  continuity	  with	   the	  notion	  highlighted	   in	   the	   third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  war	  of	   the	  
desire	  for	  sovereignty	  as	  mimicry.	  Third	  world	  states	  were	  simply	  not	  able	  to	  exercise	  sovereignty,	  but	  
insisted	  on	  doing	  so	  anyway	  (in	  mimicry	  of	  and	  warding	  protection	  from	  their	  ‘betters’,	  as	  Clapham	  put	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it).	  This	  also	  connects	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  formal/informal	  divide.	  Formally,	  sovereignty	  must	  be	  respected	  
with	   these	   third	  world	   states.	   Informally,	   it	   is	   known	   that	   they	  are	  unable	  and	  unwilling	   to	  wield	   true	  
sovereignty.	  Thus	  they	  continued	  to	  be	  pawns	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  thus	  they	  began	  to	  fail	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  Cold	  War	  when	  their	  betters	  no	  longer	  worked	  to	  prop	  them	  up.	  	  
Rather	   than	   criticize	   this	   viewpoint	  here,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   take	   it	   as	   somewhat	   representative	  of	  
orthodox	  scholarship	  regarding	  the	  mysterious,	  marginal	  third	  world	  during	  the	   latter	  Cold	  War	  and	  in	  
its	  aftermath.	  In	  this	  light,	  Afghanistan	  had	  a	  sovereignty	  which	  was	  recognized	  formally.	  Both	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	   and	   the	   United	   States	   formally	   respected	   that	   sovereignty	   –	   for	   the	   USSR	   they	  were	   there	   on	  
request	  of	   the	   legitimate	  government	  of	  Afghanistan	   to	  help	  defend	  against	   foreign	   interference.	  The	  
United	  States	  saw	  the	  Soviet	  presence	  there	  as	  initiating	  an	  illegitimate	  coup,	  and	  the	  freedom	  fighters	  /	  
mujahideen	  represented	  Afghans	  with	  a	  true	  claim	  to	  sovereign	  rights.	  Yet	  those	  formal	  concerns	  were	  
suborned	  to	  the	  logics	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and,	  once	  there	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  geopolitical	  reason	  to	  intervene,	  
Afghanistan	  was	   left	   to	  exercise	   its	  sovereignty	  as	  best	   it	  could	  without	  real	   regard	  to	  the	  effects	   that	  
those	  external	  interventions	  had	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  any	  real	  exercise	  of	  sovereignty.	  
Afghanistan’s	   right	   to	  sovereignty	  was	  central	   to	   the	   ideological	   struggle	  of	   the	  Cold	  War.	  The	  
United	  States	  and	  its	  NATO	  allies	  stood	  for	  a	  liberal-­‐democratic-­‐capitalist	  ideology,	  wherein	  sovereignty	  
and	  self-­‐determination	  were	  fundamental	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  international	  state	  system.	  This	  did	  
not	  mean	  that	  they	  took	  on	  some	  sort	  of	  moral	  or	  ethical	  responsibility	  for	  the	  success	  of	  every	  state	  in	  
the	   system	  –	  part	  of	   self-­‐determination	   in	   that	   formulation	   includes	   the	  possibility	  of	   failure.	   For	   that	  
ideological	   stance,	   however,	   that	   failure	   could	   not	   be	   allowed	   to	   come	   about	   from	   the	   Soviet	  Union.	  
Thus,	   the	   ideological	  conflict	  of	   the	  time	  was	  such	  that	  certain	  discursive	   legacies	  about	   the	  nature	  of	  
Afghanistan	   were	   hidden	   behind	   the	   formality	   of	   sovereignty	   as	   particularly	   conceptualized	   in	   that	  
particular	  historical	  context.	  	  	  
Afghanistan  as  Game  Board  
References	  to	  Afghanistan	  in	  a	  strategic	  sense	  have	  already	  been	  quite	  obvious	  in	  the	  section	  on	  
savagery,	   victimhood	   and	   heroism.	   Afghanistan’s	   heroism,	   indeed,	   relies	   on	   the	   willingness	   of	   the	  
Afghan	  people	  to	  act	  as	  de	  facto	  allies	  to	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  ideological	  struggle	  against	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  and	  communism.	  Ideology	  has	  become	  a	  major	  part	  in	  how	  conflicts	  are	  positioned	  in	  Afghanistan	  




Afghanistan’s	  sovereign	  rights	  are	  only	  brought	  up	  in	  order	  to	  chide	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Outside	  of	  
that	   context,	   Afghanistan	   is	   only	   discussed	   as	   a	   puzzle	   piece.	   Part	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   game.	   Either	   a	  
strategic	   piece	   to	   be	   used,	   or	   a	   piece	   under	   attack	   from	   the	   USSR,	   or	   a	   piece	   that	   can	   /	   should	   be	  
manipulated	  and	  see	  its	  nature	  altered	  for	  its	  own	  benefit.	  
“The	  nation	  of	  Afghanistan	  was	  delineated	  by	  the	  famous	  ‘Great	  Game’	  of	  nineteenth	  century	  
geopolitics…	  a	  land	  of	  primitive	  people	  undisposed	  to	  governance…	  became	  a	  buffer.”	  (Ritch	  
1984)	  
In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Cold	  War	   era,	   Afghanistan’s	   neutral	   status	   is	   actually	   denigrated,	   with	  
much	  made	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  going	  “back	  and	  forth	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Soviet	  Union	  for	  aid”;	  
when	   one	   wasn’t	   willing	   to	   give	   some	   type	   of	   needed	   aid,	   Afghanistan	   turned	   elsewhere.	   Despite	   a	  
healthy	  wariness	  of	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  possible	  aggression,	   turning	   to	   the	  USSR	   for	  aid	  opened	  the	  
door	   to	   Soviet	   encroachment.	   (ibid:	   5-­‐6)	   As	   such,	   Afghanistan’s	   unwillingness	   to	   pick	   a	   side	   and	  
foolishness	  in	  associating	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  to	  blame	  for	  their	  current	  troubles.	  
Afghan	   victimhood	   (and	   the	   Afghan	   status	   of	   hero)	   is	   ultimately	   subordinated	   to	   strategic	  
considerations.	  Clinical	  language	  describes	  the	  strategic	  situation	  -­‐“In	  many	  ways	  1987	  can	  be	  described	  
as	   the	   year	   of	   the	   mujahidin,	   a	   year	   in	   which	   the	   resistance	   began	   to	   seize	   the	   initiative	   from	   the	  
Soviets.”	  (Karp	  1987:	  2)	  With	  these	  barbaric,	  but	  useful,	  agents	  on	  the	  ground	  the	  United	  States	  could	  
concentrate	  on	  funneling	  them	  some	  material	  support	  but	  more	  substantively	  put	  political	  pressure	  on	  
the	  USSR	  to	  withdraw,	  which	  would	  be	  the	  United	  States’	  main	  contribution	  to	  supporting	  Afghanistan.	  
(ibid:	  22)	  
In	  a	  way,	  this	  was	  cast	  as	  a	  return	  to	  a	  more	  natural	  order	  of	  things.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  its	  
allies	  could	  withdraw	  to	  a	  more	  comfortable	  position	  of	  applying	  political	  pressure	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  
to	  cease	  misbehaving.	  Pakistan,	  as	  a	   local	  ally	  acting	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  could	  bargain	  
directly	   with	   the	   USSR’s	   puppet	   regime	   in	   Afghanistan.	   The	   Mujahidin	   movement	   –	   despite	   being	  
fractured	  and	  at	  internal	  conflict	  -­‐	  both	  added	  violent	  pressure	  to	  the	  question	  and	  stood	  up	  directly	  for	  
the	  oppressed	  Afghan	  people.	  (Tinker	  1988)	  Rather	  than	  settle	  questions	  as	  to	  Afghanistan’s	  character	  in	  
the	   international	   system,	   the	  United	  States	  deemed	  disengagement	   the	  better	  option,	   supposing	   that	  
violent	   opposing	   factions	   it	   helped	   to	   create	   and	   arm	  within	   Afghanistan	  would	   sort	   it	   out	   somehow	  
although	   the	   greater	   proportion	   of	   those	   factions	  were,	   in	   fact,	   foreign	   to	   Afghanistan.	   	   Rather	   than	  
meaningfully	  engage	  with	  an	  actual	  Afghan	  future,	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  Afghanistan	  was	  only	  of	  interest	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when	   it	   was	   an	   ideological	   battleground	   with	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   As	   the	   conflict	   died	   down	   and	   the	  
position	  of	  the	  USSR	  weakened,	  so	  did	  talk	  of	  brotherhood,	  enlightenment,	  and	  salvation.	  
There	   was	   considerable	   narrative	   pressure	   for	   the	   United	   States	   to	   find	   ways	   to	   support	  
Afghanistan	  (and	  it	  was	  not	  pre-­‐ordained	  that	  this	  aid	  would	  come	  only	  by	  way	  of	  political	  pressure	  and	  
covert	  material	  support).	  Old	  ‘Great	  Game’	  metaphors	  were	  drawn	  on	  heavily,	  as	  were	  comparisons	  to	  
Vietnam.	  (Luttwak	  1980,	  Gwertzman	  1979,	  Pipes	  1980,	  Taubman	  1980,	  New	  York	  Times	  1984a)	   In	  this	  
iteration,	  it	  was	  a	  moral	  imperative	  that	  the	  United	  States	  resist	  Soviet	  aggression.	  
“The	  Russians	  have	  torn	  it.	  They	  have	  defied	  the	  unwritten	  code	  that	  a	  generation	  of	  Soviet	  and	  
American	  leaders	  had	  evolved	  to	  contain	  their	  global	  rivalry.”	  (Times	  1980c)	  
Here,	  the	  author	  asked	  what	  lay	  broken	  in	  Afghanistan.	  He	  answered	  this	  question	  in	  saying	  that	  
by	  invading	  Afghanistan,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  betrayed	  the	  United	  States	  and	  brought	  the	  world	  to	  the	  brink	  
of	  catastrophe.	  Others	  take	  it	  further:	  
“President	  Carter	  has	  defined	  the	  Afghan	  situation	  as	  a	  superpower	  military	  confrontation	  –	  
‘the	  most	  serious	  threat	  to	  world	  peace	  since	  the	  Second	  World	  War’.”	  (Fischer	  1980)	  
And:	  
“….But	  in	  Afghanistan,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  Moscow	  has	  asserted	  its	  power	  to	  intervene	  
outside	   the	   Soviet	   bloc	   –	   an	   assertion	   that	   president	   Carter	   has	   now	   acidly	  
denounced	   as	   false.	  Western	   leaders	   are	   right	   to	   condemn	   the	   Soviet	   aggression.”	  
(New	  York	  Times	  1980a)	  
The	  Soviet	  Union,	  by	   invading	  Afghanistan,	  had	  upset	  a	  delicate	  balance	  which	  ensured	  world	  
peace.	   This	   invasion	   upset	   that	   system,	   and	   it	   was	   the	   duty	   of	   the	   United	   States	   to	   underscore	   the	  
inviolability	  of	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  
“…the	  stubbornly	  independent	  Afghans…	  have	  been	  fighting	  our	  fight	  [emphasis	  mine].	  [The	  
United	   States	  must]	   face	   a	   stark	   fact:	   Afghanistan	   is	   a	   key	   to	   eventual	   Soviet	   expansion	   in	  
South	   Asia	   and	   the	   Indian	   Ocean…	   But	   the	   Afghans	   cannot	   carry	   out	   such	   an	   extended	  
struggle	  unaided	  and	  alone.”	  (Klass	  1982)	  
What	  begins	  to	  surface	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  horror	  that	  the	  poor,	  benighted	  Afghan	  has	  been	  left	  to	  carry	  
the	   United	   States’	   great	   burden.	   The	   United	   States	   then	   has	   no	   choice	   but	   to	   step	   in	   and	   shield	  
Afghanistan	  from	  the	  interventionary	  practices	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  United	  States	  job	  was	  to	  act	  as	  a	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savior,	  to	  create	  a	  situation	  wherein	  Afghanistan	  would	  be	  able	  to	  succeed	  or	  fail	  as	  a	  sovereign	  state	  on	  
its	  own.	  This	  is	  the	  condition	  demanded	  by	  the	  ideology	  underpinning	  Cold	  War	  logics.	  	  
Thus,	   Afghan	   sovereignty	   was	   an	   idea	   which	   needed	   to	   be	   conjured	   and	   spoken	   of.	   Soviet	  
aggression	  and	  violation	  of	  Afghan	  sovereignty	  is	  protested	  time	  and	  again.	  (United	  Nations	  1980,	  New	  
York	  Times	  1980c,	  Klass	  1982,	  New	  York	  Times	  1980a)	  This	  apparent	  concern	  for	  Afghanistan’s	  right	  to	  
be	  master	  of	  its	  own	  destiny	  is	  at	  tension	  with	  how	  the	  United	  States	  treated	  the	  situation,	  however.	  	  
“It	  was	  Moscow’s	  intervention…	  that	  transformed	  Afghanistan	  into	  a	  playing	  field	  [emphasis	  
mine]	  for	  superpower	  rivalry,	  thereby	  bestowing	  an	  exaggerated	  geopolitical	   importance	  on	  
the	  country.”	  (Scioling	  1989)	  
Afghanistan,	   which	   Sciolino	   quoted	   American	   policymakers	   as	   saying	   had	   little	   intrinsic	  
significance,	  was	  suddenly	  the	  focus	  of	  US	  security	  policy.	  With	  such	  weighty	  concerns	  as	  carrying	  out	  
this	  Great	  Game,	   this	   ideological	   conflict	   in	   the	  Cold	  War,	   the	   sovereignty	  of	   such	  a	  marginal	  political	  
space	  as	  Afghanistan	  could	  be	  ignored	  (particularly	  if	  ignoring	  that	  sovereignty	  meant	  saving	  it).	  Thus:	  
“The	  United	  States	   intends	   to	  pursue	  discussions	  with	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  on	  Afghanistan	  and	  
other	   issues…	   ‘A	   continued	   dialogue	   is	   definitely	   in	   the	   cards’	   [a	   US	   official	   said].”	  
(Gwertzman	  1980)	  
The	  United	  States,	  then,	  was	  engaged	  in	  bargaining	  over	  Afghanistan’s	  future	  over	  the	  course	  of	  
its	  usual	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  over	  weighty	  matters	  affecting	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  
President	   had	   already	   defined	   the	   Afghan	   “situation	   as	   a	   superpower	  military	   confrontation”.	   (Fisher	  
1980)	  Indeed,	  Afghanistan’s	  very	  character	  was	  malleable	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  great	  purpose	  
of	  protecting	  Afghanistan	  from	  the	  evils	  of	  Soviet	  influence.	  	  
“All	  who	  are	  gravely	  concerned	  about	  the	  dangers	  to	  peace	  that	  arise	  in	  consequence	  of	  the	  
Russian	   invasion	   and	   occupation	   of	   Afghanistan	   cannot	   but	   approve…	   [of	   a	   plan	   wherein]	  
Afghanistan	  will	  assume	  a	  political	  and	  diplomatic	   status	  comparable	   to	   that	  of	  Switzerland	  
and	  Austria.”	  (de	  Hevesy	  1980)	  
Afghanistan’s	   nature	   could	   be	   changed,	   then,	   without	   its	   consent.	   This	   was	   for	   the	   good	   of	  
Afghanistan,	  certainly,	  but	  also	  because	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  such	  that	  conflict	  in	  Afghanistan	  
risked	   world	   spanning	   war	   if	   the	   situation	   proved	   too	   intractable	   for	   the	   United	   States	   and	   USSR.	  
Afghanistan,	  then,	  was	  in	  a	  familiar	  position.	  During	  the	  interventions	  on	  Afghanistan	  by	  Britain	  during	  
the	   three	  Anglo	  Afghan	  wars,	   the	   logic	  of	   the	  Great	  Game	  was	   such	   that	  Afghanistan’s	   character	  was	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meaningless	   and	  empty.	   The	   geopolitical	   struggle	  with	  Russia	  was	  of	   far	   great	   import	   –	   and	   this	   held	  
true	  once	  again	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  This	  changeable	  Afghan	  nature	  speaks	  further	  to	  its	  indeterminacy	  
and	  further	  undermines	  notions	  of	  Afghan	  sovereignty.	  	  
Cold  War  Narratives  and  US  Security  Policy  
An	   article	   by	   Bilgin	   and	   Morton	   analyzes	   the	   outsize	   effects	   of	   Cold	   War	   narratives	   on	  
scholarship	   (and	  by	   implication,	   policy).	   Their	   focus	   is	   somewhat	  different,	   looking	   at	   legacies	  of	  Cold	  
War	  narratives	  on	  contemporary	  issues	  and	  as	  such,	  this	  article	  will	  be	  revisited	  later	  as	  well.	  	  However,	  
it	  has	  strong	  relevance	  to	  this	  chapter.	  They	  argue	  that	  labels	  such	  as	  ‘rogue’	  and	  ‘failed’	  states	  are	  ways	  
of	   recreating	   /	   reinforcing	   discursive	   knowledge	  norms	   inherited	   from	   the	  Cold	  War	   in	   contemporary	  
times.	  	  
“It	  will	  be	  argued	  in	  this	  article	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘rogue	  states’	  is	  merely	  the	  latest	  in	  a	  series	  
of	  representations	  of	  post-­‐colonial	  states	  that	  have	  arisen	  in	  and	  beyond	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
Cold	   War,	   namely,	   ‘weak’,	   ‘quasi’,	   ‘collapsed’	   and	   ‘failed’	   states	   [not	   to	   suggest	  
interchangeability	  of	  the	  terms].	  What	  such	  labels	  have	  in	  common,	  however,	  is	  that	  they	  are	  
all	  representations	  of	  post-­‐colonial	  states;	  representations	  that	  enable	  certain	  policies	  which	  
serve	  the	  economic,	  political	  and	  security	   interests	  of	   those	  who	  employ	  them.”	  (BIlgin	  and	  
Morton	  2002:	  55)	  
and	  
“…consider	  the	  wider	  rise	  of	  various	  representations	  of	  postcolonial	  states	  across	  the	  
social	  sciences	  to	  highlight	  how	  thinking	  and	  practice,	  rooted	  in	  cold-­‐war	  dynamics,	  
still	  persist	  in	  the	  present	  ostensibly	  post-­‐cold	  war	  era.”	  (ibid:	  56)	  
This	   is	   in	   line	   with	   the	   findings	   of	   this	   project,	   which	   suggest	   that	   discursive	   legacies	   impact	  
current	  policy	  decisions	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  not	  always	  obvious.	  For	  Bilgin	  and	  Morton,	  the	  use	  of	  ‘rogue’	  
and	   ‘failed’	   labels	   situates	   the	   conversation	   in	   a	   Cold	   War-­‐esque	   geo-­‐strategic	   narrative,	   suggesting	  
discursive	  links	  between	  Afghanistan	  as	  we	  understood	  it	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  context	  and	  Afghanistan	  as	  we	  
understand	   it	   in	  a	  contemporary,	  “Global	  War	  on	  Terror”	  context.	  The	  point	   is	  well	   taken,	   though	  this	  
project	   suggests	   that	   the	  geo-­‐strategic	  understanding	  of	  Afghanistan’s	   importance	   is	  much	  older	   than	  
the	  Cold	  War.	  	  
Bilgin	  and	  Morton	  argue	  that	  this	  discursive	  trap	  is	  a	  result	  of	  poor	  interdisciplinarity	  reflective	  
of	  an	  academic	  division	  of	  labor	  that	  came	  about	  in	  Cold	  War	  era	  academic	  practices.	  This	  has	  led	  to	  a	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situation	  where	  different	  academic	   ‘knowledges’	  about,	   for	   instance,	  the	  social	  causes	  of	  state	  failure,	  
are	  not	  shared.	  (ibid)	  	  This	  has	  intriguing	  implications	  for	  alternative	  ways	  of	  understanding	  state	  failure	  
which	  does	  coincide	  with	  the	  aims	  of	  this	  project	  –	  opening	  up	  discussions	  of	  state	  failure	  and	  Afghan	  
identity	  to	  allow	  for	  possible	  alternative	  conceptions	  and	  understandings.	  	  
Most	   specifically,	   they	   argue	   powerfully	   that	   certain	   historical	   logics	   can	   become	   a	   kind	   of	  
narrative	  structure	  which	  is	  difficult	  to	  recognize,	   let	  alone	  escape	  from.	  The	  speak	  of	   labels	  of	   ‘rogue’	  
and	  ‘failure’	  as	  being	  embedded	  within	  Cold	  War	  logics.	  This	  is	  a	  concept	  probably	  worth	  exploring	  (as	  is	  
their	   more	   general	   point	   on	   the	   interdisciplinarity	   deficit	   in	   academia).	   While	   it	   does	   also	   speak	   to	  
connectivities	   between	  Cold	  War	   and	  Global	  War	   on	   Terror	   discourses,	   relying	   on	   this	   as	   a	  means	   of	  
understanding	  Afghanistan’s	  specific	  case	  would	  recreate	  certain	  problems	  this	  paper	   identifies.	  There	  
is,	  arguably,	  an	  impact	  of	  Cold	  War	  logics	  on	  today’s	  security	  discourses.	  However,	  this	  project	  also	  finds	  
that	   Cold	  War	   era	   discourses	   on	   Afghanistan	  were	   further	   influenced	   by	   historical	   understandings	   of	  
Afghanistan	  as	  an	   indeterminate	  and	  empty	  space	  –	  Afghanistan	  was	  readily	  situated	  within	  Cold	  War	  
logics	   specifically	   because	   of	   its	   history	   of	   being	   treated	   as	  without	   character,	   empty,	   indeterminate.	  
Other	  polities	  were	  also	  situated	  within	  the	  overriding	  Cold	  War	  narratives	  of	  the	  time,	  surely	  –	  but	  how	  
and	  why	  that	  situating	  happened	  and	  what	  the	  effects	  might	  have	  been	  are	  conditioned	  by	  historically	  
specific	  situations.	  	  
Stokes	  (2003)	  is	  interested	  in	  testing	  continuity	  and	  discontinuity	  in	  US	  security	  policy.	  In	  doing	  
so,	   he	  measures	  what	   he	   identifies	   as	   orthodox	   discontinuity	   theory	   against	   Chomsky’s	   hypothesis	   of	  
continuity,	  wherein	  Cold	  War	  policy	  is	  measured	  against	  policy	  in	  the	  War	  on	  Terror.	  For	  Stokes:	  
“[Orthodox	  theory	  tends]	  to	  view	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  bipolar	  terms	  and	  work	  with	  an	  orthodox	  
historical	   interpretation	   of	   its	   origins	   and	  operation.	   They	   also	   emphasize	   the	   discontinuity	  
characteristic	  of	  US	   foreign	  policy	   in	   the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  period.	  An	  orthodox	  historiography	  
views	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  having	  had	  expansionist	  tendencies	  throughout	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  
as	   fundamentally	   hostile	   to	   Western	   security.	   Conversely,	   US	   foreign	   policy	   is	   viewed	   as	  
principally	   driven	   by	   a	   defensive	   reaction	   against	   Soviet	   expansionism	   [exemplified	   by	  
doctrine	  of	  containment.”	  (Stokes	  2003:	  571)	  
This	   is	  a	   fairly	  uncontroversial	  description	  of	  Western	  narratives	  toward	  the	  Cold	  War	  conflict.	  
For	  this,	  Afghanistan	  is	  another	  example	  of	  Soviet	  aggression	  being	  countered	  by	  Western	  foreign	  policy	  
seeking	  to	  counter	  this	  evil	  aggression.	  Stokes	  turns	  to	  Chomsky	  for	  a	  critique	  of	  this	  notion	  (and	  it	  is	  a	  
critique	  which	  he	  takes	  on	  board	  in	  analyzing	  a	  contemporary	  case	  in	  Colombia).	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“[Chomsky]	   contends	   that	   US	   foreign	   policy	   is	   overwhelmingly	   driven	   by	   the	   geoeconomic	  
interests	  of	  US	  capital	  and	   the	  construction	  of	  a	  world	  order	  conducive	   to	   those	   interests…	  	  
the	  mainstream	  understanding	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  has	  a	  particular	  ideological	  effect.	  The	  Soviet	  
threat,	   and	   the	  US’s	   need	   to	   contain	   it,	   was	   overstated	   during	   the	   Cold	  War	   to	   serve	   two	  
primary	  purposes…	  Second,	  and	  more	  importantly	  for	  this	  article,	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  served	  as	  
a	   convenient	   pretext	   for	   justifying	   US	   military	   interventionism	   in	   the	   Third	   World,	   which,	  
according	   to	   the	   logic	   of	   North–South	   relations,	   was	   necessary	   to	   maintain	   access	   to	   raw	  
materials	   and	   markets	   and	   ensure	   cheap	   labour,	   to	   maintain	   regimes	   favourable	   to	   US	  
interests,	   and	   to	   stifle	  or	  overthrow	  movements	   considered	   inimical	   to	  US	   interests.”	   (ibid:	  
575)	  
Stokes	  provides	  support	  for	  Chomsky’s	  argument	  in	  analyzing	  US	  actions	  in	  Colombia	  as	  part	  of	  
the	   contemporary	   War	   on	   Terror.	   He	   argues	   that	   the	   US	   insistence	   on	   supporting	   the	   Colombian	  
military,	  which	  in	  turn	  supports	  paramilitary	  groups	  which	  carry	  out	  atrocities	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  ‘War	  
on	  Terror’	  is	  proof	  that	  the	  discontinuity	  thesis	  is	  correct.	  It	  essentially	  plays	  into	  Chomsky’s	  narrative	  on	  
US	  foreign	  policy	  as	  mobilizing	  a	  sort	  of	   liberal	   ideology	  as	   justifying	  oppressive	   international	   relations	  
policies	  intended	  to	  further	  its	  own	  economic	  interests,	  in	  the	  classic	  North-­‐South	  problematic.	  
Stokes	  (and	  Chomsky)	  essentially	  argue	  that	  liberal	  ideology	  and	  “knowledge”	  about	  peripheral	  
spaces	  are	  parts	  of	  a	  neo-­‐imperial	  project.	  Conversely,	   this	  project	  argues	   that	  narrative	   structures	  of	  
knowledge	   as	   to	   liberal	   statehood	   and	   how	   those	   knowledge	   structures	   interact	   with	   historically	  
informed	  knowledges	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  Afghanistan	  form	  a	  kind	  of	  constraint.	  Some	  actions	  toward	  
Afghanistan	   are	   empowered	   and	   made	   possible	   whereas	   other	   possibilities	   are	   marginalized.	  
Afghanistan’s	  historical	   indeterminacy	  has	  situated	  it	  as	  a	  tactical	  space	  which,	  time	  and	  again,	   is	  used	  
both	  as	  a	  geo-­‐political	  (ideological)	  battlefield	  where	  world	  powers	  fight	  over	  great	  questions	  and	  as	  a	  
sort	  of	  mirror	  where	  concepts	  core	  to	  Western	  self-­‐knowledge	  are	  buttressed.	  	  
For	  this	  project,	  the	  point	  is	  not	  to	  critique	  liberal	  ideologies	  as	  such,	  nor	  is	  it	  to	  make	  assertions	  
of	   neo-­‐imperialism.	   It	   is	   to	   unpack	   discursive	   “knowledges”	   specific	   to	   the	   Afghanistan	   case	   in	   an	  
attempt	   to	  make	  alternative	   knowledges,	   policy	   and	  practice	  possible.	   Stokes	  offers	   a	   compelling	   and	  
critical	   take	  on	  narrative	   connections	  between	   security	  discourse	  during	   the	  Cold	  War	  and	  during	   the	  
current	   “Global	  War	  on	  Terror”	  era.	  However,	   this	   is	  once	  again	  a	  broad	  approach	  which,	   if	   taken	  on	  
board,	  would	  pose	  the	  risk	  of	  recreating	  the	  problem	  of	  treating	  Afghanistan’s	  history	  and	  specificity	  as	  
unimportant.	  It	  would,	  then,	  reinforce	  notions	  of	  Afghan	  emptiness	  and	  indeterminacy.	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Narrative  Tensions:  Ideology  and  the  Formal  /  Informal  Divide  
Here	   questions	   of	   sovereignty/non-­‐sovereignty	   are	   increasingly	   becoming	   a	   focal	   point	   of	  
narratives	   on	   Afghanistan.	   In	   previous	   interventions	   on	   Afghanistan,	   the	   question	   of	   sovereignty	  was	  
never	   seriously	   raised	   as	   a	   respectable	   argument	   against	   intervention.	   In	   those	   interventions,	   the	  
question	   was	   obviated	   by	   recourse	   to	   narratives	   of	   emptiness	   and	   barbarism	   –	   Afghanistan	   was	   not	  
civilized	  enough	  to	  warrant	  the	  rights	  and	  duties	  of	  a	  sovereign	  state.	  	  
Following	   the	   third	   Anglo	   Afghan	   war,	   this	   formally	   changed.	   Afghanistan	   was	   formally	  
recognized	   as	   a	   sovereign	   state	  with	   all	   the	   rights	   and	   responsibilities	   that	   implies.	   Those	   rights,	   that	  
sovereign	   character	   is	   the	   justification	   by	   which	   the	   United	   States	   chose	   to	   support	   the	   mujahidin	  
resistance.	   There	   are	   some	   few	   references	   to	   Afghan	   sovereignty	   as	   a	   way	   to	   drive	   this	   observation	  
home:	  (United	  Nations	  1980,	  New	  York	  Times	  1980c,	  Klass	  1982,	  New	  York	  Times	  1980a)	  Yet	  if	  the	  USSR	  
ignored	   Afghanistan’s	   sovereignty,	   the	   United	   States	   appears	   to	   have	   done	   the	   same	   thing	   whilst	  
formally	   (ceremonially?)	   paying	   tribute	   to	   the	   very	   sovereignty	   it	   ignored.	   This	  was	  made	  possible	   by	  
reliance	  on	   informal	  knowledges	  about	  Afghanistan	  with	  unseen	  historical	  roots.	   In	  imbibing	  discursive	  
legacies	   of	   savagery	   and	   Afghanistan-­‐as-­‐game-­‐board	   the	   United	   States	  was	   positioned	   discursively	   to	  
dismiss	  Afghanistan’s	  substantive	  character	  as	  a	  state	   in	   its	  own	  right.	  When	  Britain	  was	   involved	  with	  
Afghanistan,	   its	  relations	  were	   informed	  by	  the	  geopolitical	   logics	  of	  the	  Great	  Game	  and	  some	  of	  the	  
discursive	  phenomena	  described	  in	  Orientalism.	  At	  that	  time,	  no	  notion	  of	  Afghan	  sovereignty	  needed	  
to	  be	  handled	  –	  there	  were	  tensions	   in	  Britain’s	  treatment	  of	  Afghanistan	  narratively,	  certainly,	  but	   in	  
the	   wake	   of	   the	   third	   Anglo	   Afghan	   war	   (and	   Afghanistan’s	   newly	   recognized	   sovereign	   status)	  
intervention	  presumably	  should	  have	  become	  more	  difficult.	  
At	   the	   same	   time	   ideology	   became	   much	   more	   obvious	   in	   its	   importance.	   Relations	   with	  
Afghanistan	  during	  the	  third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  war	  were	  informed	  in	  no	  small	  part	  by	  fear	  of	  the	  Bolshevik	  
ideology	   –	   indeed	  much	   of	   the	   force	   behind	   Britain’s	   decision	   to	   recognize	   Afghanistan’s	   sovereignty	  
was	  as	  a	  way	  to	   ‘combat’	  Bolshevik	  norms	  of	  nationalism.	   Ideology	  plays	  a	   large	  part	   in	   this	  Cold	  War	  
intervention	   as	   well.	   As	   Britain’s	   interactions	   with	   Afghanistan	   were	   informed	   by	   the	   geopolitical	  
necessities	  of	  the	  Great	  Game,	  the	  United	  States’	   intervention	  with	  Afghanistan	  here	  was	   informed	  by	  
the	   geopolitical/ideological	   necessities	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   (and	   later	   was	   informed	   by	   the	  
geopolitical/ideological	  necessities	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Terror).	  
Particularly	   if	  Afghanistan	   is	  a	  place	   that	  deserves	   the	   label	  of	  “failed	  state”,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  
query	  where	   is	  the	  space	  for	  Afghan	  sovereignty	   in	  this	   instance.	  For	  a	  state	  to	  fail,	   it	  must	  be	  a	  state.	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What	   is	   the	  nature	  of	  Afghan	   sovereignty	   during	   the	  Cold	  War?	  We	   should	   first	   consider	   the	  Geneva	  
Accords,	  which	  ended	  the	  Soviet	  occupation	  of	  Afghanistan	  –	  signaling	  American	  “victory”	  in	  the	  proxy	  
conflict.	  
The	   Geneva	   Accords	   were	   agreed	   upon	   in	   1988,	   with	   Pakistan	   and	   the	   Soviet	   supported	  
government	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	   the	   signatories	  and	   the	  United	  States	  and	  USSR	  as	   “guarantors”.	   There	  
had	   been	   some	   efforts	   to	   have	   the	   Mujahidin	   in	   some	   way	   represented	   at	   the	   talks	   –	   this	   never	  
materialized	  by	  decision	  of	  the	  Mujahidin.	  It	  is	  generally	  agreed	  upon	  that	  the	  anti-­‐Soviet	  movement	  in	  
Afghanistan	   saw	   the	   so-­‐called	   Afghan	   government	   as	   nothing	  more	   than	   a	   Soviet	   puppet	   (New	   York	  
Times	  1989a,	  New	  York	  Times	  1989b,	  Karp	  1987,	  Tinker	  1988)	  and	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  sentiment	  against	  
negotiating	  with	  the	  USSR.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  hindsight,	  we	  do	  know	  that	  Mujahidin	  forces	  did	  continue	  to	  
fight	   against	   the	   (Soviet	   installed)	   Afghan	   government	   after	   the	   Accords.	   We	   also	   know	   that	   the	  
Mujahidin	  movement	  was	  extremely	  fractious	  –	  there	  were	  secular	  Afghan	  nationalists,	  representatives	  
of	   different	   tribal	   groups,	   Pashtun	   Islamists	   and	   foreign	   Islamists	   –	   all	   of	   which	   had	   cross-­‐cutting	  
alliances	  and	  rivalries.	  	  
The	  choice	  of	  signatories	  is	  interesting.	  The	  conflict	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  typified	  in	  various	  ways.	  
On	   some	   level,	   it	  was	   considered	   to	  be	  a	   civil	  war	  –	   indeed	   the	  “great	  powers”	   called	   it	   that.	   Yet	   the	  
signatories	   to	   the	   Accord	   were	   actors	   generally	   considered	   “proxies”	   of	   the	   USSR	   and	   US.	   In	   any	  
circumstance,	  an	  international	  accord	  signed	  by	  multiple	  states	  is	  an	  extraordinary	  occurrence	  as	  a	  way	  
to	  end	  a	  civil	  war	  –	  particularly	  when	  one	  of	  the	  two	  primary	  parties	  to	  the	  conflict	  (if	  it	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  civil	  
war)	  was	  not	  party	  to	  the	  Accords	  at	  all.	  	  
It	   is	   further	   notable	   that,	   from	   the	  Western	   perspective,	   there	  was	  no	   legitimate	   speaker	   for	  
Afghanistan	   present	   at	   the	   talks.	   The	   Soviet	   backed	   government	  was	   a	   puppet	   and	   illegitimate	   –	   not	  
representative	  of	  Afghansitan	  at	  all	  (if	   it	  were,	  then	  the	  US	  intervention	  would	  have	  been	  illegitimate).	  
No	   faction	  of	   the	  Mujahidin	  or	  other	  Afghan	  anti-­‐Soviet	   forces	  were	  deemed	   legitimate	  parties	   to	   the	  
talks	   either.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   there	  was	  no	   competent	   Afghan	   representative	   to	   speak	   for	   the	   Afghans.	  
Afghanistan	  was,	  indeed,	  empty	  of	  character.	  
This	   is	   a	   very	  practical	   and	   concrete	  manifestation	  of	   the	   tensions	  within	   the	   informal/formal	  
discursive	   phenomenon	  by	  which	  Afghanistan’s	   identity	  was	   situated.	   The	   conflict	   in	  Afghanistan	  was	  
something	  quite	  outside	  of	  what	  we	  might	  consider	  orthodox	  understandings	  of	  international	  law,	  with	  
actors	   involved	   in	   the	   conflict	  who	   held	  marginal	   and	   in	   some	  ways	   perhaps	   unknowable	   characters.	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That	   the	   USSR	   and	   United	   States	  were	   “guarantors”	   to	   the	   treaty	   could	   have	   two	   implications.	   Both	  
implications	   suggest	   that	   without	   the	   signatures	   of	   the	   guarantors	   the	   Accords	   would	   have	   had	   no	  
relevance	  or	  force.	  	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  Accords	  were	  of	  such	  weak	  character	  (in	  the	  
sense	   of	   state-­‐ness	   and	   sovereignty)	   that	   their	   signatures	   alone	  were	   not	   of	   solemn	   and	   trustworthy	  
enough	   nature.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   could	   be	   that	   the	   Accords	  were	  much	  more	   about	   the	   United	  
States	   and	  USSR	  making	   a	   deal	   to	   back	   away	   from	  yet	   another	   Cold	  War	   flare	   up.	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	  
either	  Afghanistan	  had	  no	  possible	  sovereign	  identity,	  or	  Afghanistan’s	  sovereign	  character	  was	  not	  the	  
point.	  Afghan	  sovereignty	  was	  either	  very	  important	  but	  also	  at	  present	  completely	  non-­‐existent,	  or	  any	  
question	   of	   Afghan	   sovereignty	   paled	   beside	   the	   much	   greater	   question	   of	   Democracy	   versus	  
Communism.	  The	  notion	  of	  a	  formal/informal	  discursive	  knowledge	  regime	  fits	  well	  in	  any	  combination	  
of	  these	  options.	  
Formally,	  there	  must	  be	  recourse	  to	  international	  law	  but	  informally	  the	  parties	  who	  ought	  to	  be	  
actors	  within	  international	  law	  didn’t	  quite	  have	  the	  character	  for	  it.	  The	  mujahidin	  were	  not	  even	  in	  the	  
equation,	   despite	   having	   been	   the	   whole	   justification	   for	   US	   involvement	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   The	  
mujahidin	  were,	  in	  fact,	  given	  the	  mantle	  of	  “the	  Afghans”	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  United	  States	  –	  yet	  in	  the	  
process	   of	   the	   Accords	   they	   were	   stripped	   of	   any	   semblance	   of	   agency.	   The	   Afghan	   government,	  
whether	   we	   see	   it	   as	   representative	   of	   an	   Afghanistan	   or	   not,	   signed	   an	   Accord	   with	   a	   neighboring	  
country	  which	  had	  some	  geopolitical	  interest	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  conflict	  but	  no	  explicit	  involvement	  
(other	  than	  the	  vehicle	  by	  which	  the	  US	  funneled	  funding	  and	  arms	  to	  the	  Afghan	  resistance).	  	  
Thus,	  formally	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  an	  Afghanistan	  is	  there	  in	  name,	  but	  informally	  neither	  the	  
conflict	  nor	  the	  Accords	  were	  about	  Afghanistan	  in	  itself.	  This	  is	  justifiable	  only	  by	  way	  of	  the	  narratives	  
referred	   to	   through	   this	   chapter.	   The	  Afghan	   crisis	  was	   suborned	  by	   the	  geopolitical	   logic	  of	   the	  Cold	  
War,	  which	  was	   itself	   understood	   explicitly	   as	   another	   iteration	   of	   the	   old	   Great	   Game.	   The	   Afghans	  
themselves	  were	  perhaps	  heroic	  in	  their	  resistance	  to	  an	  evil	  ideology,	  but	  had	  no	  significant	  character	  
when	  it	  came	  to	  acts	  of	  actual	  sovereign	  will.	  	  
This	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   tensions	   within	   the	   construction	   of	   sovereignty	   previously	   mentioned.	  
Cynthia	  Weber	  argues	  that	  sovereignty	  is	  always	  an	  interpretive	  moment:	  
“Intervention	   practices	   participate	   in	   stabilizing	   the	   meaning	   of	   sovereignty.	   This	   is	   so	  
because	   discussions	   of	   intervention	   invariably	   imply	   questions	   of	   sovereignty…	   When	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intervention	   practices	   occur,	   they	   are	   accompanied	   by	   justifications	   on	   the	   part	   of	   an	  
intervening	   state	   to	   a	   supposed	   international	   community	   of	   sovereign	   states.	   In	   offering	  
justifications	   for	   their	   intervention	  practices,	  diplomats	  of	   intervening	  states	  simultaneously	  
assume	  the	  existence	  of	  norms	  regulating	  state	  practices	  and	  an	  interpretive	  community	  that	  
will	   judge	   intervention	  practices	   in	  accordance	  with	   these	  norms.	  But	   just	  as	   in	   the	  case	  of	  
international	   regimes,	   it	   is	   international	   practice	   that	   constitutes	   the	   boundaries	   and	  
capacities	   of	   both	   sovereign	   states	   and	   international	   interpretive	   communities.”	   (Weber	  
1995:	  4-­‐5)	  
The	  meaning	  of	  sovereignty	  for	  Afghanistan	  is	  constituted	  each	  time	  it	  is	  invoked,	  even	  though	  
arguments	   are	   made	   that	   it	   is	   a	   natural,	   crystallized,	   permanent	   meaning.	   This	   is	   done	   by	   way	   of	  
appealing	  to	  a	  mythical	  agreement	  agreed	  to	  by	  a	  community	  of	  states,	  a	  community	  which	  is	  defined	  
by	  its	  agreement	  on	  sovereignty.	  The	  internal	  tensions	  of	  sovereignty	  are	  stabilized	  in	  large	  part	  through	  
an	  enforced,	  an	  agreed	  upon,	  an	  ignored	  silence.	  	  
For	  Derrida,	  this	  is	  explicated	  through	  a	  specification	  of	  the	  ‘beast’	  and	  the	  ‘sovereign’,	  but	  the	  
beast	   is	   not	   separate	   from	   the	   sovereign.	   Rather	   it	   is	   what	   adds	   both	   force	   and	   meaning	   to	   the	  
sovereign.	   The	   beast	   represents	   force,	   unchained	   and	   unmatched	   force	   without	   bound	   –	   this	   is	   the	  
power	   of	   the	   sovereign	   but	   it	   is	   also,	   simultaneously	   the	   roguish,	   the	   unruly	   and	   destructive	   power	  
which	   it	   is	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   sovereign	   to	   guard	   against.	   To	  protect	   the	   citizenry	   from.	   For	   the	  
shepherd	   to	  protect	  his	   sheep	   from	   the	  wolf,	  he	  must	  himself	  have	   the	  aspect	  of	   the	  wolf	  –	  but	   that	  
aspect	  must	  be	  silent,	  hidden,	  bound	  by	  rules	  of	  right	  and	  justice…	  even	  while	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  wolf’s	  
power	  is	  that	  it	  is	  wild	  and	  unbound.	  
“…the	   silent	   voice	   commands	   him	   to	   command,	   but	   to	   command	   in	   silence,	   to	   become	  
sovereign,	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  command,	  to	  give	  orders,	  and	  to	  learn	  to	  command	  in	  silence	  by	  
learning	  that	   it	   is	  silence,	   the	  silent	  order	  that	  commands	  and	   leads	  the	  world.	  With	  dove’s	  
footsteps,	   on	   dove’s	   feet…	   What	   the	   dove’s	   footsteps	   and	   the	   wolf’s	   footsteps	   have	   in	  
common	   is	   that	   one	   scarcely	   hears	   them.	   But	   the	   one	   announces	   war,	   the	   war	   chief,	   the	  
sovereign	  who	  orders	  war,	  the	  other	  silently	  orders	  peace.”	  (Derrida	  2008:	  4)	  
This	  binding,	  this	  order	  for	  peace	  and	  for	  justice	  is	  unnatural	  to	  the	  unfettered	  sovereign	  power	  
of	   the	   wolf,	   yet	   without	   that	   conditioning	   the	   power	   of	   the	   wolf	   is	   destructive,	   unjust,	   unjustified	   –	  
illegitimate.	  Sovereignty	  can	  only	  exist	  when	  it	  has	  the	  savage	  force	  necessary	  to	  lay	  its	  claim,	  but	  it	  can	  
only	  be	  just	  when	  it	  refuses	  to	  use	  that	  power	  unjustly	  –	  and	  when	  it	  hides	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  doing	  
so	   behind	   constructs	   such	   as	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   One	   must	   say	   “hides”	   because	   for	   the	   power	   of	   the	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sovereign	  to	  be	  real,	  it	  cannot	  in	  fact	  be	  bound	  by	  the	  law	  it	  creates.	  It	  cannot	  create	  the	  law	  and	  then	  
be	   governed	   by	   it,	   because	   then	   sovereign	   power	   lies	   in	   something	   else,	   something	   uncontrolled,	  
something	  unable	  to	  actually	  wield	  power.	  The	  sovereign	  can	  only	  guarantee	  the	  law	  if	  it	  stands	  outside	  
the	  law,	  but	  its	  existence	  outside	  the	  law	  must	  remain	  an	  enforced,	  agreed	  upon	  silence.	  (ibid	  17)	  
If	  Derrida’s	  argument	  holds,	   then	  Afghanistan	  has	  a	  problematic	  relationship	  with	  sovereignty.	  
There	  is	  a	  generally	  accepted	  idea	  that	  states	  all	  have	  the	  right	  to	  sovereignty,	  but	  that	  supposed	  right	  
can	  only	  exist	  within	  a	  given	  polity	  if	  that	  polity	  has	  the	  power	  to	  enforce	  that	  claim.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
if	   one	   sovereign	   power	   intervenes	   upon	   another	   polity,	   metanarratives	   on	   the	   liberal	   state	   system	  
suggest	  that	  an	  extraordinary	  situation	  must	  exist	  for	  that	  intervention	  to	  be	  legitimate.	  There	  rises	  this	  
uneasy	  tension	  where	  “weak”	  states	  loudly	  emphasize	  the	  rights	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  whereas	  in	  cases	  
of	   intervention	   interveners	   emphasize	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   sovereignty	   –	   abrogated	   by	   the	   polity	  
which	  is	  being	  intervened	  upon	  –	  thus	  making	  that	  intervention	  legitimate	  by	  its	  humane	  necessity.	  
Further,	   Weber	   argues	   that	   while	   sovereignty	   is	   assumed	   to	   have	   a	   specific	   and	   enduring	  
character,	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  concept	  which	  shifts	  in	  relation	  to	  historic	  and	  geographical	  context.	  In	  analyzing	  
the	  interaction	  between	  concepts	  of	  intervention	  and	  sovereignty,	  Weber	  says:	  	  
“With	  respect	  to	  statehood,	  sovereignty	  refers	  to	  what	  a	  state	  must	  do	  (performative	  criteria)	  
in	  order	  to	  be	  (receive	  intersubjective	  recognition	  as)	  a	  sovereign	  state…	  What	  a	  state	  must	  
do	  to	  be	  sovereign	  is	  to	  organize	  its	  domestic	  affairs	  in	  such	  a	  way	  so	  that	  its	  ultimate	  source	  
of	   sovereign	   authority	   is	   authorized	   to	   speak	   for	   its	   particular	   domestic	   community	   in	  
international	  affairs.	  Yet	  the	  source	  of	  sovereign	  authority	  has	  changed	  historically.”	  (Weber	  
1992:	  200)	  
Interventions	  come	  about,	   for	  Weber,	  when	  how	  sovereign	  power	   is	  situated	  (or,	  presumably,	  
fails	  to	  be	  situated)	  within	  a	  state	  becomes	  an	  international	  issue.	  This	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  humanitarian	  
issue	  or	  a	  security	  issue	  and	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  as	  regards	  state	  failure.	  A	  failed	  state	  has	  
either	   such	   an	   ineffective,	   corrupt,	   or	   ill-­‐meaning	   source	   of	   sovereign	   power	   that	   it	   becomes	   an	  
international	  issue	  –	  either	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  victim-­‐citizens	  or	  because	  a	  deteriorating	  domestic	  situation	  
is	  creating	  regional	  (or,	  with	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror,	  global)	  security	  threats.	  This	  constitutes	  a	  loss	  of	  
sovereign	  authority.	  	  
What	  makes	  a	  domestic	  situation	  constitute	  an	  international	  issue	  –	  and	  thus	  a	  loss	  of	  sovereign	  
authority	  –	  has	  changed	  significantly	  over	  time	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  different	  geopolitical	  contexts.	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“How	   meanings	   take	   shape	   and	   are	   put	   to	   work	   -­‐	   by	   whom	   and	   on	   whose	   behalf	   -­‐	   has	  
implications	  for	  just	  what	  forms	  international	  practice	  legitimately	  can	  take.	  The	  examples	  of	  
interventionary	  activity	  in	  the	  1820s	  and	  1910s	  are	  cases	  in	  point.	  They	  bring	  to	  the	  fore	  the	  
importance	  of	  casting	  meanings	  in	  particular	  ways	  which	  enable	  specific	  forms	  of	  practice	  to	  
take	  place	  legitimately	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  a	  supposed	  interpretive	  community.”	  (ibid:	  203)	  
In	  this	  way,	  the	  decision	  to	  authorize	  an	  intervention	  (and	  rendering	  the	  judgment	  that	  a	  polity	  
has	  surrendered	  its	  sovereign	  authority	  to	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  its	  people)	  is	  an	  interpretive	  moment	  which	  
crystallizes,	   for	   that	   moment	   and	   place,	   a	   particular	   articulation	   of	   sovereignty.	   That	   is	   to	   say	  
interventions	  produce	  sovereignty.	  That	  interpretive	  moment	  is	  also	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  sovereign	  status	  
of	   the	   intervener.	  How	  and	  why	  a	   certain	   conception	  of	   sovereignty	   is	   ascendant	   at	   a	  particular	   time	  
must	   be	   contextualized	   in	   the	   international	   political	   climate	   and	   especially	   in	   the	   context	   of	   those	  
intervening	  parties	  and	  their	  articulations	  of	  sovereign	  authority.	  	  
These	  specific	  articulations	  are	  complicated	  –	  both	  empowered	  and	  made	  self-­‐destructive	  –	  by	  
Derrida’s	  analysis	  of	   sovereignty.	   Intervention	   is	  possible,	  but	  also	  ultimately	  problematic	   -­‐	  due	  to	   the	  
interaction	  of	  beastly	   loup	  and	  virtuous	  protector,	  of	  limitless	  power	  and	  ethical	  constraint,	  of	  residing	  
outside	  of	  and	  defining	   law	  but	   finding	   legitimacy	  only	  within	   the	  bounds	  of	   that	   law.	   Intervention	  on	  
behalf	  of	  a	  particular	  articulation	  of	   sovereignty	   intends	   to	  privilege	  and	  naturalize	   that	  conception	  of	  
sovereignty,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  intervener’s	  place	  as	  epitomizing	  that	  sovereign	  notion.	  	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   Afghanistan	   had	   to	   be	   saved	   from	   an	   illegitimate	   government	  
propped	  up	  by	  what	  was	  considered	  ideologically	  to	  be	  the	  greatest	  evil	  in	  the	  world,	  Communism.	  The	  
United	  States,	  as	  epitome	  of	   righteous	  sovereignty	   (in	   this	   ideological	  narrative),	  had	  no	  choice	  but	   to	  
intervene.	   Narratives	   in	   the	  West	   at	   the	   time	   spoke	   of	   the	   United	   States’	   responsibility	   to	   stand	   up	  
against	  the	  evils	  of	  communism,	  to	  save	  Afghanistan,	  to	  help	  it	  reclaim	  its	  rightful	  place	  as	  a	  responsible	  
and	   legitimate	  member	   of	   the	   society	   of	   right-­‐acting	   states.	   The	   very	   act	   of	   intervention	   –	   itself	   the	  
denial	  of	  a	   right	   to	  sovereignty	  and	   the	   forceful	  destruction	  of	   sovereign	  status	  –	  creates	   sovereignty.	  
The	  United	  States,	  in	  this	  instance,	  is	  cast	  as	  a	  sovereign	  force,	  enforcing	  sovereign	  dictates	  from	  outside	  
and	  above	  constraint	  –	  thus	  being	  authorized	  to	  do	  the	  unauthorizable	  and	  intervene	  –	  but	  also	  bound	  
by	   a	   code	   a	   conduct	   which	   itself	   was	   seen	   to	   be	   definitional	   of	   a	   particular	   articulation	   of	   liberal	  
capitalist-­‐democratic	  sovereignty.	  
An	   interventionist	   act	   both	   constitutes	   particular	   instances	   of	   sovereign	   definition	   and	  
simultaneously	  makes	   that	   articulation	   of	   sovereignty	   problematic	   for	   the	   intervener.	   The	   intervener	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acts	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  sovereignty,	  champions	  and	  epitomizes	   it	  and	  attempts	  to	  
infuse	  the	  failed	  state	  with	  a	  new	  sovereign	  authority	  based	  on	  those	  sovereign	  principles.	  	  
These	  arguments	  can	  be	  situated	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  project’s	  central	  questions.	  “Why	  are	  we	  able	  
to	   talk	   about	   failed	   states?”	   It	   is	   possible	   to	   talk	   about	   failed	   states,	   in	   this	   depiction	   of	   sovereignty,	  
because	  failed	  states	  simply	  don’t	  have	  the	  power	  to	  shape	  the	  narrative	  on	  their	   identity.	  More	  than	  
that,	   though,	   it	   is	   imperative	   that	   failed	   states	   be	   talked	   about	   as	   failed	   states	   in	   an	   intervention,	  
because	   that	   intervention	   must	   be	   seen	   as	   legitimate	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   undermining	   the	   sovereign	  
legitimacy	  of	  the	  intervener.	  Thus	  in	  Afghanistan	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Afghanistan	  was	  a	  victim	  of	  the	  
Soviet	   Union	   which	   abrogated	   its	   sovereignty,	   invading	   and	   occupying	   and	   visiting	   atrocities	   on	   the	  
Afghan	  people.	  Afghanistan	  naturally	  would	  /	  should	  hold	  sovereignty,	  but	  it	  had	  been	  stripped	  away	  by	  
the	  evil	  Soviet	  Union	  –	  thus	  it	  was	  left	  for	  the	  valorous	  United	  States	  to	  reluctantly	  intervene	  on	  behalf	  
of	  the	  Afghan	  victim.	  	  
Secondly,	  “what	  assumptive	  discursive	  knowledges	  empower	   the	  dominant	   (orthodox	   liberal	   /	  
policy)	  narrative(s)	  of	  intelligibility?”	  
Each	  aspect	  of	   that	   justification	   is	   important.	   It	   is	   important	   that	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  be	   seen	  as	  
evil,	  as	  a	   loup,	  as	  representative	  of	   the	   illegitimate	  use	  of	  sovereign	  power.	  Afghanistan,	   the	  victim,	   is	  
the	   focus	  of	   that	   illegitimate	  use	  of	   sovereign	  power.	   In	  a	  normal,	  natural	   state	  of	  affairs	  Afghanistan	  
would	  hold	  sovereignty	  itself,	  over	  itself.	  In	  a	  normal,	  natural	  state	  of	  affairs	  we	  see	  that	  Afghanistan	  is	  
discursively	  positioned	  as	  the	  friend	  of	  America	  (even	  though	  there	  had	  been	  little	  friendship	  before)	  by	  
way	   of	   being	   a	  member	   of	   this	   society	   of	   good-­‐acting	   sovereign	   states.	   Thus	   the	   intervention	   by	   the	  
United	   States	   is	   not	   only	   just,	   but	   it	   is	   actually	   an	   act	   that	   reinforces	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   this	   so-­‐called	  
international	  society	  of	  states.	  By	  intervening	  on	  Afghanistan,	  dominant	  conceptions	  of	  sovereignty	  are	  
reinforced	  even	  as	  they	  are	  disrupted	  by	  the	  very	  act	  of	  intervention.	  
Then,	   “how	  do	   particular	   assumptions	   about	   sovereignty,	   justice	   and	   successful	   statehood	   by	  
intervening	  parties	  negatively	  impact	  upon	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  Afghan	  crisis,	  currently	  conceptualized	  
primarily	  through	  the	  discursive	  lens	  of	  state	  failure?”	  
In	  this	  intervention,	  the	  United	  States	  intervenes	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  sovereignty	  to	  Afghanistan.	  
Yet	   the	   nature	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   sovereignty	   –	   and	   perhaps	   of	   sovereignty	   in	   general	   –	   is	   constructed	  
anew	   in	   an	   interpretive	  moment.	   Even	  more	   tellingly,	   that	   interpretive	  moment	   itself	   has	   little	   to	   do	  
with	   Afghanistan,	   purportedly	   the	   subject	   of	   the	  moment.	   Rather,	   this	   interpretive	  moment	   is	   more	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accurately	  focused	  on	  the	  ideological	  struggle	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  
European	  allies.	  Both	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	  US	   intervened	  on	  Afghanistan,	  claiming	   justification	  by	  way	  of	  
protecting/restoring	   Afghan	   sovereignty	   in	   the	   face	   of	   illegitimate	   interference	   from	   the	   US/USSR	  
respectively.	  
Justice	  in	  the	  very	  specific	  case	  of	  Afghanistan	  is	  generalized	  within	  the	  much	  wider	  ideological	  
conflict	  of	  the	  time.	  The	  USSR	  must	  intervene	  on	  Afghanistan	  to	  guarantee	  its	  legitimate	  government’s	  
primacy	  in	  a	  country	  being	  disrupted	  by	  US	  influence.	  The	  US	  must	  intervene	  on	  Afghanistan	  to	  counter	  
the	   unjust	   invasion	   of	   Afghanistan	   by	   illegitimate	   Soviet	   actions.	   Afghanistan	   is	   present	   but	   invisible,	  
silent,	  a	  victim	  with	  no	  agency	  or	  character.	  As	  a	  sovereign,	  it	   is	  a	  failure	  –	  it	  has	  failed	  to	  be	  powerful	  
enough	  to	  protect	  itself	  and	  now	  is	  the	  subject-­‐space	  of	  an	  ideological	  conflict,	  both	  sides	  of	  which	  claim	  
to	  be	  interested	  only	  in	  returning	  sovereignty	  to	  Afghanistan.	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Chapter  7  –  Post  Sept  11  Afghanistan  
	  
“After	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  decided	  to	  militarily	  overthrow	  the	  
Taliban…	  President	  Bush	  articulated	  a	  policy	  that	  equated	  those	  who	  harbor	  terrorists	  to	  
terrorists	  themselves,	  and	  judged	  that	  a	  friendly	  regime	  in	  Kabul	  was	  needed...”	  	  
Katzman	  2013	  
	  
In	   the	   post-­‐	   September	   11	   context,	  Western	   interactions	   with	   Afghanistan	   are	   typically	   seen	  
through	   two	   lenses:	   state	   failure/building	   and	   the	  War	   on	   Terror.	   Both	   approaches	   resonate	   strongly	  
with	  historical	  ways	  of	  ‘knowing’	  Afghanistan	  wherein	  its	  indeterminacy	  is	  a	  decisive	  factor	  in	  how	  it	  is	  
positioned.	  The	  idea	  of	  civilization	  and	  Afghanistan’s	  place	  outside	  of	  the	  civilized	  world	  is	  key,	  though	  
how	  the	  concept	  of	  civilization	  is	  mobilized	  has	  changed	  in	  some	  ways.	  	  
Afghanistan	   is	   situated	   within	   broad,	   orthodox	   understandings	   of	   the	   international	   security	  
landscape.	   Yet	   there	   is	   a	   tension	  between	   two	   contexts	   –	   is	  Afghanistan	   a	   legitimate	   state	  which	  has	  
failed	   and	   is	   in	   need	   of	   rehabilitation?	  Or	   is	   Afghanistan	   a	   tactical	   space,	   an	   ideological	   battleground	  
where	  the	  War	  on	  Terror	  is	  naturally	  played	  out?	  The	  specificity	  of	  interactions	  between	  the	  ‘West’	  and	  
Afghanistan	   make	   possible	   interrogations	   as	   to	   how	   and	   why	   Afghanistan’s	   identity	   is	   twisted	   in	  
different	  ways	  to	  make	  it	  ‘fit’	  within	  both	  narratives	  despite	  tensions	  within	  them.	  	  
Contemporary	   discourse	   on	   Afghanistan	   is	   situated	   in	   ways	   that	   have	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	  
Afghanistan	   itself.	   In	   an	   apparent	   departure	   from	   earlier	   narratives,	   Afghanistan’s	   character	   itself	   is	  
rarely	  spoken	  of	  in	  obviously	  positive	  or	  negative	  terms.	  On	  the	  rare	  instances	  in	  which	  Afghan	  character	  
is	  brought	  up,	  it	  is	  largely	  conceptualized	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  victims	  and	  uncivilized	  people.	  Continuity	  from	  
previous	  narratives	   come	   from	   the	  way	   in	  which	  Afghanistan’s	   indeterminacy	  and	   lack	  of	   character	   is	  
emphasized.	  	  
Afghanistan	   is	   at	   all	   times	   situated	   as	   an	   ideological	  battleground.	   In	   turns	   it	   is	   situated	   as	   a	  
failed	   state	   which	   requires	   nation-­‐building	   (in	   which	   the	   liberal	   state	   model	   is	   valorized)	   and	   as	   a	  
battleground	   between	   the	   forces	   of	   civilization	   and	   terror.	   The	   first	   instance	  mobilizes	   Afghanistan’s	  
indeterminacy	   to	   assume	   a	   ‘natural’	   history	   of	   statehood	  which	   has	   been	   interrupted	   by	   a	   period	   of	  
failure.	   In	   the	  second	   instance,	  Afghanistan	   is	  understood	  often	   in	   the	  context	  of	  Vietnam	  rather	  than	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via	  serious	  attempts	  to	  understand	  Afghanistan	  through	  its	  own	  history.	  Both	  represent	  a	  continuation	  
of	   discursive	   trends	   we	   see	   historically	   in	   relation	   to	   Afghanistan	   in	   which	   the	   formal/informal	  
dichotomy	  plays	  a	  key	  role.	  	  
Civility	   and	   legitimacy	   are	   strongly	   tied	   together	   in	   contemporary	   narratives.	   Terrorism	   is	  
barbaric	  and	   illegitimate.	  Western	  action	   is	   in	   the	  name	  of	   civilization,	   legitimate,	   and	  designed	   to	   fill	  
Afghanistan’s	  emptiness	  in	  with	  legitimacy.	  Afghanistan’s	  place	  is	  indeterminate,	  by	  turns	  legitimate	  and	  
illegitimate	  –	  wishing	  after	  and	  reaching	  for	  legitimacy	  while	  beset	  on	  all	  sides	  with	  illegitimate	  power.	  
Further,	  narratives	  on	  Afghanistan	   in	   the	  contemporary	  sense	  as	  well	  as	   the	  historical	  narratives	   from	  
which	   knowledge	   on	   Afghanistan	   is	   drawn	   assume	   barbarism	   and	   illegitimacy	   of	   the	   space.	   The	   very	  
notion	  of	  state	  failure	  is	  packed	  full	  of	  these	  same	  notions.	  
This	   findings	   chapter	   explores	   contemporary	   discourses	   on	   Afghanistan	   briefly,	   in	   order	   to	  
expose	   continuities	   to	   historical	   narratives	   on	   Afghanistan.	   Those	   connections	   exist,	   but	   are	   not	  
necessarily	  obvious	  due	  to	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  formal/informal	  divide	  which	  began	  seeing	  expression	  
in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  third	  Anglo-­‐Aghan	  war.	  This	  will	  allow	  for	  considerations	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Afghan	  
narratives	  generally	  and	  how	  these	  particular	  conceptions	  of	  Afghanistan	  are	  destructive	  to	  any	  project	  
intended	   to	   help	   Afghanistan	   overcome	   the	   numerous	   difficulties	   faced.	   Alternative	   conceptions	   of	  
Afghanistan’s	   challenges	   will	   be	   suggested	   through	   recourse	   to	   Derrida’s	   conceptions	   of	   democracy,	  
sovereignty	  and	  justice.	  	  
Every	   intervention	   analyzed	   for	   this	   project	   thus	   far	   has	   involved	   a	   sort	   of	   casting	   about,	  
discursively,	   for	   ways	   to	   situate	   and	   know	   Afghanistan	   –	   that	   exotic,	   alien,	   empty	   place.	   This	   final	  
chapter	   sees	   a	   repeat	   of	   the	   same	   phenomenon.	   Similar	   to	   the	   Cold	  War	   narratives	   on	   Afghanistan,	  
there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  reach	  to	  Vietnam	  for	  ways	  of	  understanding	  Afghanistan…	  as	  well	  as	  to	  notions	  of	  
Afghanistan	  as	  a	  savage,	  barbaric	  space.	  	  
Afghan  Indeterminacy  -­‐  Afghanistan  as  Vietnam  
The	  temptation	  to	  draw	  parallels	  between	  Afghanistan	  and	  Vietnam	  is	  not	  surprising.	  A	  rallying	  
cry	  during	   the	  Cold	  War	   intervention	   in	  Afghanistan	  was	   to	  make	  Afghanistan	   into	   the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  
Vietnam.	  Those	   calls	   grew	  more	   triumphant	  as	   the	  USSR	  became	  more	  and	  more	  bogged	  down	   in	   its	  
Afghan	   invasion.	  With	   that	   in	  mind,	   it’s	   not	   surprising	   that	   by	   the	   time	   President	   Obama	   took	   office	  
there	   was	   a	   plethora	   of	   discursive	   material	   comparing	   Afghanistan	   with	   Vietnam	   –	   this	   time	   in	   an	  




“Could	   Afghanistan	   become	   another	   Vietnam?	   …Premature	   the	   questions	   may	   be,	   [but]…	  
unreasonable	  they	  are	  not…	  echoes	  of	  Vietnam	  are	  unavoidable.”	  (Apple	  2001)	  
This	   article	   was	   part	   of	   a	   series	   in	   the	  New	   York	   Times	   in	   October,	   2001,	   analyzing	   possible	  
implications	   of	   a	   conflict	   in	   Afghanistan.	   It	   discusses	   a	   number	   of	   apparent	   similarities	   in	   how	   the	  
government	  at	  the	  time	  was	  treating	  the	  idea	  of	  invading	  Afghanistan	  compared	  to	  Vietnam	  early	  in	  the	  
days	   of	   that	   intervention.	   Further,	   the	   character	   of	   such	   a	   conflict	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   substantively	  
similar,	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  backbreaking	  quagmire,	  and	  the	  question	  of	  what	  a	  future	  would	  look	  like	  for	  
Afghan	  governmental	  leadership.	  
These	  concerns	  reflected	  worries	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  getting	  involved	  in	  a	  military	  action	  
that	   wouldn’t	   be	   easily	   resolved.	   Those	   fears	   become	   all	   the	   more	   pointed	   when	   considering	   the	  
outcomes	  of	  historic	  entanglements	   in	  Afghanistan.	  Yet	   that	  very	  history	   raises	  questions	  as	   to	  why	   it	  
would	   be	   necessary	   to	   resort	   to	   stories	   about	   Vietnam	   to	   understand	   Afghanistan	   –	   looking	   at	  
Afghanistan	  itself	  provides	  numerous	  and	  more	  specific	  analogies.	  Yet	  that	  has	  rarely	  happened	  in	  post-­‐
September	  11	  narratives	  on	  Afghanistan.	  When	  it	  has	  happened,	  analogies	  have	  tended	  to	  refer	  back	  to	  
Orientalist	  strands	  of	  narrative.	  	  
Around	   the	   time	  President	  Obama	   took	  office	   and	  began	  working	  on	   a	   reworked	  Afghanistan	  
policy,	  media	  typifications	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  Vietnam	  gained	  significant	  popularity.	  	  
“…the	  L.B.J.	  model	  —	  a	  president	  who	  aspired	  to	  reshape	  America	  at	  home	  while	  fighting	  a	  
losing	   war	   abroad	  —	   is	   one	   that	   haunts	  Mr.	   Obama’s	  White	   House…	   Just	   as	  Mr.	   Johnson	  
believed	  he	  had	  no	   choice	  but	   to	   fight	   in	  Vietnam	   to	   contain	   communism,	  Mr.	  Obama	   last	  
week	  portrayed	  Afghanistan	  as	  the	  bulwark	  against	  international	  terrorism.“	  (Baker	  2009)	  
Baker	   discusses	   apparent	   similarities	   between	   the	   conflict	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   Vietnam,	  
particularly	   in	   the	   context	   of	   leadership	   and	   decisions	   in	   policy	  making.	   The	   character	   of	   Afghanistan	  
itself	   is	  not	   important,	   except	   that	   it	   is	   a	  quagmire	  which	   is	   sucking	   in	  more	   forces	   than	  most	  people	  
believe	   it	   should.	   Justifications	   for	   involvement	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  same	  as	  well,	  by	  both	  media	  
and	  President.	  The	  war	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  sub-­‐optimal	  burden,	  but	  it	  is	  cast	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  absolute	  ideological	  
necessity.	  That	  seeming	  necessity	  is	  set	  alongside	  growing	  public	  disaffection	  for	  the	  war,	  as	  in	  Vietnam,	  
and	  the	  correlation	  seems	  complete	  from	  this	  limited	  approach.	  
This	  view	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  Vietnam	  wasn’t	  limited	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  British	  newspaper	  The	  
Telegraph	  featured	  a	  similar	  piece:	  	  
“He	  added:	  "Afghanistan	  is	  becoming	  our	  Vietnam.	  I	  have	  had	  emails	  from	  Vietnam	  veterans,	  
saying	   'This	   is	   just	   the	   same	  as	  we	  experienced.'…	   Just	  as	  American	  politicians	   then	  argued	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the	   Vietnam	   War	   was	   essential	   to	   stop	   the	   spread	   of	   communism,	   a	   threat	   which	   never	  
materialised,	   so	   he	   thought	   the	  British	  Government	   had	   "hoodwinked"	   the	  public	   over	   the	  
need	  to	  be	  in	  Afghanistan.”	  (Adams	  2009)	  
The	  Telegraph	  takes	  on	  board	  this	  Afghanistan	  –	  Vietnam	  comparison,	  highlighting	  an	  interview	  
with	  the	  British	  father	  of	  a	  deceased	  Afghan	  veteran.	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  Afghanistan,	  like	  Vietnam,	  is	  
being	  justified	  by	  an	  ideological	  struggle	  that	  the	  public	  should	  be	  wary	  of.	  This	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  true,	  
but	   is	   again	   indicative	   of	   the	   inability	   of	   the	   dominant	   narrative	   to	   treat	   Afghanistan	   and	   the	  
intervention	  there	  as	  a	  unique	  occurrence.	  
The	  Afghanistan/Vietnam	  narrative	  became	  so	  pervasive	  that	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  put	  together	  a	  
conglomeration	   of	   expert	   analysis	   using	   Vietnam	   as	   a	   touchstone.	   (Etheridge	   2009)	   Respected	  
publication	  Foreign	  Policy	  followed	  suit:	  
“But	  the	  Soviet	  experience	  in	  Afghanistan	  isn’t	  what	  everyone	  is	  comparing	  Obama’s	  current	  
predicament	  to;	  it’s	  Vietnam.	  The	  president	  knows	  it,	  and	  part	  of	  his	  speech	  was	  a	  rebuttal	  of	  
those	   comparisons.	   It	  was	   a	   valiant	   effort,	   but	   to	   no	   avail.	   Afghanistan	   is	   Vietnam	   all	   over	  
again.”	  
…and:	  
“To	   suggest	   that	   the	   two	   conflicts	   will	   have	   different	   outcomes	   because	   the	   U.S.	   cause	   in	  
Afghanistan	   is	   just	   (whereas,	   presumably	   from	   the	   speech,	   the	  war	   in	   Vietnam	  was	   not)	   is	  
simply	   specious.	   The	   courses	   and	   outcomes	   of	   wars	   are	   determined	   by	   strategy,	   not	   the	  
justness	  of	  causes	  or	  the	  courage	  of	  troops.”	  (Johnson	  and	  Mason	  2009)	  
Foreign	  Policy	  strongly	  endorses	  the	  comparison	  between	  Afghanistan	  and	  Vietnam	  from	  policy	  
and	   strategic	   standpoints.	   It	   criticizes	   various	   arguments	  of	  what	  makes	   the	  Afghan	   conflict	   different,	  
arguing	  that	  in	  all	  substantive	  ways	  they	  are	  highly	  similar	  conflicts.	  It	  does	  accept	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  
a	  moral	  difference	  –	  there	   is	  moral	   justification	  for	  the	  US	  to	  be	   in	  Afghanistan	  –	  but	  even	  that	  moral	  
justification	  isn’t	  enough	  to	  substantively	  separate	  the	  conflict	  from	  the	  Vietnam	  conflict.	  
This	  last	  piece	  was	  in	  response	  to	  an	  Obama	  speech.	  That	  speech	  itself	  came	  about	  in	  response	  
to	  this	  overbearing	  weight	  of	  narrative	  suggesting	  that	  Afghanistan	  was,	   in	  fact,	  another	  Vietnam.	  The	  
President	  tried	  to	  articulate	  why	  they	  were	  dissimilar:	  	  
“"Unlike	   Vietnam,	   we	   are	   joined	   by	   a	   broad	   coalition	   of	   43	   nations	   that	   recognizes	   the	  
legitimacy	   of	   our	   action,"	   Obama	   said	   during	   his	   speech	   at	   West	   Point	   Tuesday	   night.”	  
(Hornick	  2009)	  
The	   article	   itself	   made	   arguments	   about	   the	   similarities	   between	   Afghanistan	   and	   Vietnam,	  
without	  really	  breaking	  any	  new	  ground	  from	  previously	  highlighted	  articles.	  What	  is	  striking	  here	  is	  the	  
argument	  President	  Obama	  puts	  forward	  for	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  Afghan	  conflict.	  President	  Obama’s	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quote	  suggests	  the	  difference	  is	  in	  legitimacy	  –	  the	  US	  intervention	  in	  Afghanistan	  is	  more	  legitimate	  on	  
both	   moral	   and	   international	   customary	   grounds.	   Nothing	   to	   do	   with	   particular	   character	   of	  
Afghanistan.	   This	   is	   yet	   another	   emphasis	   of	   the	   basic	   emptiness	   and	   indeterminacy	   of	   Afghanistan’s	  
persona.	  
Afghan  Indeterminacy  -­‐  Empty/Barbaric  Afghanistan  
Emptiness	   is	   a	   recurring	   theme	   –	   the	   years	   following	   the	   attacks	   of	   September	   11	   involved	  
numerous	  accounts	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  an	  empty	  space,	  a	  wild	  land	  populated	  by	  the	  barbarous.	  The	  New	  
York	  Times	  ran	  a	  feature	  series	  entitled	  ‘a	  nation	  challenged:	  Afghanistan’	  in	  which	  persons	  of	  note	  –	  be	  
they	  experts	  or	  individuals	  with	  personal	  experience	  of	  Afghanistan	  –	  wrote	  about	  the	  unique	  challenges	  
facing	  Afghanistan.	  (Apple	  2001	  mentioned	  previously	  was	  part	  of	  the	  same	  series.)	  A	  2002	  article	  in	  this	  
series	   emphasized	   the	   empty	   and	   untamed	   nature	   of	   Afghanistan	   –	   a	   place	  which	   not	   even	   Afghans	  
could	  conceive	  of	  or	  control.	  
	  “Along	   this	   desolate	   frontier	   said	   to	   be	   teeming	   with	   Al	   Qaeda	   and	   Taliban	   fighters,	   the	  
border	  with	  Pakistan	  seems	  as	  elusive	  as	  the	  fugitives	  themselves.”	  (Dexter	  2002)	  
There	  is	  no	  control	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  borders,	  be	  it	  by	  choice	  (not	  worthwhile)	  or	  by	  simple	  lack	  
of	   capacity	   –	   or	   both.	   The	   Afghan	   government	   forces	   were	   further	   cast	   as	   both	   provincial	   and	  
ineffective.	  	  
“Mr.	  Wali,	   the	  commander	  at	  the	  post,	  said	  his	  men	  checked	  the	  documents	  of	  every	  truck	  
and	  driver	  that	  crossed	  the	  border.	  But	  as	  he	  spoke,	  cars	  and	  trucks	  passed	  through…	  	  given	  a	  
quick	   glance	  by	   the	   guards	   and	   sent	  on	   their	  way.	  None	  were	   searched.	  When	   the	   guards'	  
performance	  was	   pointed	   out…	  Mr.	  Wali	   smiled	   and	   shrugged.	   ''Most	   drivers	   around	   here	  
don't	  have	  documents;	  most	  people	  don't	  have	  any	  identification	  at	  all,''	  he	  said.	  ''This	  is	  not	  
England,	  France	  or	  America.''”	  (ibid)	  
This	   suggests	   a	   certain	   amused	   exasperation	   at	   the	   rustic	   officials	   who	   seemingly	   don’t	   even	  
understand	  simple	  security	  procedures.	  Interestingly,	  there	  are	  echoes	  of	  the	  formal/informal	  divide	  in	  
the	  wake	  of	  the	  third	  Anglo	  Afghan	  war	  here.	  Afghans	  are	  seen	  as	  playing	  at	  civility	  and	  sophistication	  
but	   at	   their	   heart	   are	   naïve	   and	   irresponsible,	   children	   compared	   to	   the	  mature	   civility	   of	   the	  West	  
playing	  at	  games	  they	  don’t	  understand.	  Any	  of	  those	  vehicles	  might	  have	  held	  Al	  Qaeda	  operatives,	  or	  
explosives	  and	  arms.	  The	  response	  of	  this	  provincial,	  we	  are	  told,	  is	  to	  smile	  and	  shrug,	  suggesting	  that	  if	  
we	  want	  things	  done	  properly	  we	  should	  look	  to	  England,	  or	  France,	  or	  the	  United	  States.	  Further	  to	  this	  
theme:	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“Armed	   by	   two	   decades	   of	   war,	   unimpeded	   by	   a	   weak	   government,	   the	   warriors	   Afghans	  
mustered	  to	  fight	  first	  the	  Soviets	  and	  then	  the	  Taliban	  are	  fighting	  one	  another	  for	  coarser	  
causes	  these	  days:	  land,	  money,	  power.”	  (Walden	  2003)	  
The	  Afghans	  are	  used	   to	   fighting	  and	  when	  not	   fighting	   to	  keep	   foreigners	  out	  of	  Afghanistan	  
will	  turn	  on	  one	  another.	  This	  resonates	  with	  19th	  century	  typifications	  of	  the	  Afghan	  persona.	  Indeed,	  
there	  were	  outright	  appeals	  to	  19th	  century	  voices	  to	  help	  understand	  Afghanistan	  today.	  
“The	   problem	   is	   that	   Afghans	   -­‐	   especially	   the	   majority	   Pashtun	   tribe	   -­‐	   will	   always	   fight…	  	  
Tribalism,	  kinship,	  blood-­‐feud	  and	  skirmish	  are	  part	  of	  the	  national	  psyche.	  We	  forget	  this	  at	  
our	  cost.”	  
And:	  
“…as	   he	   [the	   “hero”	   Brigadier	   General	   Henry	   Brooke]	   put	   it:	   'I	   fear	   we	   could	   not	   hope	   to	  
change	  the	  nature	  of	  an	  Afghan,	  who	  is	  born	  a	  treacherous,	  lying,	  murdering	  scoundrel.'	  Well,	  
I	  would	  not	  go	  that	  far.	  Yet…	  [one	  can]	  empathize	  with	  the	  Victorian	  commander…”	  
And:	  	  
“Small	  wonder	  in	  the	  past	  that	  British	  soldiers	  in-­‐theatre	  preferred	  to	  shoot	  themselves	  than	  
fall	   captive	   to	   the	   people	   Henry	   Brooke	   dubbed	   'savages'.	  Modern	   insurgents	   are	   quite	   as	  
ruthless	  as	  their	  forebears.”	  (Jackson	  2010)	  
These	  quotes	  are	  taken	  from	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  NATO	  allies	  must	  leave	  
Afghanistan.	  The	  country	  is	  doomed	  to	  ‘die’	  because	  of	   its	  nature,	  which	  hasn’t	  changed	  all	  that	  much	  
since	  1880	  (and	  presumably	  earlier,	  as	  it	  is	  barbaric	  in	  its	  fundamental	  nature).	  The	  article	  reaches	  into	  
the	  past	   to	  quote	  a	  British	  officer	  who	  was	   involved	   in	   the	  2nd	  Anglo	  Afghan	  War,	  and	  who	  was	  killed	  
there,	  tapping	  into	  his	  narratives	  on	  barbarism	  and	  savagery	  to	  “help”	  understand	  today’s	  Afghanistan	  
and	  why	   it’s	   hopeless	   to	   believe	   it	   can	   ever	   be	   anything	  more	   than	   a	   catastrophic	   place	   of	   violence.	  
Indeed,	  attempting	  to	  save	  and	  uplift	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  foolish	  prospect	  at	  best.	  
Barbaric	   Afghanistan	   is	   not	   the	   only	   trope	   borrowed	   from	   the	   19th	   century	   to	   transmit	  
knowledge	   about	   Afghanistan	   today.	   There	   were	   also	   references	   to	   mystical	   and	   mysterious	  
Afghanistan.	  Following	  is	  an	  account	  from	  an	  American	  who	  had	  travelled	  in	  Afghanistan	  in	  1971.	  
“Everything	  about	  Afghanistan	  was	  terrifying	  and	  thrilling	  from	  the	  pockmarked	  faces	  of	  the	  
men…	  	  (we	  never	  did	  see	  the	  faces	  of	  any	  women)	  to	  the	  daggers	  all	  the	  men	  wore	  in	  their	  
waistbands	   in	   Kandahar.	   …the	   horse	   and	   buggies	   that	   served	   as	   taxis	   in	   Herat…	   Maybe	  
somehow	  Afghanistan	  can	  be	  restored	  to	  a	  magical,	  mysterious	  and	  majestic	  land,	  too	  foreign	  
to	  know,	  too	  fantastic	  to	  forget.”	  (Cohen	  2001)	  
This	   is	  a	  wistful	  voice	   longing	  after	  a	  mystified	  Afghanistan	  not	  at	  all	  dissimilar	  from	  narratives	  
on	   the	   wonders	   of	   Afghanistan	   during	   the	   second	   and	   third	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  wars.	   At	   those	   times,	   this	  
longing	  for	  a	  better	  time	  was	  justification	  for	  intervention,	  though	  a	  rather	  different	  sort	  of	  intervention.	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Yet	   in	   both	   cases	   the	   idea	   of	   intervention	   is	   deemed	   acceptable	   because	   those	   currently	   in	   power	   in	  
Afghanistan	   (at	   the	   time	  of	   each	   respective	   statement)	  had	  mismanaged	  Afghanistan	   into	  a	   complete	  
disaster.	  Perhaps	  more	  interestingly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  this	  project,	  however,	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  suggests	  
that	   Afghanistan’s	   value	   is	   in	   its	   quaint	   eccentricity.	   Afghanistan	   should	   be	   restored	   to	   its	   mystical	  
baseline	  because	  it	  is	  so	  charming	  to	  the	  Western	  eye.	  
Not	  all	   typifications	  of	  emptiness	  reached	  back	  so	   far,	  however.	  Others	  suggest	   threads	  which	  
tie	  straight	  forwardly	  with	  contemporary	  descriptions	  of	  state	  failure	  in	  orthodox	  policy	  literature.	  That	  
is	   to	   say,	   the	   emptiness	   here	   purportedly	   derives	   from	  a	   capacity	   gap	   and	   /	   or	   a	   lack	   of	   political	  will	  
(arising	  most	  often	  from	  corruption	  or	  ignorance).	  
“Afghanistan	  will	   be	   a	   functioning	   democracy	   only	  when	   citizens	   can	   take	   their	   grievances	  
against	   the	   central	   government	   to	   elected	   local	   representatives	   instead	   of	   to	   armed	   local	  
warlords.	   Those	   grievances	   are	   real.	   Some	   governors	   and	   police	   chiefs	   Mr.	   Karzai	   has	  
appointed	  are	  thuggish	  and	  corrupt.	  Antidrug	  efforts	  go	  after	  poor	  farmers	  while	  traffickers	  
thrive.	   Alternative	   development	   lags.	   A	   lack	   of	   judges	   stymies	   the	   rule	   of	   law.”	   (New	   York	  
Times	  2005)	  
Discursive  Legacies  of  Indeterminacy  
Indeterminacy	   is	  a	  seemingly	  ever-­‐present	  driver	  to	  the	  narrative	  on	  Afghanistan.	   In	  any	  given	  
intervention,	  Afghanistan	  is	  (once	  again	  /	  for	  the	  first	  time)	  an	  unknown.	  It	  represents	  an	  empty	  space	  –	  
not	  only	  on	  the	  map	  but	  in	  what	  the	  popular	  mind	  ‘knows’	  about	  the	  region	  and	  the	  world.	  Afghanistan	  
is	  mystical,	  magical,	  bizarre...	  unknown.	  Thus	  in	  every	  intervention	  this	  dissertation	  has	  analyzed,	  there	  
has	  been	  a	  tendency	  in	  Western	  speakers	  to	  reach	  externally	  for	  comparisons,	  other	  knowledge	  regimes	  
to	  apply	  to	  the	  Afghan	  case.	  Though	  Afghanistan	  is	  demonstrably	  not	  empty	  –	  there	  are	  (many)	  people	  
there	  with	  a	  (multitude	  of)	  history	  (histories)	  and	  a	  culture(s)	  –	  it	  is	  made	  functionally	  empty	  by	  layering	  
of	  outside	  knowledges	  without	  recourse	  to	  concern	  over	  Afghanistan’s	  specificity.	  	  
This	  takes	  place	  not	  only	  in	  popular	  and	  policy	  discourse,	  but	  also	  in	  academic	  attempts	  to	  insert	  
some	  specificity	  into	  policy	  considerations	  regarding	  Afghanistan.	  	  
“The	   unfolding	   drama	   in	   Afghanistan	   is	   likely	   to	   have	   significant	   implications	   for	   the	   ‘New	  
Great	  Game’,	  which	  many	   think	  will	   play	  out	   in	   the	   coming	  years	   in	   the	  adjacent	   region	  of	  
Central	  Asia	  and	  South	  Asia.	  As	  well	  as	  the	  US	  and	  Russia,	  several	  other	  states	  such	  as	  China	  
and	   India	   have	   interests	   in	   this	   region	   Transition,	   talking	   about	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   space	   for	  
ideological	  conflict.”	  (Baral:	  700)	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Baral	   talks	   about	   Afghanistan	   in	   terms	   of	   Great	   Game,	   Vietnam,	   and	   likens	   geopolitics	   in	   the	  
area	  as	  a	  game.	  About	  terrorism,	  but	  also	  power	  struggles	  between	  US/Russia,	  US/China,	  India/Pakistan.	  
While	  being	  critical	  of	  normal	  way	  of	  doing	   things	   in	  Afghanistan,	  draws	   its	  knowledge	  of	  Afghanistan	  
from	  the	  same	  discursive	  knowledge	  structures.	  
“Afghanistan	   is	   difficult	   both	   to	   defeat	   and	   to	   control,	   but	   it	   has	   seldom	   shown	   a	   serious	  
inclination	   to	   control	   itself…	   Its	   people	   are	   afflicted	   by	   chronic	   poverty,	   backwardness	   and	  
ignorance.”	  (ibid:	  701)	  
Baral	   argues	   that	   Afghanistan’s	   history	   as	   a	   victim	   of	   external	   intervention	   comes	   largely	  
because	  of	  its	  nature.	  	  
“Afghans	   are	   ardent	   nationalists,	   but	   their	   actions	   weaken	   national	   unity	   and	   integration.	  
They	  are	  known	  for	  their	  spirit	  of	  fierce	  independence,	  but	  this	  independence	  may	  have	  been	  
jeopardized	  by	  the	  intermeshing	  of	  internal	  conflicts	  and	  external	  intervention.”	  (ibid:	  700)	  
Afghanistan,	  then,	   is	  not	  an	  appropriate	  partner	  in	   its	  own	  reconstruction.	  Attempts	  to	  rely	  on	  
Afghans	  in	  some	  way	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  Afghan	  solution	  is,	  for	  Baral,	  part	  of	  why	  as	  of	  2013	  all	  attempts	  
to	   install	   something	   democratic	   in	   the	   country	   had	   failed.	   (ibid	   703)	   Thus,	   falling	   back	   on	   underlying	  
assumptions	  of	  Great	  Game	  metaphors,	  Baral	  argues	   that	  Afghanistan	  must	  be	  understood	  and	  policy	  
must	   be	   formulated	   in	   the	   context	   of	   interests	   that	   external	   actors	   hold	   in	   Afghanistan.	   He	   focuses	  
primarily	   on	   competition	   between	   India	   and	   Pakistan,	   suggesting	   that	   while	   the	   United	   States	   sees	  
Afghanistan	   as	   a	   place	   to	   play	   out	   its	  war	   on	   terror,	   these	   two	   countries	   see	   everything	   the	  US	  does	  
there	   in	   the	   context	   of	   their	   regional	   competition.	   Further,	   both	   India	   and	   Pakistan	  make	   their	   own	  
geopolitical	   moves	   within	   Afghanistan	   with	   an	   eye	   toward	   their	   conflict,	   rather	   than	   the	   ideological	  
conflict	  of	  civilization	  versus	  terrorism	  (though	  both	  use	  that	   language	  to	  differing	  extents).	   (ibid:	  704-­‐
706)	   Thus,	   even	   the	   project	   of	   nation	   building	   cannot	   rightfully	   involve	   the	   nation	   which	   is	   to	   be	  
(re)built.	  It	  is	  acted	  upon,	  its	  agency	  or	  potential	  for	  agency	  denied.	  
While	  the	  exposition	  of	  regional	  motives	  in	  Afghanistan	  is	  helpful,	  Baral’s	  work	  relies	  on	  legacies	  
of	  British	  narratives	  on	  Afghanistan	  to	  understand	  that	  space.	  Every	  action	  in	  Afghanistan	  from	  the	  19th	  
century	  until	  today	  is,	  in	  essence,	  another	  iteration	  of	  the	  Great	  Game.	  
“The	   three	   Afghan	   wars	   constituting	   the	   first	   Great	   Game	   demonstrated	   the	   strong	  
nationalism	  and	   fighting	  spirit	  of	   the	  Afghans.	   In	   the	  second	  Great	  Game	  they	  were	  able	   to	  
defeat	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  with	   the	   support	   of	   the	  US	   and	   its	   allies.	   The	   third	  Great	  Game	   is	  
apparently	  heading	  towards	  America’s	  defeat.”	  (ibid	  711)	  
191	  
	  
This	  is	  not	  an	  uncommon	  issue.	  Not	  only	  do	  we	  see	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  discursive	  material	  
leaning	  on	  old	  positioning	  of	  Afghan	  identity	  as	  barbaric	  and	  wild,	  but	  that	  positioning	  has	  quite	  widely	  
enabled	  Afghanistan	  to	  be	  positioned	  as	  a	  geostrategic	  game	  board,	  devoid	  of	  specific	  character	  on	  its	  
own	  without	  outside	  –	  and	  more	  important	  –	  conflicts	  to	  give	  it	  identity.	  
Afghanistan  the  Game  Board  –  the  War  on  Terror  
A	   source	   of	   significant	   continuity	   in	   narratives	   on	   Afghanistan	   is	   derived	   from	   its	   seeming	  
indeterminate	   emptiness.	   In	   the	   contemporary	   sense,	   Afghanistan	   has	   been	   filled	   up	  with	   notions	   of	  
geostrategic	  necessity	  and	  ideological	   imperative.	  Afghanistan	  is	  once	  again	  being	  thought	  of	  primarily	  
as	   a	   tactical	   space,	   a	   game	   board	   whereupon	   geopolitical	   games	   are	   properly	   carried	   out.	   These	  
geopolitical	  competitions	  are	  not	  simply	  about	  power	  or	  protecting	  one’s	  dominion,	  however.	  Since	  the	  
third	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	  Afghanistan	  has	  been	  a	  place	  where	   interveners	   felt	   that	  conflict	  over	  certain	  
core	  tenets	  of	  the	  international	  system	  were	  at	  stake.	  Civilization	  has	  been	  a	  key	  thread	  for	  some	  time.	  
Democracy	  and	  justice	  also	  became	  important	  motivators	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  those	  continue	  on.	  
Those	  successive	  layers	  still	  seem	  to	  exist	  but	  the	  moral	  imperative	  underpinning	  conflict	  in	  Afghanistan	  
has	  changed.	  	  
Communism	   was	   figured	   to	   be	   a	   source	   of	   great	   evil	   which	   only	   the	   United	   States	   could	  
successfully	   lead	   the	   fight	   against.	   This	   holds	   true	   with	   terrorism	   as	   well.	   Despite	   a	   seeming	   surface	  
similarity,	   this	   ideological	   imperative	   seems	   even	   stronger	   in	   that	   very	   few	   countries	   consider	  
themselves	  ‘neutral’	  and	  even	  fewer	  align	  themselves	  with	  the	  interests	  identified	  as	  terrorist	  in	  nature.	  
Rather	   than	  a	   conflict	  between	   two	  different	  potential	   futures	  of	   the	   international	   system	  as	  was	   the	  
case	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  global	  war	  on	  terrorism	  is	  cast	  as	  a	  war	  for	  the	  very	  survival	  of	  an	  international	  
system	  in	  itself.	  It	  is	  a	  struggle	  at	  the	  center	  of	  which	  lies	  Afghanistan	  –	  a	  place	  where	  the	  war	  on	  terror	  
should	  be	  fought	  because	  for	  reasons	  that	  seem	  to	  make	  sense	  to	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  if	  we	  fight	  terror	  over	  
there	  then	  we	  won’t	  have	  to	  fight	  terror	  at	  home.	  
This	  is	  a	  justification	  brought	  out	  from	  time	  to	  time	  by	  leadership	  figures.	  President	  Bush	  spoke	  
regularly	  in	  defense	  of	  this	  war	  on	  terror:	  	  
“There	   is	   legitimate	   debate	   about	  many	   of	   these	   decisions.	   But	   there	   can	   be	   little	   debate	  
about	  the	  results:	  America	  has	  gone	  more	  than	  seven	  years	  without	  another	  terrorist	  attack	  




“We	   can	   decide	   to	   stop	   fighting	   the	   terrorists…	   but	   they	   will	   not	   decide	   to	   stop	  
fighting	  us…	  If	  we	  leave,	  they	  will	  follow	  us."	  	  (Bush	  2006)	  
This	   was	   a	   recurring	   theme	   which	   saw	   expression	   frequently	   in	   civil	   discourse	   debating	   US	  
interventions	  in	  Afghanistan	  as	  well	  as	  Iraq	  –	  and	  anywhere	  else	  involved	  in	  the	  global	  war	  on	  terror.	  It	  
plays	   in	   very	   strongly	   with	   the	   idea	   that	   this	   was	   a	   clash,	   a	   global	   clash,	   between	   civilization	   and	  
barbarism.	  It	  is	  an	  ever-­‐present	  and	  unending	  threat.	  
“[In	   reference	   to	   events	   in	   Iraq]	   I	   had	   started	   to	   become	   concerned	   about	   two	   other	  
phenomena.	   The	   first	  was…	   Islamic	   extremism	   and	   terrorism…	  Afghanistan	  was	   its	   training	  
ground.”	  Worse	  still,	   “In	  Afghanistan	  al-­‐Qaeda	  trained	   its	   recruits	   in	   the	  use	  of	  poisons	  and	  
chemicals…”	  (Blair	  2004)	  
And	  the	  threat	  is	  unending.	  	  
“…terrorists	  [will]	  redouble	  their	  efforts…	  they	  carry	  on	  killing	  in	  Afghanistan.”	  (Blair	  2004)	  
And:	  	  
“The	  murders	  in	  Madrid	  are	  a	  reminder	  that	  the	  civilized	  world	  is	  at	  war…”	  There	  is	  no	  neutral	  
ground	  –	  no	  neutral	  ground	  –	  in	  the	  fight	  between	  civilization	  and	  terror,	  because	  there	  is	  no	  
neutral	  ground	  between	  good	  and	  evil,	  freedom	  and	  slavery,	  and	  life	  and	  death.”	  (Bush	  2004,	  
emphasis	  mine)	  
	  The	  threat,	  not	  to	  put	  too	  fine	  a	  point	  on	  it,	  is	  to	  civilization	  itself.	  To	  be	  against	  terrorism	  is	  to	  
be	  for	  civilization	  (and	  not	  to	  forget	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  Bush	  Doctrine	  in	  the	  war	  on	  terror	  that	  suggests	  
one	  was	  either	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  United	  States	  or	  an	  enemy	  of	  civilization.)	  Fighting	  terrorism	  was	  part	  of	  
the	  conflict	  –	  the	  other	  part	  was	  democracy.	  
“The	  rise	  of	  democratic	   institutions	   in	  Afghanistan	  and	   Iraq	   is	  a	  great	  step	  toward	  a	  goal	  of	  
lasting	   importance	   to	   the	   world…	   in	   the	   greater	  Middle	   East	   as	   alternatives	   to	   fanaticism,	  
resentment,	  and	  terror.”	  (Bush	  2004)	  
Democracy	  was	  held	  up	  as	  a	  banner	  of	  civilization	  –	  the	  alternative	  to	  terrorism	  and	  the	  greatest	  
weapon	   against	   terrorism.	   So	   Afghanistan	   is	   a	   battleground	   for	   the	   soul	   of	   the	   world.	   With	   such	  
momentous	  concerns	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  place	  for	  consideration	  of	  Afghanistan	  itself	  –	  what	  sort	  of	  
character	   or	   identity	   Afghanistan	   in	   itself	  might	   have.	   At	  most,	   at	   best,	   it	   is	   a	   space	  made	   empty	   of	  
anything	   but	   victimhood	   by	   the	   evils	   of	   terrorism.	   At	  worst,	   it	   is	   representative	   of	   terrorism	   itself.	   If	  
Afghanistan	   can	   take	   up	   the	   mantle	   of	   democracy	   and	   become	   an	   ally	   in	   the	   war	   on	   terror,	   then	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Afghanistan	   was	   a	   victim.	   If	   Afghanistan	   remains	   a	   failed	   state	   then	   it	   may	   be	   populated	   by	   many	  
victims,	  but	  it	  will	  continue	  on	  as	  little	  more	  than	  a	  battleground.	  
The	  Heritage	  Foundation,	  a	  think	  tank	  which	  was	  very	  influential	  in	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  2000,	  got	  
in	  on	  the	  matter	  rather	  strongly	  as	  well.	  	  
“In	   the	   issue	   that	   matters	   most-­‐-­‐our	   survival,	   the	   civilized	   world's	   survival,	   the	   spread	   of	  
democracy,	  the	  war	  against	  terrorism	  and	  radical	  Islam…”	  (Bennett	  2004)	  
Terrorism	   is	   an	   existential	   threat	   to	   civilization.	   The	   United	   States	   is	   basically	   a	   champion	   of	  
civilization.	  Islam,	  here,	  is	  also	  seen	  as	  fundamental	  to	  terrorism:	  
“The	  problem	   is	   radical	   Islam.	  Not	   terrorism,	   radical	   Islam.	   Let’s	   get	   it	   exactly	   right:	   radical	  
Islam,	  of	  which	   there	   is	   too	  much.	  Moderate	   Islam	  –	  where	  and	   if	   it	   exists	   –	  must	   raise	   its	  
voice	  against	  that	  radical	  call.”	  [ibid,	  emphasis	  mine]	  	  
Where	  and	  if	  moderate	  Islam	  exists,	  it	  must	  successfully	  help	  to	  fight	  against	  terrorism.	  Failure	  is	  
tantamount	   to	   complicity.	   If	  Afghanistan	   is	   a	   failed	   state,	   then	  Afghanistan	   is	   a	   fundamental	   cause	  of	  
terrorism	   –	   and,	   by	   turns,	   a	   victim.	   Also,	   the	   Middle	   East	   is	   full	   of	   thugs.	   The	   invasion	   of	   Iraq	   (and	  
Afghanistan)	  were	  good	  because:	  
“The	  Middle	  East	  has	  one	  less	  thug	  leading	  one	  less	  thuggish	  state…	  Our	  efforts	  in	  Iraq	  rank	  
among	  the	  crowning	  achievements	  of	  our	  nation,	  of	  our	  democratic	  will	  against	  tyranny,	  and	  
of	  our	  goodwill	  for	  human	  rights.”	  (Bennett	  2004)	  
There	   is	   some	   kind	   of	   connection	   between	   the	   region	   and	   barbarism.	   Terrorism	   is	   prevalent	  
here	  because	  here	  is	  a	  region	  that	  is	  hostile	  to	  civilization.	  Conflict	  is	  the	  only	  way	  forward	  –	  no	  identity	  
can	  exist	  other	  than	  “them”	  or	  “us”	  –	  one	  is	  either	  for	  civilization	  or	  for	  terror,	  and	  thus	  a	  barbarian.	  
“It	  [terrorism]	  is	  an	  ideology	  that	  cannot	  be	  appeased	  or	  negotiated	  with,	  but	  which	  must	  be	  
defeated.	  The	  terrorist	  [attacks]…	  were	  not	  the	  consequences	  of	  U.S.	  or	  British	  foreign	  policy,	  
but	   part	   of	   an	   epic	   confrontation	   between	   the	   forces	   of	   barbarism	   and	   the	   forces	   of	  
civilization.”	  (Gardiner	  2006)	  
This	  then	  is	  the	  justification	  for	  interventions	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq.	  It	  makes	  civilization	  safer.	  
The	  war	  on	  terror	  is	  a	  war	  between	  civilization	  and	  barbarism.	  Afghanistan	  is	  expected	  to	  pick	  a	  side,	  as	  
if	   Afghanistan	   is	   somehow	  personified	   and	   not,	   as	   a	   character,	   involved	   in	   this	   yet.	   Afghanistan	   is	   by	  
turns	  a	  battleground	  and	  breeding	  pit	  for	  terrorism	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  
potential	  ally	  in	  the	  war	  on	  terror:	  “Afghanistan’s	  yearning	  to	  rejoin	  the	  civilized	  world…”	  (Burns	  2002)	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This	  change	  in	  character	  would	  come	  about	  if	  Afghanistan	  is	  able	  to	  take	  up	  the	  mantle	  of	  democracy,	  if	  
it	  is	  comprised	  of	  moderate	  Muslims	  who	  throw	  off	  the	  yolk	  of	  terrorism.	  It	  is,	  somehow,	  boiled	  down	  to	  
an	  apparent	  choice	  that	  is	  so	  simple	  to	  conceive	  of.	  Yet	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  failed	  state.	  
Empty.	   Collapsed.	   A	   victim.	   Helpless	   before	   the	   scourge	   of	   terrorism.	   Thus,	   it	   requires	   saving	   (but	  
violence	  on	  Afghanistan	  is	  justified	  because	  it	  is	  simultaneously	  victim	  and	  villain).	  
Situating  Afghanistan  within  the  Global  War  on  Terror  
Critical	   legal	   scholar	   Nick	   Sciullo	   wrote	   on	   the	   indeterminate	   nature	   of	   terrorism	   and	   the	  
destructive	  effects	  the	  struggle	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  terrorism	  has	  on	  law	  and	  security	  policy.	  His	  
purpose	  was	  to:	  	  
“…engage	   in	  a	  macro-­‐level	  analysis	  of	   the	  way	   the	   legal	   academy	  conceptualizes	   terrorism-­‐
not	   how	   it	   discusses	   acts	   of	   terrorism…	   	   terrorism	  has	   an	   absent	   referent,	   i.e.,	   the	   idea	   of	  
terrorism	   has	   been	   disembodied	   from	   the	   act	   of	   terrorism…	   the	   GWOT	   has	   far-­‐reaching	  
implications	  that	  threaten	  to	  debase	  our	  legal	  system	  and	  our	  civil	  rights	  regime.”	  (561)	  
He	   wrote	   that	   concern	   with	   terrorism	   in	   the	   United	   States	   as	   a	   focus	   of	   policy	   only	   became	  
prevalent	   in	   the	  mid	  1990’s.	  More	   intricate	  and	  potentially	   invasive	   legislation	  has	  been	   introduced	   in	  
the	  wake	  of	  successive	  terrorist	   incidents	   in	  the	  United	  States.	   In	  each	  instance,	  government	  authority	  
has	  increased	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  civil	  liberties.	  	  
“This	  fight	  against	  terrorism	  has	  problematized	  our	  modern	  world	  because	  it	  positioned	  us	  in	  
a	  complex	  battle	  against	  an	  unknown…	   	  Seemingly,	   it	   is	  us	  versus	   them…	  This	  dichotomous	  
thinking	  forces	  an	  oversimplification	  of	  relations	  and	  demands	  diametrical	  opposition,	  instead	  
of	  careful	  analysis...”	  (564)	  
Policy	   as	   relates	   to	   terrorism	   has	   tended	   to	   be	   both	   reactionary	   and	   heavy	   handed.	   In	   this	  
dichotomous	  ‘us	  versus	  them’	  theme	  –	  often	  articulated	  as	  civilization	  versus	  barbarism	  /	  terrorism	  /	  evil	  
–	   the	   overriding	   necessity	   of	   defeating	   terrorism	   means	   that	   all	   means	   are	   justifiable.	   Sciullo	   is	  
particularly	   interested	   in	  how	   this	   allows	   for	  a	   coalescing	  of	   additional	  powers	  being	   reserved	   for	   the	  
government	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  civil	  rights,	  traditionally	  associated	  with	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  justice	  on	  an	  
individual	   level.	   Thus,	   the	   imperatives	   of	   the	  war	   on	   terror	   require	   that	   concerns	  with	   justice	   be	   set	  
aside	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  much	  larger	  threat	  to	  the	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  justice	  –	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  
civilization	  itself.	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Sciullo	   describes	   this	   problem	   with	   reference	   to	   Descartes	   and	   his	   “ghost	   in	   the	   machine”	  
concept.	   In	   this	   case,	   terrorism	   acts	   as	   a	   ghost	   in	   the	  machine	   of	  U.S.	   national	   security	   –	   being	   itself	  
vague	   and	   largely	   defying	   settled	   definition	   while	   simultaneously	   informing	   wide	   swaths	   of	   not	   only	  
security	  policy	  but	  other	  policy	  areas	  that	  are	  only	  tenuously	  related	  to	  security.	  	  
“[T]he	   all-­‐encompassing	   fear	   of	   terrorism	   has	   morphed	   itself	   into	   a	   battle	   against	   the	  
unlocated	  specter	  of	  terrorism’s	  reality.	   In	  this	  regard,	  the	  United	  States	   is	  battling	  ghosts…	  
further	  complicated	  when,	  as	  Jacques	  Derrida	  describes,	   ‘every	  terrorist	   in	  the	  world	  claims	  
to	  be	  responding	  in	  self-­‐defense	  to	  a	  prior	  terrorism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  state…’39”	  (565)	  
Terrorism,	   Sciullo	   argues,	   defies	   definition.	   It	   is	   well	   documented	   within	   the	   legal	   and	   policy	  
professions	  that	  there	  is	  no	  definitive	  definition	  of	  terrorism.	  Individual	  government	  agencies	  within	  the	  
United	  States	  have	  their	  own	  unique	  definitions	  of	  terrorism	  by	  which	  they	  order	  their	  particular	  policy	  
responses	  to	  challenges	  of	  terrorism	  as	  they	  see	  it,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  their	  duties.	  This	  situation	  replicates	  
itself	  with	   various	   governmental	   and	   quasi-­‐governmental	   organs	  worldwide	   at	   various	   levels.	   Despite	  
this	  well-­‐known	   and	  widely	   accepted	   lack	   of	   clarity	   of	  what	   terrorism	   actually	  means,	   it	   is	   used	   as	   a	  
fundamental	   linchpin	  of	  policy	  making	  and	  security	  protocols	  across	  agencies	  and	  nations.	  It	   is	  used	  to	  
justify	   both	   domestic	   and	   international	   interventions.	   Sovereignty	   is	   impinged	   upon	   –	   both	   the	  
sovereignties	   of	   external	   states	   and	   the	   supposed	   sovereign	   civil	   rights	   of	   citizens	   of	   these	   “civilized”	  
states	  which	  are	  engaged	   in	  an	  existential	   struggle	  against	   terrorism.	  Sciullo	  argues	  that	   this	  nebulous	  
nature	  to	  terrorism	  in	  fact	  encourages	  this	  wider	  governmental	  overreach:	  
“This	   inability	   to	   define	   terrorism	   makes	   it	   difficult	   to	   engage	   terrorism	   constructively	   by	  
forcing	  us	   to	  battle	  an	  ephemeral	   specter.	  Without	  a	   firm	  base	  upon	  which	   to	  build	  a	   legal	  
regime	  to	  address	  non-­‐state	  actors	  that	  engage	  in	  terrorism,	  law	  is	  bound	  to	  fail.”	  (566)	  
Yet	  law	  acts,	  as	  we	  see	  in	  various	  legislative	  and	  interventionist	  actions.	  Thus	  the	  failure	  is	  not	  in	  
a	  failure	  to	  act,	  but	  a	  failure	  to	  fulfill	   its	  purpose.	  Alternately,	  it	  represents	  the	  unmasking	  of	  sovereign	  
power,	  the	  removal	  of	  a	  mask	  of	  legitimacy	  from	  the	  coercive	  power	  of	  the	  sovereign.	  The	  unmasking,	  
for	   Derrida,	   of	   the	   ‘loup’.	   (Derrida	   2009:	   6)	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   the	   loup	   is	   associated	   with	   the	   wolf,	   the	  
powerful	  coercive	  aspect	  of	  sovereignty	  –	  the	  predator,	  a	  power	  which	  is	  sensed	  but	  unseen,	  and	  which	  
observes	   all	   from	  behind	   a	   veil	   of	   anonymity	   and	   respectability.	   That	   veil	   of	   respectability	   is	   the	   law,	  
which	  must	  act	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  protecting	  of	  and	  sensitive	  to	  justice.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Sciullo quotes Derrida from Borradori (2003): 103 
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In	  this	  sense,	  the	  existential	  struggle	  of	  civilization	  against	  terrorism	  authorizes,	  in	  fact	  demands,	  
such	  a	  strident	  use	  of	  sovereign	  authority	  that	  the	  loup	  is	  stripped	  of	  its	  mask	  of	  legitimacy.	  Sovereign	  
actions	  are	   required	  which	  are	   so	  drastic	   that	   they	  directly	   contradict	   the	   justifications	  of	   legality	  and	  
civil	  right	  which	  have	  made	  the	  exercises	  of	  those	  powers	  legitimate.	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Afghanistan	  
this	   exercise	   of	   sovereignty	   has	   also	   been	   an	   exercise	   of	   stripping	   sovereignty,	   denying	   sovereignty	   –	  
indeed	  denying	  personality	  and	  character	  and	  existential	  magnitude	  to	  Afghanistan.	  	  
The	   indeterminacy	   of	   terrorism	   and	   the	   indeterminacy	   of	   Afghan	   identity	   have	   thus	   been	  
situated	   in	  a	  way	  as	   that	   they	   fill	   one	  another	  with	  meaning.	  Afghanistan	  has	   typically	  been	   situated,	  
ideologically,	  as	  a	  space	  where	  civilization	  struggles	  against	  barbarism.	  Terrorism	  is	  depicted	  in	  a	  similar	  
manner.	   The	   character	   of	   Afghanistan	   in	   this	   struggle	   is	  made	   further	   indeterminate,	   in	   that	   it	   is	   the	  
stage	  for	  this	  struggle	  of	  civilization	  versus	  barbarism,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  object	  of	  violent	  intervention	  in	  this	  
struggle.	   In	   being	   the	   object	   of	   intervention,	   Afghanistan	   is	   both	   enemy	   and	   victim	   –	   simultaneously	  
needing	  to	  be	  vanquished	  and	  saved.	  	  
Thus	   there	   is	   a	   discordant	   tension	  within	   this	   narrative.	   If	   the	   struggle	   against	   terrorism	   is	   an	  
ideological	   struggle	   in	  which	   the	  goods	  of	   civilization	  must	  be	   saved	   from	   the	  evils	  of	  barbaric	   terror,	  
then	   its	   legitimacy	   must	   be	   unimpeachable.	   There	   are	   attempts	   to	   resolve	   this	   instability	   in	   the	  
discourse,	   this	  auto-­‐immune	  mechanism,	  by	  situating	  such	   interventions	  as	  state-­‐building	  exercises.	   In	  
the	  case	  of	  Afghanistan,	  it	  is	  the	  site	  of	  an	  ideological	  struggle	  of	  civilization	  versus	  barbaric	  terrorism	  –	  
but	  the	  gestalt	  of	  Afghanistan	  itself	  is	  an	  object	  for	  which	  the	  West	  seeks	  salvation.	  In	  this	  war	  on	  terror,	  
there	  is	  a	  simultaneous	  state-­‐building	  project	  wherein	  Afghanistan-­‐the-­‐failed-­‐state	  will	  be	  salvaged	  and	  
returned,	   somehow,	   to	   legitimate	   statehood	   and	   respectability.	   This	   is,	   unfortunately,	   propped	  up	  on	  
very	  tenuous	  supports	  that	  further	  introduce	  an	  untenable	  tension	  within	  this	  narrative.	  
Afghanistan  the  Uncivilized  Victim  –  State-­‐building  in  Afghanistan  
	  Victimhood	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  Afghan	  character	  then	  helps	  to	   justify	   intervention	   in	  Afghanistan,	  
echoing	  particularly	  narratives	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  but	  with	  some	  resonance	  to	  earlier	  interventions	  as	  
well	  (i.e.	  Afghanistan	  ruled	  by	  Afghans	  is	  a	  horrible	  place	  –	  enlightened	  Western	  rule	  would	  make	  it	  safer	  
and	  wealthier).	  Afghanistan	  is	  simultaneously	  the	  victim	  of	  terrorism	  and	  itself	  a	  wellspring	  of	  terrorism.	  
The	   appropriate	   response	   to	   both	   of	   these	   is	   considered	   to	   be	  military	   intervention	   and	   a	   project	   of	  
state-­‐building.	  Afghanistan	   is	   a	   failed	   state,	  meaning	   it	   has	   lost	   its	   sovereignty	   and	   can	  be	   intervened	  
upon.	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  failed	  state,	  meaning	  it	  naturally	  would	  be	  a	  state	  if	  it	  had	  not,	  in	  itself	  and	  on	  its	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own,	   failed	   in	   some	   important	   way.	   Afghanistan	   is	   a	   failure	   –	   Afghanistan	   is	   both	   a	   victim	   and	   the	  
architect	  of	  its	  own	  victimhood	  –	  terrorist	  and	  terrorized.	  	  
It	   is	   for	   the	   West	   to	   intervene,	   to	   defeat	   terrorism	   both	   physically	   and	   as	   an	   ideology.	   The	  
rebuilding	  of	  Afghanistan	  is	  central	  to	  this,	  but	  only	  if	   it	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  rebuilding.	  Afghanistan	  
must	   have	   its	   legitimacy	   restored	   –	   it	   must	   have	   its	   statehood	   restored,	   rather	   than	   built	   up	   anew.	  
Democracy	   and	   justice	   and	   sovereignty	   are	   things	   which	   can	   be	   restored,	   but	   only	   through	  Western	  
beneficence.	   This	   simultaneously	   justifies	   the	   intervention	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   validates	   dominant	  
discourses	  on	  the	  character	  of	  Western	  civilization.	  Afghanistan,	  a	  place	  historically	  characterized	  from	  
the	  outside	  as	  indeterminate	  and	  empty,	  is	  filled	  with	  meaning	  in	  a	  way	  that	  fills	  the	  United	  States	  and	  
its	  allies	  with	  a	  particular	  character	  as	  well.	  	  
Central	  to	  this	  project	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  sovereignty.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  sovereign,	  the	  
government	  must	  be	  legitimate	  –	  particular	  types	  of	  democracy	  and	  systems	  of	  justice	  must	  be	  in	  place	  
for	  this	  to	  happen.	  Much	  was	  said	  in	  the	  media	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  Afghanistan	  –	  its	  
obligations	  and	  best	  strategies.	  
“…if	  a	  majority	  of	  Afghans	  do	  not	  consider	  the	  president	  and	  his	  government	  to	  be	  legitimate,	  
the	  military	  campaign	  [is	  a	  failure]…”	  (Rahel	  2009)	  
Despite	  the	  complicated	  nature	  of	  the	  intervention	  and	  the	  cost	  involved,	  it	  is	  an	  intervention	  of	  
extreme	  importance.	  Contemplating	  a	  pullout	  at	  any	  time	  was	  dangerous	  in	  the	  extreme.	  
“The	   international	   community	   is	   risking	   the	   collapse	   of	   efforts	   to	   install	   a	   stable	   and	  
legitimate	  government	  in	  Afghanistan…”	  (McWilliams	  2002)	  
It	  was	   the	  duty	  of	   the	   international	   community	  and	  particularly	   the	  West	   to	   save	  Afghanistan	  
and	  restore	  its	  legitimacy.	  This	  was	  both	  a	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  an	  important	  strategic	  consideration	  
–	  one	  which	  held	  stable	  over	  time	  into	  the	  Obama	  Presidency.	  
“President	   Obama	   now	   faces	   a	   new	   complication:	   enabling	   a	   badly	   tarnished	   partner	   to	  
regain	   enough	   legitimacy	   to	   help	   the	   United	   States	   find	   the	   way	   out	   of	   an	   eight-­‐year-­‐old	  
war.”	  (Sanger	  2009)	  
In	  terms	  of	  government	  policy,	   there	   is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  material	  available	  –	  speeches,	  debates,	  
policy	  papers,	  research	  papers	  for	  Congress.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  brevity,	  we	  here	  consider	  a	  number	  of	  items	  
from	  a	  2009	  policy	  discussion	  on	  Afghanistan	  and	  the	  most	  recent	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  report	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on	  Afghanistan.	  The	  2009	  discussion	  could	  be	  considered	  fairly	  pivotal	  –	  a	  new	  general	  had	  been	  put	  in	  
charge	   of	   operations	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   the	   Obama	   administration	   was	   working	   to	   find	   a	   unique	  
approach	  to	  what	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  untenable	  dilemma	  in	  Afghanistan	  inherited	  from	  the	  previous	  regime.	  	  
General	   McCaffrey	   spoke	   before	   Congress	   on	   newly	   appointed	   NATO	   forces	   commander	   for	  
Afghanistan	  Gen.	  McChrystal	  and	  policy	  in	  Afghanistan	  going	  forward	  from	  that	  point	  (2009).	  He	  spoke	  
largely	  in	  terms	  of	  fighting	  terrorism:	  
“General	   McChrystal	   is	   probably	   the	   most	   successful	   and	   courageous	   counter-­‐terrorism	  
fighter	  in	  the	  past	  25	  years.”	  (McCaffrey	  2009:	  3)	  
And:	  
“Our	  objective	  is	  to	  prevent	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Afghan	  government	  to	  the	  Taliban	  and	  prevent	  al	  
Qaeda	  from	  operating	  unchallenged	  in	  either	  Pakistan	  or	  Afghanistan.	  Afghanistan	  must	  not	  
again	  be	  a	  base	  for	  terrorists	  who	  want	  to	  kill	  Americans.	  [emphasis	  mine]	  A	  return	  to	  Taliban	  
rule	   in	   Afghanistan	   would…	   leave	   Afghanistan	   in	   perpetual	   violence…	   The	   people	   of	  
Afghanistan	   and	   Pakistan	   have	   suffered	   the	   most	   at	   hands	   of	   violent	   Islamic	   extremists.”	  
(ibid:	  2)	  
He	  spoke	  of	  that	  objective	  going	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  state	  building	  –	  putting	  Afghanistan	  back	  on	  
its	  feet	  as	  a	  better,	  stronger	  state.	  
“Enhance	  the	  military,	  governance	  and	  economic	  capacity	  of	  Afghanistan.	  …strengthen	  
democracy	  and	  build	  critical	  infrastructure…promote	  a	  more	  capable	  and	  accountable	  Afghan	  
government…	  Address	  weaknesses	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  elected	  government	  -­‐	  	  corruption	  and	  
inability…”	  (ibid:	  2)	  [emphasis	  mine]	  
Central	  to	  this	  project	  is	  legitimacy	  –	  not	  only	  must	  Afghanistan’s	  legitimacy	  be	  built	  up	  in	  order	  
for	  it	  to	  be	  a	  successfully	  saved	  state,	  but	  that	  legitimacy	  is	  key	  to	  winning	  the	  ideological	  battle	  against	  
terrorism.	  	  
“In	   an	   insurgency,	   civil-­‐military	   operations	   are	   centered	   on	   the	   socio-­‐economic-­‐political	  
arena…	  the	  insurgency	  center	  of	  gravity	  is	  legitimacy…”	  (ibid:	  4)	  
A	   common	   element	   in	   policy	   debates	   and	   testimony	   at	   this	   time	  was	   in	   its	   clinical	   language.	  
Afghanistan’s	   ills	   are	   diagnosed	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   fixing	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   failed	   state.	   Afghanistan	   is	  
diagnosed	   in	   line	  with	   contemporary	  orthodox	  narratives	  on	   state	   failure	  –	   thus	  Afghanistan	  must	  be	  
fixed	   and	   made	   viable	   within	   the	   context	   of	   our	   liberal	   state	   system.	   Clinical	   language	   is	   used	   to	  
diagnose	   Afghanistan’s	   lack	   of	   will	   and	   capacity	   within	   the	   state	   failure	   paradigm,	   whereas	   more	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emotional	  language	  is	  used	  in	  terms	  of	  terrorism	  and	  violence	  /	  threat	  to	  American	  ideals.	  However,	  it	  
ignores	  questions	  of	  how/why	  Afghanistan	  ended	  up	  in	  this	  situation	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Empty	  space	  for	  
tactical	  games,	  then	  abandoned	  to	  its	  own	  fate	  again	  and	  again.	  Language	  of	  salvation	  is	  seen	  again	  and	  
again	  in	  terms	  of	  interventions	  –	  when	  those	  interventions	  are	  necessary	  it	  becomes	  a	  moral	  imperative	  
to	  save	  Afghanistan.	  Saving	  Afghanistan,	  here,	  is	  both	  a	  tactic	  in	  the	  ideological	  conflict	  /	  War	  on	  Terror	  
as	  well	  as	  justification	  for	  that	  conflict.	  
In	   this	   narrative,	   what	   constitutes	   a	   successful	   government	   in	   function	   is	   dictated	   by	   an	  
orthodoxy	  of	  civility	  which	  has	  historically	  purposefully	  excluded	  Afghanistan.	  Tracing	  the	  history	  of	  that	  
alienation	   suggests	   that	   the	   individuation	   of	   blame	   inherent	   in	   the	   failed	   state	   discourse	   is	   very	   ill-­‐
placed.	  This	  strongly	  suggests	  a	  tension	  within	  the	  narrative	  of	  saving	  Afghanistan	  –	  this	   is	  true	   in	  two	  
senses.	   First	   is	   the	   sense	   that	   ‘saving	   Afghanistan’	   has	   been	   bandied	   about	   as	   the	   reasoning	   for	  
interventions	   previously	  which	   had	   the	   effect	   ultimately	   of	   seeing	   Afghanistan	   pushed	   further	   to	   the	  
margins.	  Secondly,	  Afghanistan	   is	  to	  be	   ‘saved’	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  bringing	   it	   into	  this	  orthodox	  of	  civility,	  
this	  society	  of	  nation-­‐states	  which	  not	  only	  has	  it	  been	  intentionally	  excluded	  from	  up	  until	  now	  but	  also	  
in	   a	   quite	   paternal	   ‘civilizing	   the	   savage’	   sort	   of	  way	  which	   is	   at	   odds	  with	   the	  purported	   idea	  of	   the	  
insurgency	  being	  beaten	  only	  by	  an	  Afghan	  solution.	  We	  may	  well	  find	  strong	  agreement	  with	  the	  idea	  
that	  an	  Afghan	  solution	  is	  required,	  however	  an	  Afghan	  solution	  is	  simply	  not	  possible	  within	  the	  limits	  
of	  discursive	  knowledge	  regarding	  Afghanistan	  as	  that	  narrative	  is	  currently	  framed.	  
A	  number	  of	  other	  policy	  experts	  gave	  testimony	  before	  the	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee	  
at	  the	  same	  time.	  There	  is	  some	  variation	  as	  to	  the	  focus	  of	  individual	  experts,	  but	  a	  common	  theme	  is	  
that	   the	   United	   States	   must	   reform	   Afghanistan	   and	   restore	   it	   to	   legitimacy	   –	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	  
United	  States	  itself	  is	  at	  stake.	  
Barno	   supplies	   the	  most	   overt	   concern	   over	  US	   legitimacy	   –	   success	   is	   vital	   in	  Afghanistan	   to	  
legitimacy.	   The	   United	   States	   has	   a:	   “…moral	   imperative	   of	   not	   abandoning	   the	   Afghan	   people…	  
depredations	  of	  the	  Taliban…	  deadly	  spread	  of	  instability”.	  (Barno	  2009:	  3)	  This	  moral	  imperative	  arises	  
from	  Afghanistan’s	  identity	  as	  a	  victim.	  Yet	  it	  is	  also	  a	  failed	  state	  which	  lacks	  sovereign	  legitimacy.	  
“We	   must	   focus	   our	   diplomatic	   efforts	   in	   Kabul	   on	   reforming	   the	   next	   government	   of	  
Afghanistan…	  primarily	  in	  the	  area	  of	  anti-­‐corruption…	  If	  the…	  next	  government…	  is	  every	  bit	  




US	   legitimacy	  relies	  on	  changing	   the	  nature	  of	  Afghan	  governance	  away	   from	  corrupt,	   savage,	  
tribal…	  and	   toward	   the	  civilized	  manners	  of	  governance	  espoused	   in	  dominant	  Western	  narratives	  on	  
state-­‐ness.	  In	  this,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  pure	  noblesse	  oblige	  –	  with	  the	  benighted	  savage	  turning	  to	  us	  
for	  help:	  	  
“The	  fundamental	  flaw	  in	  any	  U.S.	  approach	  to	  Afghanistan…	  remains	  the	  lack	  of	  confidence	  
in	   American	   staying	   power:	   ‘You	   Americans	   are	   not	   going	   to	   abandon	   us	   again	   [emphasis	  
mine]	  are	  you?’”.	  (1)	  
This	  emotional	  appeal	  which	  speaks	  to	  America’s	  self-­‐image	  continues	  in	  a	  more	  clinical	  way	  in	  
testimony	  from	  a	  US	  Institute	  of	  Peace	  representative.	  	  
“We…	   [can]	   help	   the	   host	   nation	   government	   and	   its	   population	   build	   rule	   of	   law,	   stable	  
governance,	   a	   sustainable	   economy	   and	   the	   fundamental	   conditions	   for	   well-­‐being.”	   (Cole	  
2009:	  3)	  
Here,	   the	  USIP	   talking	   about	   the	   role	   of	   civilians	   in	   helping	   to	   rebuild	   Afghanistan	   and	   set	   its	  
government	  up	  right.	  Sounds	  good	  in	  many	  ways,	  but	  once	  again	  it’s	  arguing	  that	  only	  through	  Western	  
intervention	   can	  Afghanistan	  be	   fixed.	  Again,	   not	   in	   and	  of	   itself	   evil	   or	   even	  necessarily	  wrong	   –	   it’s	  
hard	  to	  argue	  that	  Afghanistan	  won’t	  profit	  from	  assistance.	  However,	  this	  prescriptive	  approach	  ignores	  
history	  –	  Afghanistan’s	   specificity.	  Specifically,	  Afghanistan	  can	  and	  should	  be	   treated	   like	  every	  other	  
society	  ever	  to	  suffer	  through	  conflict:	  “At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	   in	  every	  society	  emerging	  from	  conflict,	  
and	  Afghanistan	  is	  no	  exception	  [emphasis	  mine]…”	  (ibid:	  5)	  
In	   order	   to	   save	   Afghanistan,	   the	   USIP	   argues	   before	   Congress	   that	   they	   and	   other	   civilian	  
organizations	   like	   them	   just	   have	   a	   key	   role	   in	   uplifting	   the	   Afghan	   government.	   Teaching	   it	   how	   to	  
govern	  properly	  –	  external	  expertise	   is	  needed	   in	  part	  because	   it	   is	   this	  expertise	  which	  allows	  proper	  
diagnosis	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  ills	  (which	  are,	  remember,	  the	  exact	  same	  as	  that	  of	  other	  societies	  emerging	  
from	  conflict).	  Afghanistan	  needs:	  
“a	  safe	  and	  secure	  environment,	   the	  rule	  of	   law,	  stable	  governance,	  a	  sustainable	  economy	  
and	  social	  well-­‐being…”	  (ibid)	  
And:	  
“We	  must	   redouble	  our	  efforts	   to	  achieve	   the	   condition	  of	   a	   legitimate	  monopoly	  over	   the	  
means	  of	  violence	  [emphasis	  original]	  by	  Afghans	  for	  Afghans.”	  (ibid:	  7)	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Both	  quotes	  emphasize	  the	  notion	  that	  only	  Western	  intervention,	  and	  strong	  intervention,	  can	  
establish	   security	   and	   legitimacy	   for	   Afghanistan.	   Builds	   up	   identify	   of	   America	   /	   West	   as	   seat	   of	  
civilization	  with	  not	  only	  moral	  authority	  but	  moral	  obligation	  (noblesse	  oblige)	  to	  save	  poor,	  benighted	  
Afghanistan.	  Simultaneously	  emphasizes	  the	  helpless	  and	  empty	  character	  of	  Afghanistan.	  Without	  the	  
West,	   Afghanistan	  would	   only	   be	   a	   lawless	   land,	   home	   to	   terrorism	   and	   atrocity.	   Not	   only	   does	   this	  
ignore	  Western	  responsibility	  for	  the	  Taliban’s	  ascendancy	  in	  Afghanistan,	  but	  it	  is	  completely	  oblivious	  
to	  narratives	  on	  Afghan-­‐ness	  built	  up	  through	  Western	  interaction	  over	  the	  past	  200	  years	  enabling	  this	  
state	  of	  affairs	  where	  Afghanistan	  is	  seen	  as	  nothing	  but	  an	  empty	  space.	  
However,	   even	   within	   this	   dominant	   narrative	   there	   are	   threads	   which	   suggest	   a	   potentially	  
more	   inclusive	   ‘alternate’	   way	   of	   thinking.	   Chatham	   House	   associate	   fellow	   Matt	   Waldman	  
acknowledges	  the	  same	  basic	  set	  of	  problems	  identified	  in	  orthodox	  narratives,	  but	  argues	  that	  the	  fixes	  
suggested	  up	  to	  present	  have	  been	  insufficient.	  He	  offers	  this	  scathing	  criticism	  of	  policy	  in	  Afghanistan:	  
“…much	   of	   the	   government	   is	   corrupt	   and	   ineffective,	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   weak	   or	   non-­‐
existent…	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  are	  varied	  and	  complex…	  the	  initial	  international	  approach	  was	  
manifestly	   insufficient…	   International	   aid	   has	   been	   fragmented,	   supply-­‐driven	   and	   often	  
inappropriate,	   rather	   than	   responding	   to	   Afghan	   needs	   and	   preferences.	   It	   has	   tended	   to	  
focus	  on	  physical	   and	   technical	  outcomes	   rather	   than	   the	   crucial	   task	  of	  promoting	  Afghan	  
capacity	  and	  ownership.”	  (Waldman	  2009:	  1)	  
Metric	  driven	  goals	  which	  rely	  on	  a	  quantitative	  diagnosis	  and	  cure	  are	  heavily	  problematic	  for	  
Waldman.	  Instead,	  he	  argues	  that	  some	  measure	  of	  sensitivity	  for	  Afghan	  character	  and	  preference	  are	  
essential.	  
“The	  insurgency	  is	  essentially	  an	  Afghan	  political	  problem…	  a	  government	  that	  is	  perceived	  as	  
illegitimate,	   self-­‐serving…	   based	   on	   tribal	   or	   other	   affiliations.	   Thus,	   it	   demands	   a	   political	  
response	   that	   is	   indigenous,	   inclusive	   and	   addresses	   injustices	   and	   legitimate	   grievances.	  
[emphasis	  mine]	  It	  should	  involve	  Afghan	  society	  at	  large,	  and	  include	  longer-­‐term	  efforts	  to	  
promote	  truth	  and	  reconciliation,	  while	  ensuring	  respect	  for	  justice	  and	  fundamental	  rights.”	  
(ibid:	  2)	  
These	  metric	  driven	  goals	  are	  heavily	  prevalent	   in	  both	  popular	  discourse	  on	  Afghanistan	  and,	  
especially,	   in	   policy	   discourse.	   It	   is	   hopeful	   to	   see	   this	   sort	   of	   cautionary	   voice	   being	   raised	   before	  
Congress.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   is	   questionable	   to	  what	   extent	   that	   voice	  was	   heeded.	   After	   all,	   the	  
policy	  which	  the	  US	  government	  adopted	  toward	  Afghanistan	  in	  2009	  was	  that	  of	  the	  now	  well-­‐known	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‘surge’,	   itself	   reliant	   heavily	   on	  metrics	   and	  which	  would	   then	   serve	   to	   signify	   a	   “win”	   in	   the	  war	   on	  
terror.	  
Congressional	  research	  documents	  in	  2013	  and	  2016	  reinforce	  narrative	  trends	  identified	  here.	  
Early	  on,	  Afghanistan’s	  persona	  as	  a	  failure	  is	  made	  clear:	  	  
“The	  Administration	  remains	  concerned	  that	  Afghan	  stability	  after	  2014	  is	  at	  risk	  from	  weak	  
and	  corrupt	  Afghan	  governance	  and	  insurgent	  safe	  haven	  in	  Pakistan…”	  (Katzman	  2013:	  11)	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  metric-­‐driven	  goals	  are	  central	  to	  the	  US	  plan	  to	  “fix”	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  failed	  
state.	   Afghanistan	  must	   be	  made	   into	   an	   economically	   productive	   state	   that	   integrated	   into	   regional	  
trade	  and	   investment	  patterns.	   (ibid)	  Nation	  building	  was	  the	  accepted	  means	  by	  which	  this	  would	  be	  
accomplished:	  	  
“…try	   to	   build	   a	   relatively	   strong,	   democratic,	   Afghan	   central	   government	   and	   develop	  
Afghanistan	   economically.	   The	   effort,	   which	   many	   outside	   experts	   described	   as	   nation-­‐
building…”	  (ibid:	  9)	  
Here	  again	  we	  see	  echoes	  of	  a	  sort	  of	  paternalistic	  approach	  which	  has	  been	  emphasized	  from	  a	  
variety	  of	  critical	  sources,	  very	  notably	  feminist	  and	  post-­‐colonial	  literature.	  For	  instance,	  Dutta	  relies	  on	  
critical	   discourse	   analysis	   informed	  by	   feminist	   theory	   to	   examine	   the	   binary	   nature	   of	   terrorism	   and	  
state	  failure,	  suggesting	   it	  exemplifies	  a	   ‘return’	  to	  binarism	  not	  unlike	  the	  binaries	  between	  male	  and	  
female	   or	   civilized	   and	   savage.	   (Dutta	   2004:	   443-­‐444)	   Nation	   building	   here	   represents	   a	   sort	   of	  
“paternalist	  generosity”.	  (ibid:	  445)	  Moreover:	  
“Following	  the	  September	  11	  episode,	  all	  international,	  national,	  and	  local	  incidents	  of	  terror	  
have	  been	  regarded	  in	  terms	  of	  binary	  oppositions	  stemming	  from	  the	  basic	  division	  between	  
perpetrators	   and	   victims,	   and	   calls	   to	   combat	   terrorism	  have	  had	   recourse	   to	   a	   rhetoric	   of	  
binarism	  /	  medieval	  and	  modern,	  barbaric	  and	  civilized…”	  (ibid:	  434)	  
For	  Dutta,	  this	  binarism	  strips	  away	  the	  “face”	  of	  the	  other,	  making	  them	  all	  the	  same,	  barbaric	  
and	   backward	   and	  waiting	   to	   be	   uplifted.	   Indeed,	   identifying	   the	   Afghan	   is	   both	   central	   to	   policy	   on	  
Afghanistan	   and	   hugely	   problematic	  within	   that	   policy.	   Katzman	   equates	   Afghanistan	  with	   the	   Karzai	  
government,	   widely	   considered	   both	   incompetent	   and	   corrupt.	   Other	   groups	  within	   Afghanistan	   are,	  
generally	   speaking,	   terrorists	   or	   victims.	   Victims	   are	   Afghan,	   but	   stripped	   of	   Afghan-­‐ness,	   perhaps	  
because	   the	   Karzai	   government	   has	   failed	   to	   make	   itself	   properly	   representative	   of	   those	   people.	  
(Katzman	   2016:	   13-­‐18)	   Thus,	   again,	   it	   is	   for	   the	   West	   to	   fill	   that	   role,	   protecting	   the	   victims	   of	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Afghanistan	   while	   forcing	   the	   Afghan	   government	   into	   a	   more	   suitable	   mould,	   one	   suggested	   under	  
principles	  of	  nation	  building	  which	  is	  applied	  more	  or	  less	  levelly,	  as	  a	  single	  cure-­‐all	  in	  all	  situations	  for	  
all	  ‘failed	  states’.40	  
This	  underlying	  leveling	  effect	   is	  not	  unique	  to	  policy	   literature	  or	  to	  popular	  media.	  The	  more	  
influential	   orthodox	   scholarship	   on	   failed	   states	   is	   quite	   similar.	   The	   recently	   published	   “Why	  nations	  
fail:	  the	  origins	  of	  power,	  prosperity	  and	  poverty”	  offers	  an	  economist	  perspective	  on	  the	  cause	  of	  state	  
failure.	  Here,	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  suggest	  that	  state	  failure	  is	  reducible	  to	  economic	  and/or	  political	  
institution	  failure	  within	  the	  state,	  suggesting	  a	  private/public	  dual	   intervention	  tactic.	  From	  this	  view,	  
state	  failure	  comes	  about	  when	  the	  government	  is	  more	  interested	  in	  extracting	  wealth	  from	  the	  state	  
than	  building	  its	  institutions41.	  State	  failure	  is	  directly	  attributable	  to	  how	  a	  state’s	  economy	  is	  arranged:	  
“We	   call	   such	   institutions…	   extractive	   economic	   institutions	   –	   extractive	   because	   such	  
institutions	  are	  designed	  to	  extract	  incomes	  and	  wealth	  from	  one	  subset	  of	  society	  to	  benefit	  
a	  different	  subset.”	  (Acemoglue	  and	  Robinson	  2012:	  89)	  
Thus	   the	   citizenry	   is	   not	   motivated	   to	   work	   hard,	   to	   save,	   or	   to	   trust	   in	   their	   government.	  
Furthermore,	   external	   actors	   (and	   particular	   private	   investors	  who	   can	   bring	  money	   into	   a	   state	   and	  
help	  build	  its	  social	  and	  economic	  infrastructure)	  are	  dissuaded	  from	  investing	  in	  such	  an	  environment.	  
In	  an	  extractive	  system,	  the	  elite	  ruling	  groups	  are	  interested	  in	  short	  term	  profit	  rather	  than	  long	  term,	  
healthy	  growth.	  
“The	   growth	   generated	   by	   extractive	   institutions	   is	   very	   different	   in	   nature	   from	   growth	  
created	  under	   inclusive	  institutions,	  however.	  Most	   important,	   it	   is	  not	  sustainable.	  By	  their	  
very	   nature,	   extractive	   institutions	   do	   not	   foster	   creative	   destruction	   and	   generate	   at	   best	  
only	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  technological	  progress.	  The	  growth	  they	  engender	  thus	  lasts	  for	  only	  
so	  long.”	  (ibid:	  166)	  
This	  dissuades	  external	  investment,	  it	  is	  argued,	  because	  the	  investment	  climate	  is	  just	  not	  right.	  
Outside	  investors	  require	  long	  term	  growth	  prospects	  and	  a	  stable	  environment.	  
This	   view,	   as	  Dutta	  would	   argue,	   strips	   away	   the	   face	  of	   the	  other.	  All	   failed	   states	   are	   failed	  
states	  because	  their	  governments	  are	  corrupt	  and	  worried	  only	  about	  enriching	  themselves	  in	  the	  short	  
term.	   The	   societal	   aspect	   of	   the	   state	   itself	   is	   ignored	   by	   the	   government,	   which	   if	   anything	   sees	   its	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citizenry	  as	  a	  resource	  from	  which	  to	  wring	  further	  profit.	  While	  this	  description	  may	  well	  have	  currency	  
in	  various	   situations,	  assigning	   this	  descriptive	  account	  as	   causal	  and	   thereby	   fitting	  as	   the	  basis	   for	  a	  
prescriptive	   cure	   falls	   into	   this	   trap	   of	   binarism.	   Binaries	   have	   been	   fundamental	   to	   the	   ad	   hoc	  
determination	  of	  Afghan	  character,	  filling	  its	  seemingly	  empty	  and	  indeterminate	  nature	  with	  something	  
suitable	  to	  then-­‐current	  narrative	  conceptions.	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Chapter  8  –  Findings  –  Afghan  Indeterminacy  and  the  ‘Loup’  
of   Sovereign  Legit imacy  
	  
Through	   the	   indeterminacy	   which	   has	   been	   imposed	   on	   Afghanistan	   it	   has	   become	   hugely	  
problematic	   to	   come	   to	   terms	   with	   what	   Afghanistan	   actually	   “is”.	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   failed	   state	  
reinforces	  that	  indeterminacy	  even	  as	  it	  undermines	  it.	  This	  undermining	  emanates	  from	  Afghanistan’s	  
relationship	  with	  orthodox	  notions	  of	  ‘sovereignty’	  (a	  problematic	  label	  even	  without	  specific	  reference	  
to	  Afghanistan’s	  unique	  character).	  Afghanistan	  was	  “given”	  the	  mantle	  of	  statehood	  under	  the	  auspices	  
of	  a	  discursive	  aporia	  which	  this	  project	  has	  called	  a	  formal/informal	  divide.	  	  
Formally,	   Afghanistan	   has	   been	   imbued	   with	   the	   ceremonial	   mantle	   of	   statehood	   –	   packed	  
inside	   of	   this	   are	   certain	   assumptions	   of	   sovereign	   power,	   internal	   shared	   identity,	   and	   some	   kind	   of	  
shared	   view	  of	   the	  external	  world	   as	  well	   (at	   least	  on	   some	   level).	   Informally,	   those	   states	  which	   are	  
foremost	   in	   the	   international	   society	   of	   states	   never	   really	   took	   Afghanistan	   all	   that	   seriously.	   This	  
dismissiveness	   both	   emanates	   from	   and	   recreates	   Afghanistan’s	   indeterminate	   nature.	   That	  
dismissiveness	  –	  and	  that	  indeterminate	  nature	  –	  are	  complicit	  in	  Afghanistan’s	  labeling	  as	  a	  failed	  state.	  
Interventions	   on	   Afghanistan	   from	   Britain	   and	   the	   United	   States42	   have	   had	   a	   hand	   in	   shaping	  
Afghanistan’s	  internal	  social	  and	  political	  dynamics.	  To	  say	  that	  Afghanistan	  arrived	  at	  its	  current	  state	  of	  
crisis	  solely	  because	  Afghanistan	  failed,	  as	  a	  state	  –	  because	  it	  was	  unable	  to	  properly	  use	  (and	  was	  thus	  
unworthy	  of)	  sovereignty	  ignores	  history	  and	  makes	  impossible	  any	  project	  to	  move	  forward.	  
Interventions	  in	  Afghanistan	  have	  often	  –	  and	  especially	  during	  and	  after	  the	  Cold	  War	  –	  relied	  
in	  some	  way	  on	  rescuing	  Afghanistan.	  There	  is	  no	  question	  that	  today’s	  Afghanistan	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  crisis.	  
That	   crisis	   has	   not	   come	   about	   only	   from	   outside	   military	   and	   political	   interventionism	   –	   those	  
interventions	   have	   played	   a	   role	   and	   no	   serious	   scholar	   or	   policy	   maker	   who	   is	   serious	   about	  
Afghanistan	   is	   likely	   to	   argue	  otherwise,	   but	   to	   suggest	   those	   interventions	   are	   causal	   full	   stop	   is	   too	  
simplistic	  to	  be	  the	  full	  truth.	  However,	  understanding	  exactly	  how	  and	  why	  Afghanistan	  came	  to	  be	  in	  
the	  state	  of	  crisis	  it	  is	  in	  today	  is	  beyond	  the	  purview	  of	  this	  project.	  Rather,	  this	  project	  has	  highlighted	  
how	   the	   discursive	   positioning	   of	   Afghanistan	   has	   justified	   intervention	   after	   intervention	   on	  
Afghanistan	   in	   ways	   that	   close	   off	   any	   alternative	   positioning.	   Afghanistan	   has	   been	   emptied	   of	  
meaning,	  becoming	  a	  label	  that	  means	  more	  or	  less	  what	  the	  situation	  demands.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 As well as, I must say, the Soviet Union though it was not possible (or useful, probably) to explore Soviet 
narratives on Afghanistan in this project. 
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Recognizing	   the	   discursive	   legacies	  which	   not	   only	   inform	   language	   on	   Afghanistan	   (barbaric,	  
uncivilized)	  today	  but	  have	  robbed	  Afghanistan	  of	  any	  specific	  possibility	  of	  a	  character	  offers	  a	  way	  to	  
see	  alternative	  ways	  forward.	  From	  a	  political	  standpoint	  this	  would	  involve	  rejecting	  labels	  like	  “failed”	  
or	  “rogue”	  state	  for	  Afghanistan.	   It	  would	  also	  involve	  fundamentally	  questioning	  what	  is	  meant	  when	  
referring	  to	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  state.	  In	  other	  words,	  state	  building	  projects	  that	  seek	  to	  build	  up	  Afghan	  
institutions	  currently	  have	  no	  choice	  but	   to	  visualize	  a	   future	  Afghanistan	   informed	  by	   the	  knowledge	  
constructs	  deconstructed	   in	  this	  dissertation.	  That	  can	  only	  recreate	  the	  problem	  –	  the	  problem	  being	  
not	  that	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  failed	  state	  but	  that	  there	  is	  no	  Afghanistan.	  There	  is	  no	  Afghanistan	  because	  it	  
has	  been	  consistently	  denied	  the	  (fundamentally	  discursive	  as	  well	  as	  physical)	  function	  of	  sovereignty	  
while	  draping	  it	  in	  sovereignty’s	  (interpreted)	  form/responsibility.	  	  
Giving  meaning  to  emptiness  –  Western  assumptions  and  the  failures  of  the  CCI:  
One	   aspect	   of	   the	   discourse	   on	   state	   failure	   after	   September	   11	   is	   a	   turn	   toward	   clinical	  
language.	   There	   is	   some	   postcolonial	   literature	   which	   has	   commented	   on	   this	   previously43,	   though	  
further	   analysis	   is	   called	   for.	   There	   is	   a	   discrete	   tendency	   within	   dominant	   narratives	   to	   assume	   the	  
disease	   (state	   failure)	   is	   a	   well	   understood	   phenomenon	   with	   a	   well	   understood	   template	   for	   cures	  
potentially	   allowing	   Afghanistan	   to	   be	   restored	   to	   nationhood.	   From	   within	   that	   metaphor	   set	   (and	  
without	  taking	  it	  on	  board),	  it	  seems	  problematic	  to	  make	  these	  assumptions	  while	  ignoring	  the	  specific	  
needs	   indicated	   in	   a	   ‘patient	   history’.	   Central	   to	   these	   narrative	   strands	   is	   the	   suggestion	   that	   only	  
Western	   intervention	   can	   return	   legitimacy,	  minimizing	   the	   need	   to	   understand	  more	   specifically	   the	  
character	  of	   the	  “patient”	   state.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	   statehood	  and	   the	  disease	  which	  plagues	  statehood	   is	  
understood	  by	  the	  West,	  which	  can	  offer	  remedies	  and	  guide	  erstwhile	  failed	  states	  back	  to	  success	  –	  if	  
they	  are	  willing	  to	  rehabilitate.	  Though	  the	  failed	  state	  is	  the	  object	  of	  discussion,	  focus	  is	  primarily	  on	  
the	  West	   -­‐	   indeed	   state	   failure	   and	   state	   building	   could	   be	   argued	   to	   hold	   the	  West	   as	   the	   referent	  
object.	  This	  is	  arguably	  the	  case	  in	  an	  Afghanistan	  that	  is	  historically	  acted	  upon	  without	  ever	  being	  the	  
reason	   for	   action.	   The	   notion	   of	   an	   empty	   Afghanistan	   fits	   comfortably	   within	   this	   template,	   never	  
raising	   any	   questions	   on	   its	   indeterminate	   nature	   because	   in	   general	   the	   only	   “nature”	   that	   need	   be	  
known	  is	  that	  of	  failure.44	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See, for instance, Manjikian (2008). 
44 See the Failed State Index 2007 for language on the communicability of the “disease” of state failure 
(http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2007-sortable). See also Acemoglue and Robinson (2012) for an example of 
fiscal prescriptions for a failed state “cure” that relies specifically on liberal principles as the only possible cure. 
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This	  is	  what	  prescriptive	  behavior	  does.	  It	  arises	  from	  the	  formal	  aspects	  of	  the	  formal/informal	  
dichotomy.	   	  Formally	  Afghanistan	   is	  known/assumed	  to	  have	  been	  a	   legitimate	  state	  with	  equal	  rights	  
and	   responsibilities	   to	   all	   other	   states.	   Informally,	   it	   was	   always	   ‘known’	   that	   Afghanistan	   wasn’t	  
effectively	   a	   state,	   it	   wasn’t	   civilized,	   it	   didn’t	   really	   have	   the	   tools.	   (And	   these	   knowledges	   are	  
empowered/stabilized/assumed	  true	  by	  deferral	  by	  reference	  to	  auxiliary	  binaries45	  that	  in	  this	  case	  act	  
as	   chained	  signifiers.)	  Due	   to	   that	  knowledge,	  Afghanistan	  never	   really	  had	   the	  opportunity	   (if	   indeed	  
that	  was	  an	  opportunity	  that	  Afghanistan	  would	  have	  ultimately	  chosen	  for	  itself)	  to	  be	  a	  state.	  It	  would	  
be	  wrong	  to	  imagine	  the	  discursive	  and	  material	  problems	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  ‘malign’	  
intentions	  of	  Western	  powers.	  
We	  can	   return	  once	  again	   to	  USAID’s	  Community	  Cohesion	   Initiative	  as	  an	  example.	  Activities	  
for	  the	  CCI	  were	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  south	  and	  east	  of	  Afghanistan	  in	  some	  of	  the	  most	  violent	  areas	  with	  
the	   least	   local	   trust	   toward	   Afghan	   and	   NATO	   power	   structures.	   The	   greatest	   focus	   was	   on	   five	  
provinces:	   Ghazni,	   Kandahar,	   Helmand,	   Khost,	   and	   Kunar.	   The	   goal	   of	   the	   initiative	   was	   to	  
create/strengthen	   ties	   between	   and	   among	   local	   and	   regional	   groups,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   central	  
government.	  (USAID	  2014a:	  5)	  This	  was	  carried	  out	  through	  different	  teaching	  workshops,	  carried	  out	  by	  
USAID	  employees	  and	  contractors,	  as	  well	  as	  various	  Western	  funded	  infrastructure	  projects	  awarded	  to	  
areas	   that	   had	   acceptable	   levels	   of	   interaction	  with	  workshops	   and	   teaching	   programs.	   It	  was	   hoped	  
that	   by	   increasing	   community	   cohesion,	   the	   program	   would	   “support	   peaceful	   and	   legitimate	  
governance	  processes	  and	  outcomes,	  and	  counter	  violent	  extremism.”	  (USAID	  2016)	  	  
Others	   have	   suggested	   that	   community	   cohesion	   projects,	   generally	   centered	   in	   the	   United	  
Kingdom,	   try	   to	   “bribe”	   outlier	   communities	   to	   integrate	   into	   the	   dominant	   British	   sensibility	   of	  
community,	   leaving	   their	   marginal	   identities	   aside.	   (Donoghue	   2014)	   This	   may	   or	   may	   not	   have	  
applicability	  to	  the	  Afghan	  case	  –	  more	  interesting	  here	  is	  the	  assumptions	  of	  a	  specific	  lack	  of	  character	  
and	  history.	  It	  is	  a	  job	  of	  the	  enlightened	  West	  to	  show	  Afghans	  that	  if	  they	  can	  only	  work	  together,	  they	  
can	  have	  peace.	  The	  idea	  appears	  benign,	  but	  ignores	  historical	  regional	  and	  tribal	  tensions	  –	  as	  well	  as	  
the	   possibility	   that	   cross-­‐sectional	   cooperation	   isn’t	   a	   uniquely	   Western	   idea	   that	   could	   never	   have	  
occurred	  locally	  before.	  	  
Rather	  than	  speak	  abstractly	  on	  the	  matter,	  we	  can	  turn	  to	  actual	  outcomes	  that	  can	  be	  seen.	  
USAID	  declared	   the	  program	  successful	  and	  discontinued	   it	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  2014	  Afghan	  elections.	  
Publicly,	  USAID	   credited	  CCI	  with	  mitigating	   electoral	   violence	   through	   its	   teaching	   and	  peacebuilding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 West/Oriental, civilized/savage, successful/failed, actor/tactical space, etc 
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messages	  along	  with	  infrastructural	  projects.	  (USAID	  2016)	  Internally,	  USAID	  admitted	  something	  much	  
closer	  to	  defeat	  for	  the	  CCI:	  
This	   quarter	   witnessed	   a	   continued	   increase	   in	   insurgent	   incidents	   across	   CCI’s	   target	  
provinces.	   The	   operating	   environment	   became	   steadily	   less	   permissive	   to	   Creative-­‐CCI	  
activities.	  As	  the	  project	  moved	  to	  close	  its	  remaining	  activities	  this	  quarter,	  various	  activities	  
had	   to	   be	   compressed	   in	   light	   of	   security	   concerns	   and	   some	   were	   outright	   cancelled…”	  
(USAID	  2014b:	  2)	  
The	  program,	  originally	   slated	   to	   run	   into	   the	  middle	  of	  2015,	  wrapped	  up	   instead	  during	   the	  
last	  quarter	  of	  2014,	  being	  cut	  even	  shorter	  than	  the	  intended	  earlier	  cut-­‐off	  date	  in	  some	  areas	  due	  to	  
exactly	   the	   same	   violence	  USAID	   had	   claimed	  was	   successfully	  mitigated.	   Indeed,	   after	   elections	   that	  
were	  widely	   lauded	   as	   being	   a	  major	   success	   for	   democratic	   governance	   in	  Afghanistan,	   violence	  has	  
been	  on	  the	  rise	  ever	  since	  across	  the	  country.	  By	  far	  the	  greatest	  spikes	  in	  violence	  have	  happened	  in	  
four	  of	   the	   five	  provinces	   that	  CCI	  was	   focused	  on:	  Kandahar,	  Ghazni,	  Hilmand	  and	  Kunar	   (along	  with	  
Nangarhar,	  which	  was	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  CCI).	  (EASO	  2016:	  31)	  Violence	  in	  2015	  was	  at	  its	  highest	  level	  
since	  the	  initial	  US	  and	  NATO	  intervention.	  	  
The	   CCI	   did	   not	   work,	   despite	   generally	   positive	   reviews	   and	   public	   protestations	   of	   success.	  
Every	  measure	  of	  success	  laid	  out	  by	  USAID	  for	  the	  program	  was	  ultimately	  not	  met.	  How	  is	  it	  that	  this	  
duality	   could	   exist?	   How	   can	   success	   and	   failure	   exist	   side-­‐by-­‐side,	   totally	   at	   odds	   with	   one	   another	  
while	  policymakers	  ignore	  that	  tension?	  	  
Sovereignty’s  Black  Mirror  –  There  is  no  Afghanistan    
America’s	   most	   recent	   intervention	   in	   Afghanistan	   rests	   its	   legitimacy	   on	   certain	   pillars:	  
civilization	  versus	  terrorism,	  sovereignty	  versus	  failure	  /	  vacuum	  and	  ultimately,	  particularly	  conceptions	  
of	   a	   yearned-­‐for	   democracy	   on	   the	   behalf	   of	   Afghanistan.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   notions	   of	   civilization	   and	  
sovereignty	   that	   are	   mobilized	   in	   conjunction	   with	   this	   intervention	   are	   justified	   in	   reference	   to	   the	  
seemingly	  naturalized	  dominant	  orthodoxy	  of	  liberal	  democracy.	  All	  of	  these	  terms	  suffer	  from	  a	  certain	  
emptiness,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   they	   have	   an	   assumed	   meaning	   but	   seem	   to	   mean	   different	   things	   at	  
different	  times	  in	  different	  places.	  	  
Tensions	  exist	  within	  how	  these	  concepts	  are	  mobilized	   in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  suggest	  the	  actual	  
object	  of	   these	  narratives	   is	   the	  U.S.	   itself.	   The	  way	   in	  which	  a	   certain	  vagueness	   in	   the	   concepts	  are	  
filled	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   intervention	   in	   Afghanistan	   reflects	   back	   on	  what	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   nature	   of	  
American	   character	   –	   American	   sovereignty,	   American	   civilization,	   American	   norms	   of	   democracy	   are	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legitimized	   through	   its	   attempt	   to	   restore	   Afghan	   sovereignty,	   to	   save	   it	   from	   terrorism,	   to	   uplift	   its	  
political	  consciousness	  so	  that	  it	  might	  embrace	  civilized	  democracy.	  Discourse	  here,	  then,	  is	  intended	  to	  
underscore	  American	  legitimacy	  in	  these	  various	  aspects.	  Afghanistan	  is	  here	  positioned	  as	  just	  a	  mirror.	  
Moreover,	  how	  Afghan	  identity	  and	  character	  are	  situated	  finds	  its	  basis	  on	  historical	  interactions	  with	  
Afghanistan	  on	   the	  part	  of,	   initially,	  Britain.	   Legacies	  of	   these	   interactions	   inform	  current	   conceptions	  
and	  are	  themselves	  possibly	  contrary	  to	  current	  conceptions	  of	  American-­‐ness.	  	  
It	   is	  Afghanistan’s	   indeterminacy	  which	  empowers	  this	  discursive	  relationship.	  This	  project	  has	  
shown	   through	   narrative	   analysis	   how	   Afghan	   identity	   has	   been	   again	   and	   again	   filled	   from	   a	  West-­‐
assumed	  emptiness	  to	  fill	  the	  narrative	  needs	  of	  a	  particular	  intervention.	  This	  has	  always	  seemed	  to	  be	  
on	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  basis,	  but	   there	  are	  demonstrable	   threads	  of	   continuity	   flowing	   from	  one	   interaction	   to	  
the	  next.	  We	  have	  seen	  how	  Afghanistan	  is	  positioned	  as	  a	  tactical	  space	  where	  geopolitical	  games	  are	  
played	  out.	  We	  have	  seen	  how	  Afghanistan	  is	  an	  empty	  land	  of	  exotic	  barbarians,	  ignorant	  and	  by	  turns	  
villainous	  and	  victims.	  We	  have	  seen	  how	  Afghanistan	  was	   folded	   into	   the	  notion	  of	  an	  “international	  
community	  of	   states”	   through	  a	   formal/informal	  divide,	  wherein	   formally	  Afghanistan	  was	   “gifted”	  all	  
the	  rights	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  equality	  among	  natures	  while	   informally	   it	  was	  “known”	  to	  still	  retain	   its	  
emptiness	   and	   barbarism	   –	   and	   thus	   could	   be	   ignored	   or	   acted	   upon	   in	  whatever	  manner	  was	  most	  
useful	  to	  the	  powerful.	  This	  formal/informal	  divide	  is	  powerfully	  at	  play	  when	  we	  consider	  Afghanistan	  
as	  a	  failed	  state.	  	  
For	  Afghanistan	  to	  be	  a	  failed	  state,	  one	  must	  assume	  statehood	  as	  a	  given	  –	  a	  sort	  of	  adoptive	  
state	   of	   nature.	   This	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   formal	   acknowledgment	   of	   Afghan	   sovereignty	   and	  
statehood	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war.	  This	  formal	  acknowledgment	  must	  be	  accepted	  as	  
valid	  and	  on	  all	  levels	  true	  in	  order	  for	  this	  failed	  state	  narrative	  to	  work	  –	  failed	  state	  narratives	  assume	  
that	  states	  fail	  because	  they	  weren’t	  good	  enough.	  States	  fail	  because	  they	  are	  either	  too	  weak	  or	  too	  
corrupt	  to	  take	  on	  board	  the	  trappings	  of	  civilization	  and	  internalize	  them	  –	  to	  adopt	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  
democracy,	   rule	   of	   law,	   and	   relationships	   with	   other	   nations.	   These	   assumptions	   fail	   to	   take	   into	  
consideration	   all	   the	   knowledges	   about	   Afghanistan	   packed	   within	   the	   informal	   portion	   of	   this	  
formal/informal	  divide.	  Afghanistan	  was	  still	  known	  to	  be	  not	  quite	  right	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  
No	  important	  states	  wanted	  to	  form	  real	  relationships	  with	  Afghanistan.	  Its	  preferences	  and	  voice	  in	  the	  
international	   arena	   were	   ignored	   –	   Afghanistan	   and	   others	   of	   its	   ilk	   were	   known	   to	   be	   barbarians	  
pretending	  that	  wearing	  the	  trappings	  of	  statehood	  made	  them	  like	  the	  rest	  of	  us.	  Afghanistan	  was	  only	  
important	  after	  assuming	  the	  mantle	  of	  statehood	  at	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  time	  it	  was	  important	  when	  it	  was	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on	  the	  margins	  of	  British	  empire	  –	  when	  it	  was	  deemed	  important	  for	  the	  security	  of	  the	  powerful.	  Thus	  
Afghanistan	   went	   from	   the	  margins	   of	   British	   empire,	   never	   part	   of	   empire	   or	   colony	   –	   never	   really	  
anything…	  to	  being	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  international	  society.	  Not	  quite	  a	  state,	  ever,	  but	  a	  failed	  state	  for	  
certain.	  
Taken	  broadly,	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  intervention	   in	  Afghanistan	  seeks	  to	  concretize	  notions	  of	   justice	  
and	   democracy	   through	   particular	   conceptions	   of	   sovereignty.	   This	   is	  made	   possible	   specifically	   with	  
reference	   to	  Afghanistan’s	   indeterminacy.	   It	   can	  be	  conceptualized	  simultaneously	  as	  meanings	  which	  
cannot	  possible	  exist	  together	  –	  Afghanistan	  cannot	  be	  both	  empty	  void	  and	  state,	  but	  it	  is	  assumed	  to	  
be	  exactly	  that.	  How	  the	  failed	  state	  narrative	  is	  articulated	  specifically	  in	  relation	  to	  Afghanistan	  suffers	  
from	  all	  the	  symptoms	  of	  auto-­‐immunity.	  The	  post-­‐9/11	  intervention	  in	  Afghanistan	  both	  uses	  this	  failed	  
state	  narrative	   to	   justify	   the	   intervention	  while	  also	  appealing	   to	  higher	   ideals	   to	   justify	  uneasily	  both	  
the	  intervention	  and	  the	  specific	  articulation	  of	  state	  failure	  in	  this	  case.	  	  
It	   is	   circular	   and	   self-­‐referential	   in	   its	   logic.	   It	   is	   also	   a	   recent	   iteration	   of	   interventions	   in	  
Afghanistan	  which	  follows	  the	  discursive	  patternings	  we’ve	  identified	  in	  four	  previous	  interventions.	  The	  
continuous	   threads	   in	   narratives	   about	   Afghan	   identity	   paradoxically	   underpin	   and	   empower	   this	  
conception	   of	   Afghanistan	   as	   an	   empty	   space	   –	   as	   indeterminate	   but	   constantly	   determined	   and	   re-­‐
determined	   from	   the	  outside.	   Interveners	   “fill”	  Afghanistan	  with	  whatever	   character	   is	  needed	  at	   the	  
time	   to	   legitimize	   the	   intervention	   and	   to	   help	   buttress	   particular	   conceptions	   (already	   settled	  
conceptions,	  assumed	  natural	  conceptions)	  of	  the	  intervener	  itself.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  we	  can	  say	  
that,	  in	  a	  sense,	  there	  is	  no	  “Afghanistan”.	  	  
Yet	  there	  must	  be	  an	  Afghanistan,	  or	  at	  least	  there	  is	  a	  physical	  space	  inhabited	  by	  real	  people	  
that	   is	   referred	   to	  by	   this	   apparently	  emptied-­‐of-­‐meaning	   signifier.	  What	  alternate	  articulations	   could	  
possibly	  exist	  of	  Afghan	  identity	  are	  relegated	  to	  the	  margins	  by	  this	  dominant	  discursive	  specification	  of	  
Afghanistan	  as	  empty,	  as	  barbaric,	  as	  failed,	  as	  a	  battlefield	  or	  game	  board.	  It	  is	  ironic	  then	  that,	  in	  the	  
wake	   of	   shifts	   in	   international	   discursive	   norms	   that	   the	   formal/informal	   divide	   tried	   to	   settle	   in	  
Afghanistan’s	  case,	  interventions	  in	  Afghanistan	  are	  legitimized	  by	  recourse	  to	  high	  handed	  values	  such	  
as	  democracy,	  such	  as	  sovereignty,	  such	  as	  civilization	  and	  justice.	  	  
If	  Afghanistan	   is	  a	  staging	  ground	  for	   this	  war	  on	  terror	  and	  thus	  continues	   in	   its	  old	  role	  as	  a	  
game	  board	  on	  which	  great	   geopolitical	   games	  are	  played	  out,	   it	   is	  by	   turns	  also	  a	   space	   to	  be	  acted	  
upon.	  Intervention	  is	  by	  turns	  an	  act	  of	  ideological	  war	  against	  terrorism	  and	  a	  state-­‐building	  enterprise	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whereupon	  Afghanistan	  must	  be	  saved	  and	  brought	  ‘back’	  into	  civilization.	  For	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  this	  
by-­‐turns	  function	  is	  internally	  inconsistent.	  Not	  only	  is	  Afghanistan	  simultaneously	  a	  space	  for	  terrorism	  
(and	  therefore	  the	  place	  terrorism	  must	  be	  fought)	  that	  must	  also	  have	  its	  legitimate	  statehood	  saved,	  
but	   it	   is	   also	   a	   touchstone	   of	   the	   failed	   state	   discourse	   that	   failed	   states,	   when	   saved,	   are	   generally	  
speaking	  being	  brought	  back	  into	  civilization.	  In	  this	  narrative,	  liberal	  statehood	  is	  naturalized	  –	  even	  if	  a	  
political	  space	  has	  never	  been	  a	  state	   in	  the	   liberal	  mold,	  such	  a	  situation	  would	  be	   its	  natural	  state	  if	  
internal	  barriers	  to	  such	  a	  condition	  could	  be	  removed.	  	  
Both	  of	  these	  ideas	  are	  problematic.	  In	  the	  first	  instance,	  Afghanistan	  must	  represent	  terrorism	  
in	  order	  to	  be	  legitimately	  invaded.	  But	  Afghanistan	  must	  also	  be	  saved	  and	  brought	  back	  into	  the	  fold	  
of	   civilization.	   Afghanistan	   is	   simultaneously	   the	   focus	   of	   an	   act	   of	   (justified)	   aggression,	   but	   also	   the	  
focus	  of	  an	  act	  of	  (moral)	  salvation.	  One	  can	  understand	  the	  thought	  process	  which	  situates	  some	  actors	  
in	  Afghanistan	  as	  representative	  of	  terrorists	  and	  other	  actors	  as	  representative	  of	  peaceful	  people	  who	  
want	  a	  normal	  existence	  free	  from	  strife.	  Yet	  this	  is	  functionally	  a	  difficult	  differentiation	  to	  make.	  Due	  
partially	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   asymmetric	   warfare	   and	   partially	   to	   the	   problems	   of	   cultural	   unfamiliarity,	  
victim/friend/foe	   identification	   is	  problematic	  at	  best.	   	  This	   internal	   tension	   is	  seemingly	  dealt	  with	  by	  
way	  of	  recourse	  to	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  failed	  state	  narrative.	  Prior	  to	  the	  September	  11	  attacks	  Afghanistan	  
was	  in	  the	  failed	  state	  discussion	  but	  without	  consensus	  –	  the	  Washington	  Institute	  for	  Near	  East	  Policy	  
in	  September	  of	  2000	  argued	  that	  Afghanistan	  could	  not	  and	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  a	  failed	  state	  at	  
all.	  (Rubin	  2000)	  The	  Taliban	  government’s	  refusal	  to	  extradite	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  after	  September	  11	  led	  
to	  an	  end	  of	  this	  debate	  –	  Afghanistan	  was	  a	  failed	  state.	  
Afghanistan	  as	  a	  failed	  state	  meant	  that	  it	  must	  be	  situated	  cogently	  within	  that	  policy	  narrative.	  
This	   dissertation	   has	   established	   that,	  while	   there	   is	   not	   a	  wholly	   accepted	  manner	   of	   understanding	  
state	  failure,	  there	  are	  certain	  key	  features	  which	  are	  held	  in	  common.	  Central	  to	  this	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  
the	  “failure”	  is	  a	  failure	  of	  that	  particular	  state	  –	  that	  successful	  liberal	  statehood	  is	  the	  natural	  state	  to	  
which	  all	   states	   in	   the	  current	  system	  would	  gravitate	  without	  whatever	   internal	  problems	   they	  have.	  
Those	  problems,	  while	  possibly	  exacerbated	  from	  the	  outside,	  are	   inherently	  the	  problem	  and	  fault	  of	  
internal	   dynamics.	   Thus,	   saving	   failed	   states	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   diagnosing	   their	   particular	   problems	   and	  
removing	  those	  problems,	  allowing	  the	  failed	  state	  to	  resume	  its	  place	  in	  the	  international	  system	  as	  a	  
successful,	  liberal	  state.	  	  
Resume	  is	  an	   important	  word	  here	  –	  this	  dissertation’s	  historical	  narrative	  analysis	  shows	  that	  
there	  is	  no	  ‘return’	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Afghanistan.	  Afghanistan’s	  nature	  has	  been	  situated	  as	  that	  of	  a	  non-­‐
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entity	  from	  at	  least	  the	  early	  19th	  century.	  Particular	  characterizations	  of	  Afghan	  identity	  are	  assigned	  in	  
context	   of	   current	   regional	   meta-­‐knowledges	   and	   tactical/ideological	   imperatives.	   If	   we	   look	   at	  
Afghanistan	  within	  the	  failed	  state	  narrative	  from	  the	  context	  of	  these	  analytical	  insights	  we	  can	  see	  that	  
Afghanistan	   as	   a	   failed	   state	   is	   ultimately	   another	   iteration	   of	   this	   tendency	   to	   ‘fill’	   Afghan	  
indeterminacy	  to	  fit	  the	  situation.	  	  
This	  being	  the	  case,	  a	  far	  more	  productive	  way	  of	  talking	  about	  Afghanistan	  would	  be	  to	  remove	  
it	  from	  the	  failed	  state	  narrative.	  Rather	  than	  trying	  to	  situate	  Afghanistan	  within	  a	  metanarrative	  which	  
is	  at	  best	  an	  uncomfortable	  and	  subversive	  fit,	  it	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  face	  the	  legacy	  Afghanistan	  carries	  
from	  the	  West’s	  historical	  interventions	  upon	  that	  space.	  Afghanistan	  is	  not	  a	  failed	  state	  –	  Afghanistan	  
is	   not	   a	   state	   as	  we	   typically	   think	  of	   statehood.	   Indeed,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  we	   think	  of	   identity	   at	   all,	  
there	  is	  no	  Afghanistan.	  	  
From	   this	   basis,	   it	   may	   be	   possible	   to	   undertake	   a	   very	   specific	   project	   of	   interacting	   with	  
Afghanistan	  with	  an	  eye	  toward	  what	  a	  more	   just	   future	  would	   look	   like	   in	   that	  space,	   for	   the	  people	  
who	  call	   that	  space	  home.	   If	  we	  accept	  that	  most	  of	  what	  we	   ‘know’	  about	  Afghanistan	   is	  at	   the	  very	  
least	  corrupted46	  by	  quasi-­‐colonial	  and	  meta-­‐ideological	  preconceptions	  then	  it	  might	  become	  possible	  
for	  Afghanistan	  to	  have	  a	  say	  in	  building	  its	  own	  identity	  within	  the	  context	  of	  our	  current	  international	  
system.	  The	  United	  States	  (and,	  let’s	  say,	  the	  international	  community	  as	  such)	  has	  an	  interest	  in	  seeing	  
stability	   in	   the	  region,	  as	  do	  the	  people	  of	  Afghanistan.	  There	   is	  no	  doubt	  that	  conflict	  and	  bloodshed	  
will	  remain	  a	  part	  of	  this	  in	  at	  least	  the	  near	  term.	  However,	  how	  we	  go	  about	  thinking	  about/acting	  via	  
this	   intervention	   and	   working	   toward	   that	   stability	   can	   either	   recreate/reproduce	   the	   underlying	  
problems	  in	  Afghanistan	  that	  we	  are	  at	  least	  complicit	  in	  –	  or	  it	  could	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  more	  just	  and	  
democratic	  future	  for	  the	  peoples	  inhabiting	  that	  empty	  space	  called	  Afghanistan.	  
The	  Afghanistan	  that	  we	  imagine	  does	  not	  exist.	  It	  is	  a	  chain	  of	  representations	  imposed	  upon	  a	  
space	  that,	  from	  the	  Western	  perspective,	  appears	  to	  be	  empty	  and	  devoid	  of	  any	  intrinsic	  character	  or	  
meaning.	  By	  filling	  Afghanistan	  in	  with	  particular	  meanings	  and	  character	  traits	  at	  different	  times,	  we’ve	  
created	   a	   sort	   of	   simulacrum	   –	   a	   false	   copy	   of	   what	   Afghanistan	   could	   be	   based	   on	   the	   historically	  
contextualized	  idea,	  imposed	  from	  the	  outside,	  of	  what	  it	  should	  be.	  In	  this	  way,	  particular	  conceptions	  
of	   Afghanistan	   are	   privileged	   which	   suit	   broader	   ideological	   and	   geopolitical	   logics	   rather	   than	   any	  
specific	   interaction	  with	  Afghanistan	  on	  its	  own	  basis.	   It	   is	  seen	  as	  either	  unnecessary	  or	   impossible	  to	  
interact	  with	  Afghanistan	  on	  its	  own	  basis,	  because	  Afghanistan	  has	  no	  meaning	  –	  except	  that	  meaning	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 …and covertly corrupted, at that, due to the formal/informal divide. 
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which	   it	   is	   assigned,	   externally,	   by	   reference	   to	   and	   empowered	   by	   historical	   understandings	   of	  
Afghanistan	  which	  were	  informed	  by	  the	  same	  discursive	  patterns.	  In	  understanding	  how	  this	  emptiness	  
of	  specific	  Afghan	  character	  and	  meaning	  is	  empowered	  and	  replicated,	  it	   is	  possible	  to	  resolve	  to	  find	  
another	  way.	  	  
Determining  indeterminacy  –  a  final  consideration  of  this  project’s  questions  
This	  thesis	  posited	  three	  central	  questions.	  Here	  we	  endeavor	  to	  provide	  answers.	  
Why	  are	  we	  able	  to	  talk	  about	  failed	  states?	  
What	   is	  assumed	  to	  be	  ‘known’	  about	  Afghanistan	  and	  how	  do	  those	  knowledges	  empower	  
dominant	  narratives	  of	  intelligibility?	  	  
How	   do	   dominant	   assumptions	   about	   sovereignty	   and	   successful	   statehood	   by	   intervening	  
parties	  impact	  upon	  to	  understand	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  Afghanistan	  crisis?	  
Why	  are	  we	  able	  to	  talk	  about	  failed	  states?	  
We	  are	  able	  to	  talk	  about	  failed	  states,	  and	  about	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  failed	  state,	  by	  referencing	  
an	   idealized	   theory	   of	   statehood	   and	   its	   attendant	   sovereignty	   on	   the	   dominant	   liberal	   model	   of	  
understanding.	   States	   have	   the	   natural	   right	   to	   sovereignty,	   to	   a	   place	   within	   the	   international	  
community	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sovereign	  power	  and	  authority.	  When	  a	  state’s	  government	   loses	  either	   its	  
power	   or	   its	   authority,	   it	   loses	   its	   privileged	   status	  within	   the	   international	   community.	   Its	   sovereign	  
status	   –	   which	   prohibits	   intervention	   –	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   eroded	   (though	   it	   still	   seems	   to	   exist	  
theoretically	   as	   a	   right,	   particularly	   in	   that	   intervention	   in	   failed	   states	   is	   justified	   by	   recourse	   to	   a	  
project	  to	  rebuild	  the	  conditions	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  
We	   can	   talk	   about	   states	   as	   failures	   because	   they	   have	   somehow	   lost	   sovereignty.	   This	  
authorizes	   or	   even	   mandates	   discussions	   and	   policies	   for	   intervention	   and	   state-­‐building	   purposes.	  
Because	   liberal	   understandings	   of	   statehood	   rely	   on	   an	   assumed	   natural	   and	   static	   gestalt	   of	  
sovereignty,	  that	  sovereignty	  must	  be	  privileged	  –	  making	  it	  important	  that	  sovereignty	  be	  in	  some	  way	  
reinstated	  in	  political	  spaces	  where	  it	  has	  lapsed.	  
This	   thesis	  has	  demonstrated	  how	  sovereignty	  has	  not	  served	  as	  a	  stable	  concept	   in	  regard	  to	  
Afghanistan.	  The	  attributes	  of	  sovereignty	  which	  are	  privileged	  have	  changed	  over	  time.	  Cynthia	  Weber	  
has	  worked	   extensively	   on	   concepts	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   its	   relationship	  with	   interventionist	   practices.	  
Weber	  argues	  that	  while	  sovereignty	  is	  assumed	  to	  have	  a	  specific	  and	  enduring	  character,	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  a	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concept	   which	   shifts	   in	   relation	   to	   historic	   and	   geographical	   context.	   In	   analyzing	   the	   interaction	  
between	  concepts	  of	  intervention	  and	  sovereignty,	  she	  says:	  	  
“With	  respect	  to	  statehood,	  sovereignty	  refers	  to	  what	  a	  state	  must	  do	  (performative	  criteria)	  
in	  order	  to	  be	  (receive	  intersubjective	  recognition	  as)	  a	  sovereign	  state…	  What	  a	  state	  must	  
do	  to	  be	  sovereign	  is	  to	  organize	  its	  domestic	  affairs	  in	  such	  a	  way	  so	  that	  its	  ultimate	  source	  
of	   sovereign	   authority	   is	   authorized	   to	   speak	   for	   its	   particular	   domestic	   community	   in	  
international	  affairs.	  Yet	  the	  source	  of	  sovereign	  authority	  has	  changed	  historically.”	  (Weber	  
1992:	  200)	  
Interventions	  come	  about,	   for	  Weber,	  when	  the	  way	   in	  which	  sovereign	  power	   is	  situated	  (or,	  
presumably,	  fails	  to	  be	  situated)	  within	  a	  state	  becomes	  an	  international	  issue.	  This	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  
humanitarian	  issue	  or	  a	  security	  issue	  and	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  as	  regards	  state	  failure.	  A	  
failed	   state	   has	   either	   such	   an	   ineffective,	   corrupt,	   or	   ill-­‐meaning	   source	   of	   sovereign	   power	   that	   it	  
becomes	   an	   international	   issue	   –	   either	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   victim-­‐citizens	   or	   because	   a	   deteriorating	  
domestic	  situation	  is	  creating	  regional	  (or,	  with	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror,	  global)	  security	  threats.	  This	  
constitutes	  a	  loss	  of	  sovereign	  authority.	  	  
Yet	  when	  and	  why	  a	  domestic	   situation	  constitutes	  an	   international	   issue	  –	  and	   thus	  a	   loss	  of	  
sovereign	   authority	   –	   has	   changed	   significantly	   over	   time	   and	   in	   relation	   to	   different	   geopolitical	  
contexts.	  	  
“How	   meanings	   take	   shape	   and	   are	   put	   to	   work	   -­‐	   by	   whom	   and	   on	   whose	   behalf	   -­‐	   has	  
implications	  for	  just	  what	  forms	  international	  practice	  legitimately	  can	  take.	  The	  examples	  of	  
interventionary	  activity	  in	  the	  1820s	  and	  1910s	  are	  cases	  in	  point.	  They	  bring	  to	  the	  fore	  the	  
importance	  of	  casting	  meanings	  in	  particular	  ways	  which	  enable	  specific	  forms	  of	  practice	  to	  
take	  place	  legitimately	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  a	  supposed	  interpretive	  community.”	  (ibid:	  203)	  
In	  this	  way,	  the	  decision	  to	  authorize	  an	  intervention	  (and	  rendering	  the	  judgment	  that	  a	  polity	  
has	  surrendered	  its	  sovereign	  authority	  to	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  its	  people)	  is	  an	  interpretive	  moment	  which	  
crystallizes,	   for	   that	   moment	   and	   place,	   a	   particular	   articulation	   of	   sovereignty.	   That	   is	   to	   say	  
interventions	  produce	  sovereignty.	  That	  interpretive	  moment	  is	  also	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  sovereign	  status	  
of	   the	   intervener.	  How	  and	  why	  a	   certain	   conception	  of	   sovereignty	   is	   ascendant	   at	   a	  particular	   time	  
must	   be	   contextualized	   in	   the	   international	   political	   climate	   and	   especially	   in	   the	   context	   of	   those	  
intervening	  parties	  and	  their	  articulations	  of	  sovereign	  authority.	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These	   specific	   articulations	   are	   complicated	   –	   both	   empowered	   and	   made	   problematic	   –	   by	  
Derrida’s	  analysis	  of	  sovereignty.	  Intervention	  is	  possible,	  but	  also	  ultimately	  self-­‐destructive	  due	  to	  the	  
interaction	  of	  beastly	   loup	  and	  virtuous	  protector,	  of	  limitless	  power	  and	  ethical	  constraint,	  of	  residing	  
outside	  of	  and	  defining	   law	  but	   finding	   legitimacy	  only	  within	   the	  bounds	  of	   that	   law.	   Intervention	  on	  
behalf	  of	  a	  particular	  articulation	  of	   sovereignty	   intends	   to	  privilege	  and	  naturalize	   that	  conception	  of	  
sovereignty,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  intervener’s	  place	  as	  epitomizing	  that	  sovereign	  notion.	  	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   Afghanistan	   had	   to	   be	   saved	   from	   an	   illegitimate	   government	  
propped	  up	  by	  what	  was	  considered	  ideologically	  to	  be	  the	  greatest	  evil	  in	  the	  world,	  Communism.	  The	  
United	  States,	  as	  epitome	  of	   righteous	  sovereignty	   (in	   this	   ideological	  narrative),	  had	  no	  choice	  but	   to	  
intervene.	   Narratives	   in	   the	  West	   at	   the	   time	   spoke	   of	   the	   United	   States’	   responsibility	   to	   stand	   up	  
against	  the	  evils	  of	  communism,	  to	  save	  Afghanistan,	  to	  help	  it	  reclaim	  its	  rightful	  place	  as	  a	  responsible	  
and	   legitimate	  member	   of	   the	   society	   of	   right-­‐acting	   states.	   The	   very	   act	   of	   intervention	   –	   itself	   the	  
denial	  of	  a	   right	   to	  sovereignty	  and	   the	   forceful	  destruction	  of	   sovereign	  status	  –	  creates	   sovereignty.	  
The	  United	  States,	  in	  this	  instance,	  is	  cast	  as	  a	  sovereign	  force,	  enforcing	  sovereign	  dictates	  from	  outside	  
and	  above	  constraint	  –	  thus	  being	  authorized	  to	  do	  the	  unauthorizable	  and	  intervene	  –	  but	  also	  bound	  
by	   a	   code	   a	   conduct	   which	   itself	   was	   seen	   to	   be	   definitional	   of	   a	   particular	   articulation	   of	   liberal	  
capitalist-­‐democratic	  sovereignty.	  	  
We	  can	   talk	  about	   failed	   states	  because	   the	   (various)	  ways	   in	  which	   sovereignty	   is	  articulated	  
within	  models	  of	  liberal	  statehood	  require	  it.	  When	  a	  sovereign	  state	  loses	  its	  sovereignty	  and	  becomes	  
‘failed’,	  there	  is	  no	  choice	  for	  the	  international	  community	  but	  to	  attempt	  to	  restore	  that	  sovereignty	  –	  
which	  is	  assumed	  to	  have	  a	  stable	  and	  natural	  character	  –	  or	  risk	  an	  eroding	  of	  the	  discursive	  legitimacy	  
of	  sovereignty	  within	  the	  liberal	  state	  model.	  	  
What	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   ‘known’	   about	   Afghanistan	   and	   how	   do	   those	   knowledges	   empower	  
dominant	  narratives	  of	  intelligibility?	  
These	  critical	  understandings	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  its	  internally	  problematic	  nature	  require	  unique	  
discursive	  positioning	   in	  each	   instance	  of	   intervention.	  Afghanistan’s	   indeterminacy	   lends	   itself	  to	  this.	  
Historically	  speaking,	  Afghanistan	  has	  regularly	  been	  conceived	  from	  the	  Western	  view	  as	  being	  empty	  –	  
empty	  of	  character,	  empty	  of	  meaning,	  empty	  of	  anything	  worth	  having.	  Other	  objects	  of	   intervention	  
during	   the	   19th	   century	   were	   generally	   (but	   we	   cannot	   assume	   always)	   situated	   within	   imperial	   and	  
colonial	   logics.	  Afghanistan	  is	  different	  –	   it	  was	  never	  the	  object	  of	  any	  intervention…	  it	  was	  incidental	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and	  convenient	  to	  an	  intervention	  which	  had	  something	  else	  (Great	  Game,	  Indian	  stability,	  Bolshevism,	  
Communism,	  terrorism)	  as	  its	  referent	  object.	  	  
This	   history	   of	   “creating”	   an	   Afghanistan	   with	   each	   intervention	   has	   led	   to	   this	   seeming	  
indeterminate	   nature.	   Each	   intervention	   has	   relied	   upon,	   purposefully	   at	   times	   and	   unwittingly	   at	  
others,	   on	   discursive	   legacies	   of	   certain	   ‘knowledges’	   about	   Afghanistan.	   Situations	   changed,	  
geopolitical	  contexts	  changed,	  but	  this	  dissertations	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  some	  legacies	  of	  ‘knowing’	  
Afghanistan	   all	   the	   way	   back	   from	   peripheral-­‐imperial	   understandings	   of	   Afghanistan	   influence	  
contemporary	   knowledges.	   This	   emptiness	   and	   the	   indeterminacy	   it	   empowers	   are	   at	   odds	   with	  
dominant	   narratives	   of	   intelligibility	   –	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   liberal	   understandings	   of	   statehood	   and	  
sovereignty.	  Yet	  that	  very	  assumption	  of	  emptiness,	  that	  ‘knowledge’	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  place	  without	  
a	  natural	  legitimate	  character,	  seem	  to	  make	  it	  a	  compelling	  example	  of	  state	  failure	  indeed.	  
This	   is	   reflective	   of	   the	   formal/informal	   binary.	   Formally	   Afghanistan	   can	   be	   articulated	   as	  
deserving	  of	  statehood	  and	  sovereignty	  –	  it	  has	  a	  place	  in	  the	  international	  community	  of	  liberal	  states	  if	  
it	   is	  only	  able	   to	  develop	   the	  capacity	  and	  sovereign	  authority	   to	   take	  up	   that	  spot.	  This	   is,	  as	  we	  see	  
from	   Weber	   as	   well	   as	   from	   narratives	   on	   Afghanistan	   through	   history,	   only	   possible	   through	   the	  
intervention	   by	   a	  Western	   power	   which	   is	   capable	   of	   restoring	   (creating?)	   that	   sovereignty	   from	   its	  
privileged	  place	  as	  the	  epitome	  of	  what	  that	  sovereignty	  should	  look	  like.	  
In	   this	   way,	   knowledges	   about	   Afghanistan	   –	   which	   seem	   to	   make	   it	   the	   epitome	   of	   failed	  
statehood	  –	  reinforce	  the	  discursive	  positioning	  of	  the	  West	  generally	   (and	   in	  this	   instance	  the	  United	  
States	  particularly)	  as	  epitomizing	  those	  attributes	  necessary	  to	  success	  and	  sovereignty.	  Articulations	  of	  
Afghanistan’s	   failure,	  and	  what	  we	   ‘know’	  about	  Afghanistan	   in	   relation	  to	   that	   failure,	  define	  success	  
and	   sovereignty.	   Even	  here,	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   failed	   state	   seems	  not	   to	   have	  Afghanistan	   itself	   as	   the	  
referent	  object	  –	  but	  rather	  the	  liberal	  understanding	  of	  statehood	  and	  legitimacy	  itself	  as	  the	  referent.	  	  
How	   do	   dominant	   assumptions	   about	   sovereignty	   and	   successful	   statehood	   by	   intervening	  
parties	  impact	  attempts	  to	  understand	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  Afghanistan	  crisis?	  
This	   project	   has	   also	   demonstrated	   the	   internal	   inconsistency	   and	   tensions	   within	   these	  
typifications	  of	  Afghan	  character.	  Taking	  Afghanistan	  to	  be	  empty	  and	  filling	  it	  up	  with	  various	  character	  
traits	  as	  historical	  and	  geopolitical	  contexts	  require	  may	  have	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  situate	  Afghanistan	  in	  
such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  empower	  contemporary	  understandings	  of	  state	  success,	  state	  failure	  and	  sovereignty.	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Yet	  it	  is	  an	  unstable	  foundation	  on	  which	  to	  situate	  those	  norms,	  central	  to	  liberal	  notions	  of	  statehood.	  
This	  is	  dealt	  with	  by	  recourse	  to	  explaining	  Afghanistan	  –	  and	  through	  its	  reflection	  explaining	  statehood	  
and	  sovereignty	  –	  by	  way	  of	  binary	  oppositions.	  These	  binary	  oppositions,	   found	  throughout	  historical	  
interactions	  with	  Afghanistan,	  are	  still	  operating	  in	  contemporary	  articulations	  of	  Afghan	  identity.	  
We	   can	   turn	   to	   Nandana	   Dutta	   for	   an	   exploration	   of	   how	   binarism	   operates	   within	   the	  
geopolitical	  and	  ideological	  context	  of	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror.	  Dutta	  argues	  that	  violent	  acts	  carried	  
out	  by	  states	  or	  by	  terrorists	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  GWoT	  render	  the	  victims	  invisible.	  	  
“…the	   prevalent	  mode	   of	   terror	   -­‐	   affecting	   on	   a	   large	   scale	   -­‐	  with	   the	   increasing	   resort	   to	  
weapons	  and	  modes	  of	  mass	  destruction	  and	  killings	  of	  faceless	  ‘enemies’	   in	  great	  numbers	  
becomes	  significant,	  because	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  other	  as	  faceless	  is	  a	  necessary	  step	  in	  the	  
justification	  of	  the	  self’s	  actions	  vis-­‐a`-­‐vis	  the	  other.	  Terror	  (its	  practice	  and	  production)	   is	  a	  
component	  of	  the	  world	  that	  affects	  constructions	  of	  self	  and	  other.	  The	  other	  must	  still	  be	  
‘governed’,	   must	   still	   be	   ‘translated’	   into	   familiar	   terms	   or	   into	   the	   universal	   language.”	  
(Dutta	  2004:	  433)	  
We	   are	   simultaneously	   saving	   and	   ignoring	   Afghanistan…	   or	   saving	   Afghanistan	  while	   saving	  
ourselves	   from	  Afghanistan.	   In	   violence	   related	   to	   terrorism	   –	   termed	   in	   this	   fashion	   to	  more	   clearly	  
refer	  both	  to	  violence	  carried	  out	  by	  terrorists	  and	  acts	  carried	  out	  by	  governments	  in	  response	  (real	  or	  
perceived)	   to	   terrorism	   –	   there	   is	   a	   certain	   impersonal	   dynamic.	   Often	   the	   victims	   are	   not	   seen,	  
particularly	  in	  that	  violence	  of	  this	  kind	  often	  results	  in	  mass	  casualties.	  Victims	  often	  include	  both	  those	  
who	   would	   be	   perceived	   as	   wrong-­‐doers	   but	   also	   so-­‐called	   “collateral	   damage”	   (itself	   an	   interesting	  
term	  that	  dehumanizes	  people	  who	  were	  killed	  without	  being	  actual	   targets	   themselves).	  The	  victims,	  
then,	  are	  invisible.	  Yet	  the	  victims	  are	  also	  the	  justification	  for	  intervention	  –	  victims	  are	  invisible	  in	  the	  
Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  but	  they	  are	  also	  the	  reason	  why	  we	  must	  wage	  that	  war.	  	  
Dutta	  further	  argues	  that	  a	  tragedy	  of	  this	  discursive	  recourse	  to	  binarism	  is	  that	  it	  surprisingly	  
wide	  reaching	  effects.	  Not	  only	  the	  victims	  (or	  potential	  victims)	  are	  affected.	  	  
“I	  feel	  compelled	  to	  address	  the	  assumption	  within	  the	  discourse	  of	  terror	  that	  not	  everyone	  
suffers	  from	  it	  –	  ‘we’	  suffer	  from	  terror,	  ‘they’	  do	  not.	  This	  is	  a	  limited	  interpretation	  precisely	  
because	  of	  my	   contention	   that	   terror	   affects	  our	  discursive	  practices.	   The	   idea	  of	   suffering	  
has	  to	  be	  stretched	  to	  include	  not	  only	  the	  ‘victim’,	  but	  the	  ‘perpetrator’	  and	  the	  ‘observer’	  
who	  uses	  the	  language	  developing	  out	  of	  it,	  who	  participates	  in	  the	  production	  and	  use	  of	  the	  
discourse	  of	  power.”	  (ibid:	  433)	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Everyone	   who	   is	   touched	   by	   the	   narrative	   of	   the	   GWoT	   is	   affected	   by	   it	   –	   it	   has	   become	   a	  
dominant	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  world…	  and	  it	  introduces	  this	  harmful	  process	  of	  dehumanizing	  and	  
making	  invisible	  the	  other	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  mass	  killing	  becomes	  acceptable	  and	  impersonal.	  Indeed,	  
one	  might	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  discursive	  creep	  wherein	  complete	  nationalities	  (or	  other	  identity	  
groups,	  religious	  or	  ethnic)	  are	  rendered	  invisible	  and	  dehumanized.	  Thus,	  air	  strikes	  killing	  hundreds	  in	  
Iraq,	  Syria	  or	  Afghanistan	  is	  seen	  as	  business-­‐as-­‐usual	  in	  the	  West	  because	  it	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  GWoT.	  
Ideological	   binarism	   empowers	   certain	   power	   relations	   which	   give	   a	   clear	   structure	   to	  
international	   relations	   privileging	   certain	   materially	   powerful	   actors	   –	   who	   pursue	   that	   binarism	  
accordingly.	   This	   does	   not	   necessarily	   suggest	   that	   the	  GWoT	  narrative	  was	   adopted	  with	   the	   cynical	  
intention	  of	  recreating	  uneven	  power	  constructs	  by	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies.	  Instead	  one	  can	  look	  
to	  Derrida	  for	  explanations	  of	  how	  binaries	  are	  adopted	  as	  a	  way	  to	  create	  discursive	  stability	  so	  we	  can	  
better	  understand	  our	  world	  and	  operate	  within	  it	  –	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  those	  seeming	  stable	  binaries	  
are	  problematic	  (and	  often	  hidden).	  	  
The	   discursive	   positioning	  meant	   to	   create	   discursive	   stability	   in	   conditions	   of	   narrative	   auto-­‐
immunity	  by	  recourse	  to	  binaries	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  chained	  signifiers.	  (Derrida	  1978)	  A	  particular	  concept,	  
which	   is	   problematic	   and	   unstable	   because	   of	   its	   insubstantiality	   (or	   its	   auto-­‐immunity	   when	  
substantiated),	   is	  made	   to	   seem	   stable	   by	   reference	   to	   a	   chain	   of	   other	   descriptive	   binary	   concepts.	  
Dutta	  discusses	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  civilization/terrorism	  binary	  –	  which	  is	  central	  
to	  the	  GWoT.	  It	  is	  also	  connected	  to	  how	  Afghanistan’s	  identity	  is	  situated	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  GWoT.	  
Afghanistan’s	  assigned	  identity	  as	  a	  ‘failed	  state’	  (and	  the	  concurrent	  reinforcement	  of	  norms	  of	  
successful	   statehood	   privileged	   in	   liberal	  models	   of	   statehood)	   is	   understood	   in	   reference	   to	   specific	  
articulations	   of	   sovereignty.	   Yet	   sovereignty,	   as	   a	   concept,	   is	   unfixed	   and	   attempts	   to	   naturalize	   /	  
stabilize	   it	   create	   a	   condition	  of	   auto-­‐immunity	   –	   one	   cannot	  hold	   supreme	  and	  unconditional	   power	  
while	   also	   conditioning	   it	   with	   the	   necessity	   of	   legitimate	   authority!	   The	   problematic,	   referred	   to	   by	  
Derrida	   and	   Weber	   among	   others,	   requires	   reference	   to	   other	   binaries	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   create	   a	  
condition	   of	   discursive	   stability	   that	   functionally	   stabilizes	   particular	   norms	   of	   sovereignty	   without	  
addressing	  those	  self-­‐destructive	  tendencies	  within	  the	  concept.	  	  
Understanding	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	   failed	  state	  seems	  to	  explain	  how	  and	  why	   it	  does	  not	  have	  a	  
sovereign	   identity.	   Yet	   asking	   questions	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   statehood	   in	   this	   context	   can	   only	   be	  
answered	  by	   further	   reference	   to	  other	  chained	  signifiers	  –	  binaries.	  This	  draws	  us	   into	  conversations	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about	   the	   Global	   War	   on	   Terror	   and	   civilization	   versus	   terrorism.	   Conceiving	   the	   GWoT	   in	   terms	   of	  
civilization	   versus	   terrorism	   is	   intrinsically	   connected	   to	   and	   empowered	   by	   binaries	   discussed	   in	   this	  
project:	   civilized/savage	   and	  Western/Oriental.	   So	   understanding	   state	   failure	   and	   sovereignty	  within	  
the	  wider	  context	  of	  the	  GWoT	  relies	  on	  these	  discursive	   legacies	  that	  emanate	  from	  interventions	  on	  
Afghanistan	   that	   occurred	   two	   centuries	   ago.	   In	   order	   to	   stabilize	   discursive	   understandings	   of	  
sovereignty	  and	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  failed	  state	  we	  are	  unwittingly	  referencing	  conceptions	  of	  Afghanistan	  
that	  empower	  and	  justify	  a	  kind	  of	  cultural	  subjugation	  and	  marginalization	  as	  explicated	  in	  this	  project’s	  
empirical	  chapters.	  	  
Afghanistan	   is	   situated	   as	   a	   tactical	   space,	   wherein	   geopolitical	   or	   ideological	   conflicts	   are	  
carried	  out	  –	  it	  is	  not	  an	  actor	  or	  a	  place	  with	  character	  –	  it	  is	  simultaneously	  victim	  and	  villain	  and	  thus	  
can	   be	   neither.	   (See	   Cold	   War	   typfications,	   but	   also	   think	   of	   Dutta’s	   conversation	   on	   silencing	   of	  
victimhood	  in	  terrorism.)	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  savage	  land,	  where	  the	  rules	  of	  civilization	  don’t	  apply	  nor	  are	  
they	   understood.	   Afghanistan	   has	   Oriental	   attributes,	   wishful	   of	   mimicking	   Western	   civilization	   but	  
incapable	  –	  implying	  the	  need	  for	  a	  sort	  of	  paternal	  project	  from	  the	  West	  to	  caretake	  and	  develop	  that	  
Oriental	  culture.	  Afghanistan	  has	  no	  identity,	  or	  an	  indeterminate	  identity,	  or	  an	  identity	  which	  means	  
one	  thing	  at	  one	  time	  and	  another	  thing	  at	  another	  time.	  	  
All	  of	  these	  are	  indicative	  of	  one	  side	  of	  the	  sets	  of	  binary	  oppositions	  identified	  and	  discussed	  in	  
this	  thesis.	  These	  binary	  oppositions	  are	  not	  about	  the	  opposing	  terms	  as	  such.	  They	  are	  explanatory	  of	  
tensions	  internal	  to	  central	  concepts	  in	  the	  Afghanistan	  as	  failed	  state	  narrative	  while	  working	  to	  defer	  
any	   confrontation	   of	   those	   tensions.	   Deferral	   is	   the	   only	   way	   to	   stabilize	   those	   concepts,	   and	   the	  
stability	  of	  those	  concepts	  is	  deemed	  of	  high	  importance	  as	  they	  both	  fill	  up	  Afghanistan	  with	  meaning	  
but	   also	   stabilize	   particular	   conceptions	   of	   the	   meaning	   of	   what	   it	   is	   to	   be	  
successful/sovereign/Western/civilized.	  
Implications  for  further  study  
This	  dissertation	  used	  discourse	  analysis	   to	  reveal	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  our	  “knowledge”	  about	  
Afghanistan	  is	  more	  a	  set	  of	  negative	  spaces	  than	  actual	  knowledges.	  Certain	  binary	  tropes	  have	  been	  at	  
play	   over	   time.	   Those	   tropes	   both	   empowered	   a	   continuance	   of	   this	   assumption	   of	   knowledge	  
(overlaying	   the	   actual	   indeterminacy	  of	   an	  Afghan	   character)	   and	   are,	   in	   themselves,	   self-­‐destructive.	  
This	   imposed	   indeterminacy	   has	   been	  more	   reflective	   of	   the	   specific	   self-­‐image	   of	   interveners	   during	  
episodes	  of	  intervention	  than	  reflective	  of	  anything	  inherent	  or	  specific	  to	  Afghanistan.	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The	  effect	  of	   this	  has	  been	   to	   render	  Afghanistan	  unhearable	  and	   indecipherable.	  This	   silence	  
not	   only	   strips	   away	   Afghan	   agency	   (from	   a	   Western	   perspective)	   but	   empowers	   an	   indeterminate	  
malleability.	   Because	  Afghan	   is	   silent,	   powerless,	  without	   character	   it	   is	   also	  malleable	   –	   defined	   and	  
redefined	   in	   reference	   to	   the	   intervener’s	   needs	   which	   are	   themselves	   informed	   by	   self-­‐image	   and	  
geopolitical	  externalities.	  Making	  those	  episodic	  assumptions	  creates	  blind	  spots	  in	  our	  knowledge.	  It	  is	  
to	   be	   hoped	   that	   this	   dissertation	   has	   upset	   those	   comfortable	   assumptions	   about	   Afghanistan	   and	  
Afghan-­‐ness	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  allows	  for	  fundamental	  rethinking	  of	  what	  we	  think	  we	  know	  about	  the	  
Afghan	  character.	  
Where	  does	  that	  leave	  us?	  There	  can	  be	  no	  denying	  that	  Afghanistan	  is	   in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  deep	  
and	  enduring	  crisis	  and	  this	  project	   in	  no	  way	  advocates	  the	  kind	  of	  disengagement	  undertaken	  at	  the	  
end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   intervention.	   	   The	   current	   discursive	   context	   justifying	   the	   intervention	   in	  
Afghanistan,	   however,	   has	   now	   been	   demonstrated	   to	   recreate	   and	   reinforce	   crisis	   conditions.	   It	   is	  
beyond	  the	  purview	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  suggest	  a	  cause	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  current	  political	  and	  humanitarian	  
crisis,	  but	   it	   is	  hard	   to	  overlook	  a	  historical	   complicity	  on	   the	  part	  of	   first	  Britain	  and	   then	   the	  United	  
States.	   Rather	   than	   condemn	   the	   West,	   however,	   it	   would	   be	   far	   more	   useful	   to	   use	   this	   historical	  
deconstructive	   analysis	   as	   a	   way	   to	   learn	   and	   “do	   better”.	   If	   the	   United	   States	   and	   its	   allies	   are	  
committed	   to	   the	   defense	   of	   –	   necessarily	   vaguely	   defined	   –	   humanitarian	   and	   political	   rights	   in	  
Afghanistan,	   this	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   current	   path	   cannot	   be	   continued	   upon.	   Any	   attempt	   to	   move	  
forward	   in	   Afghanistan	   –	   any	   attempt	   to	   “save”	   Afghanistan	   requires	   that	   Afghanistan	   no	   longer	   be	  
assigned	  a	  persona	  of	  determined	  indeterminacy.	  	  
We	  also	  see	  that	   the	   interpretation	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  empty	  of	  meaning	  and	   indeterminate	   in	  
nature	   is	   integral	   to	   how	   the	   West	   conceives	   of	   itself	   in	   the	   context	   of	   liberal	   understandings	   of	  
statehood.	  This	  suggests	  that	   in	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  Afghanistan,	  there	   is	  a	  need	  to	  reconsider	  how	  
and	  why	  Afghanistan	   is	  conceived	   in	   these	  particular	  ways	   in	  regard	  to	  statehood.	  Why	   is	  Afghanistan	  
assumed	  to	  be	  a	  particular	  state	  of	  particular	  character?	  How	  and	  why	  were	  its	  borders	  decided?	  Where	  
does	   this	   Afghan	   identity	   come	   from,	   and	   how	   and	   why	   was	   it	   externally	   imposed	   on	   the	   people	  
inhabiting	  those	  borders?	  
Western	  objectives	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  its	  conditions	  of	  “victory”	  must	  be	  reconsidered.	  Why	  a	  
coalition	  of	  Western	  powers	   headed	  by	   the	  United	   States	   can	  be	   justified	   in	   this	  Afghan	   intervention	  
requires	  reconsideration	  outside	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  failed	  state	  discourse.	  Nor	  can	  a	  meaningful	  future	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for	   the	   people	   and	   polity	   of	   Afghanistan	   be	   worked	   toward	   if	   Afghanistan	   is	   primarily	   seen	   as	   the	  
ground-­‐zero	  tactical	  space	  in	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror.	  	  
Up	  to	  now,	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  name	  given	  to	  a	  political	  space,	  but	  from	  the	  Western	  perspective	  it	  
has	   never	   had	   effective	  meaning.	   Afghanistan	   does	   not	   need	   to	   continue	   to	  be	  Afghanistan,	   because	  
there	  is	  no	  Afghanistan.	  That	  being	  the	  case,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  a	  state-­‐building	  project	  in	  Afghanistan	  
can	  be	  more	  constructively	  seen	  as	  a	  project	  to	  create	  Afghanistan	  where	  before	  nothing	  existed.	  This	  
must	   have	   profound	   implications	   –	   is	   it	   right	   for	   the	  West	   to	   decide	   how	   to	   create	  Afghanistan?	  Are	  
there	  legitimate	  stakeholders	  within	  Afghanistan	  who	  should	  have	  a	  say	  in	  Afghanistan’s	  identity	  rather	  
than	  just	  the	  complexion	  of	  state	  organs	  it	  adopts	  within	  the	  dominant	  liberal	  state	  framework?	  Could	  
there	  be	  many	  Afghanistans?	  Is	  there	  another	  way	  that	  the	  space	  conceived	  of	  as	  Afghanistan	  might	  be	  
politically	  arranged	  –	   in	  a	  project	   that	   is	   inclusive	   to	   internal	  Afghan	   identities	   that	  have	   to	  now	  been	  
marginalized	   and	   ignored	   –	   which	   does	   not	   rely	   on	   a	   state-­‐building	   project	   intended	   to	   reinforce	  
Western	  conceptions	  of	  self?	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